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PREFACE
This study is an attempt to show that economic planning is 
the characteristic which unifies the many and ofttimes disparate 
writings of institutional economists. There will be no attempt to 
include all economists who might be considered as institutionalists. 
Rather, attention will be centered on six of the best known Amerioan 
institutionalists— Clarence E. Ayres, John M. Clark, John R. Commons, 
Walton Hamilton, Wesley C. Mitchell, and Rexford G. Tugwell.
These six economists devoted the major portion of their academic 
careers to the teaohing and practicing of economics, but none kept 
within any traditionally prescribed limits. In their teaching car­
eers, they specialised in many other fields before turning to eco­
nomics, including medieval history, sociology, philosophy, and law.
All led quite active lives in non-aeademio activities, especially in 
various governmental commissions, and all were prolifio writers.
They were distinguished teachers, writers, and active practitioners 
in the field of economios, and honored as such, both by their fellow 
economists, and by other social scientists. Thus Commons was elected 
to the presidency of the American Economio Association, the National 
Consumers League, and the National Monetary Association; Mitchell 
also served as president of the American Economic Association, the 
Amerioan Statistical Sooiety, and the Econometric Society; Clark 
likewise served as president of the Amerioan Economic Association and 
Ayres as president of the Southwestern Science Association. Both 
Ayres and Clark served on the editorial board of the American Economio 
Review. In addition to these many positions of honor, they held many 
important positions of trust. Tugwell, for example, served as Gover-
ii
iii
nor of Puerto Rico for five years, and all six held many important 
posts as advisors and consultants to various governmental commis­
sions* A more detailed biographieal summary of these six economists 
is to be found in Appendix A at the end of this study.
I am indebted to Professors David M. Harrison and Paul A. Varg 
for a careful reading of the manuscript and for many helpful criti­
cisms and suggestions, and to Professor Herbert S. Parnes for his 
assistance and advioe -while this study m s  in its embryonic stage.
I particularly want to thank Professor Robert D. Patton for his gen­
erous and wise oounsel throughout the development of this study. And 
for her constant encouragement and infinite patience, a very special 
vote of thanks is due my wife, Eyvonne.
Materials which were not available in the library of The Ohio 
State University were graciously made available at the library of 
Columbia University.
I also wish to thank the publishers and authors for their kind 
permission to quote at length from the following copyrighted works: 
John A. Commons from Legal Foundations of Capitalism and Institution­
al Economics, Its Plaoe in Political Economy by John R. Commonsj 
John M. Clark from Preface to Sooial Economics by J. M. Clark; C. E. 
Ayres from The Problem of Economio Order and The Industrial Economy, 
Its Technological Basis and Institutional Destiny by C. E. Ayres; 
Rexford G. Tugwell from Amerioan Economio Life and the Means of Its 
Improvement by Rexford G. Tugwell and others; The University of North 
Carolina Press from The Theory of Economic Progress by C. E. Ayres; 
The University of Kansas Press from The Development of Collective 
Enterprise edited by Seba Eldridge; Columbia University Press from 
Economio Reconstruction: Report of the Columbia University Commission
iy
edited by Robert M. Maclver; the Beacon. Press from Reconstruction 
in Philosophy by John Dewey; the Viking Press from The Portable 
Veblen edited by Max Lemer; Harper and Brothers from Contemporary 
Economic Thought by Paul Homan; Appleton-Century-Crofts from The 
Trend of Economics edited by Rexford G. Tugwell; the Macmillan Com­
pany from The Economics of Collective Action by John R. Commons; 
Augustus M. Kelley from The Backward Art of Spending Money and Other 
Essays by Wesley C. Mitchell; The American Political Soience Associa­
tion from MThe Pragmatic Approach to Polities," by George H. Sabine 
in The Amerioan Political Science Review.
I wish also to thank the editors of the following journals for 
their kind permission to quote at length from the numerous articles 
by the six economists -with which we are concerned* The American Eco­
nomic Review, The Journal of Political Economy, the Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, The Southern Economic Journal; The Southwest Review,
The Journal of Philosophy and the Journal of Social Philosophy.
May, 1955
, MV "
Kendall P. Cochran
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CHAPTER I
'WHAT IS INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
Introduction
This study is an attempt to show the unifying characteristics of
a seemingly heterogeneous and diverse group of economists who appear
to many to have no central them© except that they are commonly labeled
as institutionalists.^- Or as Professor Paul Homan put its
The numerous proponents of the institutional approach 
to economics differ so markedly in their views con­
cerning the purpose, content and methodology of in­
stitutional eoonomios and the bonds of spiritual 
unity among them, engaged as they are in diverse and 
vaguely related tasks, are so intangible that the use 
of the term school is justified only if the loosest 
meaning is attaehed to it.*
It is the thesis of this study, however, that there is one character­
istic which all these economists share: an effort to convert eoonomios 
into a tool for the conscious control, improvement, and reform of the 
economic system; and further, that this conoern for eoonomic planning 
and reform is not fortuitous, but is the logical result of their com­
mon views and assumptions on various aspects of eoonomios and related 
social scienoes. This study, then, is in direct contrast to the posi­
tion taken by Homan when he said that
An institutional economics differentiated from other 
eoonomios by discoverable criteria, is largely an in­
tellectual fiction, substantially devoid of content.
This group of economists has also been variously labeled as "gen­
etic ," "evolutionary," "social," "collective," and "holistio." Since 
the term "institutional" is probably more widely understood, and cer­
tainly more widely used, we will oonfine our labeling to it.
2Homan, Paul T., "Economics— The Institutional School," The En­
cyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. V., p. 388. — ——
1
2Fifteen years ago it was a faith, and to this faith 
I assign important historical consequences. The 
faith m s  that an adequate organon of eoonomic thought 
oould be achieved by the accumulation of data and anal­
ysis of it in terms of an evolutionary process.®
Professor Homan goes on to add that while he would not deny the im­
portance of the institutionalists, “they have not ereated an insti­
tutional eoonomios."
The thesis presented here is that Professor Homan, and others who 
hold similar views, are quite wrong in such an appriasal of institu­
tional eoonomios. In fact, the view advanced above would more closely 
define the German Historical School than it would institutionalism.
But to hold that the institutionalists "have not created an institu­
tional eoonomics. . • differentiated from other economics by discover­
able criteria" is to misunderstand what institutional eoonomics is and 
what it has attempted to do. Part of this misunderstanding stems from 
a quite common attempt to take Thorstein Veblen's famous article, "Why 
is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?",^ as the cornerstone of in­
stitutionalism. 1?hile the oonoept of evolution plays an important 
role in their thinking (and which will be examined in greater detail 
in a later chapter), institutionalism is much more than the mere "accum­
ulation of data and analysis of it in terms of an evolutionary process." 
It is the purpose of this study to isolate and define the unifying 
characteristics which do Justify the use of the term "school."
3Boman, Paul T., "Institutional Economics," ABR, March, 1932, 
pp. 106-107.
4QJE, July, 1898; reprinted in The Plaoe of Soienoe in Modern 
Civilisation (New Yorks B. W. Huebsoh, 1919) and also in the Port­
able Veblen (New Yorks Viking, 1948).
3Soope of the Study
This study is to be an intensive examination of the writings of 
several economists who are generally regarded as institutionalists. 
Almost exclusive reliance will be placed upon the writings of these 
men, rather than upon what others have said about them* Many notable 
and worthwhile studies of these men have been made, treating them, 
however, as individuals.5 It is the objective of this 3tudy to show 
that a high degree of unity exists among their writings on several 
major points, centering in the need for economic planning; this study 
will therefore attempt to tie these threads together into a whole doth.
  Darwinian Institutionalism (Albu­
querque: University of New ifexioo tress, l9S$). in his work,' Gaxnbs 
attempts also to find the "genuinely identifying badge of institution­
alism." He contends that "what seemed to hold Veblen and his various 
followers together is an unreoognized premise rather than an overtly 
acknowledged principle.... That premise is the one of coercion in 
economio affairs." (pp. 11-12.) While Gambs is quite correot in detect­
ing this premise in the work of the institutionalists, this premise 
is hardly the major unifying characteristic of a different school of 
eoonomios. Another way of recognizing the existence of eoonomic coer­
cion is to deny 1hat there is free competition and equal opportunity. 
This of oourse is not a new charge to be levelled at the American 
economy. As we will see later in this study, the recognition of eoo­
nomic coercion is Indeed an important tenet in the writings of these 
economists. But it is not the major basis for finding unity in their 
various and diverse writings. It is merely one of the premises whioh 
leads to iheir central oonoern for economio planning and reform. This 
same criticism would also have to be applied to Professor Hamilton who 
contends -that the major unifying characteristic of institutionalism Is 
its emphasis upon change and evolution in the economio system. This 
too is an important attribute of institutional eoonomios, and it could 
safely be said that it, more than their concern for economio coercion, 
differentiates institutionalism from other branches or sohools of eoo­
nomios. The thesis presented her, however, is that the institutional­
ists having adopted the view whioh Hamilton so ably presents, went a 
step further, and argued that eoonomic change is subjeot to intelligent 
control and direction.
4The economists to be included are Clarence E. Ayres, John HU 
Clark, John R. Commons, Walton Hamilton, Wesley C. Mitchell, and 
Rexford 3. Tugwell. These six economists have been chosen because 
they have, over a period of some four decades, written rather exten­
sively in an attempt to evolve a science of economics suitable for the 
twentieth century. There are other institutionalists who perhaps 
could be included: Morris Copeland, Joseph Dorfman, Allan Gruchy,
Abram Harris, to name a few. They, however, have confined their writ­
ings primarily to an analysis of institutionalism, about other insti­
tutionalists, or have devoted themselves to particular institutional 
studies. While their writings are an important contribution to the 
literature of the field, they have not, with few exceptions, made what 
could be considered as original contributions to institutional econom­
ics. They will therefore be excluded except for an occasional illus­
trative reference.
Although Thorstein Veblen is generally regarded as the founder 
of this school, he differed sufficiently in his outlook and general 
conclusions to warrant exclusion from this study. As we noted above, 
the main thesis which unites these economists is their concern for 
economio planning, for the collective use of our sooial intelligence 
to improve and reform the economic system, veblen, on tie other hand, 
had no faith in the ability of sooial oontrol to make the present system 
work. The present system was too shot through with "imbecile institu­
tions,” institutions whioh simply furthered the power and prestige of 
individuals at the expense of the well-being of the community-at-large. 
Thus, somewhat contrary to his evolutionary point of view, and quite
6
Of., for example, Mitchell, Wesley C., "Political Science, Polit­
ical Economy and Values— Discussion,” AER, Papers and Proceedings,
March, 1944, p. 48.
5contrary to his reiterated insistence on the continuity of culture, 
he came to the conolusion that the only salvation for society lay in 
overthrowing the present institutional fabric. Always the oynio, 
nearly always bitter, Veblen found the only hope for a better tomor­
row in the elevation of the engineers and technicians over the cap­
tains of finance and the absentee owners, both of whom were quite dis­
pensable. Thus, in one characteristically Veblenian discussion of the 
mutual interdependence of the various factors of production:
It is true, of course, that the man-power without 
the due equipment, material resources, and teohnioal 
direction, will come to naught as a creative force.
So will also these other factors in the case without 
man-power, duly trained. By itself any one of them 
is of no account, but each is Indispensable in the 
combination. It is only in team-work, duly balanced, 
that these things become creative industrial forces.
The only dispensable factor in the case is the owner.
Charging that the owners and captains of finance specialize in "indus­
trial sabotage," that they were dedioated to the "conscientious with­
drawal of efficiency," Veblen concluded that "it is no longer prac­
ticable" to leave the control of modem industry
in the hand of business men working at cross pur­
poses for private gain, or to entrust its continued 
administration to others than suitably trained techno­
logical experts and production engineers without a com­
mercial interest.8
The modem industrial economy, Veblen argued,
is a meohanically organized structure of teohnioal 
processes, designed, installed, and conducted by 
these production engineers. Without them, and their 
constant attention the industrial equipment, the mech­
anical applianoes of industry, will foot up to just so
7
Veblen, Thorstein, Absentee Ownership and Business Interests 
in Recent Times (New York: B. W1. !&ueb3oii, 1923), p. 289. — — —
Q
Veblen, Thorstein, The Engineers and the Price System (Hew York:
B. W. Huebsoh, 1921), p. 58.
much junk. The material welfare of the community 
is unreservedly bound up with the due working of 
this industrial system, and therefore with its un­
reserved control by the engineers, who alone are 
competent to deal with it.”
It will not suffice to modify or to ameliorate. The modern industrial
system has so outgrown the eighteenth-century system of vested rights,
the business man is so purposefully wasteful and inefficient, that
... any businesslike control of production and dis­
tribution is bound to run more and more consistently 
at oross purposes with the community's livelihood, 
the farther the industrial arts advance and the wider 
the industrial system expands.
There was nothing which could save the old order. The sooner we gave
up the control of industry by business interests and turned it over to
the industrial engineers and technicians, the sooner we could abolish
industrial sabotage end turn the industrial system to account for the
welfare of the whole oommunity.
The more recent institutionalists, though tremendously influenced 
by Veblen in many respects, did not take the dismal outlook that he 
eventually adopted. It was their belief that the present system eould 
be made to work for the welfare of society. And it is this conoem for 
economio reform, and eoonomic planning to effect that reform, whioh un­
ifies this group of economists. It is the purpose of this study to 
show how they oarne to that conclusion, and what the premises and assump­
tions are whioh do lead to that conclusion, for only when taken in its 
total context, do the various strands of the institutional school come 
to be understood and appreciated. Most of the criticisms of institu­
tional eoonomios are criticisms of the minutiae} they are often criti­
cisms from a quite different set of assumptions. As Veblen criticized
7the critics of Marx:
Except as a whole and exoept in the lights of its 
postulates and aims the Marxian system is not only
not tenable, but it is not even intelligible. A
discussion of a given isolated feature of the sys­
tem (such as the theory of value) from the point of 
view of elassical eoonomics is as futile aB a dis­
cussion of solids in terms of two dimens ions.
It is my hope that this study will show the unified and comprehen­
sive view of institutionalism •whioh I believe to exist, to show that
the minutiae and details are related to each other, and that when 
taken together, they do form a larger and more consistent pattern.
The genuinely Identifying Badge of Institutionalism
If institutional eoonomics is more than the mere "accumulation 
of data and analysis of it in terms of an evolutionary prooess," what, 
then, is its "genuinely identifying badge"? Is there a common phil­
osophy, methodology, and purpose which unites this group of econo­
mists? Is there, in short, an institutional economies? Each of these 
economists with which we are concerned has attempted to answer these 
questions in numerous articles and books. But the usual reaction on 
the part of other economists is that while these various works are 
interesting, they do not form a part of a larger patterns that they 
are each independent of the others exoept for a few common points of 
view, the most obvious of whioh is that the institutionalists are crit­
ical of orthodox economic theory, but that they have not built any 
great body of theory to replaoe that of which they are critical.
This criticism, however, misses the point of what institutionalism 
is and what it has attempted to do. It is oertainly true that these
veblen, Thorstein, The Plaoe of Science in Modern Civilization 
(New York: Viking, 1919), p. 410.
economists are critical of orthodox economic "theory. But it is not 
a criticism which was undertaken solely for the delight of tearing 
down a venerable and respectable body of thought; it was certainly 
not mere iconoolasm for the sake of iconoclasm. These economists ex­
amined orthodox theory and found it wanting; they therefore set about 
both to critioize it and also to begin laying the foundations of a dif­
ferent kind of eoonomics. But Rome was not built in a day and neither 
was institutionalism— nor was orthodox economics, for that matter.
Over a period of nearly a half-century these men have been attempting 
to reconstruct eoonomic theory. It has not, however, been a minor 
attack on the periphery of orthodox eoonomics for it has been the con­
viction of these economists that to meet the needs and problems of the 
twentieth century a rather thorough revision was mandatory.
This, however does not answer the charge that the institutional­
ists have not built a great body of "theory to replace that theory whioh 
they have criticized. This charge of course can mean several things.
If it means that the institutionalists have not aped what the orthodox 
economist has come to define as theory (and that is what such a charge 
usually implies), then the charge is quite correct. Institutionalism
is oertainly not price theory; neither is it, in the words of John R.
Commons,
the deductive method...of the classioal or orthodox 
eoonomios which rested upon the isolated assumption 
of self-interest /£& whioh^ complexities are elimin­
ated because a single assumption is isolated. This
method finds the single cause in the assumption re­
gardless of the time factor. 2
In contrast to the rigid and timeless logic of orthodox eoonomios,
12Commons, John R., The Economics of Collective Action (New York: 
Macmillan, 1960), p. 124.
Commons takes a much broader view of what economic theory actually 
should be:
...as we proceed with our investigation, we have a 
changing hypothesis, taking in new factors or re­
tiring older ones, always seeking to make less uto­
pian the utopias which our minds oonstruct. Thus 
theory becomes, not only a mental process for in­
vestigation of facts, but becomes also an interpret­
ation, correlation, and expectation of facts.
Bather than ereot a newly refined body of what Is traditionally ac­
cepted as economic theory, the institutionalists have turned their 
attention to solving what has seemed to them to be the more import­
ant problems in the functioning of the economy; that is, they con­
ceived eoonomics as being a functional tool for the direction, oon- 
trol, and improvement of the economy, rather than the logioal deriva­
tion of the implications of a given set of assumptions (or as Commons 
views it, of a single assumption). This is perhaps why Gambs finds it 
difficult to evaluate the "monographic atomism" of the institutional­
ists:
because one soarcely knows how to evaluate methods 
whioh, though of great utility in meeting day-to-day 
problems with day-to-day solutions, make no import­
ant theoretical contributions.1*
It is difficult because the institutionalists * conception of eoonomic
theory differs from that which has been traditionally accepted.
Just what is economic "theory" has been defined by several of 
the institutionalists. Professor C. E. Ayres, for example, holds that 
"the function of economic theory...is to take cognizance of the sooial
1 5
Commons, John H., Institutional Eoonomios, Its Place in Pol­
itical Economy (New York: Macmillan, 1934) , p. 734.
14Gambs, op. clt», p. 82.
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needs of the day."'*’® And Rexford Tugwell in similar language says 
that
theory is a product of the thought process; and, 
if we may assume that thought is not merely random 
mental activity but is always the attempt to resolve 
some difficulty, we may then go on to a definition 
of theory as sustained thought about some difficulty 
of praotioe. Theory arises because of the inadequa­
cies of the customary way of managing affairs.
And, according to J. M. Clark,
Economio theory should be actively relevant to the 
Issues of its time and it should be based on a found­
ation of terms, conceptions, standards of measurement, 
and assumptions which is sufficiently realistic, com­
prehensive, and unbiassed to furnish a common meeting 
ground for argument between advocates of all shades of 
oonviotion on practical issues....
The oenter of theoretical interest at present is in 
price economics. If theory is to take its proper 
place, the oenter of interest must be shifted and 
price economics must become a subordinate part of soc­
ial economics.^
The institutionalists, then, are agreed that economio theory should 
be actively relevant to the current problems, to the social needs of 
the day, that it arises because of the inadequacies of customary ways 
of meeting problems, and that it should "contribute soientically to 
eoonomic reform." And if economio theory and economic praotioe are 
to achieve these various goala, they have insisted upon the need of a 
thorough over-hauling with respect to basio assumptions, scope and 
methodology. Does this mean that the institutionalists are completely
15Ayres,C. E., "The Function and Problems of Eoonomic Theory,"
JPE, January, 1918, p. 85.
16
Tugwell, Rexford 8., "Economio Theory and Practice," AER, March, 
1923, p. 107.
^Glark, J. M., "Economio Theory In an Era of Social Adjustment," 
AER, March, 1918, pp. 280, 282.
18
Clark, J. M., "Toward a Concept of Sooial Value," Preface to 
Sooial Economics (Farrar & Rinehart, 1936), p. 53. — — — — —
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dissatisfied, with, orthodox eoonomics, and that they have set about 
to evolve a totally new and unrelated approach? We cannot give a 
categorical answer to that question, for the degree to which they in­
dividually acoept or reject orthodox economics varies from individual 
to individual. Generally, they are in agreement as to the incomplete­
ness of orthodox economics, especially its attempt to read all economic 
matters into the horoscope of prioe. Walton Hamilton has given a rath­
er detailed account of his view of what is eoonomic "theory” and why 
institutional economics alone meets the necessary criteria. We might, 
then, summarize at length from his views:
The "institutional approach" doubtless has some im­
portance beoause it is a happy way to acceptable 
truth, but its significance lies in its being the 
only way to the right sort of theory. An appeal for 
"institutional economics" implies no attack upon the 
truth or value of other bodies of eoonomic thought, 
but it is a denial of the other systems of thought 
to be economic theory.*..
The claim of value economios to the dignity of "eco­
nomio theory" is not lightly to be put aside. In 
common speech it is recognized as "economic theory."
... Yet its claim must be disallowed. Its merits are 
due to a failure to recognize the complexity of the 
relations whioh bind human welfare to industry..•• 
"Institutional economics" alone meets the demand for 
a generalized description of the eoonomic order. Its 
claim is to explain the nature and extent of order 
amid eoonomic phenomena, or those concerned with in­
dustry in relation to human well-being ... Such an 
explanation cannot properly be answered in formulas 
explaining the processes through which prices emerge 
in a market. Its quest must go beyond sale and pur­
chase to the peculiarities of the economic system 
which allow these things to take plaoe upon particu­
lar terms and not upon others. It cannot stop short 
of a study of the conventions, customs, habits of 
thinking, and modes of doing whioh make up the scheme 
of arrangements which we call the "eoonomic order."
Hamilton goes on to list five tests which he holds any body of economic
doctrine whioh aspires to the name of economic theory must meet:
1. Eoonomic theory should unify economio science.
12
2. Eoonomic theory should be relevant to the mod­
e m  problem of oontrol. ... If institutional 
eoonomics has a relevancy which neo-classical 
eoonomios has not, it is beoause problems have 
ohanged.
S. The proper subject-matter of eoonomic theory is 
institutions. If it is to be german® to the 
problem of oontrol it must relate to changeable 
elements of life and the agencies through whioh 
they are to be directed. Such elements of life 
and dlreotive agencies are alike institutions.
4. Economio theory is oonoerned with matters of 
prooess. ... Value theory deals with its pheno­
mena as if they were physically complete, inde­
pendent, unchangeable substances. ... We need 
constantly to remember that in studying the 
organization of economio activity in general 
as well as in particular, we are dealing with 
a unified whole which is in prooess of develop­
ment.
6. Eoonomic theory must be based upon an accept­
able theory of human behavior. ...
In the past eoonomios has been fortunate in using a 
theory of oonduct in harmony with the general 
thought of the age. It has been unfortunate in tak­
ing this unconsciously from the common sense of the 
times rather than arriving at it by oareful observa­
tion and analysis. This has led to a disposition to 
preserve it as part of a traditional body of dootrine 
long after it had oeased to have meaning to those who 
had looked at it too critically.
In this rather lengthy observation Hamilton makes at least two points 
worthy of emphasis at this time. The first is "if institutional eoo­
nomics has relevancy which neo-classical economios, has not, it is 
beoause problems have ohanged.” This, I think, would find general 
agreement among the institutionalistsj that is their criticism of 
orthodox eoonomios would be not so much that it is wrong, as that it 
is no longer applicable or relevant. It would be a fuirtless task to 
modify or refine the orthodox analysis. In the opinion of J. M.
19"The Institutional Approaoh to Eoonomic Theory," AER, Maroh, 
1919, pp. 309-517 passim.
IS
Clark,
Instead of starting with static doctrines and modify­
ing them to allow for dynamic elements, it seems to 
me necessary to start with the static premises and 
revise them.20
The issue of statics versus dynamics will be considered in greater 
detail later, but the important point here is that the institution­
alists do not conceive their task as merely refining the traditional 
economlosj in faet, they would hold that therein lies one of its major 
faults, that it has been refined for too long and hence is no longer 
applicable.
The second point of Hamilton's to consider is his test that "eoo- 
nomic theory should be relevant to the modern problem of control.n 
This test would of course bring sharp disagreement from many economists, 
but not from the institutionalists for that is the major unifying char­
acteristic of institutionalism— the attempt to oonvert economios into a 
tool for the direction and control of the eoonomic system. And this 
also explains, to some extent, why there is and can be serious disagree- 
meat among economists as to the plaoe of institutionalism in economics—  
or even of its claim to be eoonomics (’maybe sociology, but not econ­
omios..."). To many economists, economics simply is not concerned with 
the problem of control or of planning. They conceive economios to be
"the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between
21ends and scarce means whioh have alternative uses.” Or as "the study 
of the principles governing the allocation of scarce means among com­
peting ends when the objective of the allocation is to maximise the
20
Clark, J. M., Ibid., p. 323.
21Bobbins, Lionel, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of 
Economic Soienoe, second edition (London: Macmillan, 1949), p. 16™.
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attainment of ends.” And Boulding defines economic theory as "a 
body of general principles and a discipline of logic whioh may be 
applied to the interpretation of all eoonomic problems, past or 
present.”2® Viewed from any of these definitions, then institution­
alism is indeed a controversial departure. It is not the task of 
this study to debate the issue of whether or not the institutional­
ist approach is better than the traditional one. Thatis for each 
economist, or would-be economist, to decide.
This concern for economic planning and reform does not suggest 
that institutionalism does not have a bodyof theory, for it does; but 
it does suggest that it is a theory of a different kind than that of 
traditional price theory. It is basically a method of approach, based 
on a certain set of generalizations or assumptions, which is concerned 
primarily with how to provide for the welfare of the oomrauni-ty-at- 
large. Their theory stems from the pragmatism or instrumentalism of
C. S. Peirce, John Dewey and William James, and is ooncemed with know­
ledge for the sake of action, rather than an attempt to uncover the
24universal and immutable laws for -which Boulding is seeking. It is, 
then baBed on philosophical and psychological assumptions whioh differ 
markedly from those on whioh orthodox theory is based. And it is these 
assumptions which make institutionalism a quite different body of 
thought; it is the examination of these assumptions which is the
A A
Stigler, George, The Theory of Price (New York: Maomillan, 
1947), p. 12.
^Boulding, Kenneth E., Eoonomic Analysis (New York: Harpers, 
1941), p. 8.
^For a more complete treatment of the influence of pragmatism 
and instrumentalism on the institutionalists, see Chapter Five, be­
low.
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primary purpose of this study*
Institutionalism takes as its basio assumption that the function 
of the economio system is to provide, in the highest degree possible, 
for the welfare of the population as a whole. This assumption would 
probably not be denied by most economists. The distinction, however, 
would arise when the question is raised as how this is to be achieved. 
The institutionalists deny that this goal will be achieved by the 
automatic workings of supply and demand, free competition, laissez- 
faire— or any other set of natural laws, whether taken individually or 
eollectively. Instead, they view the economy as a social institution 
which, is governed by the existing state of the industrial arts oper­
ating within a given institutional structure, and, which is subject to 
human control.
Thus, with the eoonomic system conceived as a social or human 
phenomenon rather than a congeries of natural laws and natural forces 
which are not to be tampered with, the institutionalist denies what 
is perhaps the most important tenet of orthodox theory— -the efficacy 
of the market mechanism as the organizing force in the modem indus­
trial economy. Traditional economics has made exchange value the cen­
tral feature of its analysis rather than the oonduciveness of industry 
to the community’s material welfare. And quite rightly so, when we 
assume that the way to achieve the highest level of material well-being 
is by means of the market mechanism wherein a vast sum of individuals 
are seeking their own self-interest, individuals who are conceived as 
being equal and The are "by nature" lazy, selfish and rational. But 
if these premises are dropped, then the alternative is to approach the 
problem from a different direction, and that is what the institutional­
ists propose to do. The institutionalists view consumption and produo-
16
tion, the economio system itself, as a part of a larger develop­
mental prooess, that is, the community life-process. And in view of 
the faot that that prooess is indeed going on, we are confronted with 
the alternatives as stated by Barbara Wooton: "Plan or No Plan"j
that is to say the alternative of planless or planned, vegetative or 
intelligent, growth and development. If the alternative chosen is an 
intelligently planned growth or development, and this is the one these 
economists have ohosen, then they insist that this directing, control­
ling, planning, must be based on a wider and more modern understanding 
of our highly complex and interdependent industrial economy than that 
provided by orthodox price analysis.
What, then, is their central theory— their "discipline"? To par­
aphrase Professor Girvetz:
^Institutionalists/1’ have been loathe to present blue­
prints. Good architects do not plan the details of
a structure until they know the site on which it will
be built. Dootrinaires and dreamers may quarrel about 
the outline of Utopiai wise men will consider the
problems at hand. Accordingly, the method of the
^^Institutionalists^ is tentative rather than final, 
experimental rather than authoritarian, pragmatic 
rather than dogmatic.26
And Professor Dorfman, long a student of institutional eoonomios,
has said that:
In concluding, I simply want to say that I think that 
succeeding generations will make contributions to in­
stitutionalism, for as long as our economy is a grow­
ing one, there will be need for "analytio description" 
and adjustments of policy. The current period is one 
of consolidation of gains.... However, an era of in­
flexibility of theory may againooour, and then onoe 
more there will be vigorous protest, doubtless under 
a different name than that of institutionalism. 26
n g
Girvetz, Harry K., From Wealth to Welfare, the Evolution of 
Liberalism (Stanford: Stanford tJniversiiy Press, 1656), p. 250.
26Dorfman, Joseph, "Institutional Economios— Discussion," AER, 
May, 1951, p. 81.
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Institutional economics is seen to be tentative, exploratory, exper­
imental; "theory" is more of the nature of an approaoh to eoonomio 
problems, rather than a given and eternal set of prinoiples. A more 
precise statement of what institutional economics is, will emerge
during the course of this study.
Forecast of -the Thesis
Stated very briefly, it is the thesis of this study that this 
group of economists has one major characteristic in common: the view 
that economics should be converted into a tool for the conscious oon­
trol, improvement, and reform of the existing economic system. The 
major portion of the 3tudy will be devoted to an examination of the
unifying assumptions and points of view which led these economists to
this concern for economic planning and reform. These assumptions and 
premises were in large part a product of the intellectual, social, and 
material environment of the twentieth century, which a3 David Hamilton
has so well demonstrated, is at variance with the conditions under
27
which orthodox economics was nurtured.
It has been recognized by many that the institutionalists were
concerned with or interested in eoonomio planning and reform. Richard
Teggart, for example, in his critioal study of Veblen, noted that
even the recent survey of modem eoonomics made by 
the Hungarian economist fails to appreciate the ex­
tent to whioh Veblen’s dialectical subtleties have 
contributed toward a current tendency of thought 
which pretentiously links the name of science with 
suggestions and demands for the sooial oontrol of 
eoonomic activity.2®
27Hamilton, David, op. oit.
23
Teggart, Richard V., Thorstein Veblen. A Chapter in American 
Economio Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press,1932) Uhi- 
versity of California publications in Eoonomios, Vol.XI, No.l, p. vil.
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And Joseph Dorfman, in a somewhat friendlier spirit, pointed out 
that
In general the institutionalists stood for social 
control and the need for a more realistic under­
standing of the functioning of the economy in order 
to make intelligent adjustments.^
And in a similar vein, Gambs noted that
Their interest in the present and the past is 
primarily to help them shape the future. The light 
of their knowledge usually focusses upon the possi­
bilities of aotion, of public oontrol of business, 
of social and economio planning.®0
Likewise, Gaetan Pirou, the French economist recognized that
Classical eoonomics is the corollary of an auto­
matic economy. Institutionalism is the oorollary 
of a planned eeonomy. It is therefore conneoted 
to the experimental and pragmatic eclecticism of 
the beginning of the twentieth century.31
And Kenneth Parsons, a close student of Commons, summed up what he 
considered to be Commons' main contribution whan he stated that Com­
mons
has been attempting to work out a theory of econ­
omios which shall be adequate both for the analy­
sis of eoonomio problems and the guidance of soo­
ial aotion in resolving the difficulties.32
With one exoeption, however, there has been little more than such
passing references to this facet of institutional eoonomios. That one
29Dorfman, Joseph, "Institutional Eoonomics— Discussion,” AER, 
Papers and Proceedings, May, 1951, p. 81.
30
Gambs, op. cit>, p. 71.
22  ^ /
, piirou, Gaetan, Les Noveaux Gourants De La Theorie Eoonomique 
Aux Etas-Unis, Tome— IIs L' Economic Institutionelle (Paris: F. Lov- 
iton & Cie«, 1939), p. 2l7j translation mine.
go
Parsons, Kenneth, "John R. Commons' Point of View," in Com­
mons, John R., The Eoonomios of Collective Aotion (New York: Macmil­
lan, 1950), p. %42; reprinted by permission from The Journal of Land 
and Public Utility Economios, August, 1942. "' '
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exception m s  an article of Professor Gruchy's: "The Concept of Ra­
tional Planning in Institutional Eoonomios,"®® whioh, while expand­
ing on the theme of planning as viewed by the institutionalists, does 
not adequately explore the background, the assumptions and generaliza­
tions, whioh form the basio framework for such an outlook*
It may be questioned whether any one institutional economist ever 
held without qualification the thesis as present in this study. .And 
the obvious answer of course would be that none did. There is no in­
tention in this study to imply that all of these economists agree with 
all the points that will be raised. Just as there are many differences 
among the orthodox economists, there is nevertheless a recognizable and 
unified body of thought, and so also is the case with institutional eco­
nomics* There are many points and ideas which these economists have 
discussed whioh are not included in this studyj and no attempt has been 
made to include every side of every issue. It is simply the aim of this 
study to show that there is a consistent and unified body of thought 
whioh warrants the title "The Institutionalist School of Economios," 
rather than a dissident and heterogeneous group of institutionalists.
In so far as possible the study will rely on direct quotations in 
order to let each of these economists speak for himself on the various 
issues and topics. Ity role is simply to have detected what appears to 
be a unifying framework and then to put their writings into that frame­
work. Whether that framework exists and whether these economists fit 
■that framework is, of course, for the reader to deoide.
S3Gruohy, Allan G., "The Concept of National Eoonomio Planning in 
Institutional Eoonomics," Southern Economio Journal. October, 1939.
CHAPTER II
THE ECONOMY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ECONOMIST 
The Function of the Eoonomio System
An important aspect of institutionalism is what the economic system 
is, its function or purpose, and how well it achieves this funotion.
The institutionalist takes a rather instrumental view of the relation­
ship between himself as an economist, the science of economics, and the 
economic system itself. He generally conceives himself to be, not an 
idle bystander— a disinterested observer— but rather, an active partic­
ipant in the functioning or non-functioning of the economic system. It 
is thus that he views economics as "the attempts of thinkers ... to come 
to grips with the problems of their times." Taking a genetic or evolu­
tionary view of the economy, he views it as being in a constant state of 
development within which new problems arise -which consequently require 
readjustment— readjustment not only within the economic system, but 
within the science of economics itself. It was from this point of view 
that J. M. Clark gave his evaluation of Adam Smith:
The most important thing to preserve is the thing -which 
gave his thought its power and vitality; namely, its 
grasp on the interests of his time to which the institu­
tions of the time gave inadequate opportunity and ex­
pression. And since these interests and institutions 
have changed greatly in a century and a half, our answer 
must correspondingly change....
Tugwell, Rexford G., "Experimental Beonomios," The Trend of Eoo- 
nomics, ed. by RexfordG. Tugwell (New York: Appleton-Gentury-Crofts, 
1924}, p. 412.
^Clark, J. M., "Adam Smith and the Currents of History," Preface 
to Social Economics, (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1936), p. 1§2.
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Since the interests and institutions have changed greatly, these econo­
mists insist that the older, traditional, economics is no longer appli­
cable. Thus it m s  that Ayres pointed out that
It is this kind of problem— problems resulting from in­
stitutional obstruction— that gives rise to economic 
planning. The over-all problem of economic planning is 
one of institutional adjustment. ... The progress of 
science and the industrial arts is continually altering 
the physical patterns of social life so as to produce 
situations contrary to the institutional practices of 
the community.®
And so it is, Ayres thinks, that among the various circumstances which 
led to the formation of institutional economics as a "new conception" of 
the economic system, "one has been concern for the actual functioning of 
the economy."" This concern for the actual functioning of the economic 
system plays a major role in the thinking of these economists and an ex­
amination of this concern necessarily involves the question of what they 
consider to be the purpose or function of the economic system, how well 
that function is being fulfilled and how, if it is not being fulfilled 
adequately, the situation could be improved.
To begin with, they take a rather broad and inclusive view of the 
productive process. It is not in their view merely the grinding out of 
goods a^d services by an automatio mechanism. It is, rather, an integral 
facet of the total social mileu; it is an exceedingly complex and involved 
technological and institutional process; it is, however, subjeot to human 
control and direction.
Basically, they conceive it to be the conflict, or the lack of oon-
Ayres, C. E., The Industrial Economy, Its Technological Basis and 
Institutional Destiny (Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1952), p. 192.
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gruiiy, between these technological and institutional characteristics
which are responsible for malfunctionings in the economic system. Thus
it was that Mitchell pointed out that the business cycle is dependent
upon a "particular scheme of institutions" and our understanding of that
5
institutional scheme is therefore deemed to be of primary importance. 
Elaborating upon the importance of the institutional and technological 
aspects of economic activity for economic analysis, Professor Ayres 
argued that
If the productive potency of our society constantly 
threatens to overflow its distributive arrangements, the 
complete explanation of that situation must eventually 
take account of the dynamic character of technology it- 
selfj and if the distributive arrangements of our society 
fail to adjust themselves to prodigious gains in produc­
tive efficiency, the complete explanation of that aspect 
of the case must take account of the static character 
which our institutions share with all of their kind.
In Tugwell's opinion, it is the insistence upon such vestigal institu­
tions as "competition, on voluntarism, and on the sacredness of the right
of each to do as he sees fit with the property to which he holds title"
7
which stands in the way of an effective coordination of industry. If 
we are to achieve this effective coordination of industry, Tugwell in­
sists that
we need, as a point of departure, a description of going 
industry rather than a traditional attitude. Only when 
we substitute a real picture for the ideal one do we 
reach a workable basis either for understanding or for 
reorganizing effort.
g
Mitchell, Wesley C., Business Cycles; The Problem and Its Setting. 
(New York: National Bureau of Economic Researoh, 1927), p. 6l.
6Ayres, C. E., "The New Economics," The Southwest Review, Summer, 
1948, p. 227.
7
Tugwell, R. G., The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts. 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), p. 137.
8Ibid., p. 143.
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It is this substitution of a more realistic understanding of our modem,
our highly dynamic, industrial economy for a "traditional attitude"
which the institutionalists are attempting. This industrial prooess is,
in the view of Walton Hamilton, "dynamic, erratic imperative"; industry
"moves, situations change, industrial custom takes a new form." Hence,
Public policy can employ no single method of attaok.
Industries are moving at various tempos in different 
directions. ... The national economy is an intricate 
affair; the attack upon its disorders must go forward 
case by case.^
Such being the case, Hamilton argues that "The ta3k of keeping industry 
the instrument of the commonwealth is as arduous as it is everlasting."^ 
The institutionalists are in general agreement that the economic 
system, as it has operated in the past several decades, has not always, 
indeed, has rarely, produoed the goods and services of which it is cap­
able; nor has it distributed this limited amount as equitably as it could 
and should. Thus, Hamilton remarks that we
can hardly escape the conclusion that the economio 
order yields far lessof the wherewithal of the living, 
leisure, and opportunity than even as a minimum we have 
the right to expect from it. It has served us none too 
well, is only partially under our control, and still 
presents a turbulence that awaits the domesticating 
touch of the future.
ind Mitchell in similar fashion, holds that the economic system is sub­
ject to further criticism
if the test of efficiency in the direction of economic 
activity be that of determining what needs are most
^Hamilton, Walton, The Pattern of Competition, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1940), pp. 81, 82, 96.
10
Ibid., p. 99.
■^Hamilton, Walton, and Associates, Price and Price Policies (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1938), p. 2.
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important for the common welfare and satisfying them 
in the most economical manner.... For, in nations where 
a few have income sufficient to gratify trifling whims 
and where many cannot buy things required to maintain 
their own efficiency or to give proper training to 
their children, it oan hardly be argued that the goods
which pay best are the goods most needed.
This criticism of the market mechanism for failing to determine what
needs are most important for the common welfare is, in many respects,
similar to J. M. Clark's argument in connection with his concept of over­
head costs: that the cost to society of supporting labor does not vary 
with their output, and yet, according to "our customary system of wages," 
this fixed cost is translated into a variable cost to the firm, to be in­
curred if it is profitable. If large numbers of firms lay off labor be­
cause it is not profitable to hire them, Clark thinks that "socially
13
speaking, this is a fallacy; a pecuniary fiction." The market mechan­
ism, in other words, does not operate so as to determine which needs are 
the most important and then satisfy those needs in the most economic 
manner.
A theory of economics should, according to Tugwell, include what is
the goal of the industrial system, what ought it to be directed toward.
It is from this instrumentalist attitude and the disconcerting events
that have taken place in the economic system, that these new views and
attitudes about the economic system have arisen:
a notion of industry as one sooial mode of functioning 
to be devoted henceforth to new ideals. Industry ought 
perhaps to supply the world with goods, but equally 
important, it ought to supply its workers with a good 
life.... It ceased to be a matter of urgency whether 
some individual enterprises were protected in their
12Mitohell, Business Cy-oles, p. 172.
13Clark, J. M., "Some Social Aspects of Overhead Costs," ABR, March, 
1923, pp. 55-56.
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rights; what was more important was the efficiency 
with which the organization fulfilled its social 
functions.-*-4
Mitchell likewise views production as not merely the "process of making
goods, but also as a set of human activities in which the workers are
being cramped or being developed." Such being the case,
economics will lay less stress upon wealth and more 
stress upon welfare. Welfare will mean not merely 
an abundant supply of serviceable goods, but also a 
satisfactory working life filled with interesting 
activities. At present welfare thus conceived is 
rather vague,, but it is capable of being made objec­
tive and definite in reference to such matters as 
food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, eduoation,
fatigue, leisure.
As a further illustration of their broad and inclusive view of the eco­
nomic process, Professor Ayres holds that
The whole idea of an economic system is contingent 
on the assumption that production and distribution 
coincide and are different aspects of one and the 
same thing.15
It is from this point of view that Ayres asks the question whether it 
is to "the interest of industrial society for two-thirds of the popula­
tion to be ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed." And it should be noted 
that this question is asked, not as an interested humanitarian, but as an 
eoonomist who is directly concerned about the effective functioning of 
the economy. It is in the same manner that Mitchell insists upon includ-
14Tugwell, R. G., "Human Nature and Social Economy," The Journal of 
Philosophy, August 14, 1930, pp. 454-455; see also, Tugwell, "Human ” 
Nature in Economic Theory," JPE, June, 1922, p. 332.
IB
Mitchell, W. C., "The Prospects of Economics," The Backward Art 
of Spending Money and Other Essays (New Yorks August M. Kelley, 1950J, 
p. 381; reprinted by permission of Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 
from The Trend of Economics, ed. by R. G. Tugwell, 1924.
16
Ayres, C. E., "The Principles of Economic Strategy," The Southern 
Economic Journal, April, 1939, p. 467.
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ing the goal of a satisfactory working life, and Tugwell stresses that 
industry ought to supply its workers with a good life, and Clark holds 
that
Individuals may be so poor that they literally cannot 
afford to conserve their health, but the nation is 
never so poor as these poorest individuals, either in goods 
or in the range of policies and expedients which are open 
to itj hence it can afford to conserve health where the 
individuals themselves cannot and can set a higher money 
value on it than individuals are in a position to do. '
From the above it will be seen that these economists take a rather 
broad and at the same time a rather critical view of the functioning of 
the economy. To them the economy is not a vast impersonal market where­
in the forces of supply and demand operate to satisfy consumers' wants, 
to allocate soaroe resources among unlimited consumers' desires. It is 
rather a social or cult\iral phenomenon, the product of many historical 
influences, which molds men as well as goods, which satisfies some needs 
and neglects others— others which these economists hold to be more 
important than some that are satisfied. It has failed to provide even 
the minimum of living, leisure and opportunity which it should have pro­
vided. The institutionalists are convinced that the economic system as 
it has operated has not made full use of its productive resources and 
capacity, that from a social point of view, there is a persistent trend 
away from the optimum use of its resources. Their economics, then, is 
concerned primarily with the efficiency of the whole system, and an effi­
ciency measured not in terms of business profits but in terms of the 
broader aims of society.
They insist that economists must concern themselves with peoples'
■^Clark, J. M., Social Control of Business (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1939), p. 159.
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wants and needs, with ends, and not confine themselves to an analysis of
economic mechanisms. Orthodox economics assumes that the economic
mechanisms are themselves neutral hut the institutionalists insist that
these mechanisms are not neutral for they hold that the market is biased
and that if the economist limits himself to a study of the market he is
accepting that bias. They argue that the economist cannot limit his
study to the organization of economic forces by the single agency of
price or to measure human ends solely by their expression through the
price mechanism. As J. M. Clark has summarized it, the function of the
economic system is to serve the interests of human beings, but
Price is one agency for furthering that purpose,
and those interests which command a price are the ones
served by the system of private enterprise. ... If we 
are to judge the effectiveness with which the function 
is being performed, and the success of the system of 
private enterprise in performing it, we shall stultify 
the inquiry if we do not contemplate the whole function, 
and include all the interests, whether they command a 
prioe or not. ... If we see no interests except those 
which command a price, we are hardly in a position to 
make a searching scrutiny of the adequacy of price as
an agency for the furthering of interests. 8
It should be noted that Clark takes as a basic premise that the economist
is to judge the effectiveness of the economic system, that the economist
should make a "searching scrutiny" of how adequately the interests of all
human beings are being met. He does not, in other words, take the price
system as one of his "givens."
Another major point of agreement about the economic system is the 
view of the role of competition. The degree to which competition does or
no
Clark, J. M., "The Relation Between Statics and Dynamios," Preface 
to Social Economics, p. 216; reprinted by permission of The Macmillan 
Company from Economic Essays in Honor of John Bates Clark, ed. by Jacob 
Hollander.
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does not prevail is of course a perennial theme among economists of 
various leanings. It should be noted, however, that the institution­
alists are not interested solely in whether we have a competitive system, 
or to what extent monopolistic elements have encroached upon that system, 
or the best m y  to rid the economy of such elements. The orthodox econo­
mist generally looks upon competition as being the regulator of the eco­
nomic system; it is in his view the primary means to be relied upon to 
achieve justice and harmony in the industrial order. Any deviation from 
competition is therefore suspect. The institutionalists on the other 
hand take a rather dim view of its effectiveness as a regulating or co­
ordinating mechanism. Clark, for example, thinks that it is a "serious
question" whether competition "can continue to work with dominating effect
19under the changing conditions of large-scale industry."
In The Pattern of Competition, Hamilton insists that the problem of 
competition must be examined from a "practical" rather than an "academic" 
standpoint. He argues, and would of course not receive much opposition, 
that the concept of pure competition is a thing of the mind rather than 
of the eoonomic system, it is "more a creature of intellectual method than 
of industrial reality." These academic exercises are, in Hamilton's view, 
for those "whose delight it is to turn a handful of postulates into an 
articulate system; they well serve persons who must have their truths 
simple, rovmd, and universal." Hamilton excludes himself from this latter 
group, and asks instead, "can our economy be described in terms of competi­
tion?" "Is competition an effeotive instrument of order and justice which 
a society can use at its will?" "Or is it, after all, a great myth by 
■which we reconcile ourselves as best we can to a business system which
19Social Control of Business, p. 141.
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goes its own ■way?” Hamilton thinks that the latter explanation is the
nearer the truth, that the competitive system no longer prevails and to
conceive of the economic system in suoh terms is only to delude ourselves;
it is the "great apology." In an earlier work Hamilton discusses the
evolution of competition as a regulating device, pointing out that
In its heyday competition was regarded as the one way of 
industrial order— not a mere scheme of human arrangements.
It was the product of the great organizer which shaped all 
wealth to social ends. Its omnipotence was first challenged 
by the invocation of the state to maintain the conditions 
essential to its successful operation. ... Once a part of 
the natural order and an affair for the gods, it has come 
under the dominion of man. As industry becomes the concern 
of human beings and of public policy, the way of its control 
descends from the absolute and the imponderable to the con­
crete and the specific.^l
Hamilton does not believe that competition as such has ceased to exist
or that it ever will, "competition among persons, goods, industries,
ideas, institutions and cultures" will always remain. He does argue,
however, that the 19th century concept of competition as the omnipotent
regulator of economic activities is no longer valid.
The important point is that they insist that competition has failed 
to achieve that which it m s  theoretically supposed to achieve— hamony 
and justice. They insist that the importance of economic power, or 
"coercion” as Gambs has named it, is not only negleoted, but is not 
even given a place in orthodox analysis. Thus Ayres holds that whereas
20
Hamilton, W., The Pattern of Competition, pp. 4-5; cf. also, Hamil­
ton, "Competition," The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. V, 
pp. 141ff.
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Hamilton, W., Price and Price Policies, p. 22.
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Hamilton, W., "Competition," The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Vol. V, p. 147.
23See Page 3, above.
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capitalism is a "power" system,
the key to a sound economy is not power but production.
In effect, the old economics declared that no one need 
concern himself about production. Competition for 
pecuniary gain— that is to say, for economic power—  
would take care of that.24
The orthodox economist would of course agree that the key to a sound 
economy is production, but would argue that the way to obtain this produc­
tion is to permit the businessman to compete for profits. Ayres, however, 
insists that what this really means is to give the businessman freedom to 
exercise his power to achieve his individual goals without interference 
or restraint (or at least a minimum of interference or restraint). The 
institutionalist sees this individual businessman as being concerned, not 
so much with the balancing of marginal costs and marginal receipts, as 
with how to increase his sphere of control over a vast range of situa­
tions— political as well as economic. He is concerned with interlocking 
directorates, with how to get Jones appointed head of the Public Housing 
Commission since Jones is opposed to public housing, or how to get Smith 
on the Federal Power Commission since Smith is opposed to federal power 
developments, or how to remove Brown from the Bureau of Standards because 
Brown insists on testing a new "Youth-Restorer" in the laboratory rather 
than in the market. He sees the businessman as being content to more or 
less follow the general practices in business operations, operating more 
or less by rule of thumb. The businessman is less concerned with the 
actual costs involved in a union’s demand for higher wages than with the 
relative division of power that will result if the demand is met. It 
should be recognized of course that orthodox economics has taken note of
OA
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such problems, especially in the last few years. The institutionalist, 
however, insists that such treatment still regards this activity as 
atypical, that so long as economic analysis is rooted in the analysis of 
price and the workings of the market mechanism, it cannot adequately 
cope with such problems.
Commons especially has concentrated on such problems as these in 
great detail. His emphasis on transactions as being the crux of economic 
analysis is based on the idea and the existence of very complex power 
relationships existing throughout the economy. So long as economio 
activity is conceived as being the result of bargaining between two indi­
viduals who are equal, then economic power or coercion will not arise 
since competition will prevent its being utilized by either party. Com­
mons insists, however, that such a conception does not do justice to the 
modern industrial economy. Thus he pointed out that
Adam Smith, in basing his economic theory on the legal 
rights of the individual to liberty, equality, and 
property, strongly opposed both Corporate and regula­
tive/7 forms of concerted action. As against them he 
set up an impersonal, quasi-mechanical competition 
which controlled individuals in their bargaining.25
Such a reliance upon competition is no longer applicable Commons holds 
for it ignores one very important aspect of the problem. For competi­
tion to achieve the ends which it is supposed to achieve, the necessary 
condition is that such competition be between equals. Commons points 
out that Smith, and the courts, and most economists since Smith’s time, 
have assumed that the only source of inequality was political. That is 
to say, that if individuals were free and equal in the eyes of the law9
25Commons, J. R., ’’Bargaining Power," Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, Vol. II, p. 459.
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if no one person were granted special privileges or another person 
special liabilities, then the two would be equals. Commons argues, how­
ever, that this ignores one very important and pervasive source of in­
equality, namely, economic power or coercion:
The trend in economic history is no longer the old 
laissez faire, or ’let alone," in human activity.
Now it is becoming evident that the choice lies in 
the degree of power of an individual confronted with 
choosing an alternative— a double choice which is the 
all-inclusive founda.tion of modern economics. 26
It is for these reasons that Commons holds that the basic unit for in­
vestigation in economics is the transaction, and it is also why he dis­
tinguishes three kinds of transactions: bargaining, managerial and ration­
ing, which differ according to the economic and the political status of 
the individuals involved. Thus bargaining transactions (those which are 
the concern of orthodox economics) may take place between individuals who 
are equal before the law, but who have very unequal economic power. Com­
mons centers his analysis on the concept of power beoause, as he sees it, 
property today has come to mean economic power; it has come to mean not 
merely to hold for one's own use, but "the right to withhold from others 
what they need but do not own. "^
Thus, with legal power to withhold commodities and ser­
vices finally recognized in law, reasonable restraint of 
trade, according to the court's ideas of reasonableness 
but contrary to the anti-trust laws, comes to have a stand­
ing in law; and its equivalent bargaining power, or intangi­
ble property, comes to have a standing in economics. For
Commons, J. R., The Economics of Collective Action (Hew York: 
Macmillan, 1950), p. 39.
27Commons, "Bargaining Power," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Vol. II, p. 460.
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restraint of trade jLs bargaining power.
Commons concludes therefore that
The term "property" cannot be defined except by defining 
all the activities which individuals and the community 
are at liberty or required to do or not to do, with refer­
ence to the object claimed as property.
This of course implies that both liberty and freedom (economic power) are
aspects of property; or the converse, that property is the source of both
liberty and freedom (economic power). Liberty, according to Commons,
means the absence of physical (legal) restraints, while freedom means the
ability (i.e., the "power", including the economic power) to proceed— the
30
existence of opportunities. Commons makes much of these aspects of 
property for to him they are essential problems relating to the role of 
competition. "If competition were always ideally free, as assumed in the 
working hypotheses of non-institutionalists, then there would be no mea­
surable difference between competition and choice of opportunities." 
Competition, however, is not always ideally free, and Commons is concerned 
therefore with
the sooial opportunities owned, controlled, or withheld 
by other individuals, in a world where there is no 
equilibrium at -the cost of reproduction simply because 
there is not perfect freedom, perfect equality, or per­
fect promptitude of competition.®"-
The point seems to be that Commons is not interested in analyzing
28
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the profit maximication of individual firms in a powerless vacuum where­
in competition will work for the benefit of all and where if competition 
does not exist it should be reinstated. He does not seek to find the 
understanding of the economy in the forces of supply and demand opera­
ting to raise or to lower prices in an impersonal market. He is, rather, 
concerned with the very complex power relationships which in fact do 
exist, power relationships which stem from economic and political inequal­
ities which are manifested in bargaining, managerial, or rationing trans­
actions. He is interested in the "collective action in control, libera­
tion, and expansion of individual action"j he is concerned with the 
"economic collective aots of private concerns /vihicl\jf are at times more 
powerful than the collective action of the political concern, the State.
Professor Ayres has a somewhat similar view of the problem of power 
in the modern economy. As noted earlier, he holds that the modem capi­
talist system is in fact a power system— not an efficient organization 
for production, and production he insists is the key to a sound economic 
system. He takes rather serious issue with the modern orthodoxy, namely, 
monopolistic competition theory and its ability to handle suoh problems.
He noted in a recent book that the problem of bigness
is not a matter of price equilibrium at all. It is a 
struggle for power. Some economists (such as Veblen) 
and some statesmen (such as justice Brandeis) have recognized 
it as such all along. But economists in general ... do not 
as yet do so. They do not do so primarily because the clas­
sical theory of the self-regulation of the market eoonony by 
the meohanics of price equilibrium has taught them other- 
wx se••••
The so-called monopoly problem is really the problem of fin­
ancial power. It is not the degree of deviation from a
32Commons, The Economics of Collective Aotion, p 21, Institutional 
Economics, p. 70.
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theoretical ideal that makes a so-called monopoly 
dangerous.3®
He goes on to point out that as a guide to social policy— what form or 
degree of competition we should seek to maintain or to restore— , "The 
theory of monopolistic competition is valueless."3^ It is, he thinks, 
the "reduoto ad absurdum" of classical theory, for although the founders 
of classical theory based their analysis on several serious errors, they 
thought of competitive equilibrium as a desirable state of affairs be­
cause they thought that it was "natural." If, however,
any state of affairs is no more and no less natural than 
any other— if oligopoloid and monopsonistic situations 
result in price equilibrium no less than competitive sit­
uations— then it seems clear that the attainment of price 
equilibrium is not a guide to social policy, and that 
classical theory now has no answer to the question, VJhat 
kind or degree of competition should we s e e k ? ^ 5
Ayres and the other institutionalists would agree with Hamilton that 
"the task of policy is to make industry a more useful instrument to the 
community." To achieve this, however, there is a need of "more facts, 
of better analysis, of a broader grounding in reality."36 They insist 
that the polioy to make industry a "more useful instrument to the com­
munity" is not to be ascertained from such as the theory of monopolistic 
competition.
KVhat these economists are seeking is to make industry a more useful 
instrument; they are trying to understand the economy more thoroughly in
*2*2
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order to provide the knowledge necessary for the control and direction 
of it. To achieve this end, they insist that the orthodox analysis is 
insufficient, for it merely takes the given institutional and technologi­
cal situation as given and then seeks to analyze the play of the market 
forces. The institution of private property and the corollary problem 
of power is an excellent example of the difference in the two approaches. 
The institutionalist insists that the role of private property must be re­
examined in the light of present day conditions. They do not assume 
property as one of the givens and then work out the logical implications 
of such a given institutional setting under static conditions. They seek 
rather to examine the role of private property in the functioning of the 
modern economy with a view to ascertaining to what extent this institution 
is a hindrance or a benefit to the functioning of the industrial commun­
ity. As J. M. Clark has contrasted the two positions:
the earlier economics was content to ask: what is the 
justification of private properly or occasionally: what 
m s  its origin, the realistic economics asks the more 
inconvenient question: what is private property and what
is it doing?37
It is in this sense that they seek to examine the relations between 
liberty and economic power and private property, that they undertake a 
study of the problem of control versus ownership with a view to discover­
ing how it affects the actual functioning of the economic system and how 
that functioning can be improved.
Traditional economics take3 the institution of private property as 
one of the ’'givens"; it holds that economics is conoerned only with the 
allocation of scarce resources among alternative uses. Hamilton takes
37
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rather serious issue with such a viewpoint, however:
It is common among too many of us to hypothecate a world 
of scarcity in which humanity is the prisoner. Man is 
Alice in a kind of Blunderland who has to run as hard as 
he can to remain in the same place. He is a creature of 
innumerable and insatiable wants; and nature, which must 
provide the materials that minister to them, is an affair 
of scanty, even of niggardly, resources- The problem—  
which can invite nothing better than a passing solution—  
is to make the stuff at hand go as far as may be. The 
antithesis between human nature and the material universe 
is never to be resolved— for there is not enough to go 
around.
A finite world endows such a statement with a measure 
of truth; but it is far too much an economic version of 
the loss of Eden to be a well-rounded account. In an ulti­
mate sense— though it is a little early in the affairs of 
mankind to raise the question of the absolute— the material 
universe may be fixed beyond our poor powers to add or sub­
tract. It is, of course, impossible to develop human gifts 
or extract worldly goods out of stuff which does not exist.
But as yet we have made hardly a start at turning to account 
what is there; the world of nature is a reservoir upon which 
we may draw rather than a treasury which we may tuna to 
account.
Knowledge is the key to the universe. As vision is 
sharpened, knowledge accumulated, taboos broken down, ways 
of finding invented, •the world about us makes its response.
Vie know nature only as we discover and put to use the things 
it holds.
If I understand Hamilton correctly, what he is objecting to is the sole 
concern on the part of many economists with the given relationship be­
tween man's infinite wants in a finite world, whereas to him the important 
problem is man's continual efforts to overcome this relationship, to nar­
row the gap. It is of course true that we live in a finite world, and a 
world in whioh there is diminishing returns with a given technology. But 
Tugwell argues that
Those nineteenth century economists who formulated the so- 
called dismal lawsof economics, neglected the one obvious
38
Hamilton, Walton, Patents and Free Enterprise, TNEC Monograph #31, 
Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1941/, p. 170.
38
fact that "gives away the whole show." Man need not 
press upon his food supply if he wills not to and so 
can genuinely raise the levels of living; diminishing 
returns will never set in so long as man continues to 
exercise his intelligence. These economic generaliza­
tions turn out not to be natural laws at all but merely 
a statement of the conditions of life in an undeveloped 
society
Economic theory, since the time of Ricardo, has been passionately and 
painstakingly concerned with this principle of diminishing returns. 
Hamilton and Tugwell, however, are objecting to the sole obsession with 
the principle qua principle, for this misses what to them is truly sig­
nificant: the circumventing of the effects of diminishing returns. The 
resources with which orthodox economics is concerned are not "given," 
Hamilton argues; they are "not primary, but derivative. They are natural
resources in view of -the knowledge and techniques which currently we 
40bring to them." He is not willing to take either the technology or 
the institutional structure of society as one of the "givens." As he 
sees it, man's knowledge, his know-how, his tools and techniques, are 
"the key to the universe." They are the means of overcoming both the 
niggardliness of nature and the breaking down of old taboos, of outmoded 
institutions, such as the institution of private property. Thus he con­
cludes that
if the common good is to be served, an economios of 
scarcity must give way to one of abundance. The right 
of a man to his own exists within the common wealth; he 
may do as he pleases with that which is his property.
But liberty and property stop short at the line marked
39Tugwell, "Experimental Economics," The Trend of Economics, p. 391.
^Hamilton, W., Patents and Free Enterprise, TNEC Monograph #31, 
p. 171.
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41out by the general welfare.
And thus it is that the concept of and the function of the institution 
of private property must be re-examined and re-evaluated in the light of 
our modern industrial economy. This modern industrial economy is one in 
which property is important as a source of power. Property is no longer, 
as Commons has pointed out, the holding for oneself, but is the withhold­
ing from others. This distinction, according to Commons, underlies the 
difference between wealth and assets and between use value and scarcity 
value. "The distinctions are not made by customary common sense, but a 
science of economics must make the distinction," because the wealth of 
the community is increased by increasing the things useful to man while 
individual assets are increased by the scarcity of wealth.
This paradox of wealth and assets is confusing to common 
sense. But common sense has previously injected uncon­
sciously something that restricts the supply and maintains 
scarcity value. Common sense injects private property.... ^
Economic theory, however, should not unoonsoiously inject private property 
as it has traditionally conceived. If the institution of property oper­
ates so as to decrease the wealth of the community, then it is the busi­
ness of economios to show how that has happened and how the institution 
can be modified to work more efficiently.
It is obvious that the institutionalists think our economic system 
is capable of much higher levels of production, that it is not providing 
us with the standard of living of which it is capable. Thus Mitchell 
pointed out that
the inefficiency of our economic organization is not
4lIbid., p. 175.
42Commons, The Economics of Collective Action, pp. 94-95.
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limited to these transitory periods of cyclical depres­
sion. The fact is that in good times as well as in bad 
our economic organization prevents society from producing 
as large a real income as natural resources, man power, 
plant capacity, and engineering skill make possible. *
As they see it, the primary function of the eoonomio system is to provide
as high a level of production as its natural resources, man power, plant
capacity and engineering skill make possible, and if it is not fulfilling
this task adequately, then it is the function of the economist to diagnose
the ill and prescribe a remedy. It is in this sense that Hamilton asserted
that if "the common good is to be served, an economics of scarcity must
give way to one of abundance."
This view is of course quite contrary to the traditional view in eco­
nomics, that economios deals with the allocation of scarce resources among
alternative wants, lyres argues that such a "definition illustrates per-
44
fectly what is wrong with traditional economic thinking." As Ayres sees 
it, the word "scarce" has been misused in economic thinking. In tradi­
tional economics, "scarce" refers to the point of view of the individual, 
and Ayres agrees that relative to air, bread, for example, is indeed 
scarce even to the richest man. But furthermore, and more important, it 
may be disastrously scarce to the unemployed at the same time wheat is so 
disastrously abundant to the farmer that it hardly pays to ship it to the 
mill. The latter, Ayres insists, is something quite different than scar­
city to the individual; it is the social problem of over-all searcity-or- 
abundance. The essential problem according to Ayres is that of "expanding 
consumption to bring it into line with our continually more abundant pro-
43Mitchell, W. C., "Engineering, Economics, and the Problem of Social 
Well-Being," Mechanical Engineering, Vol. 53, Feb., 1931, p. 105; italics 
added.
44lyres, The Industrial Economy, p. 366ff.
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duction." This is a social problem and one for which traditional eco­
nomics supplies no answer:
It is all very well to give "scaroe resources" an indi­
vidualistic meaning. But when we make this definition 
the basis of a declaration that there is no such thing 
as an over-all problem of abundance, we are saying in 
effect that there shall be no discussion of economic 
problems except in terms of individuals. In this fash­
ion we make eighteenth-century individualism mandatory 
upon twentieth century "social" science, and in doing 
so we also invoke the whole intellectual setting of 
eighteenth-century individualism.45
Ayres argues that this traditional point of view, based on an individual­
istic orientation, misconceives the social problem with which a social 
science must be concerned. He thinks that the social economy is quite
capable of becoming one of abundance, that industrial production can be
"prolific beyond the wildest dreamsof only a generation or two ago."
The insistence that abundance is an unattainable illusion is based on a 
misconception. It is true, as many insist, that
the production of food, clothing, shelter, and the other 
necessities of life (not to mention luxuries), can never 
be sufficient to permit each of us to treat such things
"like dirt." But is that the proper way to define
abundance? As the soil conservationists are trying to 
show us, even dirt can be squandered. The proper test 
of abundance is not individual wantonness but social
availability.46
Ayres maintains that the significance of abundance is to be found in the 
social point of view and not from individual feelings of repletion. The 
significance of abundance is to be found in the fact that the "masses" 
are now able to avoid perpetual sickness; it is to be found in the tre­
mendous efficiency of these masses; in the fact that "skill, initiative, 
and responsibility which are more widely diffused than ever before; and 
this fact is a direct consequence of abundance." The fact that the great
45Ibid., p. 368.
46Ibid., p. 404.
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majority of children are now able to go through high school is due to a 
sufficient degree of social abundance to make it unnecessary that they 
work in the mines and mills. And perhaps more important is the realiza­
tion that the masses are capable of such achievements— something which 
would have been deemed impossible not too long ago when it seemed clear
that the common run were quite incapable, were "by nature" incapable of
grasping any more than the barest rudiments of education. Now, however, 
it is "clearly established that the dullness and stolidity of earlier 
generations m s  in large part a matter of dietary deficiency, lack of 
proper sleep, and hookworm." It is such social improvements as these that 
makes abundance significant and important for economics:
Abundance can be had only through the medium of social 
justice, and social justice can be had only through the
medium of abundance. Abundance and justice define each
other. It is only because this is so that the indus­
trial eoonomy makes sense. ^
And if this is the case, if it is only beoause of this that the industrial
economy makes sense, then it is the function of economic analysis to
understand that and to then make the industrial eoonomy achieve it to an
even higher degree.
The institutionalists would, I believe, take this as a basic criter­
ion by which to judge the economic system; that is the extent to which it 
does provide social abundance, the extent to which it does provide for 
the material welfare of the community at large, the extent to which it con­
tributes to the life process of the community. With this as a basic criter­
ion, they go on to point out that economics is a study of how the eoonomic 
system operates and how that operation could be improved upon so as to con­
stantly improve this primary function. It is for reasons such as these
47
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that Mitchell thinks that "on the -whole, economists have been construe-
48tive critics and would-be reformers of the economic system." And in
another place, Mitchell points out that economic life may be regarded as
the process by which a community seeks its material wel­
fare. On this view every person is a contributor to, a 
burden upon, or a detractor from, the commonweal. ...
The concept of oapital merges into the broader concept of 
resources— soil and climate, mines and forest, industrial 
equipment, public health, intelligence and general educa­
tion, the sciences that confer control over nature, the 
sciences that aid in developing body and mind, and the 
sciences that bear upon social organization.
Now our interest in economies centers in its bearing 
upon social welfare in the present and the proximate 
future. ...it is feasible even now to set up a tentative 
criterionof economic welfare, and make investigations into 
the relations between various features of economic activ­
ity as now conducted and welfare thus conceived. Such 
work may have as keen theoretical interest, as genuine 
scientific standing, as work that professes to maintain 
a serene indifference to the fate of mankind. But its 
successful prosecution on a scientific basis presupposes 
considerable knowledge of how economic processes actually 
work at present.
Elaborating upon this concept of welfare and its relationship to eco­
nomics, Tugwell insisted that the concept of welfare included "the ideas 
of progress, prosperity, and intelligent direction," the latter because
if the complex system remains unguided or guided only by 
the intermittent acquisitivism of its individuals, happy 
adjustments will come by seldom and by the merest chance, 
and in all likelihood the future of such a regime would 
hold little but intolerable intensification of the present 
pressures of civilization.
This formal dependence of society upon acquisitivism 
has led to the characterization of ours as an "acquisitive
Mitchell, "Engineering, Economics, and the Problem of Sooial Well- 
Being." Mechanical Engineering, Feb., 1931, p. 107.
49"The Role of Money in Economic Theory," The Backward Art of Spend­
ing Money, pp. 174-5; reprinted by permission from ABR, March, 1916.
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society." It is true that there is quite merciless play 
upon this rather unattractive human trait in our economic 
system. But this does not excuse economists for hiding 
aoquisitivism under a mask of productive virtue, for 
justifying what becomes a ruthless and ■unintelligent dir­
ective force in industry, leading nowhere in particular 
except to the enlargement of this acquisitivism and the 
final justification of it in our common morality.
Consideration of the fact that the directive emphasis 
in our industrial system is worse than useless— oven a 
positively pernicious— one leads directly to the whole 
problem of industrial ideals which we see economists are 
after all under obligation to understand, unless, indeed, 
they are prepared to turn this whole matter over to the 
philosophers and to content themselves with after-the- 
fact analyses of price.
Tugwell, however, will have none of this "after-the-fact" analysis of
price, insisting to the contrary.
economists are imperatively required to be social scien­
tists in reality; and this means that they are to say 
what it is the industrial system does to men and to de­
fine what it is men have a right to expect from industry.
... The directive intelligence of our time must grapple 
at once with the complexities of an industrial system 
that is straining men's natures to the breaking-point in 
its uncontrolled and juggernaut-like advance. Upon whose 
minds should this directive responsibility fall if not upon 
those specifically gifted and trained in the understanding 
of industrial philosophy and technique?®*-*
The point of these quotations would seem to be that the function of the 
economic system is to provide, in the broad sense of the term, for the 
material welfare of the community, and that given this as the basic func­
tion, then the purpose of economics and the economist is to show how 
this could be improved; but to do this, economios needs to be overhauled 
and revamped.
50Tugwell, "Human Nature in Economic Theory," JPE, June, 1922, 
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The Nature of Economic Science and the Function of the Economist
The first point to be made in this respect would be to re-emphasize 
what has been noted thus far in this chapter, for their view of what the 
eoonomic system is, what its purpose is and how well it fulfills that 
purpose is a very important part of their views on the science of eco­
nomics. They conceive the economio system to be a cultural phenomenon 
which is in a constant state of evolutionary development; they conceive 
this eoonomic system to be a product of institutional and technological 
determinants and that malfunctionings arise primarily beoause of the 
incompatibility of these institutional and technological characteristics; 
they insist that the function of the economic system is to provide for 
the material welfare of the community at large and they further hold
that this process is subject to human control and direotion; and if this
economic system is to be controlled and directed, then a new avenue of 
approach must be made for the traditional field of economics will not 
provide the answers.
It is this search for a new approach -which Commons is seeking when 
he argues that the "working rules" of corporations, labor unions, and 
governments constitute the "main subject-matter of twentieth century eco­
nomics ."
Instead of taking for granted a beneficent providence
that makes the rules, as did the early economists, the
rules themselves are investigated.... It is through a 
knowledge of working rules that modem administrative 
economics learns its mechanism of control by collective 
action.®-*-
It is through a knowledge of working rules ( w h i c h  he notes are the sub­
stantial equivalent of "institutions") that economists are able to guide,
51Commons, Economics of Collective Action, p. 129.
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control and direct, for, "today human skill and judgment must take the
place of a u t o m a t i s m . i t  is on this basis that he criticizes the
traditional assumption of ceteris paribus, which, though necessary in
abstract logic, is misleading in practice because
Nothing remains the same. When we are trying to tie to­
gether all the changing activities, we are at least try­
ing to get away from our logical fallacies of taking 
only that part that we are interested in and neglecting 
the whole that concerns everybody. The problem is to 
attain a balance between the parts which recognizes the 
strategic and proportionate relations within the part- 
whole complex.
And this is indeed a complex and difficult problem because these rela­
tionships are continually changing:
What are contributory at one point of time may become
strategic at the next point of time. ... The most
important of all investigations in the economic affairs 
of life, and the most difficult, as we shall find, is g. 
the investigation of strategic and contributory factors.
This relation of the strategic and contributory factors is an important
facet of Commons' economics for it is the strategic or limiting factors
which are basic to his conception of control by collective action. And
it is for this practical reason that the assumptions of homogeneity and
ceteris paribus have no working relevanoe for Commons.
It is in this same sense that Mitchell holds that the subject-matter 
of economics is institutions, for they are the factors chiefly responsible 
as directive agents for the forms of human behavior which are of interest 
to economics. These institutions or social habits,
like our space perceptions, have elaborate implications
52Ibid., p. 247.
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that are not immediately apparent. It is useful to 
think out their implications carefully.... Any ™ n  
who realizes that he is studying an institution keeps 
his work in historical perspective, even when he con­
fines himself to analyzing the form that the institu­
tion has assumed at a particular stage of its evolution.
By so doing he opens vistas enticing to future explora­
tion, instead of suggesting a closed system of know­
ledge, ... he is eager to profit by any light shed upon 
his problem by any branch of learning— history, statis­
tics, ethnology, psychology.
The reason why economics must keep an historical perspective, the reason 
why institutions are the main subject-matter of economics, is that eco­
nomics is concerned with the facts and the problems of economic activity 
which is in a continuous process of change and evolution. If such is not 
the case,
If economics does not attempt to explain the concrete 
facts of economic life, then all Ricardian economics 
needed was skillful exposition, the correction of minor 
lapses, and certain extensions along the original lines. 
Economic truth has been found and would abide so long as 
logic lasted, no matter what pardoxical developments 
appeared in the world of railways, centralized banking, 
trusts, and trade unions; no matter what facts the 
statisticians pressed, no matter what the anthropolo- 
gists learned or how psychologists shifted their grounds.
Since Mitchell holds that economics should attempt to explain the facts
of current economic life, he holds that the present-day extensions of
57Ricardian economics is inadequate. With a change of emphasis to a 
study of institutions and the current functioning of the economic system,
55Mitchell, W. C., "Weiser's Theory of Social Economics," The Baok- 
ward Art of Spending Money, pp. 255-256; reprinted by permission from 
the ^Political Science Quarterly, March, 1915.
^Mitohell, "The Prospects of Economics," The Baokward Art of Spend­
ing Money, p. 355.
57See, for example, his "Engineering, Economics and the Problem of 
Social Well-Being," Meohanioal Engineering, February, 1931, pp. 106-107, 
where he discusses the inadequacies of the marginal analysis.
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economic analysis will
come to a close scrutiny of the relations between our 
pecuniary institutions and the efficiency in producing 
and distributing goods ... investigations of this type 
will broaden out into a constructive criticism of that 
dominant complex of institutions known as the money 
economy— a constructive criticism which may guide the 
efforts of our children to make that marvelously flexi-co 
ble form of organizations better fitted to their needs.
And it is that "constructive criticism" of the economic system, of the 
organization of economic activity, which Mitchell deems to be among the 
primary functions of the science of economics, for his interest in eco- 
nomios oenters in "its bearing upon social welfare in the present and 
proximate future." This approach Mitchell thinks could have as "genuine 
scientific standing," and "as keen theoretical interest" as that type of 
economic theory which "professes to maintain a serene indifference to the 
fate of mankind."^ It is from this point of view that Mitchell sees eco­
nomics as part of "man’s long struggle to master his own fate," and that
seen in this perspective economic speculation repre­
sents a stage in the growth of mind at which man’s 
effort to understand and control nature becomes an 
effort to understand and oontrol himself and his
society.60
J. M. Clark also takes a rather dim view of the effectiveness of
orthodox economics to deal -with the problem of welfare and social reform:
When Marshall wrote his Principles of Economics the 
age seemed an age of self-reliant foresight beyond 
other ages, and this is the force around whioh nine­
teenth-century economics centers. The twentieth cen­
tury is an age which, beyond other ages, is aware how 
much man is molded by his environment, and is deliber-
58Mitchell, W. C., "Quantitative Analysis in Eoonomic Theory," The 
Backward Art of Spending Money, p. SO; reprinted by permission from itie 
AjBR, March, 1925.
59Mitchell, "The Role of Money in Economic Theory," The Bpckward 
Ant of Spending Money, p. 174.
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ately undertaking to control this molding process.
This fact must be a dominant note in constructive 
contributions to theory in the immediate future.
Clark argues that for the economic problems of a century ago, the study
of economics from the standpoint of individual initiative m s  supremely
relevant, but that for the problems of today, it is other phases of 
activity that claim attention; and other methods must therefore be 
employed. Thus he thinks that the growth and advances in the fields of 
scientific knowledge of mental and physical health is "working a revolu­
tion ... undermining the idea that each individual is the best judge of 
his own desires."
Ill health is not only the greatest source of defeated 
desires, but also one about which the doctor knows more 
than the patient, and the public health officer, by 
virtue of statistics, may know more than either. Thus 
the social costs of industry in disease and accident may 
be recorded and studied quite objectively in a way far
more useful as a guide to public action than is the a
priori doctrine of equality between marginal disutility 
and marginal reward.
It should be noted that the basic premise is to be "useful as a guide to
public action"; and it is thus that Clark rejects the idea that economics
should take as a basic assumption that the individual is the best judge
of his own desires, for this individual "can make nothing out of the world
that the world does not first make out of him"; nor can he "even desire
of the world save as it has taught him to desire it."
We used to think that we sought things because they gave 
us pleasure; now we are told that things give us pleasure 
because we seek them. Vie built economics on the idea of 
rational choosing, only to be told that rational choosing 
is but a small and very imperfectly developed part of our 
mental life. We thought of the self as sovereign will, in
61Clark, J. M., "Economics and Modem Psychology," Preface to Social 
Economics, p. 98; reprinted by permission from JPB, Vol. 26 (1918).
^ Ibid., pp. 98-99.
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some sense independent of the universe. Men had their 
wants, and the universe granted or denied their gratifi­
cation. Production consisted in turning out goods and 
services to suit these pre-existing mnts. Now, however, 
we find a self which is but a series of attitudes toward 
the universe; a set of tendencies to react and to see, 
whioh are themselves the joint product of certain under­
lying tendencies, developed and given their shape and 
direction by the universe outside. ...
To sum up: the quest of welfare evidently involves 
far more difficulties than can ever be surmounted by the 
mere calculating faculty of the individual. The propor­
tion as scientific research progresses, minimum standards 
of welfare will become more and more matters of social 
knowledge and less and less matters of individual taste....
The net result is that, according to Clark, man is today becoming more and
more aware of the extent to which he is molded by his environment and that
society is seeking to control this molding process, especially in view of
the increasing scientific knowledge which society has at its disposal—
knowledge which the individual can never obtain. These facts, Clark
argues, must become a "dominant note" in modern economics. And it is for
these reasons that Clark criticizes economists who
have been content to let the market decide the uses to 
which economic goods should be put. I am suggesting -that 
they make a declaration of partial independence from the 
market, which is a biased instrument for i*ecording 
values....®^
As noted above, the basic reason for declaring an independence from the 
market is that Clark believes that the individual is not the best judge 
of his desires or of what is good for him and any economic analysis which 
is concerned with "public action" which ignores this fact is to that extent 
incomplete and inadequate. Economic progress is to be had only by using 
"trial and error" as its chief tool; "it cannot be accomplished through
^3Ibid., pp. 100-104, passim.
64Clark, J. M., "Economic Principles of the New Civilization," Our 
Emergent Civilization, ed. by Ruth N. Anshen (New York: Harpers, 1947), 
p. iE9.
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the static conceptionof independent demand schedules or the statio 
’ideal1 of marginal utility."®^
Ayres in the same manner as Commons, Clark, and Mitchell proposes 
to find the meaning of the modem economy in an analysis of it as a social 
and cultural phenomenon. He notes in one place that institutional eco­
nomics proposes to find the answers to important problems and questions
in "the interplay of institutions and technology" which are the "basio
66
analytical principles" of institutional economics. It is the distinc­
tion between these two aspects of economic life which he thinks is the 
"kernel of a general theory of social and economic development." The 
purpose of economics, insists Ayres, "Is an attempt to achieve fuller 
understanding of the present social order. Such an attempt, if success­
ful, should lead to a fuller appreciation of the merits, advantages, and
68possibilities of our society." The basic point of view underlying in­
stitutional eoonomics, according to Ayres, is that economic analysis can 
provide "no universal or final answers." It does, however reveal "the 
instability of the industrial economy." This instability, however, is
an immediate and limited problem which can be solved only through "prag- 
69
matic planning," pragmatic, evolutionary, planning as distinct from 
blue-print planning.
Rexford Tugwell in similar manner insisted that the goal of economics
65
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is "through gradual and experimental change" to replace "social drift";
it is "to mold our social and economic environment so as to reap the
71largest possible rewards." Eoonomic theory and analysis, Tugwell
argued, cannot escape their "responsibility for policy. Economics is
still social economics. The test of its significance lies in the field 
72of social action." This being the case, Tugwell insists that received 
eoonomics is not relevant to our modern industrial society; it is inap­
plicable to our present-day problems of control. Orthodox economics, in 
Tugwell1s view, grew up
beside the meager turnip fields of Europe.... We are 
just beginning to see that we shall really have to begin 
all over, forming our science upon relevant facts in 
American life....Economics incontestably has got a bad 
metaphysicalodor that only a renaissance or rebuilding 
from the ground up can dissipate .73
Tugwell insists that economics must become a "body of relevant principles"
and this is why he thinks that the so-called law of diminishing returns
has "outlived" the significance or "usefulness it once may have had in
economics."^ Thus he holds that it makes little or no difference in
the work and analysis of the modem economist whether the "classical lavra
are clung to or not." The modem economist can believe them or not as
75
he wishes, "but they have no working relevance for him." It is then 
the working relevance of the principles of economics— not their logical
Tugwell, "The Superpolitical," Journal of Social Philosophy, 
January, 1940, p. 97.
71Tugwell, Our Economic Society and Its Problems, p. 541.
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truth or falsity— -which is important.
It is a similar criticism which Hamilton levels at economics since 
the time of Mill at whose hands it "became more systematic, but less 
organic." It has become "little more than a mechanical soheme...aloof 
from the passing concerns of the day." As a separate and rigid disci­
pline,
It was in position to acquire a body of traditions of 
its own which were to determine its future identity, its 
future province, and the direction of its growth. It 
was to draw to itself a group of professionals, of 
votaries who were schooled in its dogma rather than in 
the affairs of life, and who could be depended upon not 
to betray its traditions.
It is this aloofness, the disdain for the mundane matters of the worlc-a-
day world, which Hamilton finds wrong with the orthodox approach. He,
like Tugwell, thinks that orthodox economics is no longer relevant to
the problems oocurring in the economic system, especially the modern
77problem of control.
Wesley Mitchell presented a similar view of traditional economics,
holding that prior to the stimulus of VJorld War I,
eoonomics had settled into an academic discipline, culti­
vated by professors and neglected by men of action, modest 
in its pretensions to practical usefulness, more conspicu­
ous for consistency and erudition than for insight.
It was the economic mobilization for war which pointed up the necessity
for economics to turn its attention to practical usefulness, "rather than
"^Hamilton, W., "The Place of Value Theory in Economios," JPE,
March, 1918, p. 244.
77See pp. 11-12, above, for a rather lengthy discussion of Hamil­
ton's view on this point.
78Mitchell, "The Prospects of Economics," The Backward Art of Spend­
ing Money, p. 364.
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logical consistency and erudition." The -war forced to the attention of 
economists many complex problems, problems ■which required diligent and 
searching answers, answers which were not to be found within the frame­
work of neoclassical price analysis. Textbooks and treatises on eco­
nomics did have both their theoretical and applied sections, but Mitchell
argued that they were "held together by nothing more intimate than the 
79binding." It is from this deficiency that Mitchell held that
before trying to remedy the defects we may see in the 
^economic/ machine, it is well to ponder this current 
explanation in terms of marginal satisfactions and 
marginal sacrifices.80
It was his opinion "that this explanation must be improved before we shall
know enough to make the machine work as we should like." Instead of the
narrow marginal interpretation, Mitchell conceives economics to be a
broader interest in the understanding of human behavior, and as such,
"economic theory becomes part and parcel of the social psychology we are
On
gradually developing through the cooperation of all the social sciences."
And it is this broader approach to economios which Mitchell believes "will
82prove to be a vigorous organizer of working programs."
John R. Commons’ writings were quite difficult and complex and his 
criticisms of traditional economics are correspondingly difficult to draw 
out and to summarize in a few lines. This difficulty is partly due to the
79
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Being," Mechanical Engineering, February, 1931, p. 107.
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fact that he seemingly accepted a great deal of orthodox economios,
holding that it m s  to a large extent a product of early 19th century
influences and relevant to such a period, but that a twentieth century
economics is necessarily concerned with other and different issues. At
other times, however, he is rather critical of the orthodox economists,
insisting, among other things, that
they assume the very thing to be investigated and mea­
sured, namely, whether a given plan of management or 
administration is the best plan possible, under the cir­
cumstances, for the general welfare of all participants.8^
That is to say, rather than take the given institutional structure of
society as one of the "givens," Commons argues that this is one of the
84
primary areas to be investigated. It is in the same light that he 
criticizes the orthodox economics on methodological grounds. It ms, he 
thought, simply the logical deductions from a single assumption— that of 
self-interest, whereas to him, assumptions should be "devices for in­
vestigation." Their validity is established or rejected "through the
85
fruitfulness of their uses." Commons dwells at great length on the 
"individualistic" bia's of traditional eoonomics, insisting that a "twen­
tieth century" economics must concern itself with the workings of col­
lective action— the corporation, the trade union, the government. Rather 
than analyze and investigate "an individualistic human atom," this twen­
tieth century economics should concern itself with "the working rules and
83Commons, Economics of Collective Action, p. 189; of. also, Legal 
Foundations of Capitalism, pp. 136-7.
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86administrative decisions of all collective action." For the purposes 
of economics, "'society1 is not the sum of isolated individuals, like 
a census of population; it is a multiple of cooperating individuals."8  ^
The classical or orthodox conception of the sooial system, however, was
QQ
"not a society, but a population of molecules.1 It is this sooial, or
collective, point of view which Commons is attempting to establish in
economic analysis. As Kenneth Parsons has pointed out,
Essentially, Commons has been attempting to work out a 
theory of economics which shall be adequate both for the 
analysis of economic problems and the guidance of social 
action in resolving the difficulties. /%&/ shares in the 
deep faith of pragmatists (or instrumentalists) generally 
in the possibility of human intelligence for working out 
the problems of social conduct. 9
It is only from such a point of view as this as to the function of eco­
nomics, that Commons' criticisms of the orthodox analysis is to be under-
*
stood. It is because he conceived of economics as furnishing the founda­
tion for control and guidance of the economic system, that he criticized 
others for "assuming the things to be investigated," for limiting eco­
nomics to the logical deductions from a single assumption, for their 
individualistic orientation. It m s  in this same sense that he took 
Professor W. I. King, "a logical mathematical economist," to task for 
confusing the "law" of supply and demand with the "logic" of supply and 
demand.
It is not "law"; it is a part-whole fallacy. Any one
86Commons, "Twentieth Century Economics," Journal of Philosophy.
Vol. V, p. 33.
87Commons, Eoonomics of Collective Action, p. 132.
88Commons, Institutional Economios, p.225.
89
Parsons, K., "John R. Commons' point of View," Eoonomics of Col- 
lective Action, pp. 342-3.
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principle of similarity, when isolated from all others, 
such as the law of supply and demand, can be carried out 
logically to its inevitable disaster. This is not eco­
nomic law; it is economic logic, regardless of time and
circumstances.90
The point is that the main objection to all collective action," whether 
against protective tariffs, against immigration restriction, against 
labor unions, or against corporations," has been interference with the 
law of supply and demand." Commons, however, argues that this is an argu­
ment against the logic of supply and demand, which depends on other things 
being equal. The important point for economics is that
these interferences have nevertheless been repeated and 
cumulated for a hundred years, because the alternatives 
of noninterference under the circumstances were deemed 
worse than the interferences.
Public programs and policies, social experiments generally, "can not be 
evaluated in terms of 'the logical consequences of isolated assumptions." 
Instead, Commons insists they "must be judged by the practical conse­
quences of their operations."
Clark1s criticisms of orthodox economics are not as direct and 
pointed as those of some of the other institutionalists. This is in part 
due to his offering new suggestions as replacements without pointedly 
criticizing that which he feels needs to be replaced. He also apparently 
does not reject orthodox analysis as much as he seems to think it irrele­
vant to present day eoonomic analysis. It is not so much that the answers 
provided in the orthodox tradition are wrong, as it is that the questions 
which are asked are not the more pressing ones to be answered today. Thus 
he pointed out that
it is impossible to look realistically at the problems we
90Commons, Economics of Collective Action, pp. 136-7.
91
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shall face in the future without realizing that tradi­
tional conceptions of eoonomic objectives and standards 
of value are bound to be disturbed, and in some respects 
reversed.
In another instance, he developed what he termed "Eon-Euclidean Eco­
nomics," in which he took what he considered to be the eight basic axioms 
of traditional economics, inverted them, and then analyzed the signifi­
cance of these "antitheses.’' This venture was undertaken, he adds, not 
with a view to denying the truth or validity of these propositions, but
of raising the question "whether their antitheses do not contain a more
93urgent and vital truth for the present generation." Another case of 
his insistence upon the relativity of economics was when he pointed out 
that
The traditional "economic laws" are not wholly obsolete, 
but they can no longer be presented as representing the 
dominant tendencies of the actual economic system now ex­
isting. ^
It is from this point of view that Clark infers that "each generation 
of economists succeeds to a new assortment of practical problems to 
which its doctrines are to be applied."®® In other words, it is not so 
much that orthodox economics is wrong as it is that the problems have 
changed and the new problems require a different approach and analysis. 
Thus it was that he pointed out that the assumptions of Smith were true
qp
Clark, J. M., "Economic Principles of the Eew Civilization," Our 
Emergent Civilization, ed. by Ruth K. inshen, p. 126.
®^Clark, J. M. ,"The Socializing of Theoretical Economios," The Trend 
of Economios, ed. by R. G. Tugwell, pp. 86ff.
94Clark, J. M., "The Role of Economics," Education for Citizen 
Responsibilities, ed. by Franklin Burdette (Princeton: Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 1942), p. 31.
95Clark, J. M., "Economic Theory in an Era of Social Adjustment," 
AER, March, 1918, p. 284.
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,!as over against the chief doctrines they had, at the time, to combat."^ 
He goes on to add that if those assumptions had been surrendered, it would 
not have been in favor of the modem ones of "social welfare and democratic 
solidarity," for these were not important at that time. They would in­
stead have yielded to the "interests and sophisms of class exploita­
tion." And while the points which Smith tried to make clear, which he 
tried to implement, are still important, they
ignore many democratic and human values which are now striv­
ing for practical recognition, and the adjustment between 
these limited truths and others less limited is one of the 
central conflicts of modem economic thought.§7
As is readily perceived, Clark takes a somewhat broader view as to 
the scope of economics, the problems with which it should be concerned, 
than do his contemporaries in the orthodox tradition; he once expressed 
his thanks for "the evidence that there is more economic theory in the 
world than many theorists have realized."®® These few remarks sum up 
rather briefly Clark's views of traditional economics. He was, as was 
the case with the others, critical of many specific points which will be 
dealt with in somewhat greater detail in later chapters. Generally speak­
ing, he felt that economic theory should be concerned with the economic 
and social problems of the day and that the orthodox treatment couched 
in terms of price analysis was inadequate, that if
theory is to take its proper place, ... price economics 
must become a subordinate part of social economics.®®
96Clark, "The Socializing of Theoretical Economics," The Trend of 
Economics, ed. by R. G-. Tugwell, pp. 82ff.
98Clark, "Economics and Modem Psychology," Preface to Social Eoo­
nomics, p. 94. “
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Scienoes," Essays in Research in the Sooial Science(Washington: The 
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...it is one thing to make a study of prices as such, and 
another thing to select the problem of price as the cen­
tral one around which to build a general treatment of 
eoonomic principles, or of eoonomic order.
Formal economic theory, Clark argues, has made
but few and incomplete excursions beyond the realm of 
static and price-governed assumptions, and the need of 
an overhauling based on broader premises is more than ever 
a pressing one.-^
This "overhauling" is necessary in Clark's view beoause the eoonomist 
"must deal with quantities and qualities of which actual market prices 
are not the only measure." It is necessary because "our most fundamental 
concepts should be independent of the institutions of competitive ex­
change ... if we are to have any standard of judgement on economic re­
forms -which are continually overruling the valuations of the market.
Ayres is perhaps the most trenchant of the group in his criticisms 
of orthodox economics. He has apparently felt that it m s  not enough to 
erect the foundations for a new approach to economics; before that could 
be done, the old would have to be destroyed. In part, this belief stems 
from his conception of the role of economic theory and the history of 
economic thought. It m s  in one of his earliest writings on economics
that he held that "the function of economic theory ... is to take cog-
103
nizance of the social needs of the day." He argued that the growing 
insistence and importance of "fundamental social problems" and the inef-
^^Clark, "Economic Theory in an Era of Social Readjustment," HER, 
March, 1918, p. 282.
101Clark, "Economics and Modena Psychology," Preface to Social Eco­
nomics, p. 94.
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pp. 709-10.
103Ayres, "The Function and Problems of Economic Theory," JPE, 
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fectiveness of orthodox theory in dealing with those problems was ’'forc­
ing fundamental changes in economic theory." This view grew out of his 
contention that the history of economic thought reveals a definite cycle, 
that it moves through a "cycle of criticism, reconstruction, approbation, 
and renewed criticism of the institutional o r d e r . T h e  cycle had by 
the twentieth century run its course— the development which began as a 
criticism of the then existing institutional structure had evolved into 
an approval of the now existing institutional structure. Thus it is once 
again time for economic theory to chart a new oourse, "not of revising 
economic doctrine," but of giving an account of the modem social econ­
omy "which shall square with the facts of social justice and thus be
105relevant to the needs of the age." His later writings indicate a strong
dissatisfaction with orthodox economics:
Economic theory has become a sort of intellectual game. ...
So voluminous has the lore of this game become, and so tax­
ing is the effort of becoming, and remaining, expert in it, 
that the ambitious economic theorist has no time or energy 
left with which to reflect on the meaning of it all. Mean­
time the gap between the esoteric formula-making of the 
theorist and the world of economic actuality has become so 
great that the theorist would be lost if he were to stop 
and inquire what his formularizing is all about.-*-06
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While his criticisms of traditional economics have been many, he has 
tried to evolve what he considers to be a more realistic and relevant 
economios. He often refers to the more recent dissidents in economics,
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It is clear that he considers his writings to he in this stream and 
that it is indeed a departure from traditional price theory and marginal 
analysis.
As was noted earlier concerning the other institutionalists, Ayres 
conceives economics as only a facet of a larger attempt to understand 
social phenomena; in his view, all the social sciences have been evolving 
toward a "unified field theory of human behavior, social structure and 
cultural process." And \vhile economics has played its part in this move­
ment, its contribution has been limited for the most part to the empiri­
cal studies and practical activities of economists, "neoclassical price
theory," however, "has not" contributed to this "common understanding of 
1 0 9man and society." As was also noted with respect to the other insti­
tutionalists, Ayres is not content to limit economics to the logical 
implications of a few (or a single) static assumptions. Economics is 
instead concerned, along with the other social sciences, with the more 
pressing problems of the day. The most pressing problem of direct oon- 
cern to the economist is the problem of social control of the industrial 
prooess and it is with respect to this problem particularly that these 
economists find the traditional economic analysis inadequate if not 
invalid.
109Ayres, "The Role of Technology in Economic Theory," AER, May, 
1953, p. 279.
CHAPTER III
SCOPE AHD METHOD IN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
Scope
Even a cursory reading of the above chapters would lead one to the 
conclusion that the problem of scope is of little direct concern to the 
institutionalists. In general, it could be safely said that they are 
not willing to define the scope of economics a_ priori end then to con­
fine their work or their analysis within that limitation. It would be 
more accurate to say that they are prone to let the immediate problem 
define their field of inquiry whereas the orthodox economist will first 
delimit the field by giving the conoept of "economics11 a rather definite 
meaning and then proceed to the analysis within the scope as thus de­
fined.^- Rather than first define the "proper" boundaries of economics 
and then confine one's analysis within that framework, Clark proposes 
that
it is less important to keep inside any traditional 
limits than to follow our natural questionings wherever 
they may lead, and do Thatever work we are specifically 
fitted for and find undone.^
The reason for their widening the scope of economics stems from
their insistence that the scope of the orthodox approach is too narrow
nnH that the problems with which the economist should be concerned are 
wider and more inclusive than traditionally conceived. In a frank recog-
^The charge that the scope of institutional economics is rather wide
and inclusive is a common one. For a view similar to that developed above,
comparing institutional to orthodox economics, see, Kenneth H. Parsons, 
"Institutional Economics— Discussion," AER, May, 1951, p. 83; and George 
H. Sabine, "The Pragmatic Approach to Politics," The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, (1929). '
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nition of this point, Mitchell said that
Quite literally, we cannot understand any phase of social 
behavior apart from all other phases. It is easy to make 
this admission— ours is not the first to do so; but to 
accept its consequences in practice and to develop a genu­
ine program of cooperation among the sooial sciences is 
hard.
Ths institutionalists, however, are willing to make such an admission 
and they have tried to work out a broader and more comprehensive study 
of the economic system. That they have not completely succeeded is 
readily agreed to; whether they have made substantial progress in that 
direction is much more readily contested. But that they have made a ser­
ious attempt to rebuild, or to build anew, so as to include other aspects 
of human behavior, is rather evident. It is this point which Ayres made 
when he pointed out that the institutionalists
have insisted, not without asperity, that ^ economics/'1 
can accommodate the new ideas the other social 
sciences]/ only by a complete overhauling. ...the eoo­
nomic insurgents are by no means satisfied to follow the 
bypaths of dynamic peradventure and perchance. On the 
contrary, they propose to denounce the major assumptions 
of orthodox theory and most particularly with respect to 
its objective.
fiat is required according to their point of view is to broaden the base
of economics so as to include the newer findings in the other social
sciences and also to make economics itself more amenable to these other
social sciences. It is in this sense that Commons refers to economics as
5
a ’’department of social philosophy," and Mitchell conceives of it as
^Mitchell, "Economics 1904-1929, The Backward Art of Spending Money. 
p. 402.
4
Ayres, "Fifty Years’ Development in Ideas of Human Nature and Motiva­
tion," AER, March, 1936, p. 232.
^Commons, "Twentieth Century Economios," Journal of Sooial Philosophy. 
Vol. V, 1939, p. 29.
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being "part and. parcel of social psychology." Tugwell also argues 
that
It seems somewhat absurd to already have divided the 
field of social behavior into departments. There are 
many natural scientists who can not say whether they 
ought to be called "physicists" or "chemists": but the 
barriers which separate economists, social psychologists, 
political scientists, historians, and sociologists are 
even more imaginary; even more obviously they owe their 
continuance to an academic traditionalism which can not 
long survive.'
The point is, of course, that the social sciences are concerned with the 
behavior and the problems of the whole human being and the society of 
whioh he is a part; the institutionalists are proposing that in order to 
understand both the individual and the society, the analysis cannot pro­
ceed from rigid a priori delimitations. They are, rather, jointly con­
cerned in analyzing the problems which Commons thinks are "as broad as 
the whole field of adult, sane, legally recognized human will— both 
individual and collective." Ahd it is because economics is ooncemed with 
such a broad field that Commons admitted that he had
never been able to think of the various sooial sciences 
as separate fields of history, political science, law, 
economics, ethics, and administration.®
J. M. Clark once noted that many other economists argue that his 
work lies "outside the realm of economics altogether." But in Clark's 
view, such an opinion is simply based on an unshakable conviction that 
economics is necessarily confined to the subject of exohange value, and
Mitchell, "Economics 1904-1929," The Backward Art of Spending Money. 
p. 408.
<7
Tugwell, "Human Nature and Social Economy," The Journal of Phil­
osophy, August 14, 1930, p. 489.
Q
Commons, Economics of Collective Action, pp. 118-119.
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this being the case, ’’there is little more to be said, save that exchange
9
■value described in terms of itself is meaningless." His argument is that 
the subject-matter of economics is equally concerned with human motives 
and desires, with the problem of idle capacity, with "a description of 
the way economic forces vrork, and a study of the economic efficiency— or 
inefficiency— which r e s u l t s . I t  is his contention these problems can­
not be analyzed nor understood if attacked within the traditional con­
fines of exchange in the market. Thus it is that he argues that if eco­
nomic analysis is limited to marginal utilities and marginal costs, ’then 
it simply does not lay hold on the deepest economic issues of our time.’’'*'*" 
It is thus that he insisted that the economist be free to follow his own 
natural questionings wherever they may lead and that quest will then 
define the proper boundaries or the scope of economics.
These "questionings,’’ as we have noted earlier, are primarily con­
cerned with the general field of economic planning or economic reform.
And it is specifically in this context that Mitchell pointed out that
the economist who participates in planning policies 
finds that he must consider factors that are not com­
monly regarded as strictly economic.
Mitchell recognizes that this is the very reason cited by many persons 
why economists should stand aloof from practical activity; they simply 
are not competent to advise outside of their own speciality. Mitchell 
argues, however, that the other alternative is preferable— that the eco­
nomist must associate himself with the other social sciences, that he must
^Clark, "Toward a Concept of Social Value," p. 60.
^°Clark, "The Socializing of Theoretical Economics," The Trend of 
Economios, ed. by R. G. Tugwell, p. 73.
■^Glark, "Toward a Concept of Social Value," Preface to Social Eoo­
nomics , p. 54.
12
Mitchell, "Economics 1904-1929," The Backward Art of Spending Money. 
p. 402.
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broaden his analysis and his inquiry so as to include them. The basic
reason for this, according to Mitchell, is the incompleteness and the
inapplicability of "felicific calculus, declining utility, or curves of 
13indifference." Does such a broadening as Mitchell envisions mean the
demise of economics? Mitchell agrees with those who fear that it does—
if "one takes conventional economic theory to be the common bond."^
He and the other institutionalists, however, are not willing to take
such a definition as being the common bond or the primary concern of eco- 
15noraics. They are rather concerned with the larger problems of control,
planning and economic reform, and they insist that with such a concern
as theirs', they must free economics from the narrow, static approach
w h i c h  is characteristic of orthodox price analysis. Thus it was that
Clark aruged that the economist cannot afford
to limit his study to the organization of these fo\x&sct\f 
forces by the one agency of price tinder free exchange, 
or to measure human ends solely by their expression 
through the one channel of a price-determining demand.
Formal theory, however, has so far made but few and in­
complete excursions beyond the realm of static and price- 
governed assumptions, and the need of an overhauling 
based on broader premises is mere than ever a pressing 
one.
14Ibid., p. 410.
1 R
Allan Gruchy in an appraisal of Mitchell pointed out that his 
pioneering attitude had led him "to look beyond the confining bound­
aries of orthodox economic thought, and to follow paths which promised 
more light on the eoonomic problems of the first half of the twentieth 
century." Review of Wesley Clair Mitchell, The Economic Scientist. ABR, 
June, 1953, p. 398. Also see, Edwin' E. Witte,’ ''institutional Economios 
as Seen by an Institutional Economist," Southern Economic Journal. 
October, 1954, pp. 133-135, for a similar view of the question of 
proper scope for economic analysis.
1 fi■LOClark, "Economics and Modern Psychology," Preface to Social 
Economics, p. 94.
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Limiting eoonomic analysis to price theory, Clark argues, is a serious
handicap to an understanding of the effectiveness and efficiency of the
economic system as a whole. As he noted in one article, "price is one
agency" for serving the economic interests of human beings, but it is
17not the only agency; a fulfilled economios must therefore free itself 
from the narrow premises and assumptions of this traditional approach.
The basic reason why this broadening is necessary, according to 
Clark, is that we live in an "economy of control with which our intel­
lectual inheritance fits but awkardly." He notes that both the demand 
for and the need for control has "grown with amazing speed," that in eveiy 
direction "experiments are being tried." Economic theory, however, is 
still in its infancy having been formulated in a quite different era; 
regulation and control are still regarded as exceptions outside the field 
of economics by many economists. But Clark insists that
It is good and necesssary that new proposals should be 
first treated as exceptions to economic theory, for they 
need to be settled on their own merits, but it is not 
good that they should remain permanently unassimilated.
The point is of course that Clark thinks that the problem of control and 
regulation need to be assimilated into economic theory, but that if it 
is to be done, then economic theory itself must necessarily be broad­
ened; the scope of economics and the problems with which it is concerned
20
must be made to fit the twentieth century.
17Clark, "The Relation Between Statics and Dynamics," ibid., 
pp. 216ff.
18See, for example, his "Economics and Modern Psychology," ibid.. 
pp. 94ff.
19Clark, "The Changing Basis of Economic Responsibility," ibid.. 
pp. 67, 78, 79; reprinted by permission from JPE, vol 24 (1916).
20
In one plaoe Clark pointed out that "as an economist" he was 
direotly concerned with such problems as the "balance of private action
What, then, is the institutionalists* answer to the problem of 
soope? Generally speaking, he would say that this is a question that 
cannot be answered a_ priori; he would prefer, as Clark put it, to follow 
his own natural questionings wherever they may lead. It is for this rea­
son that Mitchell insisted that the main point of departure for economics 
is a study of institutions, not only because the institutions themselves 
are of primary importance, but because with such an orientation the eco­
nomist would always keep an "historical perspective" and "by so doing he
opens vistas enticing to future exploration, instead of suggesting a
21closed system of knowledge." Ayres likewise explains the importance
of institutions for the scope of economic analysis when he pointed out
that economic aotivity includes activities of both a technological and
an institutional character;
and these two sets of activities not only coexist but 
condition each other at every point and between them 
define and constitute the total activity of "getting a 
living." It is the problem of economic analysis to dis­
tinguish and understand these factors, and their mutual 
relations, and the configurations of eoonomic aotivity 
for which they are responsible.22
Commons also indicates the general scope of "twentieth century" eco­
nomics when he insists that many different agencies including corpora­
tions, labor unions, and governments create working rules (i.e., insti-
(Cont.) and governmental power: between freedom and ooercion." (Alterna- 
tive to Serfdom, Oxford: Blackwell, 1948, p. 3.) While such problems are 
removed from the purview of orthodox economics, they are examples of the 
types of problems of concern to the institutionalist. It is also inter-/ 
esting to note that Clark considered Keynes* most important contribution 
was that he opened up problems for analysis which heretofore had been/' 
taboo for the respectable economist, (ibid., pp. 92-93.) /'
^Mitchell, "Wieser*s Theory of Social Economics," The Backwa^ Art 
of Spending Money, pp. 255-256.
22
Ayres, C. E., The Theory of Economic Progress (Chapel Hill: Uni­
versity of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 9§.
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tutions which define economic activity) and that "these working rules
03
are the main subject matter of twentieth century economics." He empha­
sized the central importance of control and regulation for the scope of 
economics when he pointed out that
Economic investigations in the twentieth century, with
its revolutions, credit cycles, unemployment, and re­
peated wars, must take into account many different 
aspects of activity. Otherwise research and investiga­
tion cannot be brought to full use in the collective 
effort to control the great and violent "forces" of to­
day. '*
Elsewhere he says that "it is questioned whether the American system 
can cope with these new political and economic problems." If they are
to be solved, however, it must be through the modern technique of "social
science investigation and the administration of collective action." It 
is the administration of collective action which is "the meeting place 
of social philosophy and the collective action that distinguishes present- 
day economics from the nineteenth century abstract philosophies." And 
perhaps even more important, these social science investigations, accord­
ing to Commons, are "not mere search for truth, they are designed to 
improve conditions." And from this approach, economics must necessarily 
widen its scope so as to include these various and diverse activities 
and conflicts "which characterize modern economic action."2®
^Commons, Economics of Collective Action, p. 129.
~ 2^ Ibid., p. 73.
9 c
Commons, "Twentieth Century Economics," Journal of Social Philo- 
sophy, Vol. V, p. 38. Kenneth Parsons specifically recognizes the basis 
for Commons' sweeping approach to economics when he pointed out that "He 
has tried to formulate an analysis which would give a foundation for the 
coordination of the social sciences, especially law, ethics, economics, 
and political soience. This coordination is made necessary by planning, 
by administrative and legislative direction of economic affairs— by social 
control generally." ("John R. Commons' Point of View," reprinted in Com- 
mons, The Eoonomios of Collective Aotion, p. 344).
This broadening of the scope of economics stems from, and is a 
necessary corollary to, the institutionalists' definition of economics.
As they see it, economics is not limited to the logical derivation of 
a given set of assumptions relative to the behavior of prices. It is 
rather the concerted attempt to understand the workings of the economic 
system with the aim of its improvement. To achieve this end, they in­
sist a knowledge of price behavior, no matter how thorough or refined, 
is simply not enough because there is no such thing in the real world 
as the economic behavior as described by the traditional definition of 
economics. The distinction of economics from political science or 
sociology or anthropology is only a traditionalism. These so-oalled 
fields or departments are separated only by artificial barriers— barriers 
which must be broken down if any workable understanding is to be achieved. 
The institutionalists are of course not alone in this view, and were in 
fact rather strongly influenced by the writings of John Dewey who has 
insisted that man’s problems are not economic £r political ojr sociologi- 
cal. The point would seem to be that they do not recognize economics 
as a separate "field" or department of the social sciences. The tradi­
tional barriers which supposedly delimit one of the social sciences from 
the others simply do not exist from the criterion of working relevancy.
26See for example his Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp. 151ff and his 
Intelligence in the Modern World, pp. 1059-69. The following quotation 
points up both the above point and also another instance of the influence of 
Dewey which will be developed more fully in Chapter Five— that truth is not 
sought for its own sake, but for its social significance, or in Commons' 
words, "to improve conditions." "ihen all is said and done in criticism of 
present social deficiencies, one may well wonder whether the root difficulty 
does not lie in the separation of natural and moral science. When physics, 
chemistry, biology, medicine, contribute to the detection of concrete human 
woes and to the development of plans for remedying them and relieving the 
human estate, they beoome moral; they become ... something to be pursued not 
in a technical and specialized way for what is called truth for its own sake 
but with the sense of its social bearing, its intellectual indispensableness 
(Reconstruction in Philosophy," pp. 138-9) This general point of view is 
important for the epistemological foundations of the institutionalists' 
concern with planning and reform.
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Instead they see the social sciences as having a common objective and 
economics as being merely a particular emphasis, a facet, or an aspect 
of the total.
This general point of view is, of course, often admitted by the 
orthodox economist. He insists, however, that the only way to achieve 
knowledge is by specialization: that the economist must pursue his own 
field, the sociologist his, the anthropologist his, that no one man can 
become a specialist in all fields. This is obviously true if taken in 
only one sense— the traditional one. The institutionalist would insist 
that the alternatives are not necessarily limited to becoming a specialist 
in economics or a specialist in all the social sciences (or if he could 
not achieve that, a failure in both). He would argue that the important 
point is that the scope of economics has become merely traditional; that 
it is today arbitrarily and unnecessarily limited. The institutionalist 
insists that the limits cannot be ascertained a_ priori but depend upon the 
problem and the circumstances at hand. Thus in one sense what he is argu­
ing is that economics must branch out to include many of the findings in 
other social sciences and that just where he should stop cannot be arbi­
trarily decided. This is due to his conception of economics as being 
essentially a problem-solving science and that the nature of the problem 
will decide what are the factors that have to be included and which are 
to be excluded. Such an approach to economics will inevitably obscure 
or extinguish the limits of each of the social sciences as they have been 
traditionally conceived.
Professor Sabine recognized this difficulty and pointed to one possi­
ble solution when he discussed the influence of pragmatism on the social 
sciences:
Behavior is not in fact departmentalized with anything 
approaching the sharpness of the lines we have been
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accustomed to draw between legal and moral, economic and 
political. These categories are merely traditions, per­
haps we might even say stereotypes, which originated 
solely as somebody's effort to classify social phenomena.
Even though they may have served a useful purpose, their 
validity never consisted in anything but their utility.
They correspond to nothing that exists, and it is worth 
asking, at least whether they are still useful. ...
Undoubtedly this presents a difficulty; for the limitation 
of human capacity compels us to be specialists, whether 
this fits the facts or not. What the pragmatic method 
seems to drive us to, however, is not specialization along 
the traditional lines which were supposed to divide poli­
tics and economics and law, but rather to the isolation 
of the relatively separable problems and an attack upon 
them along converging lines of economic, political, and 
legal study. Such, problems would expect to be located by 
what Professor Dewey would call "tensions" that occur in 
the functioning of the social apparatus. The area that a study 
would have to cover would depend on what we found to be rele­
vant to the problem under e x a m i n a t i o n . ^ 7
The point would be that rather than attempting to become either a special­
ist in the traditional field of economics or in all of the social sciences, 
the specialization would take the form of following the lines dictated by 
a particular problem. This certainly applies to much of the work done by 
the institutional economists. Thus Mitchell undertook a study of the 
business cycle— as a problem which in itself was worthy of deep probing 
and analysis, and a problem which was much too complex to be analyzed 
within the traditional confines of price theory. Likewise Ayres has 
devoted considerable attention to the problems of business cycles and 
wars and their connection with the institutional and social setting of 
twentieth century America. It was in like fashion that Hamilton explored 
the complexities of the patent system, and of the coal industry. Commons 
chose for himself the problem of industrial strife and spent many years 
investigating it and making recommendations and suggestions for improving 
the situation. And Clark devoted his attention to the problem of social
97Sabine, op. cit., pp. 881-882.
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cost-keeping and the social significance of idle plant capacity. Bach 
of these problems is of far-reaching significance. Each has social, 
political, legal, ethical, moral, historical, as well as, economic as­
pects. And it is the view of these economists that such problems could 
neither be understood nor solved by simply adding together the findings 
of various specialists. They must each be approached as a total problem.
It is, as Mitchell pointed out, "the economist who participates in plan­
ning policies finds that he must consider factors that are not commonly
OQ
regarded as strictly economic." The important point is that these were 
problems which these economists deemed to be of serious importance to the 
community as a wholes and in their view, they were sooial problems which 
could not be understood nor solved within the limits of orthodox price 
analysis.
It should also be noted that these economists departed from the tradi­
tional field in yet another way. They did not conceive their function to 
be that of merely pointing out the means of achieving specified ends, of 
waiting for someone else to say "this is a problem," and then attempt to 
show what the alternative means were to achieve that given end. Rather, 
they, as economists, felt it their duty to point out what were the problems 
and how they might be solved. Snch a view of the function of economics 
and of the economist differs from the orthodox, for it conceives of the 
economist as being an active participant in the functioning and the improve­
ment of the economic system. And it is this view, basic to the whole in­
stitutional school, which accounts for its breaking down of the traditional 
boundaries in the social sciences.
Are the institutionalists, then, merely utopian do-gooders? T/Yhat,
^Mitchell, "Economics 1904-1929," Backward Art of Spending Money. 
p. 402.
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one may ask, do ethics and morals, questions of social betterment, have 
to do with economics? Most of these economists would probably not deny 
the charge of being utopiens, reformers, do-gooders— whatever the exact 
charge may be. It would seem apparent that they consciously sought to 
improve the economic system of the United States. But, then, is not 
orthodox economics utopian? The important point is that it is not so 
apparent precisely beoause it is orthodox. The utopian idealism of tradi­
tional economics is obscured simply because it has become so thoroughly 
institutionalized. Free competition, an unfettered market system, non­
interference of the government, are all ideals, all unfilled aspirations. 
The essential difference would seem to be that the institutionalists are 
somewhat abandoning the precise ideals which have unconsciously permeated 
economics since the time of Adam Smith and are proposing to enlarge and 
widen these in light of the abilities and the deficiencies of our current 
economic system, in the light of changing ideals and aspirations. This 
is certainly the point Clark was making when he emphasized that
The most important thing to preserve is the thing which 
gave his /:^3mith1 s j thought its power and vitality; namely, 
its grasp on the interests of his time to which the insti­
tutions of the time gave inadequate opportunity and expres­
sion. And since these interests and institutions have 
changed greatly in a century and a half, our answer must 
correspondingly change.
The ideals with which the institutionalists are concerned are not those
eternal verities relating to The Good, The Tine and The Beautiful, but
rather those relating to the institutions and working rules by which we
order our economic behavior. It is not a question of what is Good, but
whether those institutions are always adequate for a changing economy.
It was in this sense that Tugwell insisted that our rules of conduct must
Clark, "Adam Smith and the Currents of History," Preface to Social 
Economics, p. 192.
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necessarily change as industrial conditions change, that
The good in mediaeval life is an insufficient good for 
our life; the good of the eighteen-nineties is an insuf­
ficient good for our life; and it may be that the good 
of the twenties will be an insufficient good for the 
thirties— certainly it -will be if the great shifts of 
control and productiveness which now seem imminent 
materialize at all.®®
As it turned out, the "good” of the twenties was indeed an insufficient
good for the thirties. The importance of ethics for economics, says
Tugwell, is the recognition of "ethics / f s ?  an instrument of progress,
31not a series of inspired and permanent rules of conduct." He further 
argues that
All this means that economics is ethical, inescapably 
and rightly so; and it means that the ethics involved 
is an experimental ethics. The economists of the new 
generation are making tentative proposals which they 
believe to be hopeful, but which they desire above all 
to see tested and verified or disproved. If the sug­
gestions prove to be good they ought to be put into 
practice, and not only put into practice but also be­
come a part of our codes of conduct.®2
In support o f his point, Tugwell cites the work of Hamilton in the
"Theory of the Rate of Wages," which is clearly an attempt to show why
wages should be increased, and Mitchell's work on the business cycle
whioh is "conditioned upon and motivated by" the belief that business
cycles are bad and that they can and should be eliminated. Summing up
his view as to the interrelatedness of ethics and economics, Tugwell
adds that
It is impossible to see any way to separate economics 
from ethics; and it seems further that, even if it
30Tugwell, "Experimental Economics," The Trend of Economics, 
pp. 416-417.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid., pp. 419-420.
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could be done* it would be nothing less than disastrous 
for a young science that hopes to become more and more 
important and useful and for a world which needs to have 
the work of the economists directed toward the better­
ment of its material situation.33
Ethics, then, are not merely eternal rules of conduct; some of them may 
be that, but according to Tugwell, ethics is a much wider and more inclu­
sive term. They are an instrument of progress in that those suggestions 
for improvement of the economic system are necessarily ethical and it is 
the function of the economist to make those suggestions. It is in this
sense that he defines economic theory as the "actual formulation of
34these suggestions for change, these solutions of problems."
Commons likewise sees no dualism between economics and ethics. For 
purposes of analysis, investigation, and control,the two are inseparable. 
Any supposed distinction between the two is based on what Commons consid­
ers to be a false premise for the social sciences, namely, the atomistic 
view that society is no more than the sum of the individual members.
This mistaken and archaic view, however, is not one of a society, "but
35of a population of molecules." Commons insists that in this case, 
as in all other aspects of the sooial sciences, the individualistic 
approach must be abandoned. Social problems and their solutions are not 
to be discovered by beginning with the individual and then by some alge­
braic manipulation arriving at a society. And thus it is with the problem 
of ethics and its place in economics, a problem which Commons long con­
sidered to be important for he has repeatedly declared that one of his main 
objectives was to work out the basis for the social analysis and the corre-
33
Ibid., p. 420.
34Ibid., p. 418j see also his "Theory and Practice," AER, March,
1923, ppTT07ff.
35
Commons, Institutional Economics, pp. 225ff.
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36
lation of economics and ethics. The confusion and difficulty asso­
ciated with these two concepts and their relationships, Commons
traces back to Jeremy Bentham, who reduced ethics to 
pleasure, pain, happiness, and. repudiated duties as 
painful. This repudiation is repeated in the dimin­
ishing pleasure and increasing pain of Bentham’s 
successors, the hedonistic economists. Later eco­
nomists, basing their theories on prices instead of 
feelings, continue to eliminate ethics as only feel­
ings— under such names as ethical taste, moral sense, 
emotions, sentiments— all of which are, of course,
only individualistic.27
It is this "individualistic," subjective, brand of ethics which has dom­
inated the thinking of economists, and which has rightly been ignored 
and eliminated from their field. It is the social ethics which are to 
be included, in the view of the institutionalists.
Commons, however, points out that even from a social point of view, 
there are two types of ethics to be considered. The one to be excluded 
from economics is that which Commons terms as the "unattainable, such as, 
we may say, heaven, communism, anarchism, universal brotherly love, uni­
versal virtue, universal happines." If, however, the ethical ideal is 
attainable, "then a theory of the attainable is as much a scientific 
theory as is a theory of the attained." This second meaning of sr dal
ethics concerns that which is best for sooiety among those which as -i
38attainable; it is that which "ought to and can be attained." That which 
ought to be attained is of course an ethical problem; it is also the 
problem of the economist in Commons* view, for in his haste to eliminate 
both the individualistic subjective brand of ethics and the unattainable 
social ethics from economics, the economist has also eliminated the attain-
^^See, for example, ibid., pp. 56 and 714ff.
^Commons, Economics of Collective Action, p. 197.
38Commons, Institutional Eoonomios, pp. 741, 743.
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able social ethics. It is this omission which Commons feels is in need
of repair. TOaen we shift from the individual to the social point of view
and eliminate the unattainable, then there is no distinction between
economics and ethics for the central core of Commons' thinking is "that
kind of associated action which is both ethical and economic," which he
39names "collective action in control of individual action." Commons
argues that economists have in general missed the significance and the
importance of ethics in economic analysis because "they have not, as
yet," constructed or adopted for purposes of analysis and investigation
40
this "mental tool of the history of collective action." Thus in Commons' 
view, that which is good for the social group is ethical, and in the twen­
tieth century, this ethical good is best achieved by the associated action 
which Commons refers to as "collective action in control of individual 
action." It is this collective action which has been eliminated from the 
scope of economics and which must be included if economics is to serve 
the needs of mankind—-if economics and ethics are to be correlated for 
the purposes of social analysis.
Methodology
Methodological controversies are probably no longer as important, 
or at least not as heated, as they once were. It is generally recognized 
that the methodology to be employed in the social sciences is not a matter 
of induction versus deduction versus the historical versus the quantita­
tive method. This is probably due to the recognition that no one method 
is suitable alone, and that in fact, all must be employed with varying
39Commons, Economics of Collective Action, p. 196.
40Ibid., p. 197.
80
shades of stress. The decline of such controversy is also due bo the 
increasing recognition that as the problems of the science of economics 
become more complicated, as we at the same time come to know more and 
more about the economic system, human psychology, etc., we are less 
and less inclined to be dogmatic or doctrinaire about questions of meth­
odology. This was basically the position of Mitchell when he noted that 
methodological controversies had declined in importance. This, he said, 
was "not a symptom of declining fervor," it is rather, "because increas­
ing concern with factual observation is breeding in us a more scientific 
and a less dialectical temper." Whether or not there is less contro­
versy over such questions among most economists, the general position of 
the institutionalists on these matters is not too clearly understood and 
in fact is often misunderstood. They have made some rather trenchant 
criticisms of orthodox methodology and, in the context of their own view 
of economics, they have made some rather important contributions.
Generally speaking, their position on this question would be much 
the same as noted above on the question of scope— that the orthodox posi­
tion has been too narrow and too rigid to permit the economist to do the 
task which is specifically his to do. Thus in Mitchell's opinion, "human
behavior is such a complicated affair that those who seek to understand
42
it can ill dispense with any line of attack." A precise statement of
41Mitchell, "Economics 1904-1929," Backward Art of Spending Money.
p. 405.
42Ibid., p. 413. Alfred North Whitehead once pointed out that "there 
is no groove of abstractions which is adequate for the comprehension of 
modern life." And he went on to add that "it is very arguable that the 
science of political economy, as studied in its first period after the 
death of A^nm Smith (1790), did more harm than good. It destroyed many 
economic fallacies, and taught how to think about the economic revolution 
then in progress. But it riveted on men a certain set of abstractions which 
were disastrous in their influence on modem mentality." (Science and the 
Modem World, pp. 283, 288.) The institutionalists would agree rather com­
pletely with this statement.
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the institutional position on methodology, hoivever, is rather difficult 
to find,for the primary reason that they, with rare exceptions, did not 
explore this question specifically. Such being the case, it is necessary 
to infer from soattered remarks what their position is as a whole. Another 
difficulty stems from the fact that their views on methodology are very 
closely tied to their basic epistemological views; and these views are 
important enough to be explored in a separate chapter. These economists 
did, however, make some important criticisms of the traditional methodology 
and lay out what they considered to be new points of view, so that a con­
sideration of these should be in order at this time.
Perhaps the most important criticism is basically one of original 
assumptions or premises; that while the logic of the traditional economics 
may be flawless, the assumptions from which the conclusions are deduced 
are too narrow to give an adequate insight into the complexities of the 
modem economy. Thus Clark argued that if economic theory is to be re­
molded to fit present needs, much more time will be devoted to "establish­
ing its assumptions on a realistic basic," and less time devoted to
43"elaborating the minutiae of the laws that may be deduced from them."
Commons specifically contrasts his position with the orthodox posi­
tion as "the conflict between deductive and comparative reasoning." The
former method "rested upon the isolated assumption of self-interest. Com-
„44plexities are eliminated because a single assumption is isolated." Com­
mons holds that the more fruitful method is the comparative method, the 
searching for significant similarities and differences in activities."
The purpose of this search is as a "method of investigation to isolate
43Clark, "Economic Theory in an Era of Social Readjustment," AER, 
March, 1918, p. 290.
44Commons, Economics of Collective Action, pp. 124-5.
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similarities.'1 The other, according to Commons, is "the method of gen­
eralizing— arriving at universals." And the important difference is not 
an abstract preference of Commons for the one method over the other, it 
is the fruitfulness of each in solving problems, and of locating diffi­
culties. It is the comparative method -which is the more fruitful, the 
more useful, in the realm of "public administration and policy /Tor  
results in directing attention to particular conflicts and problems." It 
is the usefulness of economics as a contribution to public administration 
and policy which is the important criterion in Commons1 view. Public pol­
icy must look from present conditions to the future, "whether the object 
be the creation or the realization of opportunities." This shift in 
orientation from the
past or present to futurity requires ... a shift in the 
method of reasoning from the deductive method of a single 
efficient cause and its effect limited by predetermined 
"laws" and to a comparative method of seeking similari- 
ties and differences within a complex of future indeter­
minate causes, purposes, and events.45
It is the important and necessary relation of economics to practical 
application which also lead3 Commons to criticize another methodological 
device of orthodox economics— the assumption of ceteris paribus, which 
may be necessary in logic, but is misleading in practice. Commons’ com­
parative method is an attempt to "tie together all the changing activi­
ties"; it is the attempt "to get away from our logical fallacies of tak­
ing only the part that we are interested in and neglecting the whole that 
conoems everybody."4®
This concern for the whole, and not the parts, is another important 
methodological distinction between the institutionalists and the orthodox
^®Ibid., p. 153.
46Ibid., p. 138.
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economist. The distinction is not that the institutionalist thinks the 
whole is more important than the orthodox economist, but rather in the 
procedure to be employed in understanding and analyzing the whole. Gen­
erally speaking, the methodological procedure of traditional economics 
is an additive one; it begins with the parts and then proceeds to the 
whole. The institutionalists, on the other hand, reverse this technique. 
They insist that the whole is not the sum of its parts, rather it is the 
existing structure of the whole which determines the characteristics of 
the individual parts; causation is conceived as flowing from the whole to 
the part. This is the distinction which to a considerable extent is re­
sponsible for GrUchy* s characterization of these economists and their work 
as being "holistic.1 As he says,
They take the American economic system to be an evolving 
process or going concern any one part of which is to be 
fully explained only in the light of its relations to the 
whole dynamic economic complex.^7
The point is that they insist it is a methodological mistake to take one 
part at a time, holding the others equal, and then by some process of addi­
tion, arrive at an understanding of the whole. In fact, Tugwell holds 
that this is perhaps the core of the institutionalists' dissent, that they 
maintained a "fundamental disbelief in the 'one thing at a time' proce­
dure." Quite to the contrary,
They conceived the world as a complex, actually-going mechan­
ism, which had never been understood because both the tools
47Modem Economic Thought, p* 5; for a more complete discussion of 
his characterization of holistic, see ibid., chapter I and especially 
pp. 4-5, 23-28. The English philosopher Alfred North ll/hitehead, is one 
of the chief exponents of this general philosophical position. He argues 
for the substitution of the concept of "organism" for the individualistic 
one, insisting that an individual item cannot exist apart from the system 
of which it is a part, that indeed the individual item is but an abstrac­
tion because "the reality is the process." (Science and the Modem World, 
p. 106; see also Chapter Four- where he discusses this concept of organism 
more completely.)
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for work and the impulse to genuine analysis had been 
smothered in the velvety folds of classicism. One 
thing at a time m s  not good enough, because no one 
knew the important things to choose as well as beoause 
other things never remained equal.
Rejecting this procedure, then, the institutionalists thus accepted the 
economic system’s ’’complexity and flux as the very subject-matter of 
their study." They chose to start with the whole, to start with the 
complexity and the flux of the economic system, holding that only by fol­
lowing such a methodological procedure could they achieve the understand­
ing necessary for control and guidance of the economy. It is in this 
sense that Clark, in his presidential address to the American Economio 
Association, envisioned the future work of the economist as being in a 
"very different setting"; it would be in a world of "trial-and-error
experimentation," rather than the "atmosphere of relative stability and
49
certainty in which our predecessors operated." These economists are 
taking the evolving, complex, economic system as their starting point, 
insisting that it is the whole complex which determines the character 
of the individual item and not the other way around (an understanding 
of the economy is not to be achieved by an anlysis of the economics of 
the firm). With such an orientation, they are not willing to confine 
themselves to the stricter methodological procedures of the orthodox 
economist.
Clark once pointed out that "the core of scientific method lies, 
not in induction nor in deduction, but in taking account of all relevant
A D
Tugwell, "Human Nature and Social Economy," Journal of Philosophy. 
August 14, 1930, p. 455.
49Clark, J. M., "Past Accomplishments and Present Prospects of 
American Economics," Preface to Social Economics, p. 431; reprinted by 
permission from AER, March, 1936.
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50facts and excluding none." This statement would come as close as any 
to summing up the institutionalists’ point of view on this subject. 
Although it must be admitted that by itself, it tells us very little 
because the crucial problem is just what are the "relevant facts." It 
is the general framework within which this problem is to be answered that 
we discover the more positive contributions to the institutionalists’ 
position on methodology.
Essentially what this means is the goal to uncover economic truth, 
but in the opinion of the institutionalist, what is "truth," depends con­
siderably upon what it is the investigator is seeking. Thus, R. P. Hoxie, 
in one of the few discussions by an institutionalist on the question of 
methodology, raises an interesting point:
We are prone to think of scientific knowledge as an end 
in itself— to speak of scientific spirit as simply a de­
sire to know— to understand the existing situation— but 
is it not time that in reality all scientific investiga­
tion is undertaken in furtherance of some definite, vital, 
human interest? We wish to control the forces at hand so 
as better to realize some human purpose, therefore we seek 
to comprehend the existing situation from the standpoint 
of the purpose or interest in question. The scientific 
interest is therefore not merely academic but is in a 
sense practical— practical in the sense that it is an 
interest in understanding for the sake of the life of the 
society or the individual. ^
The institutionalist does indeed wish to control certain forces, namely, 
the economic ones. And it is his view of this purposive nature of the 
science of economics which in large measure distinguishes him from the 
orthodox economist. He does not conceive economics as "an end in it­
self," but rather would agree with Hoxie that it is purposive; that it 
is "undertaken in furtherance of some definite, vital, human interest."
Clark, "The Socializing of Theoretical Economics," The Trend of 
Economics, p. 75.
C l
Hoxie, R. P., "Rotes on Method," Appendix I, Trade Unionism in 
The United States (New York: D. Appleton, 1920), pp. 377-378.
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And it is from this point of view that we can understand Clarlc's state­
ment of the scientific method— "taking account of all relevant facts and 
excluding none." As noted above, what are the relevant facts, is the 
crucial problem. Ytfhat is relevant from one point of view, will not be 
relevant from another. The factors which are relevant to the tradi­
tional economist are those which influence the determination of price.
For the institutionalist, it is those factors which are relevant to a 
particular problem, or which are relevant to the over-all problem of 
control or planning. And as such, the breadth of relevant facts is of 
necessity going to be much broader for the institutionalist than for 
the price theorist. And thus it is seen that the institutionalists' 
view on methodology is closely related to his view on scope; in a sense, 
the two are inseparable.
Thus it is that the question of what is the institutionalists' posi­
tion on methodology is not so easily answered as one might hope. It is 
not the simple question of induction versus deduction. It is a question 
of taking account of all of the relevant facts; it is a question of build­
ing a science of economics which will serve as a basis for directing, 
controlling, and reforming the economic system. Thus the methodology 
stems from a much more comprehensive point of view than we have so far 
covered. It is determined by their view of what economics is all about, 
what its function is; it is likewise determined by their general philo­
sophical orientation concerning relativity, revolution, and a wide number 
of subjects, including their philosophy of knowledge.
CHAPTER IV
BASIC CONCEPTS AND PHILOSOPHICAL ORIENTATION 
Statics v Dynamics
In the closing pages of the Distribution of Wealth, J. B. Clark 
warned that the development of a dynamic economics was still in its in­
fancy, that his treatment of it was both brief and tentative because "the 
task of developing this branch of science is so large that the execution 
of it will occupy generations of workers.With this statement, the 
institutionalists would find little to disagree. In fact, his son, John 
Maurice Clark, once pointed out that
Unlike statics, dynamics is in its infancy, and very 
possibly is destined to remain in that stage, on 
acoovint of the fact that conditions change so fast 
and so endlessly that analysis and interpretation 
cannot overtake them.2
The area of agreement concerning eoonomio dynamios would probably end at 
about that point, however. This is due to a somewhat different concep­
tion as to -the nature of dynamic economics and its relation to statics. 
Thus the elder Clark stated that as dynamics
...becomes more and more nearly complete, it will en­
able men to announce with increasing confidence the 
kinds of change that are to be expected in the future.
Yet, whatever movement the dynamic division of eco­
nomic science may discover and explain, static laws 
will never cease to be dominant. All real knowledge 
of the lav/s of movement depends upon an adequate 
knowledge of rest.®
Clark, J. B., The Distribution of Wealth (New Yorks Maomillan, 1889), 
p. 442.
2Clark, J. M., "The Relation Between Statios and Dynamics," Preface 
to Sooial Economics, p. 199. "
3Clark, J. B., op. oit., pp. 74, 442. Concerning the importance of 
static laws for eoonomios, and whether, in the view of the institutional­
ist, they "will never oease to be dominant," Professor Gambs noted that,
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The institutionalist 'mould argue that economics will never be able to 
predict the future, at least not in the sense of vdiat they consider to 
be the important aspects of economic life because "conditions change so 
fast and so endlessly that analysis and interpretation cannot overtake 
them." They would also disagree with the elder Clark as to the dominance 
of statics over dynamics— that "all real knowledge of the laws of movement 
depends upon an adequate knowledge of rest." Quite to the contrary, they 
would insist, if they were to cast their argument in such terms, that any 
knowledge of rest would depend upon an adequate understanding of movement.
The distinction between the two sohools on ihis point, however, is 
more than just an argument concerning the prior importance of one over 
the other; it stems basically from a rather different point of view as to 
the nature of dynamics. Generally speaking, the orthodox economist views 
dynamics as some variant of statios (all knowledge of movement depends....). 
That is, dynamics would be conceived as being a series of statlo equili­
brium positions, or the transition between them. Or it might be defined 
as the study of overall fluctuations in income and/or employment. The gen­
eral framework of any such view, however, would be the analysis of certain 
variables within the market mechanism as it is to be understood by price 
theory. The basic point of departure in this dynamios of the price system 
is the same as in static theory, that being an individualistic orientation: 
an understanding of the whole is reached by beginning with the individual.
(Cont.) in his opinion, “Some institutionalists would probably say that 
their branch of economics bears the same relation to standard or orthodox 
theory that contemporary physios bears to Newtonian physios. ... It is, 
perhaps, impossible to feel much kinship with Newton then you know about 
X-rays and vhen you are unable to say whether the primary stuff of a rock 
is matter or whether it is energy. Similarly, few institutionalists feel 
much kinship with Ricardo, Jevons, or J. B. Clark. ... It is plausible 
to argue that the static categories of both types of theory are not unlike, 
but that when standard theory begins to reach out into the realm of dyna­
mics, it parts company with institutional theory, which is essentially a 
dynamic theory." (Beyond Supply and Demand, pp. 4-6).
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It is this basic assumption or point of view which helps differen­
tiate the institutionalists' conception of dynamics from the traditional* 
It was in this sense that Commons contrasts "individualistic economios 
and institutional economics" as the difference between "static economics
A
and dynamics." And it is also this basic difference in orientation 
which Clark emphasizes when he noted that "dynamios must not be oast in 
statio molds"— that the shift to dynamios "will necessarily view society 
as an organic whole rather than a mechanical summation of the results of 
theoretioal acts of independent ’free exchange.'"®
The institutionalist would have little use for traditional statio 
analysis, mainly, because if not inapplicable, it does not lay hold of 
the significant problems of the economic life of society. And he like­
wise would have little use for orthodox analysis oast in dynamic terms, 
beoause it is still cast in a static mold; it is no more than an exten­
sion of the same point of view with the addition of a few variables.
In the last analysis, the institutionalists would hold that only their 
economics is truly dynamic, for it is only theirs which actually takes 
over-all change into consideration (not merely change in the price system) 
and that any pretense of orthodox economics to the claim of dynamios is 
false* The issue of course is not which of the two methods is truly 
dynamic. The issue is over the definition of the term, and generally 
speaking, the institutionalist uses the term to mean "realistio." 
"Realistio," in the sense that eeonomio analysis should primarily be con­
cerned with the problems of the economic system— an economic system 'which 
is in a oontinual state of evolutionary development, which is itself
4.
Commons, Economics of Collective Action, p. 52.
C
Clark, "The Relation Between Statios and Dynamios," Preface to 
Social Economics, p. 225. '
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dynamic— and further, that a dynamio economics is cast therefore in pol- 
ioy-oriented terms. J. M. Olark is the only one of the institutionalists 
actually to use tide terms statio and dynamio to any great extent, and he
g
variously defines dynamios as being concerned with "actual conditions,”
7
or with the "actual world," or that dynamics is basically "realistio
economics"® and that it is essentially an "enlargement of the scope of 
9
economics." It is thus that Clark insists that the economist oannot 
carry the "statio hypothesis" into "the dynamic study of the aotual 
world.
What the institutionalists are attempting to do is to reorganise 
economic theory to make it more compatible with our modern, highly 
dynamio economy. And they insist that if this is to be done, then 1416 
assumptions, the preconceptions, and the tools of orthodox eoonomics, 
which are largely statio in nature, must be abolished. As an abstract 
speculation about the behavior of prices under various assumed conditions, 
the orthodox analysis is satisfactory; but as a basis for the social con­
trol and guidance of the eoonomlo system, it is quite unsatisfactory*
As Clark put it, social control of the economy "cannot be accomplished 
through the static conception of independent demand schedules or the 
♦static* ideal of marginal utility."^
The basio difference, however, between the two systems of thought
£
Clark, J. M., "A Contribution to the Theory of Competitive Price," 
Preface to Sooial Economics, p. 296; reprinted by permission from QJE,
August, 1914.
7Clark, "Toward a Concept of Sooial Value," Prefaee to Sooial Eco­
nomics c pp. 58-59.
8
Clark, "The Relation Between Statics and Dynamics," ibid.. pp. 199-215.
9Ibld., p. 199.
*°Clark, "Toward a Conoept of Sooial Value," ibid.. p. 6 8.
11Clark, "Economics and Modern Psychology," ibid.. p. 127.
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canters around the nature of change and what it is that actually changes. 
In a reoent study of institutional economics, David Hamilton holds that 
this is in fact the distinguishing feature of institutionalism. As he 
put it*
The classicist has always viewed change as discontinuous 
and has held that it is a re-establishment of an equili­
brium or a state of quiescence. ... The institutionalist, 
on the other hand, considers change to be a part of the 
economic process. Instead of viewing the economy as a 
fixed system periodically prodded into movement to a new 
point of non-motion, he holds that the eoonomy is at all
times undergoing a process of cumulative ohange, and that,
the study of economios is the study of prooess.12
This is the basio issue concerning dynamics. It is not a question of 
one system being more dynamic than the other. Orthodox economists have 
insisted that they are concerned irith dynamics, that they too are inter­
ested in ohange. The orthodox economist of course has been concerned 
with ohange as manifested in the price system itself, or with a quantita­
tive ohange in output which was induced by quantitative change in price.
The price system is seen as the central and basic characteristic of the
eoonomio system and their analysis is therefore confined to price move­
ments. The concept of ohange with which they are primarily conoemed, 
and which they label dynamics, is the shift from one static equilibrium 
of prices to another static equilibrium of prices. Illustrative of this 
point, consider the following two definitionss
static laws furnish the natural standards to which the 
incomes of eoonomio groups and -those of laborers and 
capitalists within tend to conform. Dynamio laws, on 
the other hand, account, first, for the variations of 
actual incomes from these natural standards....Static 
forces set the standards, and dynamio forces produce
12Hamilton, David, Newtonian Classicism and Darwinian Institution­
alism (Albuquerque* University of New Mexico Press, 1§53), p. zi.
13■variations.
...dynamic economics is the study of the path by which a 
set of economic quantities (i.e., prioes and quantities) 
reach equilibrium, within a statio framework. 14
Although a half-century separates these two quotations, they are almost 
identical. Through the mechanics of the price system the separate and 
isolated acts of individuals become, by means of some transubstantia- 
tion, an economic system. Change takes plaoe in the quantities of prices, 
but never in the prioe system itself. Dynamics, in the traditional view, 
is ooncemed with the introduction of various "foreign" elements— popula­
tion growth, invention, etc. These prioe changes,however, are purely 
mechanical in nature; every shift away from a normal (or equilibrium) 
position, brings into play opposing forces which start a chain reaction 
which forces prices back to their normal position. These changes in 
prioe, however, do not bring about a ohange in the substance, in the basic 
characteristics, of the eoonomio system itself. As David Hamilton summed 
it upt
In this view of things, sooiety is a permanent structure 
composed of landlord, capitalist, and laborer, and eco­
nomic change is nothing more than movements away from and 
back to equilibrium— which is nothing but a balance of 
sensations of pleasure and pain to the nth degree of 
nicety. 5
But the fluctuations of prioe about an equilibrium position do not, in 
the view of the institutionalists, contribute much toward an understand­
ing of our complex and highly dynamio economic system. This was certainly 
the point which 7/alton Hamilton made when he discussed the development of
3.3
Clark, J. B., The Distribution of Wealth, pp. 36, 32.
^Stigler, George J., The Theory of Price, p. 26.
15Hamilton, David, op. cit., p. ISO.
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Hoxie*s economic thought:
His material environment was that of contemporary Amer­
ica.
A continent, possessed of unparalleled resources, had 
just been subjugated by the aid of the machine process.
An aggregation of trades, processes, and markets m s  
being forged into an industrial system. ... Ohange 
m s  everywhere. Wealth m s  increasing; accumulated 
oapital m s  being invested and new oapital values were 
emerging without investment; old industries were being 
expanded and new ones were springing up; the advance 
of technology m s  making obsolete productive processes 
which a moment before were new....
Changes such as these defied expression in quantitative 
terms. The adjeotive "normal" seemed strangely inappro­
priate when applied to any aspect of the situation; in 
the perpetual newness of things all must be "natural" or 
all unnatural. Nor oould the situation be expressed in 
static terms. It offered no disposition to return to an 
"equilibrium" after a disturbing "force" had disarranged 
the gear. It might well be that a series of actions and 
reactions was tending toward such a consummation; but if 
so, they were of negligible importance, for they oould 
not stem the onward tide of the highly dynamio foroes which 
were drawing industrial society into an unknown future. ... 
The less important "being" m s  swallowed up in the more 
important "becoming,
The basio difference between the institutionalist and the orthodox 
economist in this respect is in the nature of change itself. Bather 
than viewing change as a discontinuous process— the re-esb?'-lishment 
of an equilibrium, they take it to be the dominant feature of the eco­
nomy; this "complexity and flux" are the features to be analysed and 
understood. They are typical, not atypical. This is one of the main 
reasons that institutionalism has been labelled evolutionary or Darwin­
ian. Ayres thinks that this
is That Veblen meant when he made Darwinism the crucial 
issue of modem economics. It is not a question of change 
but of vhat changes. Orthodox economists have insisted, 
with considerable bewilderment, that they are just as
^Hamilton, Walton, "The Development of Hoxie*s Economics," JPE, 
November, 1916, pp. 859-860.
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interested in ohange as anybody else.^
And this insistence, Ayres agrees, is true. But the important problem 
is still that of what is the nature of change and how it is to be viewed. 
The orthodox economist, beoause of his view of statics and dynamics, has 
fettered his economic analysis with a dualism which has destroyed its 
validity. This dualism, Ayres argues, m s  originally that of the ’actual1' 
and the "normal," but more recently it has shifted to the "dynamio" and 
the "static."
Contemporary economists maintain "that the distinction 
is only an analytical device, but it is certainly more 
than that. Under both sets of names one of these states 
is existential and the other is ideal in both metaphysi­
cal and moral senses. If one be defined as the realm in 
whioh change is occurring and the other as a "stationary 
state," it is at once apparent that change is regarded 
as something of a nuisance and as an essentially transi­
tory oondition. How otherwise could the analysis of 
imaginary "stationary states'* be regarded as a useful 
analytical device? It is useful only on the supposition 
that the static world is the real world and the dynamio 
world phenomenal in the metaphysical sense.
Ayres argues that this dualism is basically responsible for the inability
of orthodox economics to lay hold of the problems of our times, that it
is this dualism which is responsible for the split between theory and
actuality— the split whioh shielded the tradition (the theory) of the
price-governed, market-organised, economy from the impact of eoonomio
reality, from the impact of eoonomio ohange. This split between theory
grid actuality was "first defined in terms of competition." With the growth
of big business, however,
it was easy for economists to attribute any shortcomings 
of theory of the market-organized eoonoray to that differ­
ence rather than to any inherent defect of classical theory.
If the economy failed to behave as classical theory led us
17Ayres, "Fifty Years* Development in Ideas of Human Nature and 
Motivation,” AER, March, 1936, p. 236.
18Ayres, The Theory of Eoonomio Progress, p. 103.
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to expect, that seemed to be sufficiently explained by 
the prevalence of monopoly. Thus instead of re-exam­
ining their theory, economists were able to point out the 
very great discrepancy between the competitive conditions 
which the theory assumed and the "restraints of trade" 
which monopoly had brought.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century the split 
between theory and actuality was further widened by the 
recognition of "statio" and "dynamic” states. ...it 
seemed to economists that the perfect adjustments (which 
they now proposed to call "equilibrium") promised by clas­
sical theory might prevail were it not for the fact that 
the economic scene is continually changing. Thus they 
were able to attribute the discrepancy between theory and 
actuality to the disturbing factors of change, rather 
than to any defect of the theory of the market-organized 
economy.
This distinction between statics and dynamios is, then, a misleading one. 
And it is for this reason that the institutionalists objeot to the dyna­
mics of orthodox economics, insisting that only their analysis is truly 
dynamic for it takes change and flux as being the normal state of affairs, 
rather than as a deviation from or to some equilibrium position. It is 
from "this point of view that another important ooncept of the institution­
alists is to be understood: their evolutionary point of view.
THE EVOLUTIONARY POINT OF V I M
Considerable reference has been made in the pages above to the in­
stitutionalists as having an evolutionary outlook, that they are trying 
to build an evolutionary economics. In an important sense of the word, 
the distinction between dynamios and statios, as viewed by the institu­
tionalist, is contingent upon this evolutionary or genetio frame of refer­
ence. Indeed, it might be said that any understanding of institutionalism 
would depend upon an understanding of their evolutionary frame of refer­
ence. Thus it would be important to turn our attention to an examination
19Ayres, The Industrial Economy, pp. 346-7.
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of this particular facet of institutionalism. Immediately upon embark­
ing upon suoh a quest, however, we are confronted with a rather import­
ant difficulty. This is the faot that the institutionalists to suoh a 
considerable extent took this point of' view as a basic premise, as a 
starting point, that they do not write extensively upon it per se.
The use of the term and the influence of the concept of evolution
is traceable to a considerable extent to Veblen. To many, institutional
economics is synonymous with evolutionary economics— whatever the latter
term may mean. Professor Homan, as was pointed out earlier, said that
An institutional eoonomics, differentiated from other 
economics by discoverable criteria, is largely an intel­
lectual fiction, substantially devoid of eontent. Fifteen 
years ago it was a faith...the faith was that an adequate 
organon of economic thought could be achieved by the accum­
ulation of data and analysis of it in terms of an evolution­
ary prooess.20
As was noted in Chapter One, this view is to a large extent a mistaken 
one. The evolutionary point of view is important, but institutional 
eoonomios is not merely the "accumulation of data and analysis of it in 
terms of an evolutionary process." As a matter of faot, Homan in an ear­
lier work, though ostensibly discussing the changed outlook of the science 
of eoonomios, gave a much more accurate picture of institutionalism:
And so in eoonomics, the search for sweeping generaliza­
tions is being subordinated to finding by what chain of 
circumstanoes our present institutions came into being, 
how they at present work in detail, whither they are car­
rying us, and by what means and to what ends we can direct 
their future development. 21
This is a much more aocurate pioture of institutional eoonomios and of
the iiqportanoe of the evolutionary point of view, than is his later
20
Homan, "Institutional Eoonomios," AER, March, 1932, pp. 106-107.
21Homan, Contemporary Economic Thought (Hew York: Harpers, 1928),
p. 460.
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polemic.
Veblen, of course, had considerable influence upon the institution­
alists with his insistence that eoonomics must adopt th© evolutionary 
point of view. It was his view, that for anything to be labeled as 
scientific it must adopt this point of view. Or in his words, the prime 
postulate of modern science
is that of consecutive change, and consecutive change 
can, of course, not come to rest exoept provisionally.
By its own nature the inquiry cannot reach a final term
in any direction.22
It was his contention that any science which is modem is of necessity
an evolutionary science. .And he points out that the men of soienoe who
are "proud to own themselves ’modem'" find fault with economics for its
pr©-evolutionary bias, its ooncem with taxonomy, with definition and
classification.**® Before the impact of Darwin, Veblen held that the
animus of soienoe was
of how things had been in the presumed primordial stable 
equilibrium out of which they, putatively, had oome, and 
how they should be in the definitive state of settlement 
into which things were to fall as the outcome of the play 
of forces which intervened between this primordial and 
the definitive stable equilibrium. To the pre-Darwinian
economists the oenter of interest and attention to which
all scientific inquiry must legitimately converge, was
the body of natural laws governing phenomena under the 
rule of causation.24
An evolutionary soienoe, on the other hand, Veblen insisted, "is a olose-
knit body of theory. It is a theory of a process, of an unfolding se-
'Veblen, T. B., "The Evolution of the Scientific Point of View,"
The Plaoe of Science In Modern Civilisation (New Yorks B. W. Huebsoh, 
1919}, p. 33j reprinted by permission from the University of California 
Chronicle, Vol. X, No. 4.
23See especially his artiole, "Why is Eoonomios Not an Evolutionary 
Soienoe?," The Portable Veblen (New York: Viking, 1948), pp. 2l5ff; 
originally published in the qJe , July, 1898.
^Veblen, "The Evolution of the Scientific Point of View," The Plaoe 
of Soienoe in Modern civilisation, p. 56.
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quenoe."^ Eoonomios, therefore, must abandon its mechanistic, pre-
Darwinian orientation. It ’’must be a theory of the eoonomio life pro-
26cess of the raoe or the community."
Veblen was not critical of everything in olassioal eoonomics but
he did point out repeatedly that it had not continued to progress as had
the other sciences. In one of his rare complimentary remarks concerning
classical economics he noted that "Of the achievements of the classical
economists, recent and living, the science may justly be proud...•" But
still they fail by the criterion of the evolutionist's for "conceiving
their theory in terns alien to the evolutionist's habits of thought.
Eoonomios ... still shows too many reminiscences of the 
"natural" and the "normal," of "verities" and "tenden­
cies," of "controlling principles" and "disturbing causes" 
to be classed as an evolutionary science. ...
The standpoint of the classical economists, in their 
higher or definitive syntheses and generalisations, may 
not inaptly be called the standpoint of oeremonial ade­
quacy. The ultimate laws and principles whieh they formu­
lated were laws of the normal or the natural, aooording 
to a preoonoeption regarding the ends to which, in the 
nature of things, all things tend. ...
The soheme so arrived at is spiritually binding on 
the behaviour of the phenomena contemplated. ... The 
formula is then tested by comparison with observed per­
mutations, but the polarisoopic use of the "normal case"; 
and the results arrived at are thus authenticated by induc­
tion. Features of -the process that do not lend themselves 
to interpretation in the terms of the formula are abnormal 
oases and are due to disturbing oauses. In all this the 
aganoies or forces oausally at work in the economic life 
process are neatly avoided. The outcome of the method, 
at its best,is a body of logically consistent propositions 
concerning the normal relations of things— a system of
Veblen, "VJhy is Eoonomios Not an Evolutionary Science," The Port­
able Veblen, p. 217. ~
2 6Ibld., p. 237.
27Ibid# 3 p. 218*
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economic taxonomy.
This normalized scheme of analysis is the basis for the dualism which, 
according to Professor Ayres, has shielded economio theory from economic 
reality. It has enabled economic theorists to attribute deficiencies in 
the economic system to deviations from the normal, to disturbing oauses 
which have no plaoe in pure theory. The disturbances, the deviations from 
the idealized system, are -thus excluded from study, from analysis. The 
insitutionalist, on the other hand, takes these disturbances as the very 
subject-matter of economics; he is interested in ascertaining what are 
the forces at work in the eoonomy as a whole, not just those forces as re­
flected in the price system.
The importance of this evolutionary point of view is in large part 
the problem to which we directed our attention earlier; that of statics 
and dynamios. The orthodox position has essentially been that the oonoept 
of evolution did not have any place in eoonomics because economio analysis 
was concerned with problems for which change in the larger sense of the 
word had no importance. Their oonoept of change was confined to changes 
within the prioe system itself and their economio analysis was -therefore 
timeless. The reason for this stems primarily from the peculiar shape 
pruj color which David Ricardo gave to eoonomios. As Mitchell saw this 
problem;
Ricardo took for granted (1) the physical environment in 
-which he lived; (2) the social organization, including 
the industrial technique, of his day and people; and (3) 
the human nature of his contemporaries as he understood 
them. He did not analyze this familiar world beyond ex­
plaining a few technical points in the mechanism of -the 
money market, which lay readers could not be expected to 
know. Still less did he consider the problem of how soc­
ial organization or human nature had reached their current
Ibid., pp. 224-226, passim.
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29patterns.
Mitchell went on to point out that Ricardo ''thought of sooial organiza­
tion as something that had changed materially in the past, but had 
reached maturity and would not change materially in the future." Tilth 
that as his basic preconoeption, Ricardo concentrated upon these social 
relationships as manifested in the price system with respect to the 
problem of the distribution of income and price (or value). And it was 
this orientation which has become one of the major preconceptions of orth­
odox eoonomios since that time* Assuming a fixed sooial organization, 
they have directed their attention to the movements of prices within that 
social organization and by so doing have prevented their economics from
being cognizant of change in the total sooial-eoonomic structure— the
30structure of which eoonomics is but a facet.
Professor Gruchy liBted what he thought were the three main reasons 
why orthodox economists have failed to incorporate evolutionary change 
in their economic analysis. In the first plaoe, the science of eoonomios 
was a well-established discipline long before "evolutionary concepts had 
become a part of the intellectual furniture of most men." And secondly, 
many have been proud of the exactness which the soienoe of economics 
afforded, an exactness which had not been attained in the other sooial 
sciences. "As a result the scope of economios has been unduly narrowed 
to accommodate those who refuse to go beyond equilibrium analysis.” The 
third reason he cites, is from the viewpoint of the institutionalist, per-
^Mitohell, W. C., "Postulates and Preconceptions of Ricardian Eco­
nomics," The Baokward Art of Spending Money, p. 206; reprinted by permis­
sion of Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, from Essays in Philosophy. 
ed. by T. V. Smith and W. J. Wright, 1929.
30
See, Hamilton, David, op. olt., for a more oomplete disoussion of 
these points.
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haps the most important:
a study of this type of change has not always been -wel­
come by oertain groups in the community. ... It can 
hardly be denied that the very close connection between 
economio change and economic reform has tended to push 
the study of economio change into the "sociological pen­
umbra" of Lionel Robbins and other so-called orthodox eco­
nomists, where many significant economic matters have been 
conveniently impounded and soon for gotten. 31
Most institutionalists would not aoouse orthodox economists, as ffruohy 
seems to do, of consciously keeping economic analysis in non-evolutlon- 
ary terms in order to appease certain groups in the community. But that 
its attention to the statie analysis of price movements, its unduly nar­
row scope and its concern with equilibrium, has prevented orthodox eco­
nomics from laying hold of the issues and the problems of the times, the 
institutionalists would all agree. And this, as has been pointed out ear­
lier, is the major oriticism of orthodox economics. It does not suffi­
ciently oonoem itself with the problems of economio planning, with eco­
nomic reform. Again to quote Gruchy:
■Where the economist considers ehange to be a matter of 
growth, development, and evolutionary expansion, eoo­
nomios turns out to be a broad sooial science which is 
more capable of coming to grips„with the major economio 
issuesof the twentieth century.
When -tixe economist considers change to be solely a matter of price 
movements, he is thereby limiting the applicability of his economic analy­
sis in the broader area of social-economic reform. The institutionalist 
argues that the inadequate attention given to the evolutionary point of 
view cripples economic analysis in the field of policy because it oonfines 
attention to the normal and thereby omits or ignores change, flux, growth, 
development, in the economic system itself. It was from this point of
31Foreward to ibid., pp. 7-8.
32Ibid.
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view that Veblen criticized economics for not having adopted -the evolu­
tionary point of views
But it is precisely in this use of figurative terms for 
the formulation of theory that the classical normality 
still lives its attentuated life in modem, economics.: and 
it is -this facile recourse to inscrutable figures of 
speeoh as the ultimate terms of theory that has saved the 
economist from being dragooned into the ranks of modern 
science. The metaphors normality and propensity are 
effective, both in theirnomiletioal use and as a labour- 
saving device-more effeotive than their use designs them 
to be. By their use the theorist is enabled serenely to
enjoin himself from following out an elusive train of cas­
ual sequence. He is also enabled, without misgivings, to 
construct a theory of such an institution as money or wages 
or land-ownership without descending to a consideration of 
the living items concerned, except for convenient corrobora­
tion of his normalised scheme of symptoms. ... Features of 
the process that do not lend themselves to interpretation 
in the terms of the formula are abnormal cases and are due
to disturbing causes.S3 
The institutionalist argues that it is the disturbing oauses which are 
the very problems of analysis. In an era of swiftly and rapidly moving 
events, it is the function of the economist to analyze this flux, to
keep his economio theory in close contact with it. In his view, the
only "normal" aspeot of our eoonomio system is change and flux— but not 
merely the change of prices to a new equilibrium position whioh is, in 
the opinion of the institutionalist, nothing but a remnant left over from 
the pre-Darwinian era. Professor Sabine pointed out this non-normalized, 
non-equilibrium, aspect of Mitchell's study of the business cycle. No­
where does Mitchell find a "normal" condition of business which tends to 
reinstate itself to some equilibrium position. "Nothing is normal except 
change" and it is the ohange which must be understood if we are to do any­
thing in the area of control. In Sabine's words:
The stream of civilization has no end, and it has no 
single cause. Consequently, the condition in whioh it
33"VJhy is Eoonomios Not an Evolutionary Soience,” The Portable Veblen. 
pp. 226-7.
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happens to find itself at any given date— the particular 
constellation of institutions and practices whioh happens 
to prevail— is no more normal than that whioh prevails at 
some other date. The only abiding faot is change, and 
change is a resultant of all the causal factors, physical, 
psychological, historical, and sooial, that operate in the 
given situation. There is no state of equilibrium, no bal­
ance of economio forces, which forms a standard or norm.®*
Orthodox eoonomio analysis, however, did take the general sooial organiza­
tion, the industrial techniques, whioh were extant in Ricardo’s day as 
being fixed. It has confined itself to changes within the price struc­
ture of that fixed social and industrial organization. It is this gen­
eral orientation which the institutionalists label as non-evolutionaryj 
it is this restriction whioh they insist seriously cripples its effective­
ness in coming to grips with the issues and problems of our times. Ricardo 
clearly recognized this facet of his own eoonomio theory when in a letter 
to Malthue he said:
It appears to me that one great cause of our difference 
in opinion on the subjects whioh we have so often dis­
cussed is that you have always in your mind the immediate 
and temporary effects of particular changes, whereas I put 
these immediate and temporary effects quite aside, and fix 
my whole attention on the permanent state of things whioh 
will result from them.®®
Ricardo was not interested in the temporary changesj he was seeking to 
establish the universal and permanent laws of price and distribution. He 
had no conoem for the social structure of his day, where it had come 
from, or where it was going. The important point, from the view of the 
institutionalists is not Ricardo’s unduly narrow soope, but of the main­
stream of economio analysis that has followed Ricardo’s example.
This use of Ricardo as an example is not to be taken as a severe
Sabine, George H., op. cit., p. 8 6 8.
55Letters of David Ricardo to Thomas Robert Malthus, 1810-1825, 
p. 127.
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indictment of him. We are often prone to think of earlier economists, 
suoh as Ricardo, as being conservative; such a judgment, however, is in 
terms of our own times and our own standards. Judged by his day and by 
the problems of his era, Ricardo was a radical, anxious to change and to 
improve the social-eoonomio system as he knew it. He was indeed an ac­
tive and ardent reformer, cognizant of many of the problems of his day 
and anxious to solve them if possible, and if not, at least to improve 
the situation. The public debt, money, banking, the com laws and agri­
cultural problems, are well known examples. He soon came to be one of 
the more respected members of parliament because of his penetrating analy­
sis of and his independent judgment of the many controversial problems.
And in large part because of his influence, economics wielded consider­
able influence. As Mitohell pointed out:
Hever, in fact, has politioal economy enjoyed such popu­
lar favor and intellectual prestige, never has it exer­
cised such practical authority as in the two generations 
that followed Ricardo.5®
Rioardo was seriously oonoerned with the more pressing problems of the 
eoonomio system of his day and set about to analyze them. To be certain, 
he is to be criticized for his hasty conclusions, his sweeping generaliza­
tions. And he is in the view of many (especially the institutionalists) 
to be criticized for asking the wrong questions. The major oritioism, 
however, is to be laid against those economists who followed Ricardo.
They took his economio principles as being timeless, as being universal; 
while they contained a few errors, some mistakes in logic, a few minor 
repairs would solve all major deficiencies. The institutionalists, how-
36Mitchell, "The Prospects of Eoonomics," The Baokward Art of Spend­
ing Money, p. 364; see also Mitchell’s Lecture flotea on tTypes of jtsoonomTo 
Theory (Hew York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1949'), VoY I, pp. lAbff.
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ever, take serious issue with that line of developments
Economists who took this line might be technically right 
in every one of their contentions; it matters little 
whether they were right or wrong. TfVhat does matter is 
that by taking this line they lost the most powerful in­
centive to further achievement. If eoonomics does not 
attempt to explain the concrete facts of eoonomio life, 
then all that Ricardian economics needed was skillful 
exposition, the oorreotion of minor lapses, and certain 
extensions along the original lines. Eoonomio truth had 
been found and would abide as long as logic lasted, no 
matter what paradoxical developments appeared in the 
world of railways, centralized banking, trusts, and 
trade-unions; no matter what facts the statisticians 
pressed, no matter what anthropologists learned or how 
the psychologists shifted their ground.®”
In -the view of Mitchell and the other institutionalists, however, eoono­
mios does attempt to explain the "concrete facts" of economic life, and 
Ricardian eoonomics therefore needed more than a few minor corrections 
and extensions. Eoonomios is not, in their view, timeless or universal; 
the correction which they have prescribed for this deficiency has been 
the adoption of the evolutionary point of view.
In attempting to explain the "concrete facts1' of economic life, the 
institutionalists argue that the evolutionary point of view is important 
for the light it sheds on what is a oonorete faot. This is the part- 
whole relationship to which reference has been made earlier, or the philo­
sophy of holism, as it has been named. Faots or data, aooording to this 
interpretation, do not speak for themselves; an isolated fact or datum 
is meaningless since it takes its meaning and its significance from a 
larger, evolving whole of which they are but a part; meaning and signifi­
cance are seen to stem from the whole to tha part. This is the signifi­
cance whioh Veblen saw in the Darwinian revolution— that Darwin had ex­
plained "species in terms of the process out of which they have arisen,
37Mitchell, "The Prospects of Economics," The Bftokward Art of Spend­
ing Money, p. 555,
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rattier than out of the prime cause to whioh the distinction between 
38them may be due." It is this point of view whioh he insisted eco­
nomics must adopt: that the activities of the individual are to be ex­
plained by the larger cultural whole, and not vice versa as the ortho­
dox economist was (and still is) attempting to do. This whole, this 
process, is itself an evolving, changing one. The economist therefore 
must consider antecedent and consequent to understand the immediate 
problem whioh calls for anlysis and solution. This is the genetio or 
evolutionary concept which Clark has described as
explaining things in terms of the conditions out of 
whioh they arose. And a genetic economist would natur­
ally be one in whom this element is so fundamental as 
to give him a sense of the relativity of all institutions 
to the circumstances of -their origin. To this the modem 
mind adds the idea of endless evolution, not directed by 
rational purpose toward any previsioned end nor explain­
able by a tendency toward any ultimate "natural" system.
... Indeed there is no outcome that can be oalled ulti­
mate.®®
As has been noted earlier, -this evolutionary approach of these economists 
does lead them to deny the validity of any natural or normal state of 
affairs. To them the only thing which could be desoribed as normal is 
change itself, and it is thus that they direct their attention to change 
and flux, regarding it as typioal. They have, in Tugwell’s words, 
aocepted "its complexity and flux as the very subject-matter of their 
s t u d y . B y  studying the process itself, emphasis is plaoed on the ante­
cedent and the consequent, and a place is thuB held open for the novel.
38
Veblen, T. B., The Theory of Business Enterprise (New York: Scrib­
ner's, 1904), p. 369.
39Clark, "Adam Smith and the Currents of History," Preface to Social 
Eoonomios, p. 189.
40
Tugwell, "Human Nature and social Eoonomy, Journal of Philosophy. 
August 14, 1930, p. 465.
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Reality is seen to be in the process itself, not in the parts whioh are
but abstractions of the process# And individual item cannot exist apart
41from the larger system to which it belongs except as an abstraction.
And to approach reality by way of the individual item is what Whitehead
42termed the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness." It commits a fallacy 
by attempting to find reality in the abstraction.
Thus it is that the institutionalists object to the methodological 
approach of the orthodox economists who attempt to find meaning, attempt 
to understand the eoonomio system, by analyzing what an individual firm 
would do under certain hypothetical circumstances. It is a fallaoy be­
cause it is an attempt to understand reality by analyzing the abstraction 
under hypothetical conditions. By studying the eoonomio system as an 
evolving, ever-changing process, the institutionalist is recognizing and 
giving primary importance to the new and the different. As Walton Hamil­
ton said of Hoxie's economicsi "Since his environment m s  a developing
43
one, his problem was ever changing." The mechanistic, addititive 
approach of the orthodox economist they insist leaves no room for evolu­
tion or change in the economic system as a thole— only in the price system—  
for it confines attention to the isolated parts.
It is of course from this standpoint that the institutionalists argue 
that the thole is greater than the sum of its parts:
The persistence of the naive reasoning in which wholes 
are regarded as the simple stuns of parts is more aston­
ishing in sooial matters than elsewhere. ... It seems 
not difficult to understand that the prosperity of soc­
iety is something more than the total of individual pros-
41Ah important corollary of this will be explored in a later chapter 
in whioh the relationship of the individual to society will be examined.
4 ^Whitehead, A. N., Soienoe and the Modern World (Hew York: Macmil­
lan, 1925), chap. iv, and especially pp. l(te, r/4.
43Hamilton, W., "The Development of Hoxie's Bionomics," JPE, November, 
1916, p. 861.
108
parities: that sooial behavior is not to be predicted 
from knowledge of individual psychology.^4
Critics have argued that it is impossible for a whole to be greater than
the sum of its parts, but in so arguing they have missed the central
point, such a statement does not refer to a quantitative summation; it
refers rather to a qualitative recognition that the part is only an
45
analytical abstraction. It is the evolving process whioh is real;
and it is within that evolving process that the institutionalist proposes
to find the meaning and the understanding necessary for the social control
of that process. It is ■this influence to which Homan referred, though
perhaps unwittingly, when he noted that the emphasis in eoonomics was
shifting to an analysis of how our present system and its institutions
came into being, how they work, where they are carrying us, and "by what
46means and to what ends we can direct their future development."
THE CONCEPT OF HEIATIVITY
Another facet of the institutionalist's thinking whioh is olosely 
related to, but distinct from, the evolutionary point of view, is what 
has generally been referred to as the concept of relativity. Viewing 
the economio system as an evolving, changing phenomenon, they insist 
that eoonomios as a body of thought must likewise change and evolve.
Their eoonomics represents a shift from a search for universal, ever­
lasting laws governing an ordered universe, to a relativistic, temporal 
analysis; there are no universal generalizations applicable at all times
^Tugweil, Rexford G., "The Directive," Journal of Social Philosophy 
and Jurisprudence, October, 1941, p. 22.
45
J. C. Smuts, the originator of the term "Holism," said that "The 
so-called parts are in faot not real but largely abstract analytical dis­
tinctions, and do not properly or adequately express what has gone to the 
making of the thing as a whole." (Encyclopedia Brltannica. Vol.XI, p. 640).
46Homan, Contemporary Eoonomio Thought, p. 460.
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in the real world, there are rather, specifio problems in a changing and 
oomplex world whioh require specifio answers. It was this facet of Hoxie 
whioh Walton Hamilton also noted when he pointed out that the rapidly 
changing sooial and intellectual environment "impelled him to the con­
clusion that the methodology of orthodox eoonomios was out of harmony
47with the dominant intellectual thought of the times."
Eoonomio theory, in the view of the institutionalist, must be made 
more relevant, less universal and generalized. This view stems primarily 
from their insistence that there is no normal state of affairs, that eoo­
nomio conditions and problems at any one time reflect the interaction of 
the prevailing institutions and technology of that particular society.
As was pointed out earlier, it is their belief that the static-oriented 
analysis of the orthodox eoonomist is not necessarily wrong, but that it 
does not come to grips with the significant issues and problems of the 
times. Thus it was that Mitohell held that for deoades economic theory 
and eoonomio problems had little more in common than the binding of the 
textbook.
When, however, economic theory is made an account of 
the cumulative change of economic behavior, then all 
studies of special institutions become organic parts 
of a single whole. ...economio theory will oease to 
be a thing apart from applied eoonomios, beoause eco-^„ 
nomio theory Itself will deal with genuine issues....
The institutionalist aooepts as the basis for a sound and workable eco­
nomio theory Mitchell’s observation that
One of the results of any survey of the development 
of economic doctrines is to show that in very large
^Hamilton, W., "The Development of Hoxie’s Eoonomics," JPE, Nov­
ember, 1916, p. 864. .
48Mitchell, "The Prospects of Eoonomios," The Backward Art of Spend­
ing Money, p. 372.
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measure the important departures in economio theory 
have been intellectual responses to changing economic 
conditions.^®
The fact remains, however, that within the mainstream, economics has 
attempted to meet changing conditions, the new problems which arise, 
with basically the same tools, the same concepts, the same methods and 
techniques. The important departures have not ocourred within this 
mainstream of economic thought for it has remained essentially a deduc­
tive soienoe concerned with the determination of price in a market eco­
nomy. (Almost no attention has been devoted to that market mechanism 
itself— its role as an allocating, coordinating, distributing, device 
and the efficiency with which it performs these various functions; it is 
but one of the ’’givens" in orthodox eoonomics.) And it is this narrow 
concern which the institutionalists insist unduly hinders orthodox eoo­
nomics from being relevant to the changing and evolvingproblems and issues.
J. M. Clark noted what he considered to be the primary issue when he 
said that
Economic theory should be aotively relevant to the
issues of its time and it should be based on a founda­
tion of terms, conceptions, standards of measurement, 
and assumptions which is sufficiently realistic, com­
prehensive, and unbiassed to furnish a common meeting 
ground for argument between advooates of all shades of 
conviction on practical issues.®®
Clark finds that there are two bodies of eoonomio theory which are separ­
ated by "more or lees thought-tight compartments." One of these is the
orthodox analysis of the determination of price, the mechanism of "free 
exchange in a perfect market."
It searches for laws governing levels of equilibrium in
49Mitchell, Lecture Notes, Vol. I, p* 1.
CA
Clark, "Eoonomio Theory in an Era of Social Readjustment, AER,
March, 1919, p. 280.
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suoh markets, and in this broad sense is statio. In its 
view of human nature and of soclal-eoonomic institutions 
it either assumes them to be static or tries to frame its 
static statements so as to admit, passively, the exist­
ence of dynamic facts but make no further changes in the 
statio statements and hence make no aotive analysis of 
dynamic forces and changes in human nature and institutions. „  
This has much the same effect as assuming them to be static.
Clark dieting! ishes a second body of economio theory which he calls '*soo­
ial economics," and within which he obviously includes himself:
Here belongs John Stuart Mill’s discussion of property 
and communism, of land tenures and of the sphere of govern­
ment, and also the Essay on Liberty. Adam Smith's treat­
ment of public expenditures falls in this division, also a 
large part of J. B. Clark's Philosophy of Wealth, and the 
writings of Veblen and Hobson.
Clark emphasizes that the important point for eoonomio theory is that
"each generation of economists succeeds to a new assortment of praetioal
problems to which its doctrines are to be applied." But if eoonomios is
to be significant and relevant, if it is to oome to grips with these
practical problems «nd issues whioh change with each generation, then the
search for laws governing equilibrium within a statio framework must give
way to, or at least be subordinate to, the other body of economio theory—
that of "sooial eoonomios." We must "strip dogmas of their universality
54and interpret them in relation to time and place." Clark is willing
^Clark, "Adam Smith and the currents of History," Preface to Sooial 
Eoonomios, p. 173»
The materials of prioe theory, he notes, are
selected, not with a reference to furnishing a rounded 
interpretation of the business system with reference to 
the movements that are afoot in the coming era of recon­
struction, but with reference to their 
ting into ... a logical "closed system.
51Ibid
62Ibid., p. 281.
53Ibid., p. 282
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to concede that the statio equilibrium analysis may have been "su­
premely relevant" to the economio problems of a century ago*.*, but
for the problems of today it is the other phases of guidance that 
55olaim attention." The pressing modern problem oalling for atten­
tion is that of control and regulation, the guidanoe of the economio 
system; and it is for this purpose that the institutionalists hold that 
traditional eoonomios is inadequate.
Another faoet of the oonoept of relativity in institutional eoo- 
nomioB is in the role assigned to the "givens" and the "variables." 
Orthodox eoonomios, taking as its central problem the analysis of 
prices, has consistently allotted many factors to the realm of the 
"givens." These were the factors which were deemed of no importance 
for eoonomios since they did not influence the determination of prices* 
Among the more important of these fhotors were the institutions of 
society, its sooial organization, the prevailing technology, human be­
havior or human nature, the distribution of income, the aooeptanoe of 
all costs which are variable to the individual firm as being variable 
costs to society, and finally, the efficiency of the market meohani3m 
itself. The institutionalist demurs at this delineation and proposes 
instead to treat these various factors as variables, as being items 
which should be taken into account, as items which are to be analyzed. 
Thus it was that Clark insisted that the institutions of a society 
cannot be taken "for granted as if they were supreme ends in them-
eg
selves;" they are rather to be treated as "means to social ends."
They are, as Ayres puts it, among the more important analytical tools
65
Clark, "Economics and Modem Psychology," ibid., pp. 94-95.
^Ciark, "Concept of Value— A Rejoinder,"QJE, August, 1915, 
pp. 721-2.
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by which the institutional economist proposes to show how the modern
57economy functions and how it oan be improved. The orthodox economist 
also chooses to ignore human nature, insisting that such an analysis 
is not pertinent to economics, while the institutionalist insists that 
this is one of the major areas to be explored by the economist. In 
attempting to explain the economic system, the orthodox economist shows 
how the variable costs of the firm influence its activities and then 
goes on to the oonolusion that suoh activities give an aoourate pieture 
of the economy as a whole. The institutionalist on the other hand points 
out that -while such costs as labor are variable costs from the point of 
view of the firm, they are fixed or constant costs from the point of view
CO
of society and any correct social accounting would so regard them.
What is at issue of course is the difference in outlook of the two 
economists. The one holds that the meaning of the eoonomy is to be found 
in the interplay of and the determination of prices and for suoh a view, 
an understanding of human nature, the institutional setting, the distribu­
tion of income, etc., are not pertinent. He merely takes them as given. 
The other views economios as being primarily concerned with the control, 
regulation, and improvement of the economy and hence insists that all 
suoh factors as these are indeed relevant. As Commons said, an eoonomio 
"policy" is to promote national prosperity and an "eoonomio theory is an 
explanation of all the foroes at work" affecting that policy; "a theory 
criticizes, modifies, or justifies the policy."59 The problem as seen by
57See for example, ^yres, "The Co-ordinates of Institutionalism,"
AER, May, 1951, p. 52.
^See J. M. Clark, The Economics of Overhead Costs, and "Some Sooial 
Aspects of Overhead Costs ,v AER, March, 1623.
59Commons, "Wage Theories and Wage Policies," AER, Maroh, 1923,
p. 112.
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the institutionalist is suoh a complex of interdependent faotors, of so 
many and diverse relativities, that an understanding of them may proceed 
only from, the inclusion of them in the analysis.
The influence of the concept of relativity can perhaps best be
stated by Commons:
The modem theory of relativity has superseded the older 
ideas in physics of the absolute distinctions between 
time and spaoe, and between the investigator and the 
materials investigated; it is also urgent that we see 
the relativities in sooial action and investigation. ...
Social affairs are also relative to time. Everything
I have taken up in my investigations seems to have had its 
character determined by what went before or by something 
that came after.60
This last oomment of Commons, it will be noted, bears a striking simi­
larity to the general oonoept of evolution. These two ideas— that of 
relativity and of evolution— are of course closely interrelated. They 
point up, for the institutionalist, the interrelated nature of the eco­
nomio system, that any specific event is a product of what has gone on 
before it, that it is determined by the general institutional structure
of society at that particular time, that rather than having universal
and never-changing laws and principles whioh will provide an insight 
and understanding into the economy, it is necessary to tackle the problem 
in terms of the overall "Gestalt” of whioh the problem is but a facet.
Thus one of the more important attributes of this general concept
of relativity, of a social Gestalt, is the necessity of integrating any
planning with that Gestalt. As Gambs humorously comments, "In certain
situations, we have been told, it would be wise to use pink and blue
81double-aoting self-oanoeling sorip instead of money." But as Gambs
60Commons, Eoonomics of Collective Action, p. 117.
61Gambs, Beyond Supply and Demand, p. 76.
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rightly notes, if suoh a plan is not congruous with the general institu­
tions of the society, with the sooial Gestalt, then we should abandon the 
plan* This idea of a sooial Gestalt, of the interrelatedness of the 
various facets of society, of the relativities involved, serves in one 
of its more useful functions as an integrating device. It helps foous 
attention on the many faceted institutional characteristics of the eco­
nomy rather than narrowing attention to the analysis of price movements. 
It therefore necessarily becomes an integral part of the general orienta­
tion of the institutional economist who is aiming at developing an eoo­
nomio theory for purposes of control and who insists that suoh a theory 
cannot be aohieved within the confines of the analysis of price move­
ments in various assumed market conditions.
The importance of relativity is also seen in the necessity of reoog- 
nizing »nd accounting for the influence of the economist himself in the 
subject of his inquiry. It is a breakdown of the traditional distinc­
tion between subjective and objective, insisting to the contrary, that 
the’thoughts, ideas, and investigations of the sooial scientists are a 
part of the materials of their own investigations.”®^ Thus, one import­
ant philosophical influence of the concept of relativity has been to 
point up the importance of taking the observer or the reporter into 
account, that "much more dependB upon the point of view of the observer 
than was formerly thought.”63 It is the recognition that -the economist 
is a produot of his past experiences, his attitudes, his prejudices, his 
preconceptions, and that his economic analysis is inevitably going to be 
conditioned by his peculiar orientation. Any thorough understanding of
62Commons, Eoonomics of Collective Action, p. 117.
63
Russell, Bertrand A. W., "Relativity: Philosophical Consequences,” 
Encyclopedia Britaimica, Vol. XIX, p. 99.
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1die work of any one economist must therefore reoognize this influence 
as muoh as possible in order to discount it. This is simply another 
way of saying -that economic theory is a product of the times and cir­
cumstances under which it arose and that it is likewise a product of 
the person or persons involved. As Clark put it, "to understand any 
forceful writer and to make the necessary allowances, find out what it 
was against which he was reacting."641 This is perhaps a rather strong 
way of putting the idea, but the important point is that eoonomio theory 
is not a dispassionate, objective account of the economic system. Eco­
nomic theory arises from the need for readjustment, from the shortcom­
ings of the traditional way of conducting economic activities} and for 
a more precise understanding of eoonomio theory, one should therefore 
know the circumstanoes under which it arose.
This point of view has been explored in recent years by many psy­
chologists and philosophers as a problem in perception. The general 
conclusion has been that perception, thether it be visual or social 
perception, is not a mere recording of the outside world. It is rather 
a two-way relationship, a mutual product of both the viewer and the 
viewed. The so-called "objective" qualities suoh as size, shape, and 
distance, do not exist in their own right in the objeot; neither do 
they exist in the mind of the viewer. They do instead result from the 
mutual interaction of both. It is in this sense that Gonsnons argues 
that the economist should take cognizance of the "active, participa­
ting mind" in his economic theory. This is true, aooording to Commons, 
from two points of view. First of all, we should take account of
64Clark, "Adam Smith and the Currents of History," Preface to 
Social Eoonomios, ' p. 174.
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the economist himself, for his thoughts, ideas and investigations are, 
or become, an integral part of the results. Also, economic theory should 
view human activity as the result of this active participating mind, a 
mind which is not content to let matters take their own course, but 
whioh can and does give direction to events by separating -the strategic 
and controlling factors. Economio change and development are seen then 
to be a result, not of "natural" selection, but rather of "artificial" or 
"purposeful" selection— the rejection of those praotioes, habits, and in­
stitutions whioh are an impediment to economio development. And it is 
the economist’s function to appriase these impediments and point to a 
more satisfactory scheme. We shall return to this oonoept of relativity 
again in the next chapter in connection with the institutionalists' theory 
of knowledge. Before doing so, however, we should briefly turn our atten­
tion to an examination of the oonoept of planning as viewed by the insti­
tutional economist.
THE CONCEPT OF PIAMING
Planning to the institutional economist is a rather broad and inclu­
sive concept. It includes the idea of control, of regulation, of direc­
tion! it inoludes also the idea of consoious reform of the economic system; 
and it also inoludes the idea of setting goals and how they may be attained. 
While it is only the latter oonoept which is commonly thought of as plan­
ning (probably because of the system of planning in the Soviet Union), 
the institutionalist insists that in any meaningful sense, it is a much 
broader concept.
Essentially, the issue is one of automatism versus human direction.
As has been apparent throughout this study, and as will be explored more 
fully in a later chapter, the institutional economist rejects the concept 
of an automatic market mechanism whioh will, as if by natural law, ensure
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the smooth functioning of the eoonomio system. He insists that quite 
to the contrary, societies, have always planned, that they have always 
oonsoiously intervened in the functioning of the market. As Mitchell 
pointed out, even laissez faire m s  planned. That is, it m s  not a nat­
ural nor an inevitable condition; it m s  rather a particular organiza­
tion of society whioh had to be implemented in order to achieve results 
whioh otherwise were not attainable. Thus, in Mitchell's view, after
publication of The Wealth of Hations, the "British government planned to 
65
have no plan.11 This was the era of laissez faire, of reliance upon 
the invisible hand. And in suoh a small-scale, atomistic, economy, irre­
sponsible self-interest m s  one possible technique of organization. With 
the growing complexity and interdependenoy of the modem economy, however, 
it became evident that this m s  insufficient. It was neither adequate
gg
nor desirable for a highly dynamic, interdependent society. While
laissez faire may have been planned, it was never a suooessful plan or
arrangement. That is, it never achieved the results whioh society thought
were good and desirable and the result m s  a certain amount of tinkering
with the automatic forces from the very outset. Or as Commons put it,
the consequences of noninterference with these "natural" forces were always
67deemed worse than the oonsequenoes of interference, and the result has
been a considerable, and an increasing, amount of this so-called interfer-
68
enoe with the functioning of the American economy from its founding.
65Mitchell, W. C., "The Social Sciences and National Planning," The 
Backward Aft of Spending Money, p. 8 6; reprinted by permission from 
Science, January 18, 1&55.
®6Cf. Clark, Alternative to Serfdom, pp. 4ff.
67Commons, Eoonomios of Collective Action, pp. 136ff.
68
Mitchell, W. C., "Intelligence and the Guidance of Economio Evolu­
tion," Backward Art of Spending Money, pp. 119ff; reprinted by permission 
from Scientific Monlfcly, November, 1956.
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With the growth of the economy to a mature, closely integrated and 
highly interdependent system, planning, control, regulation, became 
more and more necessary* The reliance upon irresponsible self interest 
to which Clark referred, was simply no longer one of the possible methods 
of organization. Clark emphasized this same point in a somewhat differ­
ent way also:
In the past, most observers felt that central control 
could do no better than unplanned competitions and 
they focused their attention on the marvelous fact that 
free exchange without central planning does produce some 
sort of order. This may have been a proper attitude at 
the time, in view of the prevailing ignorance of the 
principles of large-scale organization, and of the nature 
of the problem of business depressions. But it is not a 
proper attitude now.®®
Thus it was that planning, intervention, social control generally, 
had by the beginning of the twentieth century become an accepted part 
of the American economy. Mitchell once remarked that private enterprise 
had in fact become a pass phenomenon before the publication of the Wealth 
of Nations which was merely a ’'philosopher* s rationalization" of exist­
ing practices. And so it was that planning and social intervention had 
the twentieth century become a mass phenomenon in a nation that still 
"accepted the principle of laissez f a i r e . A n d  perhaps it might be 
said that the writings of the institutionalists are merely a philosopher's 
rationalization for existing praotioes. Indeed, many have said approxi­
mately the same thing. A. B. Wolfe, for example, noted that Mitohell
fi9Clark, J. M., "Long-Eange Planning for the Regularization of In­
dustry," Preface to Social Eoonomios, p. 240j reprinted by permission 
from The Mfew Republic, January 15, 1932, part 2. This article appeared 
as a report on unemployment and industrialization stabilization by a sub­
committee consisting of Clark as chairman, J. Russell Smith, Edwin S. 
Smith, and George Soule.
70Mitohell, "Intelligence and the Guidance of Eoonomio Evolution," 
The Backward Art of Spending Money, pp. 108, 118.
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aooepted as a basic principle that "Economic planning is inevitable
■whether we think it feasible or not. Henoe we had better organise to
71
do the job as well as we oan." And in a certain sense of the word, it 
seems that their writings are indeed philosophic rationalizations for ex­
isting, and what they consider to be necessary, practices.
In the view of the institutionalist, orthodox eeonomio theory has 
provided little which will assist in social control. And the result has 
been a long series of hodge-podge, hit-or-miss, ad hoc, pieoemeal programs; 
but pieoemeal, partial controls have unforeseen effects in many other areas 
of the economy. According to Tugwell,
This is one reason why piecemeal regulation tends to 
widen and why some effort at really national planning 
becomes a practical issue immediately upon considera­
tion of any planning at all.^2
Mitohell also recognized that
The piecemeal method o verlooks the interdependence that 
is so important a characteristic of sooial processes.
Change one feature of sooial organization and you are 
certain to change many other features. Some of the 
changes you did not plan you will not like.
In addition to induoing far-reaching and unforeseen effects, pieoemeal,
emergency controls are usually handioapped by the need for quiok and
immediate action* We do not, according to Mitchell, make the "best use
of what limited intelligence we possess" when we proceed on such a basis.
The shortcomings of suoh a procedure were illustrated by Mitohell when he
^TTolfe, A. B., "Thoughts on Perusal of Wesley Mitchell's Essays,"
JPE, February, 1939, p. 5; see rlso (jruchy's review of Wesley Clair Mit­
ohell, the Eoonomio Scientist, AjSR, June, 1963, p. 397.
72Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts.
p. 20 1.
73
Mitohell, "The Social Soienees and National Planning," The Back­
ward Art of Spending Money, p. 99. — — —
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commented that
To design an efficient National Industrial Recovery Act 
is vastly more diffioult than to design an efficient 
bridge across the Golden Gate. The one task we essayed 
in a fine frenzy of good intentions and rushed it through 
in short order* the other we performed deliberately after 
elaborate study of the geological as well as the meohanioal 
faotors involved.
Mitohell proposes that instead of this procedure, we "organize ourselves 
for deliberate and systematic study of sooial problems." The oentral 
problem, Mitohell argues, is "not at finding a * solution,’" but at find­
ing methods by which communities can carry on intelligently the process
of working out the endless series of detailed solutions with which they
75must keep experimenting.
And it is the function of the economist to participate in this organ­
ized sooial experimentation, for as Tugwell argued,
... if the social good is to be obtained, and not just 
here and there the good of an individual or a group, if 
we are to have, in this sense, progress, it oan only oome 
from a constant re-examination of ideals and oonstant re­
direction of sooial forces toward their attainment. ... 
for industry is a sooial instrument whioh, if freely ex­
perimented with, and if directed to the uses of men, holds 
definite promise for the future. ... It oan free mankind 
for whatever life seems good. It remains only to be said 
that an experimental eoonomios is the condition of this 
freedom.
And it is Tugwell*s opinion that it is to the eoonomist that "we ought
to look for guidance" in such matters, because
Economists are imperatively required to be sooial scien­
tists in reality; and this means that they are to say what
^Mitohell, "Intelligence and Economic Evolution," ibid.. pp. 130-1.
^Ibid., p. 127; italics added.
76
Tugwell. "Experimental Eoonomics," The Trend of Eoonomios. pp. 421-
422.
77Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental ArtB, 
pp. 87-8.
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it is the industrial system does to men and to define what 
it is men have a right to expect from industry. ...the 
economists are not providing their share of the contribu­
tion to a problem which, in its major phase, is espeoially 
and specifically theirs. The directive intelligence of 
our time must grapple at once with the complexities of an 
industrial system... Upon whose minds should this direc­
tive responsibility fall if not upon those specifically 
gifted and trained in the understanding of industrial 
philosophy and technique?'®
Tfllhat, then, are the goals, the ends, toward which the eoonomic system is 
to be directed? If the directive intelligence for industry is to be 
supplied by the economist, if this task is specifically his, That is it 
that he is to prescribe. Is he in other words, to become a virtual 
dictator, indicating what shall be produced and what shall not be pro­
duced?
In the opinion of these economists, he would not be such. As Clark
put it, "we are developing at least in the direction of objective standards
for deolding such questions;" we are capable of devebping standards accord-
79ing to which we may namend the 'standard1 of the market.” And Ayres 
pointed out that
We do not hesitate to tamper with people's wnats when 
they run athwart the productive interests of the com­
munity ... we are beginning to learn that dietary 
deficiency ^ for example^ is also contrary to the same 
common and general interest in physical, productive
health.80
Mitohell likewise said that in his opinion welfare "is oapable of being 
made objective and definite in reference to such matters as food, eloth-
Tugwell, "Human Nature in Economic Theory," JPE, June, 1922,
p* 343*
^®Clark, Sooial Control of Business, pp. 199ff.
80Ayres, "The Principles of Eoonomic Strategy," Southern Economic 
Journal. April, 1939, p. 467.
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ing, shelter, sanitation, education, fatigue, leisure."81 These eco­
nomists do not think that this "directive intelligence" of the indus­
trial system need be by a dictator in the sense that this direction will 
be merely a matter of personal whim. They hold to the contrary that with 
increasing knowledge and understanding, such direction may be made scien­
tific. These are of course important and difficult problems for they do 
represent a view contrary to that usually taken by the economist. And 
they are problems which must be scrutinized before one can be expected 
to accept or to reject institutional eoonomios. A more searohing and in­
clusive answer will have to wait, however, until the end of this study at 
whioh time a separate chapter will be devoted to this whole problem, be­
cause the answer of the institutionalists to these questions is really 
predicated upon other major premises which have yet to be explored. A 
tentative summary of their position might well be in order at this time, 
however,
While there is some disparity among these economists on what goals 
or ends the eoonomic system is to be directed toward, there is basically 
general agreement. Professors Ayres and Clark see the main task as pro­
viding the understanding necessary to ensure a stable, but not a static, 
economy. Thus Clark pointed out that
The true objective of planning is ... regularized growth.
It is the full utilization of our powers of production, 
whioh are continually growing, in order that our consump­
tion may grow correspondingly. ... Increased production 
and a raised standard of living must go hand in hand; 
neither end can be gained without the other.
And Ayres in similar fashion said that
We are even beginning to wonder more seriously than ever
Q1
Mitohell, "The Prospeots of Eoonomios," The Backward Art of Spend­
ing Money, p. 381.
Clark, "Long-Range Planning for the Regularization of Industry," 
Preface to Sooial Economics, p. 245.
124
before if it is to the economic interest of industrial 
society for tiro-thirds of the population to be ill-fed, 
ill-clothed, and ill-housed.... In order to produce we 
must consume. Economic stability and the full utiliza­
tion of our productive skill are contingent on the dis­
tribution of consumer purchasing power. ... The whole 
idea of an economic system is contingent on the assump­
tion that production and distribution coincide and are 
different aspects of one and the same thing.®®
Economic planning, Ayres agrees with Clark, is "planning for a stable
OA
economy." But vrhat a stable economy is and how it is to be aohieved,
has been misunderstood and misrepresented by orthodox analysis:
...the first principle of all economic stability is phy­
sical stability. The stabilitywithout which civilization 
is impossible.... For a century and a half we have been 
accustomed to think of economic stability in terms of 
prices. But economio stability can certainly be under­
stood in such physical terms as the relation of food 
supply to population, the regularity of working habits 
of the people, continuity of operation of machines, and 
so forth. ••• It is this stability with whioh we are 
confronted: to seek economio stability conceived not In 
terms of price equilibrium but in physical terms as 
stability of men, machines, and operations.
The oentral oonoem of these economists is to ensure the stability of 
the eoonomic system, to provide the understanding neoessary to ensure 
that stability, conceived not in terms of prioe equilibrium, but in terms 
ofproduction and employment— the "full utilization of our powers of pro­
duction." Theirs is a recognition of the identity of production and 
consumption— that eaoh is neoessary to the other, that the two taken 
together are what constitute the economic system* and further, that the 
economic system can be made to operate more efficiently— meaning produo-
o<z
Ayres, "The Principles of Economic Strategy," The Southern Economio 
Journal, April, 1939, p. 467. .....
84
Ayres, "The New Eoonomios," Southwest Review, Summer, 1948, p. 228.
Q£
Ayres, "The Principles of Economio Strategy," Southern Economio 
Journal, April, 1939, p. 464* quotation re-arranged. ' ' ' '
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tlon and consumption oan be progressively raised— only if the economist 
re-orients his thinking. And that is precisely -what they are attempting 
to do— to provide the understanding and knowledge necessary for that 
task. The task, which Tugwell defines as being "to mold our social and
Off
economic environment so as to reap the largest possible rewards.' To 
develop the "social control" whioh, according to Clark, "must be capable
go
of progressively raising the level of mankind." It is both "irrelevant 
and intolerable” Clark adds, that the production of consumer goods should 
reach its maximum only when the community is unusually busy building rail­
roads and skyscrapers, then to have that production
...fall to levels that mean privation when these tasks 
subside, though oonsumers continue to have just as many 
needs and producers continue to have just as much power 
(or more) to produce goods to gratify them. These irra­
tional and destructive instabilities are the things to 
be eliminated.®®
This is the same point Hamilton made when he said that "the end of all
industrial activity is obviously the enlargement of the material means
to human welfare." He added, however, that we
oan hardly escape the conclusion that the eoonomic order 
yields far less of the wherewithal of living, leisure, and 
opportunity than even as a minimum we have the right to 
expeot from it. It has served us none too well, is only 
partially under our oontrol, and still presents a turbu­
lence that awaits the domesticating touch of the future.®®
The eoonomic system has then failed to meet these objectives whioh these
36Tugwell, R. G., and Hill, H. C., Our Economio Society and Its 
Problems (New York: Harcourt Braoe, 1935), p. S45L.
87Clark, Sooial Control of Business, p. 16.
8 8Ibid., p. 455.
89Hamilton, W., Prioe and Price Policies, pp. 2, 24.
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economists hold are the standards by whioh the economic system is to be 
judged.
The economic system is only partially under our control. One of the 
basic reasons why it is not under our control is the traditional view of 
the price system as an effielent organizing device. The institutionalists 
insist that it is a rather inadequate organizing mechanism and they fur­
ther argue that it is only one among many. They insist that it is not an 
automatic mechanism, that it perverts the objectives of the eoonomic 
system (to progressively raise the level of mankind), and that if the 
economy is to fulfill these objectives, economic analysis must include 
more than to explain the functioning of the economy in terms of price 
movements. We are not so certain, says Tugwell, that “so vital a concern” 
as income and standards of living
...ought to be left to the vagaries of the market. ... The 
idea grows that the national income and its apportionment 
is a matter which ought not to be left without some sooial 
supervision. It is perhaps true that a large supply and a 
small demand will lower prices and that a small supply and 
a large demand will raise them; but it does not follow that 
the public interest is best served by allowing the supply 
of and the demand for commodities to remain completely and 
solely determinative.
Tugwell is then agreeing with the others. The economic system is not a
natural or automatic mechanism; it is, rather, a social institution,
which oan and must be directed and controlled to achieve societal ends*
This oan be accomplished, however, only if economio theory and economio
analysis redirect their efforts to provide the neoessary understanding
and knowledge.
90Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts.
p. 179.
CHAPTER V
THE EPISTEMOLGGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INSTITUTIONALISM
Introduction
An important premise of institutional eoonomios whioh gives unity 
both of direction and of spirit is their general philosophical orienta­
tion variously known as pragmatism or instrumentalism. The influence of 
this philosophy is most clearly seen in their views concerning the func­
tion of and the nature of knowledge and the role of knowledge or knowing 
in economics. Defore turning to an examination of specific facets of 
this general topic, a few introductory or summary remarks concerning 
pragmatism would seem to be in order.
This philosophical position originated with the writings and the 
investigations of Charles Peiroe who evolved a general theory with respect 
to the nature of truth as applied to soienoe, especially as related to 
the methods and results of scientific investigation. Peiroe, a physical 
scientist with the Geodetic survey of the Federal Government, had worked 
out what he considered to be a more fruitful approach to the physical 
sciences and to the establishment of the validity of scientific theories. 
In its more debased form, this is the position that whatever works is 
true right. This, however, was not Peirce's position. He simply 
pointed out that if a theory "works,” if it gives consistent results 
which are verifiable by others, then that theory is "true" in so far as 
present knowledge is concerned. His was basically a theory of knowledge, 
that is, only that xfcich is used and is usable is "knowledge." Peiroe 
did not expound his ideas at any great length, but did exert considerable 
influenoe upon the thinking of others, especially William James and John
12?
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Dewey. Peiroe protested the use to whioh James and Dewey put his ideas,
however, insisting (correctly) that they made the test of truth of an
idea, or of a theory, not only whether it led to the expeoted consequences,
2
but also whether it led to desirable consequences.
Although it is to Peirce that credit must be given for first having 
formulated the basic position of the pragmatists, it remained for Dewey 
especially to expound and to elaborate it into a more complete philosophi­
cal position; and it is Dewey who has certainly exerted the greatest influ­
ence on the institutionalists— both in his writings and in personal contact. 
Clark and Tugwell were both associated with him on the faculty at Columbia. 
Mitchell in addition to being on the same faculty at Columbia studied under 
him while at the University of Chicago. Mitchell m s  tremendously impressed 
by and influenced by Dewey while at Chioago and has recounted this exper­
ience in a most interesting letter to J. M. Clark in whioh he said in parts
It seemed to me that people who took seriously the sort 
of articles which were then appearing in the J. E. 
might have a better time if they went in for metaphysios 
proper.
Meanwhile I was finding something really interesting 
in philosophy and eoonomios. John Dewey was giving courses 
under all sorts of titles and every one of them dealt with 
the same problem— how we think. I m s  fascinated by his 
view of the place whioh logic holds in human behavior. It 
explained the eoonomic theorists. The thing to do was to
Thus Dewey once pointed out that "The readers who are acquainted 
with the logical writings of Peirce will note my great indebtedness to 
him in the general position taken. As far as I am aware, he was the 
first writer on logic to make inquiry and its methods the primary and 
ultimate source of logioal subject-matter." Logic; The Theory of In­
quiry (New York; Henry Holt, 1938), p. 9-n).
2For a disoussion of these ideas and their influence upon one of 
the institutionalists, see Commons, Institutional Eoonomios, pp. 140- 
156.
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find out how they came to attack certain problems....
Ayres actually did his graduate work in the field of philosophy and has 
been a close student of Dewey since that time, contributing many artioles 
on the significance of Dewey’s ideas for economics* In one he noted that 
as ’’The economics of the past acknowledges a philosopher as its chief 
arohiteot; ... so will the economics of the future."^ Commons made re­
peated references to the works of Dewey throughout his writings and was 
apparently especially influenced by Dewey's extremely worth-while book: 
the Quest for Certainly: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Aotion. 
Commons’ continual reference to ideas as being "springboards for aotion," 
his reference to the role of assumptions and theories as guides to action,
stem from the instrumentalism of Dewey. In a discussion of the supposed
dichotomy between soienoe and art, Commons himself drew a parallel be­
tween his ideas and those of Dewey on this subject:
The method of historical soience, and therefore of eoo­
nomic science, is the process of analysis, genesis, and 
insight. We reach a better understanding by attaining 
a better analysis and a better knowledge of sequence. ...
Historically this process is not really different 
from the prooess of natural soience, if by natural science 
we mean, not a body of knowledge, but a process of attain­
ing control over the forces of nature by better knowledge 
of the ways in which these forces operate. But such is not 
the usual meaning of the word soience. It is rather the 
meaning of the Art of Engineering. "Art" supposedly differs 
from "science" in that it means human control, whereas 
soienoe means only human knowledge. If, however, the sub­
ject-matter of natural science is looked upon not as a body
of knowledge but as a body of scientists acquiring knowledge 
by experiment and investigation, then ^ Ehe distinction is
g
Letter from Wesley C. Mitohell to J. M. Clark, dated August 9, 
1928, reprinted by permission of Mr. Mitohell In J. M. Clark, Preface 
t6 Sooial Economics, pp. 410-416.
4Ayrer, "Instrumental Eoonomios," an article contributed to a 
special issue in honor of John Dewey on the occasion of his 90th birth­
day, New Republio, October 17, 1949, p. 20.
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" illusory^. •. • It would seam that way out is to
ohange the subjeot-matter of science from a body of know­
ledge to a body of scientists. If so, then natural soience 
becomes the same as that whioh economists know as the 
"machine process,” and the universe is no longer an infin­
ite ”meohanism” independent of human will, but is a finite 
"machine” constructed by scientific investigators. Some­
thing like this may happen. It seems to be outlined by 
Dewey. He said, "Ideas that are plans of operations to be 
performed are integral factors in actions which change the 
face of the world ••• A genuine idealism and one compati­
ble with science will emerge as soon as philosophy accepts 
the teaching of science that ideas are statements not of 
what is or has been— but of acts to be performed.’1®
This view of Commons is significant in many respects other than the direct 
reference to Dewey in that it contains several instances of the influence 
of pragmatism upon the -thinking of Commons, and as we shall note later, 
upon the thinking of the other institutionalists. Thus, soience is taken 
to be "not a body of knowledge, but a process of attaining control over 
the forces of nature," and the universe is viewed as a "finite 'machine* 
constructed by scientific investigators." As we shall see, this activist 
view of knowledge forms the basis for the institutional approach to eco­
nomic theory and economic analysis.
The Function of Knowledge 
The key words in the institutionalists’ view of knowledge are func­
tional, useful, exploratory, investigative, tentative. They have accepted 
rather completely the philosophy of pragmatism whioh Horace M. Kallen 
defined ast
Pragmatism dissolves dogmas into beliefs, eternities and 
necessities into ohange and chance, conclusions and finali­
ties into processes. But men have invented philosophy pre­
cisely because they find change, ohanoe and process too much 
for them, and desire infallible security and oertainty.
^Commons, Institutional Economics, pp. 746-7j quote of Dewey from 
The Quest for Certainty, P» 138.
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Pragmatism is no philosophy for them.
It is, however, a philosophy for the institutional economists. They have 
accepted change and flux as the subject-matter of their inquiry, insist­
ing that this change is not random or haphazard, but is subject to orderly 
control and direction. As Mitohell onoe noted,
In the life of the nation, planning plays the role that
thinking plays in individual life. Both processes are
resorted to typically to find ways of surmounting diffi­
culties that occur in the course of routine behavior.?
Knowledge, in the view of the institutionalists, is seen to be an instru­
ments its function is guidance and control. Their concern with knowing 
and understanding is for the sake of aotion, rather than with an attempt 
to unoover universal and immutable laws or truths. And thus it is that
knowledge must be useful; we never find a_ solution, but work out endless
series of tentative solutions to ever-changing problems. Dewey has 
asserted that knowledge "does not oome into existence till thinking has 
terminated in the experimental act which fulfills the specifications set
g
forth in thinking." Knowledge, then, does not simply mirror the world;
it is a changing, dynamic body of hypotheses or theories which work when
tested. Thinking is a creative process which, when successful, results
in reshaping the world: ideas, doctrines, theories, are instrumental to 
9
that purpose.
^Kallen, Horace, "Pragmatism," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. 
Vol. XII, p. 311.
7
Mitchell, "Intelligence and the Guidance of Eoonomic Evolution,"
The Backward Art of Spending Money, p. 129.
p
Dewey, Intelligence in the Modem World, ed. by Joseph Batner (New 
York: Modern Library, 1939), p. 932; reprinted from Essays in Experimental 
Logic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1917).
®See Titus, Harold H., Living Issues in Philosophy (New York: Ameri­
can Book Company, 1946), pp. 2(j6ff.
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Thus it is that the pragmatic or instrumental theory' of knowledge
is oriented toward the future, toward the novel, and not the past. We
emerge into a world which is at least in part of our own making. "The
thinking process," says George H. Mead,
is to enable you to reconstruct your environment so that 
you oan act in a different fashion, so that your knowledge 
lies inside the process and is not a separate affair. It 
does not belong to a world of spirit by itself. Knowledge 
is power; it is a part of conduct that brings out the other 
phase that is connected with pragmatism, especially in 
Dewey’s statement.
This phase is its instrumentalism. What selection, 
and its development into refleotive thought, gives us is 
the tool we need, the instruments we need to keep up our 
process of living in the largest sense. Knowledge is a 
process of getting the tools, the instruments.^
"Tools" or "instruments" are not to be construed in the narrow sense of 
hammers or lathes, but rather in the larger sense of ideas, concepts, 
theories, hypotheses, which in the field of eoonomios assist in this 
developmental life-process of the community. Sooial stability is defined 
as keeping the basic ©ontinua of the biological-sociological-teohnologi- 
oal frame of reference continuing; what is really meant by stability is 
control— man’s control of that continuum. Knowledge is indeed power, 
for the function of knowledge is to provide the guidance, control, im­
provement, of a changing and dynamic world. We participate in an evolv­
ing experience to whioh knowledge is an act of adjustment and adaptation. 
Knowledge, like experience, is in constant flux for its consists of con­
tinuous readjustment to changing circumstances, changing problems. Learn­
ing is therefore a dynamio rather than a reflective process; and as men 
endeavor to adjust their eoonomic environment to their needs, to make it 
perform as they wish it to, they will learn more about their evolving eoo-
*°Mead, George H., Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century. 
(Chicago! University of Chicago Press, 1&S6), pp. 360-351.
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nomio system and economio soienoe will become a more useful soienoe*
It is in this sense that Mitohell said that "Knowledge is one of the
11resources which must be continuously renewed." It is not a fund to 
be dipped into occasionally; it is rather of the nature of a flow, but 
a flow which must be continuously used, for that very prooess of use in­
creases the flow. And thus it was that Mitchell, always the good student 
of Dewey, al30 insisted
That we oannot do a perfeot job until we have perfeot 
knowledge is no excuse for not doing the best job our 
imperfect knowledge permits. One of the best ways to 
increase knowledge is to apply what knowledge we have.
Mitchell and the other institutionalists have rather thoroughly accepted
the teaching of Dewey that thinking is an aotive, not a passive prooess.
That it is concerned with problem solving; that it must be useful— and
further, that to be useful it must be used. Ideas, faots, theories,
hypotheses, are allaperational. As Dewey has said,
Ideas are operational in that they instigate and direct 
further operations of observation; they are proposals 
and plans for acting upon existing conditions to bring 
new faots to light and to organize all the selected facts 
into a coherent whole.IS
Ideas are never self-contained entities; they are organizational devioes
for reshaping the environment, for resolving difficulties, for solving
problems.
Institutional economics has often been characterized as being primar­
ily concerned with problem solving. And in a certain sense thiB is quite
^Mitchell, Business Cycles? The Problem and its Setting, p. 93.
^Mitchell, "Engineering, Eoonomios, and the Problem of Social Well- 
Being," Mechanical Engineering, February, 1931, p. 107.
13Dewey, Logic* The Theory of Inquiry, reprinted in Batner (ed.) 
op. cit., p. 8&§.
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true. These economists view the economio system, and the endless series
of problems that arise in the functioning, or non-functioning, of that
system as capable of being solved, or at least improved upon. It is their
view that the economic system is a human and sooial institution capable of
being and needing to be guided, controlled and directed. They have
aoeepted Dewey's position that thinking is an active prooess, that it is
the adjustment or adaptation of new experiences and an inquiry into the
meaning and consequences of experience, of ideas, of facts. Dewey perhaps
made this position muoh more clearly when he said
The isolation of thinking from confrontation with faots 
encourages that kind of observation whioh merely accumu­
lates brute facts, which occupies itself laboriously with 
mere details, but never inquires into their meaning and 
consequences— a safe occupation, for it never contemplates 
any use to be made of the observed facts in determining a 
plan for changing the situation. Thinking whioh is a 
method of reconstructing experience treats observation of 
facts, on the other hand, as the indispensable step of defin­
ing the problem, of locating the trouble, of forcing home a 
definite, instead of a merely vague emotional, sense of 
what the difficulty is and where it lies. It is not aim­
less, random, miscellaneous, but purposeful, specific and 
limited by the character of the trouble undergone. The 
purpose is to clarify the disturbed and confused situation 
that reasonable ways of dealing with it may be suggested.14
These economists see that the function of economics is, in Dewey's words, 
to change the situation. Thinking, research, investigation, for them are 
the indispensable steps of defining the problem, of looating the diffi­
culty, all with the aim of olarifying the situation, of resolving diffi­
culties.
Tugwell has defined this philosophyo f instrumentalism as
a doctrine whioh is subtly subversive of any dootrine at 
all, even of itself as a dootrine; for pondering upon it 
breaks it down into method. It is not a faith to hold to,
14 /Dewey, John, Reoonstruotlon in Philosophy (New York* The New Ameri­
can Library of World Literature, Mentor Boolp Edition, 1950; first pub­
lished by Henxy Holt, 1920), p. 119.
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but merely a procedure; and its ohief teaching is that 
there is no stopping plaoe but fact and that few faots 
survive for long.
This is contrasted with the more passive, armchair or spectator, theory 
of knowledge whioh confines itself to excogitating and extending a given 
set of premises handed down from previous generations (previous genera­
tions which had different problems). This given set of premises or prin­
ciples, according to Tugwell, then
becomes refined and separated from the other fields of 
human knowledge; and it builds up a separate body of 
principles that is added by successive increments until 
it becomes a closed system of assumptions, logical devel­
opments and generalizations, rounded and whole. The in­
crements that are added are really additions. not changes; 
and so that assumptions remain unchanged in a changing 
world.16
These economists have not been satisfied merely to extend the logical 
analysis of a given set of assumptions, to the contrary, they view assump­
tions as tools for investigation— again illustrating the active, partici­
pating role which knowledge plays in their analysis.
We have spoken above of the view of knowledge as being a flow re­
source, a resource which must be continuously used and that the very 
process of use increases that flow. Conversely, the non-use of it 
deoreases the flow. Tomorrow's knowledge is available tomorrow, but not 
unless today's knowledge is used today; today's knowledge cannot be 
hoarded, unused, until tomorrow. We cannot save or hoard our knowledge 
of what to do about improving the economio system until tomorrow; it must 
either be used today or wasted. Ahd if we do use it, it will not be the
16Tugwell, "Human Nature and Sooial Economy," Journal of Philosophy. 
August 14, 1930, p. 449.
16Tugwell, "Experimental Eoonomios," The Trend of Economics, p. 396.
136
same tomorrow as today, for by using it we will improve it. This is what
Mitohell meant when he noted that "One of the best ways to increase know-
17ledge is to apply what knowledge we have." And this, the role of "crea­
tive intelligence" in economio thinking, is a point 7/hioh both Ayres and 
Mitchell have emphasized repeatedly. Ayres summed up what he thought to 
be the connection between creative intelligence and economic problems and 
sooial problems 11/hen he said that
No society ever has been or ever can be "planned." Socie­
ties grow and ohange, and will always do so. But in that 
prooess of growth and ohange oreative intelligence has 
always played a part and will do so increasingly as know­
ledge and understanding grow.18
And Mitohell pointed out that
... few of us have been willing to trust what Adam Smith 
regarded as "natural" forces. Instead, we have cherished 
ambitious designs of harnessing social forces much as we 
have harnessed steam and eleotric ity.18
In his essay, "Intelligence and the Guidance of Economic /Evolution,"
Mitohell discussed the haphazard way in whioh we have applied our colled-
tive intelligence to sooial problems in the past:
When individual enterprise produced results they did not 
like, they would not wait for the evils to correct them­
selves in the long run. Each generation has realized the 
foroe of Mr. Keynes* remark that in the long run we shall 
all be dead. Nor do all economic evils tend to cure them­
selves ... ^Secause^ there are sooial processes of degenera­
tion that work cumulatively. The aotual outcome was a mixed
17Mitohell, "Engineering, Economics and the Problem of Sooial Well- 
Being," Mechanioal Engineering, February, 1931, p. 107; italics added.
18Ayres, The Industrial Economy, pp. 189-90.
^Mitohell, "The Social Seienoes and National Planning," The Back­
ward Art of Spending Money, p. 95.
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system of control by the imperfect intelligence of indi­
viduals and control by the imperfect intelligence of govern­
ments . 20
In oontrast to this ad hoc, piecemeal, haphazard use of imperfect intel­
ligence , Mitchell advocated "trying to mobilize the intelligence of the
21country for systematic and continuous study of sooial problems,..."
And he foresaw, or at least hoped for the day, when economic theory would 
provide the framework for the collective use of the oreative intelligence
of the nation, when eoonomic theory would "prove a vigorous organizer of
22working programs." Tugwell in a similar vein added that "When one 
theorizes he is thinking about ways in which our institutions can be 
made to work better." And theory he defined as "trained intelligences 
at grips with problems that are the crucial ones of modern life."^®
This view of the role of and the funotion of thinking and theoriz­
ing is rather far removed from the more orthodox view in eoonomios.
These quotes do illustrate the extent to whioh the institutional eco­
nomists have accepted the teaching of Dewey and the other pragmatists 
and have incorporated these views into their economic analysis and eco­
nomic theories. They have accepted the view that the role of thinking 
is to meet difficulties, to solve problems, to locate difficulties—  
and that intelligence and knowledge is what emerges from this prooess; 
they have, therefore, evolved a framework of analysis in eoonomios which
po
Mitchell, "Intelligence and the Guidanoe of Economic Evolution," 
The Backward Art of Spending Money, p. 117; the very title of this essay, 
it wiTT’be noted, emphasizes the Instrumentalist view of the funotion of 
knowledge and intelligence whioh Mitchell holds.
^Mitohell, " The Social Sciences and National Planning," ibid..
p. 1 0 2.
22
Mitchell, "Eoonomios.1904-1929," ibid., p. 414.
2STugwell, "Economic Theory and Praotice," AER, March, 1923, 
pp. 108-09.
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takes that view as its basic premise. Dewey himself rather well summed
up this point of view in its relation to economics when he said that
The problem, of today remains one of using available in­
telligence, of employing the immense resources science 
has put at our disposal: a pooled and co-ordinated sooial 
intelligence, not the mere scattered individualized in­
telligences here and there, however high their I. Q.’s may 
be. ... Sooial oontrol effeoted through organized applica­
tion of social intelligence is the sole form of sooial oon­
trol that oan and will get rid of existing evils without
landing us finally in some form of coercive control from
above and outside.24
This co-ordinated social intelligence to whioh Dewey refers is of course
what Mitchell means when he advocated mobilizing the intelligence of the
country for the melioration of sooial problems. It is what lyres re­
ferred to when he spoke of the role of creative intelligence in economio 
evolution and growth. It is the central thesis of pragmatism that know­
ledge should be useful, purposeful, functional. It is to be gained through 
experience, through trial and error? it is, therefore, both experimental 
and tentative. Tugwell defined this multi-faceted "experimental eco­
nomics’* as an
economics developed on -the side of theory for the projec­
tion of reconstructive programs, on the side of research 
for testing and substantiation, and on the side of teach­
ing to provide new workers and new attitudes and to insure 
the continuity of knowledge as well as to acquaint men in 
general with the nature of problems and -the general means 
of their solution....25
The institutionalists have accepted this instrumental theory of know­
ledge ftnd its corrolary that -the funotion of knowledge is control and that 
the truth or validity of that knowledge is to be ascertained by its effi­
cacy in problem-solving, by its efficacy in the control of the eoonomic
24Dewey, "The Economic Basis of the New Society,** Intelligence in 
the Modem World, ed. by Joseph Ratner, p. 430.
25Tugwell, "Experimental Economics," The Trend of Eoonomios. p. 421.
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process. They have taken as a major premise Dewey's definition of the
nature of truth as given by this "experimental and functional" logic:
If ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, 
systems are instrumental to an active reorganization of 
the given environment, to a removal of some specific 
trouble and perplexity, then the test of their validity 
and value lies in accomplishing this work. If they succeed 
in their office, they are reliable, sound, valid, good, 
true. If they fail to clear up oonfusion, to eliminate 
defects, if they increase confusion, uncertainty and evil 
when they are acted upon, then they are false. ...
The hypothesis that works is the true one; and truth 
is an abstract noun applied to the collection of cases, 
actual and foreseen and desired, that receive confirmation 
in their works and consequenees.
And it is this basio premise of institutional eoonomios whioh accounts
for their criticism of orthodox economics— it does not aid in clearing
up oonfusion in the social-economic complex of the modern world; it does
not assist in eliminating defects. As the institutionalist sees it,
theories are but instruments to be used in the aotive reorganization of
the eoonomio structure, in the "removal of some specifio trouble." They
27
have accepted, as George H. Sabine clearly points out, the instrumenta­
list view of
...control as the end of knowledge and the test of its 
efficacy, and therefore makes purpose an ineradicable 
part of all thinking. It acknowledges only an ad hoc 
test of truth, sinoe thinking must suooeed, if a£ all, 
only in terms of the problem that calls it forth; and 
it sees in logic, both deductive and inductive only an 
apparatus by whioh solutions may be methodically tested.
Truth, then, is an evolving, tentative set of hypotheses that when used,
lead to the expected results. And logic is not a formalized set of rules
28Dewey, Reconstruction in philosophy, pp. 128, 129.
27Sabine, "The Pragmatic Approach to Politics," The American Politioal 
Soienoe Review, December, 1929, Vol. XXIV, pp. 866-67.
28Ibid.
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of affirraation-negation, general-partioular, inclusion-exclusion, by
which certain results may be drawn from a given premise. They do not
see logic solely, as one logician has defined it, as "the art and soience
29of criticism of reasoning." It is rather, as Sabine said, "an apparatus 
by whioh solutions may be tested."
Logio as a Functional Soienoe
Dewey and the other pragmatists or instrumentalists do not dismiss
the traditional logio of the syllogism, but they insist that it is not
enough. Dewey, especially, has spent considerable effort in evolving
what may be termed a "functional" logic. Titus recognized this facet of
pragmatism when he said that
The new logic implied by pragmatism and instrumentalism 
attacks the syllogism and the assumptions underlying trad­
itional logio. The syllogistio logic, it is said, is aca­
demic and attains certainly only at the oost of novelty 
and because it fails to conform to the faots of experience.
If the conclusion of the syllogism follows the premises, it 
is not new; and if it is new, it does not follow from the 
premises. We gain new knowledge by taking a mental leap 
which involves guesswork, or a hypothesis, that is aceepted 
if it works and rejected if it fails to give satisfactory 
results
Dewey contrasted his view of the basic principles of logio with the more
traditional view as follows:
According to one view, such principles represent ultimate 
invariant properties of the objects with which methods of 
inquiry are concerned, and to whioh inquiry must conform. 
According to the view here expressed, they represent condi­
tions whioh have been ascertained during the conduct of con­
tinued inquiry to be involved in its own successful pursuit. 
The two statements may seem to amount to the same thing.
29Black, Max, Critical Thinking: an Introduction to Logio and Scien­
tific Method (Hew York: Prentioe-Hall, 19'46), p. 7.
30Titus, Living Issues in Philosophy, p. 261} for a more complete 
examination of t)ewey*s views on this see his Logio: The Theory of Inquiry 
and Reconstruction in Philosophy.
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Theoretically, there is a radical difference between them.
For the second position implies, as has already been 
stated, that the principles are generated in the very process 
of control of eontinued inquiry, while, according to the 
other view, they are a priori principles fixed antecedently 
to inquiry and conditioning it ab extra.
In other words, logie is concerned with inquiry and investigation, and 
it is from inquiry and investigation that knowledge arises; logic, then, 
is the correct form which inquiry takes in order to arrive at that know­
ledge. Dewey has characterized knowledge as "the appropriate close of
32inquiry," as "that which satisfactorily terminates inquiry." And all
logical forms, all principles of logic "arise within the operation of
inquiry and are concerned with control of inquiry so that it may yield
33warranted assertions." The testof knowledge is, according to this 
view, its usefulness; it must be as Dewey has termed it, a "warranted 
assertion." It is both the methods and the results of inquiry or re­
search which are, then, the prime subject-matter of logio. Logic, 
asserts Dewey,
is a matter of profound human importance precisely be­
cause it is empirically founded and experimentally 
applied. So considered, the problem of logical theory 
is none other than the problem of the possibility of 
the development and employment of intelligent method in 
inquiries concerned with deliberate reconstruction of ex­
perience.®’
Logical theory according to the pragmatists is, then, simply the improve­
ment of the use of intelligence in inquiry, research, and experiment.
It is a more active conception of the role of logio than the more ortho-
31Dewey, Logic* The Theory of Inquiry, pp. 10-11. 
S2Ibid., p. 8.
Ibid., pp. 3-4.
*2 A
Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 117.
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dox view. It is both "empirically founded and experimentally applied."
As has been noted above, D©wey puts primary emphasis on the role of in- 
quiiy and experiment in the formation of knowledge; intelligence is but 
■the active means of reconstructing experience, of remolding the environ­
ment, of adapting to a changing and dynamic set of experiences. Such be­
ing the case,
then logic, as an account of the procedure of thought, 
is not purely formal. It is not confined to laws of 
formally correct reasoning apart from truth of subject- 
matter. . .. If thinking is the way in whioh deliberate 
rcorganization of expeiience is secured, then logio is 
such olarified and systematized formulation of the pro­
cedures of thinking as will enable the desired reconstruc­
tion to go on more eoonomioally and efficiently.®®
Thus it is that the pragmatists* theory of logio fits in rather 
closely with their general view of knowledge and of truth. Thinking, 
intelligence, research, inquiry, are all active, direoted to locating 
the problem, to defining the difficulty. There is nothing sacrosanct 
or ultimate about these ways or rules of thought. The creative social 
intelligence, whioh plays suoh an important role in their analyses, is 
a collective sooial product; what is considered to be reasonable, intel­
ligent, and logical, is culturally determined. Thus it is that the thing 
called social truth is both tentative and experimental; it is subject to 
constant readjustment and revision. In the same way, principles of logio 
are aooepted as suoh beoause at a given time they incorporate the most 
useful and successful experiments in thinking and in the use of that 
thinking— the use of the creative social intelligence— available at any 
given time. These have evolved, as Puller has noted, "beoause they have
•worked,'" they "owe suoh authority as they possess to their instrumental-
36
ity in helping us solve the problems that confront us now and here."
55 ”
Ibid., pp. 114-5.
36
Fuller, B. A. 6., A History of Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt, 
1945), Vol. II, p. 471.
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Under different conditions, in the light of different knowledge, with 
new and different problems, these principles might prove ineffective, 
or even worse, a positive hindrance. They would then oease to be good 
logic, but would be bad logio.
Purpose and the Scientific Method
The role of and the funotion of human purposes in scientific in­
quiry has often been misunderstood; many, including Veblen,3^ insisting 
that they had no place in a truly scientific theory, or in a scientific 
inquiry. In the attempt to be objeotive, to rule out any influence of 
goals and motives, some thinkers have insisted that they had no place in 
any body of thought claiming to be scientific. To a considerable extent 
this attitude may have resulted from a desire to make the sooial sciences 
as ’'respectable” as the physical soienoes where the scientist putatively 
removes himself from all sooial or institutional purposes whioh may be 
involved in his work. Thus it is said that "the atomic scientists were
not to question whether the atom bomb was good for mankind, it was merely
38their function to build the bomb. And likewise, many social scientists 
have insisted that human purposes, values, motivations, eto., do not have 
any place in economics. This view, however, is not shared by the pragma-
37
See especially his essay, "Why is Economics N0t an Evolutionary 
Science?" reprinted in The Portable Veblen and in The Plaoe of Science 
in Modem Civilisation; also his essays, "The Place of Science in Modem 
Civilisation," and "The Evolution of the Scientific Point of View," re­
printed in ibid.
38
And it may be noted that when one of them did step out of this role 
in oonneotion with the hydrogen bomb, he was severely criticized, even 
aocused of consciously delaying the development of the bomb. The question 
of what role a physioal scientist should play in suoh matters is of oourse 
far from settled. And indeed the role that the sooial soientist should 
play in suoh areas has yet to be agreed upon. These economists which we 
are here examining do have a point of view in this respect, however, and 
it is one which will be developed in the course of this study.
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tlsts.
Dewey drew attention to what he considered to be the difference be­
tween a sooial and a physical scienoe according to their treatment of 
human purposes:
...attention may be directly called to one outstanding 
difference between physical and sooial faots. The ideal 
of the knowledge dealing with the former is the elimina­
tion of all factors dependent upon distinctively human 
response. "Pact,” physically speaking, is the ultimate 
residue after human purposes, desires, emotions, ideas 
and ideals have been systematically excluded. A social 
"fact," on the other hand, is a concretion in external 
form of precisely these human factors. ... The machine 
itself may be understood physically without reference to 
human aim and motive. But the railway or publie-utility 
system cannot be understood without reference to human 
purposes and human consequences.
Commons, who always considered himself a pragmatist, has characterized
the essential difference between a physical and a social soience as
whether or not human purposes are included; the "primary principle'* of
the social sciences is that the investigation must start with a recogni-
40
tion of public purpose. Commons drew a distinction between the prag­
matism of James and the pragmatism of Dewey, noting, however that he used
the term "pragmatism" always in the scientific sense of 
Peirce as a method of investigation, but we consider 
that Peirce used it only for the physical sciences where 
there is no future and no purpose, while James and Dewey 
used it always for the human sciences, where the subject- 
matter itself is a pragmatic being always looking to the 
future and therefore always motivated by purposes.4-1
Commons insists that the sooial sciences, including economics, must begin
39Dewey, "Social Soienoe and Social Control," Intelligence in the 
Modern World, pp. 949 , 950; reprinted with permission from The frew Republic. 
July 29, 1SS1.
40Commons, Institutional Economics, p. 654.
41Ibid., p. 665.
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42with human purposes, for they define its very subjeot-matter; a theory
in other words is primarily an instrument to assist mankind, it is not
43
merely the logical deductions from a given assumption. Being strongly 
influenced by pragmatism, Commons and the other institutionalists, insist 
that a theory in economics is nothing more than a man-made, tentative 
proposal to fit some human purpose. The only satisfactory criterion of 
the validity of that theory is whether or not it leads to the expected 
social results Then used. Human thinking and human knowledge are both 
relative and tentative and cannot in practice be separated from societal 
purposes and the institutionalists are merely ready to and willing to 
accept that as a basio premise and therefore to reorient economic think­
ing so that it will fit those social purposes. J. M. Clark thus argued 
that
The greatest use of the data of social science should be 
in eliminating the calf-paths of social habits.... The 
outcome of -this process will be laws: laws which, instead 
of embodying past customs seek to modify them and improve 
on them. Such, laws are conscious means to calculated ends 
and their value lies wholly in their expected results.^
The institutionalists conceive the function of economics as being 
to improve the economic process, to solve sooial-economic problems; they 
therefore see economics as being exploratory, investigatory, antleipa- 
tory. It must continually examine and re-examine the functioning of the 
economic system and it must therefore take as its very subject-matter
^See ibid., pp. 150ff.
43As a matter of fact, Commons strongly insists that the orthodox 
economist has misconceived the role which assumptions are to play in 
economic analysis— a point to which we will return in the next section.
44Clark, "Toward a Concept of Social Value," Preface to Social Eco­
nomics , p. 63.
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human purposes and the extent to which they are being fulfilled or 
thwarted in the actual operations of the economy. It is their function 
as economists to show where the economic system is not functioning cor­
rectly and to show how it could be improved. George Sabine in one of the 
clearest and most cogent discussions of the relationship between pragma­
tism and institutionalism, said that "Quite obviously, the pragmatist has
to stand or fall with the proposition that every theory has a purpose
45somewhere behind it." The institutionalists are simply willing to take 
their stand on this proposition and to recognize the role of human pur­
poses explicitly and not be content merely to leave them in the background. 
Robert Franklin Hoxie who, like Commons, 3pent a considerable part of his 
life investigating social conditions, appended a section on methodology 
in this Trade Unionism in the United States. In this appendix he pointed 
out the necessity of first realizing "just what is the end of scientific 
investigation" in the social sciences. He dismissed the view of scientific 
knowledge as "an end in itself" holding to the contrary that "...in all 
reality all scientific investigation is undertaken in furtherance of some 
definite, vital, human interest." The obvious reason for this says Hoxie 
is that
We wish to control the forces at hand so as better to 
realize some human purpose, therefore we seek to compre­
hend the existing situation from the standpoint of the 
purpose or interest in question. The scientific interest 
is therefore not merely aoademio but is in a sense practi­
cal— practical in the sense that it is an interest in 
understanding for the sake of the life of the society or 
the individual. It follows that all scientific investiga­
tion is bound to be highly selective. We do not seek to 
understand the existing situation as a whole— that would 
be impossible— but we seek to understand the present in its 
relation to the interest at stake, the problem at hand.^6
^Sabine, "The Pragmatic Approach to Politics," The American Political 
Soience Review, December, 1929, Vol. XXIV, p. 880. '
^*Hoxie, Appendix I, Trade Unionism in the United States, pp. 377-8.
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This view is somewhat contrary to that taken by the more orthodox econo­
mist who insists that his role is not to engage actively in reforming 
society. He insists -that he must be "scientific" and "objective." It 
is not his to question economio practices or procedures. The institution­
alist, however, argues thatthis misconstrues the nature of scientific 
analysis; that as we noted above, it confuses the nature and the function 
of the social sciences v/ith that of the physical sciences. The field of 
economics is intimately concerned with human purposes and human problems 
and it is the function of economics "to do something about" those purposes 
and problems. They conceive economics, not as a withdrawn, passive, aca­
demic discipline, but rather as an active participating endeavor to improve, 
to oorrect, to ameliorate economic conditions. There runs through all of 
their thinking and analysis this tendency toward meliorism— that the world 
can be improved and that it is their duty to show in what ways this oan be 
achieved. As Gruohy noted,
They have felt themselves called upon to use their accumu­
lated knowledge about the eoonomic system as a tool for 
social and economio criticism and for the definition of 
the proper ends of our economic system.^”
Walton Hamilton recognized, as he saw it, the necessary connection between
the inclusion of human purposes or aspirations, and meliorism, consciously
aligning himself with those who do "want to do something about it.1'
An analysis has its roots in the purpose of the search, 
in the use to which the information is to be put. .*•
It is the hope that understanding can be put to some 
human use whioh gives zest and purpose to the undertak­
ing. It is not the fashion to procalim a desire "to do 
something about it" as a justification of intellectual 
adventure; and words like "objective" and "scientific" 
have come to serve as masks with whioh to affect a lack 
of personal concern. ... Accept as we must the neces­
sity for utmost integrity, yet the adventure should
^Gruchy, "The Concept of National Planning in Institutional Eco­
nomic sj," Southern Economio Journal, October, 19S9, p. 121.
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yield results useful to the making of polioy.
These economists agree with Hamilton that knowledge and understanding 
should be put to some human use, that economics must be useful in direct­
ing, guiding, and reforming, the economic system. They consoiously accept
49
the role of economio reformers and that the only meaningful frame of 
reference for knowledge and understanding is this guidance and improve­
ment of the developmental process of the economy. This is why they have 
put a great deal of emphasis on the need for research and investigation.
An important basis for their view of such research or investigation is 
their view of the function of assumptions or principles in economics— a 
view whioh stems from pragmatism and which differs markedly from the 
orthodox position.
The Use of Assumptions as Tools for Investigation
Considerable has been said above about the epistemologioal basis 
of institutional economics and one consistent theme has been the emphasis 
placed upon investigation, research, inquiry, and experimentation. It is 
the general view, aooepted by the institutionalists, that economics must 
become an active, participating discipline. Knowledge and underatending 
are seen to evolve from continual testing and retesting— from continual 
use. Pragmatism regards any theory, assumption, or hypothesis as a tool 
or an instrument, the efficacy of which is to be judged by its oonsequenoes 
in use. Dewey once pointed out that
...notions, theories, systems, no matter how elaborate
^Hamilton, W., Price and Price Policies, p. 527.
49Mitchell specifically recognizes this point in his article, "Engin­
eering, Eoonomios and the Problem of Social Well-Being," Meohanioal Engin­
eering, Vol. 53, February, 1931, pp. 106ff. See also A. B. Wolfe,
Thoughts on Persual of Wesley Mitchell’s Collected Essays," JPE, February, 
1939, p. 19.
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and self-consistent they are must be regarded as hypo­
theses* They are to be accepted as bases of actions 
•which test them, not as finalities. To peroeive this 
fact is to abolish rigid dogmas from the world. It is 
to recognize that conceptions, theories and systems of 
thought are always open to development through use. It 
is to enforce the lesson that we must be on the lookout 
quite as much for indications to alter them as for oppor­
tunities to assert them.®0
Such being the oase, as we noted earlier, logic is seen to be not merely
the rules governing the excogitations of given assumptions, but rather
the continual testing, using, modifying, and experimenting, with those
assumptions. MThe real meaning of a hypothesis," said Clark, "lies in
the different way things may happen if it is true, as contrasted with
51the way they would happen if it were false." Assumptions, theories, 
hypotheses are tools for investigation* they represent possible alterna­
tive oourses of action. Kenneth Parsons noted that in Commons' view, 
thought is seen to be "oreative and constructive, not simply reportor-
• •. « 5 2  lal.
These views are in rather marked contrast to that taken by the more 
orthodox price theorist who sees assumptions or hypotheses as bases from 
which conclusions may be deduced. Professor Stigler, for example, ex­
pounds this view most explicitly in the opening chapter of hi3 Theory of 
Price. He recognizes "two parts" to an "economic law"* they are, "oer- 
tain assumptions or hypotheses* and a conclusion drawn from these hypo­
theses." And he further adds that "The formal validity of a scientific 
law depends only on the logical rigor with whioh it follows from the 
assumptions." It is true that Stigler goes on to remark, in the nature
^Derwey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 121.
51Clark, "Economics and Modern Psychology," Preface to Social Eco­
nomics , p. 96.
®^ Parsons, "Introduction" to Commons' Economics of Collective Aotion,p. 17. ' ' " ' . ■ . . .
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of an. aside, that "if a science were to study only the logioal impli­
cations of various propositions or assumptions, then logic (or mathe­
matics) would be the only science." He notes that a more fundamental
test is that "it must explain the behavior of the phenomena in -which we
53are interested; the assumptions must correspond with the facts." Even 
with the qualification, however, this view of assumptions and the part 
they are to play in economic theory is quite different from that accepted 
by the institutionalists. And the difference is even greater when we ex­
amine the general nature of the economio theorizing to whioh these two 
methods lead. Whether true or not, Stigler would argue that the real 
meaning of an hypothesis or assumption is in the conclusions which may 
be deduced from it and its validity depends upon the logical rigor with 
whioh the conclusions follow from these premises. Perhaps it would be 
more correct to say, whether meaningful or not, with reference to the 
assumptions. For orthodox theory is based, for example, on the conclu­
sions drawn from the theory or assumption of diminishing returns. Now, 
this is undoubtedly a "time" assumption. But whether it is meaningful 
or not is another question. And the institutionalists argue that eco­
nomics must beoome a useful, participating inquiry. It must contribute 
to the solution of the problems of the modern industrial economy, and in 
their vimi, the assumption of diminishing returns and the conclusions 
drawn from it, do not contribute greatly toward the solution of contempor­
ary problems.
The real difference, however, is in the quite different view taken 
of the assumptions which are to be used. Thus, Stigler holds that they 
are but premises from which other conclusions are to be drawn with the
®3Stigler, The Theory of Price, pp. 4-6, passim.
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greatest care. The institutional economist insists that assumptions 
are tools of investigation— ’'The real meaning of a hypothesis lies in 
the different way things may happen if it is true, as contrasted with 
the \my they would happen if it were false." John R. Commons has written 
a5re extensively on this general subject than any other of the institu­
tionalists. In his analysis, assumptions, hypotheses, theories, princi­
ples, are all specifically designated as tools or instruments for investi­
gating the ongoing social-economic prooess, rather than premises whose 
contents are to be explored by "rigorous logic.
Commons has often referred to twentieth century eoonomics as "admin­
istrative eoonomios."64 And one of the more important cornerstones of 
his whole m y  of thinking is his concern for investigations as being the 
necessary oorollary of proper administration. Commons has contrasted his 
method of analysis with the traditional orthodox analysis as the differ­
ence between the "comparative and deductive" methods of reasoning.
The deductive method is oharacteristio of the classioal 
or orthodox economics which rested upon the isolated 
assumption of self-interest. Complexities are eliminated 
because a single assumption is isolated.
The oonflict between these two methods, says Commons, comes into sharp 
focus when they are put to actual use, "when economists are required to 
work with public administrators— in the administrative commissions or 
aotion agencies."56 He holds that the economist because of his training, 
and the administrator because of his problem, may be speaking entirely 
different languages, they are operating in quite different frames of refer­
ence, and they are thus less effective than if they were operating in the
^See, for example, his "Twentieth Century Economios," Journal of 
Social Philosophy, Vol. V, 1939.
56Commons, Economies of Collective Action, p. 124.
56Ibid., pp. 125ff.
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same framework® To bs useful and helpful in such "action*1 situations,
(and Commons insists that these are the important province of eoonomics), 
•the economist must abandon his traditional method of reasoning, of deduc­
ing from a single assumption and adopt the comparative method of investi­
gation. He noted that in traditional eoonomics, assumptions are often 
called fundamental principles or elementary principles, because they are 
the basic premises from which conclusions or logioal implications are 
drawn.
In contrast to this traditional view, Commons takes the position that
assumptions are to be used as "mental tools for purposes of investiga- 
57tion." Assumptions in economics are
...made for the purpose of attaining systematic interpret­
ation and understanding in a world of diversity. They are 
devices for investigation. The validity of such assump­
tions is found through the fruitfulness of their uses.6®
The main point of difference is that the orthodox economist uses assump­
tions as premises from which to expand, by means of rigorous logio, fur­
ther conclusions; and eoonomio "theory" is the whole body of assumptions, 
conclusions, implications. Commons, however, insists that assumptions 
are devices to aid in understanding the eoonomio system by means of in­
vestigation, by testing, by accepting or rejecting according to the light 
they shed on the problem. The importance of this whole point of view, 
according to Commons, is that
It converts the whole process of economic theorizing 
from a "theory," in the older sense of the logical con­
sistency of reality, to the mere methodology of con­
structing intellectual tools to be used in investiga­
tion. There is no longer a question of antagonism be-
57
Ibid., p. 113; see also ibid., pp. 73, 124-126, 203, and 237j 
and InsilWtional Economics, pp. 722, 734; and "Twentieth Century Eco­
nomics,11 Journal of Social Philosophy .Vol. V., 1939.
68Commons, Eeonomios of Collective Action, p. 73.
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tween theory and practice, for a theory is only a tool 
for investigating practice.... Indeed, a science is 
not a body of knowledge— it is just a method of in­
vestigation and its theory is its method-®®
Noting the active, exploratory nature of this "twentieth century eoo­
nomics", Commons added that
...as we proceed with our investigation, we have a 
changing hypothesis, taking in new factors or retiring 
older ones, always seeking to make less utopian the 
utopias Y/hieh our minds construct. Thus theory becomes, 
not only a mental process for investigation of facts, but 
becomes also an interpretation, correlation, and expecta­
tion of facts.®0
Thus in Commons’ view, assumptions are but the mental tools or instru­
ments, the devioes, to be used in investigating and inquiring into eco­
nomic problems and processes; economic theory, then, is the mental pro­
cess of that investigation and the interpretation, correlation and ex­
pectations involved in that investigation. This view of economic theory 
has meaning primarily, if not exclusively, only in relation to economics 
as the basis for the control and the guidance of the economic system. It
is obviously public policy oriented, operating from the point of view that
economio theory and economic analysis must be useful and that the primary 
criterion of usefulness in the twentieth century is oontrol of iiie eco- 
nony. Such control or reform must proceed from a thorough understanding 
of the nature of the contemporary system and its problems and potentiali­
ties; such an understanding is not to be gained by excogitating the same 
principles or assumptions as used by economists of days gone by.
Economic investigations in the twentieth century, with its
revolutions, credit cycles, unemployment, and repeated 
wars, must take into acoount many different aspects of
^Commons, Institutional Eoonomics, p. 722.
^Ibid. , p. 734.
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activity. Otherwise research and. investigation cannot 
be brought to full use in the collective effogt to con­
trol the great and violent "forces" of today.
Eoonomics, then, is not an abstract, academic discipline; it is 
rather a functional, active body of understanding and investigation 
vhose function is to ’’control the great and violent forces of today.”
This active participation, the institutional economists insist, must pro­
ceed from a better insight into the economy, its limitations and poten­
tialities, than that provided by the orthodox method "whioh rested upon 
the isolated assumption of self-interest." It is in this sense that Com­
mons lias emphasized the necessity of converting assumptions into mental 
tools for investigations and the testing of the validity of such assump­
tions in their usefulness in control of the economic system.
Viewed in this context, a very common misunderstanding about insti­
tutionalism may be easily corrected. It is often said that the institu­
tional approach is that of the case study, of the empirical, of the induc­
tive. And that of course is correct, but it is not the end of the story, 
as so many seem to think. Professor Ayres noted the importance of these 
studies when he said:
During the half-century that is just closing profes­
sional economists have been devoting more and more of 
their energies to empirical investigations. The result 
of this application has been a bumper orop of "descrip­
tive studies," as they are often called. T put the 
phrase, "descriptive studies," in quotation marks because 
it is a misnomer. These investigations ... are none of 
them merely descriptive in the photographio or literary 
sense. All seek to identify causes and effects, and are 
therefore definitely analytical. ^
The institutional economist particularly puts a great deal of emphasis on
61Commons, Eoonomics of Collective Action, p. 73.
gp
Ayres, "Piecemeal Revolution," unpublished paper delivered before 
the Southwest Social Science Association, April, 1949, Fbrt Worth, Texas.
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the case study, on empirioal research, on investigation, on inquiry, 
upon the experimental attitude. But the emphasis is not upon any one, 
or all of these, taken alone. It is not a study for the sake of a study. 
Any case study per se would not be a product of institutional economics. 
It must begin with the premise that understanding of the problem neoes- 
sarlly precedes improvement or correction. Walton Hamilton’s study of 
the coal industry is a good case in pointj this was not a study under­
taken merely to describe the market structure of that industry. It was 
most certainly not merely "descriptive." It was an attempt to show -the 
shortcomings, gaps, and the potentialities, with a view to providing the 
basis for substantial improvement of the existing situation. Commons of 
course devoted most of his life to analyzing, probing into, investi­
gating various aspects of the economy— inquiring into labor’s history, 
its problems and areas for improvements into industrial government and 
industrial commissions, into sooial security and publio utility regula­
tion. Likewise, Mitchell is perhaps best known for his long and pains­
taking work investigating the business oyole, insisting that it could be 
understood only ip relation to "the problem and its setting." None of 
these was a mere description of an industry, none of these originated 
from a dispassionate desire to know for the sake of knowing— but all were 
undertaken with hopes that inquiry would lead to a better grounding in 
facts in order to provide the understanding necessary for action. It was 
precisely this position which led Mitchell to hold, in 1951, that eco­
nomics was making muoh faster progress than ever before, because
...the records of human behavior, regularly collected 
and published, are beooming fuller and more accurate.
... In dealing with many, though not with all, problems 
we can substitute knowledge of faot for uncertain opin­
ion; analysis of aotual prooess for speculation about 
what would happen under hypothetical conditions."63
Mitchell, "Engineering, Economics and the Problem of Social Well- 
Being," Mechanical Engineering, February, 1951, p. 108.
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And -when he discussed the problem of the business cycle and the diffi­
culties involved in bringing it under control, Mitchell warned that
These defects in the system of guiding economio activ­
ity and the bewildering complexity of the task itself 
allow the processes of economio life to fall into those 
reourrent disorders which constitute crises and depres­
sions. To recognize this fact, however, is but the be­
ginning of wisdom. Much patient analysis is required 
to discover just how these disorders arise, and why, 
instead of becoming chronic, they lead after a time to 
the return of prosperity.64
The central point is that, as these economists view it, the function of 
knowledge is control, but control must proceed from a more basic and 
thorough understanding of the "problem and its setting" than is possible 
from the orthodox point of view. What is needed is the substitution of 
"knowledge of fact for uncertain opinion," the analysis of actual pro­
cesses rather than hypothetical speculation.
Ayres once emphasized what he considered to be one of the more 
important contributions of pragmatism to economics when he said that "In­
stead of finding solutions for the problems we have all been struggling 
to solve, Dewey has tried to show us that we are asking the wrong ques­
tions,"65 and from this, he added that the important lesson to keep al- 
ways in mind is that "questions and answers develop together." Rather 
than ask what are the determinants of price under various assumed condi­
tions, we should ask, what are the determinants of the eoonomio well-being 
of the society! the answer to that question must emerge from the inquiry
^Mitchell, Business Cycles> The Problem and its Setting, p. 173; 
the very title of this work may be taken as illustrative of this point—  
that an understanding of the problem oannot be separated from its set­
ting.
®®Ayres, "Instrumental Economios," Hew Republic, October 17, 1949,
p. 18.
66Ayrcs, The Industrial Economy, p. 18.
which that question originates. It is the same point made by Commons, 
Mitchell, and Clark* that the whole learning prooess is a developmental 
one, not an additive one, and that an appreciation and acceptance of this 
is a necessary prerequisite to a workable knowledge of the eoonomio system.
Rex Tugwell has also been greatly influenced by this general point 
of view, naming it "experimental eoonomics." The whole basis of modem 
science, says Tugwell, is experimentalism— the "distrust of premises and 
dependence upon consequences." We have ceased, he said, to "look for 
ultimatea and turned to the searoh for expedients." We must learn by 
doing by experiment,by trial and errorj for it is only by such processes
68that knowledge and understanding of the economio system are to be gained.
The basio reason for this shift to experimentalism "has been the failure 
of deduction from excogitated premises to produce results that count for 
the attainment of the goals society more or less unconsciously sets for 
itself." And it is results that oount. The whole basis for this atti­
tude is the distrust of premises and the relianoe upon consequences, for
"in this twentieth centuiy, the truth must be useful. And this /xieo-
70
classical economic -theory/ is not." He explained this experimental 
attitude as the recognition that
the solution of the problems of our eoonomio life can 
be found only through maintaining an experimental atti­
tude toward those problems, and through acoepting a sug­
gested solution for them only jLf it works.
67
Tugwell* "Experimental Economics," The Trend of Economics, pp. 394-5.
68See Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts. 
pp. 2l6ff.
^Tugwell, "Experimental Eoonomios," The Trend of Economics,
pp. 394-5.
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The economist must cease to look upon social end eoonomio agencies and 
institutions as given, as ends-in-themselves, and must instead regard 
them as instruments, as means to ends, as temporary rather than Perman­
ent. Walton Hamilton, in similar fashion, added that "It is not a final 
answer to the enigma of industrial order that is sought.... It is rather
•ways of procedure and devices of accommodation for meeting situations as 
71they arise." And has been noted previously, this is the general view 
to whioh all these economists subscribe: that the economic system does not 
require a PhAN, a blueprint, but rather a conscious use of social intelli­
gence in the guidance of the economic system. As Mitchell warned,
the oommon attack of the social sciences upon this problem 
should aim, not at finding a "solution," but at finding 
methods by which communities oan carry on intelligently the
prooess of working out the endless series of detailed solu­
tions with which they must keep experimenting.
Clark also warned that "planning is no easy panacea ... it oan easily
make mistakes. But it contains possibilities of real contributions to
our present stage of industrial development." He further emphasized that
73"We are bound to be trying experiments in the coming generation." And 
if this is the case, then one primary function of economic theory and eco­
nomic analysis is to provide the background necessary for such experimenta­
tion. "For that needed measure of light, we must probably look to a course 
of social research and social education which may be a matter of genera­
tions."74 Social research, inquiry, investigation, all loom rather import­
71Hamilton, W., Price and Price Polioies, p. 555.
72Mitchell, "Intelligence and the Guidance of Eoonomio Evolution," 
Backward Art of Spending Money, p. 127, italics added. Again, Mitohell 
has emphasized an important point by a title to an essay.
73Clark, Social Control of Business, p. 471.
74Ibid., p. 50.
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ant in the view of these economists. It might be asked, "Investiga­
tion for what?". And indeed it would be a proper question, and one for 
whioh these economists would have an answer. Knowledge is, in their 
view, not a mere end in itself; it is, rather, the basis for action; it 
is primarily "an instrument of oontrol."
Knowledge as an Instrument of Control
Introduction
Pragmatism or instrumentalism stressed that Hie function of knowledge 
is to provide man with the means to control the various forces to which 
he is subject; the pragmatists have thus made action, rather than con­
templation, the key to the meaning of knowledge. This has in many respects 
been the central thesis by which they have identified their way of think­
ing and contrasted it with earlier (and aocording to them, cruder,) forms 
of philosophy. It was in this sense that Dewey argued that
But in the degree in which the active conception of know­
ledge prevails, and the environment is regarded as some­
thing that has to be changed in order to be truly known, 
men are Imbued with courage, with what may almost be 
termed an aggressive attitude toward nature. ... Change 
becomes significant of new possibilities and ends to be 
attained; it becomes prophetic of a better future. ...
Since ohanges are going on anyway, the great thing is to 
learn enough about them so that we may be able to lay hold 
of them and turn them in the direction of our desires. ...
In a profound sense knowing ceases to be contemplative and 
becomes practical.^®
Thus Dewey is arguing that to truly know the environment it must be looked
upon as something that is to be changed by man; knowing, understanding,
knowledge itself, cease to be contemplative and become instead, practical.
In another work, he points out that the significance of instrumentalism is
...a change from knowing as an esthetic enjoyment of the
75Deweyt Reconstruction, in Philosophy, pp. 102-103.
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properties of nature regarded as a work of divine art, 
to knowing as means of secular control— that is, a method 
of purposefully introducing ohanges which will alter the 
direction of the course of events.
True knowledge, then, is the method and the results of purposefully
introducing ohange, of controlling and directing the course of events,
rather than relying on the forces of nature. Commons has characterized
this distinction as one between "artificial" and "natural" selection,
that is, a reliance upon human direction rather than automatism. Social
or economio evolution, according to Commons, is in the twentieth century
concerned with a controlled future; it is not an evolution of mere "blindly
cumulative causation," but rather adaptation by choice and selection.
Artificial or "purposeful" selection means "Purpose, Futurity, Planning,
77injected into and greatly controlling the struggle for life." The in­
stitutionalists maintain a common faith in the ability of human intelli­
gence, socially applied, for the working out of and the guidance of eco­
nomic problems. Mitchell insisted that research, investigation, and in­
quiry "will broaden out into a constructive criticism" of our modern eco­
nomio system; it will be a "constructive criticism whioh may guide the 
efforts of our ohildren to make that marvelously flexible form of organ­
ization better fitted to their needs." This oonstruotive criticism, 
this"close scrutiny" of our eoonony, "is indispensable to convert society’s
blind fumbling for happiness into an intelligent process of experiments- 
78tion. And Tugwell noted with approval that there had been a gradual
7BDewey, The Quest for Certainty, reprinted in Intelligence in the 
Modern World, p. 5z7.
77
Commons, Institutional Eoonomics, p. 636; see also Copeland, M. A., 
"Commons’ Institutionalism in Eelation to Problems of Sooial Evolution 
Eoonomio Planning," QJE, February, 1936, pp. 333ff, for a disoussion of this 
facet of Commons1 writings.
78
Mitchell, "Quantitative Analysis in Eoonomio Theory," The Baokward 
Art of Spending Money, pp. 30-31. '
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shift in some universities to "an intensive study of institutions, and 
the operating foroes of industrialism." The underlying «nd unifying 
thesis of such research, according to Tugwell, is "that industry shall 
fit better the large needs of mankind and serve civilization with 
smoother-running machinery, and with better adjusted human arrangements." 
It is only in such an atmosphere as this, Tugwell insists, that "Economics 
thus becomes a science.""^
The effeot of such research and inquiry, according to Clark, is that 
present-day economists "know much more than we did fifty years ago," but 
even more Important, such investigations have shown us that there is "much 
less of which we are certain." The disappointment of it all, however, is 
that
it remains true that in time of desperate need, eoonomics 
has not furnished the unified and authoritative guidance 
whioh many have thought, rightly or wrongly, that they 
have a right to expect.
Thus the function of economics is seen by the institutionalist to provide 
that unified and authoritative guidance which is so desperately needed 
to convert society's blind fumbling into an intelligent process of social 
experimentation. But as Walton Hamilton specifically pointed out, "con­
trol of the development of the industrial economy is contingent upon a 
knowledge of the bundle of conventions and arrangements which make it
79Tugwell, "Experimental Economics," The Trend of Economics, p. 398.
80Clark, "Past Accomplishments and Present Prospects of American Eco­
nomics," Preface to Social Eoonomios, p. 416.
81
Hamilton, W., "The Institutional Approach to Economic Theory," AER, 
March, 1919, pp. 311ff.
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Human Direction versus Automatism
As we have noted above, the institutionalists insist that economic 
and social evolution belong in the category of "artificial" or "purpose­
ful” selection, rather than in the category of "natural" selection. This 
is simply an emphasis upon their reliance upon the ability of organized, 
social intelligence to meet the problems of an evolving, dynamic society; 
that socialized intelligence oan successfully guide "the destiny of that 
evolution. It is a reliance upon human direction and control rather than 
upon any natural set of foroes. John Dewey onoe argued
that failure to make action central in the searoh for 
such security as is humanly possible is a survival of 
the impotency of man in. those stages of civilization 
when he had few means of regulating and utilizing the
conditions upon which the occurrence of consequences
depends.®2
Dewey's point is simply that as long as man was "unable by means of the
arts of praotioe to direct the oourse of events," he inevitably had to
accept the forces of nature and their control over him; his only recourse
was by saorifioe, supplioation, and magical rites, to propitiate the gods
who determined his destiny. "If man could not conquer destiny he could
83
willingly ally himself with it...." With the growth of the arts and
sciences, with the increasing understanding and knowledge whioh man has
at his disposal, he has been able to turn the foroes of nature to his 
account. This latter method, the method of changing the world through
action, is the basis of instrumentalism and its emphasis upon the role of
knowledge as an instrument of control over man's environment.
82Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, reprinted in Intelligence in the
Modem World, p. 2Sv.
83Ibid., p. 276.
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It further is the argument of Dewey and the other pragmatists that 
it is only through planning, controlling, guiding, and the active use of 
man’s social intelligence, that an active science emerges. In Dewey’s 
words:
...if we want something to which the name ’’social science" 
may be given, there is only one way to go about it, namely, 
by entering upon the path of social planning and control.8*
This, as it will be recognized, is merely the necessary corollary of the
active, participating view of knowledge whioh Dewey holds. And it is a
point of view which the institutionalists have accepted, agreeing with
Dewey that
...it is a complete error to suppose that efforts as social 
control depend upon the prior existence of a sooial science.
The reverse is the case. The building up of social science 
... is dependent upon putting sooial planning into effect.85
Knowledge and understanding of the economio system grow out of investiga­
tion which is directed at control* and that is the only function which 
knowledge can have for the sooial sciences— it is an instrument of con­
trol. Dewey once criticized traditional logic and traditional theories 
of knowledge as being
...general answers supposed to have a universal meaning that 
covers and dominates all particulars. Henoe they do not 
assist inquiry. They close it. They are not instrumen­
talities to be employed and tested in clarifying oonorete 
social difficulties. They are ready-made principles to be 
imposedggpon particulars in order to determine their 
nature.
Dewey, "Social Soienoe and Social Control," ibid., p. 954.
8 5Ibid., p. 951.
8fiDewey, Reconstruction in. Philosophy, p. 149.
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The institutionalists have agreed with Dewey in these several respects—
that a sooial science can emerge only through use, only through control}
that, as Clark and Tugwell pointed out, it is to the economists that
society should have been able to look for guidance. The difficulty,
however, has been that the orthodox economist has been too engrossed in
refining traditional economics, they "have been lost in a tradition,"
and have thus been prevented from taking cognizance of the ever-changing
87economic system and its problems. And it is thus that economics has
missed its primary responsibility which is policy} the test of its sig-
88
nificance, says Tugwell, "lies in the field of sooial action." We do 
not, he argues, seek "knowledge for its own sake," we seek to understand 
"in order to be better fitted to improve our lot, to raise our levels of 
living."*^
Mitchell clearly and specifically spelled this general point out for 
us when he noted that "In economics as in other sciences we desire know-
Q A
ledge, mainly as an instrument of control." Commons in like note de­
fined economic scienoe as "the process of analysis, genesis, and insight," 
adding that economic science is not a given or fixed sum of knowledge,
"but a process of attaining control over the forces of nature by a better
91knowledge of the ways in whioh these forces operate." This is the basis
87Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline, pp. 87-8.
88Tugwell,"Human Mature and Sooial Eoonomy," Journal of Philosophy. 
August 14, 1930, p. 477.
®^Tugwell, Our Economic Society and its Problems, p. 496.
90Mitchell, "The Prospeots of Economics," The Backward Apt of Spend­
ing Money, p. 372.
91Commons, Institutional Economlos, p. 746.
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upon whioh Commons insists that eoonomio soienoe belongs to the area 
of purposeful selection for this twentieth century eoonomics is basi­
cally characterized by a shift to a conscious direotion of the economic 
system rather than a reliance upon natural forces or natural laws:
Instead of taking for granted a beneficent providence 
that makes the rules, as did the early economists, the 
rules themselves are investigated.... It is through 
knowledge of working rules that modem administrative 
economics learns its mechancism of control by collec­
tive action.
And in another instance, Commons asks if it is not better to recognize
what the foundations of our modem economy are rather than to be "oon-
tented with ’natural law’ instead of a better organized collective 
93action." These economists are arguing that man no longer has to sub­
mit to the foroes of nature, or to the fortuitous foroes of an imper­
sonal market meohanism, and that with increasing understanding, with con­
tinually improving knowledge, mankind can control his own eoonomio des-
92Commons, Eoonomics of Collective Action, p. 129.
Commons, Institutional Eoonomics, p. 846. It might be well to 
interject a note of explanation at "this point. The references to human 
control v automatism, the reliance upon human direction, upon sooial 
action, rather than upon natural foroes, may raise some objection in the 
mind of the reader. For who, one may ask, would rest his case in the 
twentieth century upon natural law? This question cannot be easily an­
swered at this time. The institutionalists argue in general that ortho­
dox economics is rather heavily infused with a theory of knowledge that 
relies heavily upon some such metaphysical basis. But more important than 
that, having accepted the pragmatio or instrumentalist position, the in­
stitutionalist has evolved a rather different position in several respects. 
One is his acceptance of the function of the economist in actively helping 
to direot and control economio development. Another is a fundamentally 
different conception of human nature and human behavior, vhioh will be 
developed in a later chapter. But perhaps most basic, as concerns this 
matter of reliance upon natural foroes, is the refusal of the institution­
alist to accept a rather important tenet of orthodox economios— the reli­
ance upon the market mechanism. Rather than take it as the end of eco­
nomic analysis, the institutionalist insists that it is but one of the 
subjects for investigation.
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tiny. As Tugwell approvingly noted,
The laissez-faire of the nineteenth century was based 
upon a metaphysics of providential guidance. The plan­
ning of the twentieth eentury rests its case on a philo­
sophical faith in the power of man to promote orderly eco­
nomic and sooial change.94
As a specific example of their faith in the ability of man to free him­
self from the vagaries of the market mechanism, Commons once noted the 
terrible price that had been paid by sooiety for the automatic gold stan­
dard and that, thought difficult, how much better from the standpoint of 
the economic welfare of the community was a managed money system. He went 
on to praise the Bretton Woods Agreement as "the abandonment of an ’auto­
matic’ international monetary system" and its replacement by the "open
and explicit acceptance of international management and control of cur- 
95rencies." And Mitchell also argued for the advantages of a managed
monetary system, holding
...that there are grounds for hoping that men may free 
themselves from dependence upon fortuitous ohanges in 
th8 annual output of gold by more skillful management 
of their monetary and banking systems.9®
Seen in the total picture, these are but two examples of the insistence
by these economists that mankind can control and direct his own destiny
and that the function of economics is to contribute to that guidance.
This is of course economio planning. And it is this whioh is
the oentral core of the whole way of thinking in institutional eoonomios.
It means an experimental, active, participating, functional eoonomios.
It means, in the words of Tugwell, "actual working with and thinking about
94.
Tugwell,"Planning and Laissez-faire," AER, March, 1932, p. 89; 
quoted from tin article "The Problem of Eoonomio Planning," by L. L.
Lorwin of the Brookings Institution.
^Commons.Economics of Collective Action, pp. 246-7.
96Mitchell, Business Cyclesi The Problem and its Setting, p. 136-n.
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industrial foroesj it means making proposals for change...." It means,
in Tugwell's view, the joining together of research, social criticism,
and sooial direction. It is this multi-faceted view which economists
must adopt, for
It oan be said that a free university is almost the sole 
source from which such critical sooial examination can 
come as will be involved in the new experimentalism..*.
Without projects for change whioh come from a disinter­
ested source, society lacks wholly any industrial direc­
tive force at all....And if the sooial good is to be 
obtained, and not just here and there the good of an 
individual or a group, if we are to have in this sense, 
progress, it oan only come from a constant reexamina­
tion of ideals and constant redirection of social foroes 
toward their attainment.
Ayres also agreed when he noted that the primary function of economic 
theory is to take "cognizance of the social needs" of the day and that 
eoonomics is therefore necessarily concerned with "sooial reform." He 
also was of the opinion that modem eoonomics is in "the prooess of form­
ation was one of the instruments of control over social renovation," that 
it is turning its attention to "giving an account of the modem sooial 
order whioh shall square with the facts of sooial justice and thus be 
relevant to the needs of the day."98 In a recent article, Ayres dis­
cussed the nature of eoonomio change and development and asked whether 
that "prooess is meaningless," or, "is it susceptible to intelligent con­
trol."99 He strongly urged that it is subjeot to intelligent control, 
that it is not the product of automatic forces over which man oan exer­
97Tugwell, "Experimental Eoonomics," The Trend of Economics, pp. 413, 
420-1.
98Ayres, "The Functions and Problems of Economio Theory," JPE, Jan., 
1918, pp. 85-88, passim.
99Ayres, "The Role of Technology in Economic Theory," AJ3R, May, 1953,
p. 285.
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cise no guidance, forces before which man must stand helpless. Their 
central point is that to have a sooial science, economic thinking must 
actively enter into control, into reform, into planning, for, in Ayres' 
view, "All economic thinking postulates planning...."*®0 It is only by 
such a procedure that a science can emerge, for knowledge to be useful 
it must be used; the more it is used, the more we know, the more there is 
about which we are certain.
The Function and Use of Eoonomio Theory
We have noted above that the institutionalists have accepted the 
position that economio analysis, economio theory, and indeed, all think­
ing in economics, must be an active functional prooess; that it is con­
cerned with problem solving; that it must, in other words, be useful—  
and that to be useful, it must be used. Hypotheses, theories, and ideas, 
are but springboards for action, to be tested, verified or rejeoted in 
aotual practice. They must be aimed toward the reform and the improve­
ment of the eoonomio system. There runs through their writings a strong 
melioristic tendency— that man's social world is not "given," nor is it 
automatically governed by inexorable foroes, but is capable of improvement, 
and that the primary function of economic theory is to assist in that im­
provement. These economists have insisted that it is their duty to trans­
late economic theory into some form of aotion -which will enable us to get 
at the root of various economic problems and maladjustments. Thus Clark 
deemed it "inevitable" that there should be a careful and "searching re­
consideration of the question of -what we want an economio system to do 
for us." He added that while final answers would not be easily or quickly
100
Ayres, The Industrial Economy, p. 186.
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formulated,
economics will need to raise this question and that if 
it is answered by conventional formulas based solely on 
satisfying commercial dollar demand, it will not be fao- 
ing the realities of the time.101
Clark envisaged the da.y when eoonomics would be more directly concerned 
with such problems, when it would become less and less a custodian of an 
insulated discipline with an '’academically defined boundary." If such is 
the case, he added, pedants need not be unduly fearful that their theoret­
ical problems will lose their importance, "It is only the traditional
readymade answers— or methods of evading the need of an answer— that will 
102lose standing." It should be noted that it is the eoonomist who is to 
raise these questions about the goals or ends of the economic system, but 
to do this, Clark argues the economist must not be "content to let the mar­
ket decide the uses to which economic goods should be put." He insists 
that they "make a declaration of partial independence from the market," 
for although it is an important instrument, it is nevertheless, a "biased
1 A 7
instrument for recording values." It is for these reasons that G-ruchy 
pointed out "They have felt themselves called upon to use their accumu­
lated knowledge about the economic system as a tool for sooial and eco­
nomic criticism and for the definition of the proper ends of our economic 
system. This of course marks one important distinction between the
institutional and the orthodox economist; the latter insisting that it is
^^Clark, "Economic Principles of the New Civilization," Our Emergent 
Civilization, ed. by Ruth N. Anshen, p. 127.
1 0 2Ibid., p. 123.
1 0 3Ibid., p. 129.
104Grruchy, "The Conoept of National Planning in Institutional Eco­
nomics," Southern Economio Journal, October, 1939, p. 121.
not his function to define the goals of the economic system, neither is 
it his function to criticize or to suggest. The institutionalist, how­
ever, conceives it to be his function specifically to do so and his writ­
ings and investigations, his theories and proposals are so oriented.
Thus Mitohell's analysis of the business cycle m s  never a mere intellec­
tual exercise; it m s  undertaken with the firm conviction that here ex­
isted a problem calling for a solution, an evil to be eliminated— and 
an evil which could be eliminated if approached from a proper frame of 
reference. The same is certainly true of Ayres' concern with the busi­
ness cyole and its close connection with the economic causes of wars.
Clark devoted most of his life to trying to evolve a more correct approaeh 
to social oost accounting by showing that the free market actually throws 
the burden of overhead costs upon the individual laborer, rather than 
socializing them. Thus it was that Clark insisted that economists must
take and use various "standards of value contrary to -those of the free
105market" if it is to "contribute scientifically to economic reform."
The traditional "theories of value and distribution," however, have
scarcely ever descended from their "rarified atmosphere" to the problems
with which the eoonomist must and should be concerned. And, Clark adds,
"If these be the limits of economic science, then it simply does not lay
„106
hold on the deepest issues of our time."
Tugwell added his conviction that in the twentieth century, "truth 
must be useful," but he insists that neoclassical economics is not use­
ful. It makes no difference, he noted, whether one believes in the classi­
cal economic laws or not, "because they have no working relevance" for the
^°^Clark, "Toward a Concept of Social Value," Preface to Social Eco­
nomics , p. 52.
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modern economist. To accomplish any goal, to show how and in what 
ways the economic system can be improved upon, to evaluate existing in­
stitutional practices, it is necessary to have better research, a better
grounding in reality. Judged by the functional criterion of results,
108reoeived economics is quite inadequate for the task. Thus it is that
the most important use of the social soiences, aocording to Clark, is
the elimination of the wandering "calf-paths" of social habits. This,
however, calls for a continual re-examination of existing institutional
practices, or existing social habits. And the result will be a conscious
109
effort to modify and to improve upon past customs. The result will be 
to make the best possible use of our collective intelligence in the eco­
nomic process and not to rely upon the automatic functioning of an econ­
omic man, the price system, or the sum total of a mass of individual 
actions.
The institutionalist has obviously taken a rather different view 
from the orthodox economist in many important respects: in his view of 
human nature and psychology, the influence of oulture, his view of society 
and its relation to the individual, the meaning and function of the price 
system. To complete our inquiry into the basis for economic planning in 
institutional economics, we must therefore turn to an examination of 
these various concepts.
107Tugwell, "Human Nature and Social Economy," Journal of Philosophy. 
August 14, 1930, p. 480; "Experimental Economics," The Trend, of Ifcoonomios. 
p . 393 .
X08
See Clark, "The Relation Between statics and Dynamics," Preface 
to Social Economics, pp. 199-200, 204, 216, 219. ~
■^Clark, "Toward a Conoept of Social Value," p. 63.
CHAPTER VI
human nature and psychology
Introduction
The epistemology of the institutional economists is closely cor­
related with their views on psychology or human nature. As we have 
noted above, they view knowledge as being functional, useful, explora­
tory, investigative. They take the mind to be an adapting, exploring, 
adjusting mechanism, rather than a mere "passive receptacle of ideas."*
It is this quiescent theory of the mind which the institutionalists argue 
has dominated the thinking and the theories of economists. For this, 
they would substitute a view of the human mind as being both a reflector 
of the world of experience and a reshaper of that world. Commons speci­
fically argues that economics is a study of "the human will in action," 
and urges that economists must adopt a volitional, behavioristic, psychol­
ogy in place of the subjeotive, passive, pleasure-pain psychology of the
classical economist. They have stressed the functional role of the mind
in the life-process and have consequently adopted a somewhat different 
view toward the importance of psychology for economics, a somewhat dif­
ferent conception of human nature, or human behavior.
It is in this sense that Tugwell noted that
One criticism brought against conscious economic theory 
is that it fails to take advised and realistic account 
of human nature. Economics is admitted to have a concep­
tion of human nature; but the root of the trouble 3eems
to lie exactly in the fact that it is a conception— or,
1
Commons, John R., Institutional Economics, Its Place in Politioal 
Economy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), p. 16.
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perhaps more accurately, a preconception.
This preconception is, in large part, the individualistic and atomistio
view of the orthodox economist. In this view, the emphasis is on men
qua individuals. Social behavior is seen as merely the summation of the
individual acts of individual men who are what they are "by nature"—
3
lazy, selfish, rational. This being the case, society is no more than 
a set of rules for the control and guidanoe of mankind. Economic activ­
ity is basic to all other activity and from it the natural laws of human 
conduct are deduced. Government exists, therefore, only to give complete 
freedom of action to those basic economic drives. This is essentially 
the point of view of human nature as expounded by Adam Smith and his suc­
cessors; it was, as Dewey has pointed out, an attempt "to give intellec­
tual expression to the rising industrialism" which was taking place in 
England; it m s  "not framed with scientific objeotiveness but on the 
basis of what was needed to give intellectual formulation and support to 
practical social movements."^ Professor Ayres, commenting upon this same 
approach to the formulation of a concept of human nature, noted that
Adam Smith's theory of moral sentiments was the behavior­
ism of the eighteenth century. By intention itwas a 
wholly objective account of human nature.... /what he 
sought to explain/ was, in fact, the pre-estabTished har­
mony of the theologians. Science had eliminated the 
guiding hand of Providence but not 'the conception of a 
providentially well-ordered universe. Consequently there 
was only one possible explanation of this state of affairst
^Tugwell, Rexford G., "Human Nature in Economic Theory," JPE, June, 
1922, p. 317.
g
For an excellent criticism of this point of view, Cf. Harry K. 
Girvetz, From Wealth to Welfare. The Evolution of Liberalism (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1950;, especially chaps, i, ii, & vii.
4
Dewey, John, "Human Nature," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
ed. Edwin R. A- Seligman, Vol. VII, p. 535.
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contrived at the outset with Infinite Cunning, wound up 
at the beginning of time like a transcendental clock, it 
would tick on through infinity according to the beneficent 
laws of nature, a perpetual manifestation of the ration­
ality of things. Human nature was thus conoeived to be a 
part of the universal clock.®
It is this view of human nature which, according to Ayres, has condi­
tioned the ’’whole way of thinking" in classical economics but -which, 
"nevertheless, economists have showed very little disposition to in­
vestigate...." The institutionalists, however, have insisted that a 
realistic and valid way of thinking in economics must be based upon a
g
realistic and valid conception of human nature. Just what is a valid 
conception of human nature, of human behavior, has been one of the more 
important questions which they have tried to answer— and which we will 
try to summarize and explain in the course of this and the next chapter.
The Importance of Economics as a Study of Sooial Behavior
Wesley 0. Mitchell, among others, attempted, in his studies and 
writings, to answer this question, consistently arguing that human be­
havior was one of the more important subjects to be explained, and that 
it was one of the primary tasks of the economist to contribute to this 
explanation. Thus he objected to those who held that psychology and 
human nature were beyond the proper purview of economists:
For when economic theory has been purified so far that 
human nature has no plaoe in it, economists become 
interested perforce in much that lies outside their 
theoretical field.
8Ayres, C. E., The Theory of Economic Progress (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1944}, pp. 69-70.
g
Cf. ibid., p. 90, for example.
Mitchell, W. C., "Human Behavior and Economics," QJE, November, 
1914, p. 2.
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And in another essay he noted that
In reviewing The Trend of Boonomioa. Professor Allyn 
A. Young predicted that 1 ^ wiTl' uTiimately be com­
pelled" to admit that economics "always has been a 
study of human behavior." That has long-Veen one of 
my favorite remarks, though I would like to add,
"whether economists recognize the fact or not," But 
economics should advance with surer steps when econo­
mists see dearly what they are really discussing. 8
It is the contention of Mitchell, and the other institutionalists, that 
the main subject-matter of eoonomios is a study of human behavior, but 
that received economics has chosen not to make this the main point of 
its study and thinking. It has, rather, adopted without investigation 
that view whioh prevailed at the time of Adam Smith, and has continued 
to elaborate it into a myriad of complex formulations concerning the 
behavior of price. Thus the orthodox economist has confined his dis­
cussion of psychology or human nature to a footnote, or a terse para­
graph. The institutionalist, on the other hand, has made this one of 
the main tenets of inquiry, one of the primary bases to be established 
as a foundation upon Whioh the superstructure of economic theory is to 
be built. It is their view that if eoonomios is to contribute to an 
understanding of the economic system of the twentieth century, if it 
is to contribute to the solution of today’s problems, if it is to serve 
as an efficient tool for guidance and control, then this preconception 
of the nature of human nature must be revised.
The institutionalists have argued that economic aotivity is but one
aspect of total sooial behavior, and that since this is true,
... the analysis of that activity must comport with the 
analysis of behavior generally. The classical economists 
were quite right in deriving their economic principles 
from the theory of human nature; the fault ... lay in 
the conception of human nature which prevailed in the
0
Mitchell, W. C.,"Postulates and Preoonoeptions of Rioardian Eco­
nomics," The Backward Art of Spending Money, p. 223; reprinted by permis­
sion of Ooen Court Wblishing Company, Chicago, from Essays in Philosoohv. 
ed. by T. V. Smith and W. J. Wright, 1929.
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eighteenth century.
Mitchell emphasized this same view, insisting that man's activities 
are not nioely compartmentalized, that we cannot realistically separ­
ate the political, economic religious, phases of his behavior; that 
"quite literally, we cannot understand any phase of social behavior apart 
from all other phases."^
Thus, the subject-matter of economics is seen to be that of human 
behavior in a total social milieu, not the behavior of prices, or of 
money, or of entrepreneurs, or the effect of a dose of fertilizer on a 
piece of marginal land. It was thus that Mitchell further held that "all
of the social soiences have a common aim— the understanding of humsua be- 
11havior," that economists must recognize
... that economics ... is a constructive study of human 
actions, making its own peculiar contributions to the 
knowledge of social behavior. The like holds true of 
all the social sciences. They have a common problem and 
a common working program. 12
And, according to Ayres,
Whatever its form and preconceptions, eoonomios is neoes- 
sarily a description, an analysis, and even it may be a 
prediction of human behavior; and consequently it cannot 
avoid being affected by any important development in the
9
Ayres, Theory of Economio Progress, p. 89.
^Mitchell, W. C., "Economics 1904-1929," The Backward Art of Spend­
ing Money, p. 402, reprinted by permission of dolumbia University IPress 
from A' Quarter Centuxy of Learning, 1931.
1:LMitohell , W. C., "Quantitative Analysis in Economic Theory," The 
Backward Art of Spending Money, p. 27, reprinted by permission from--fcSe 
AER, March, 1§25.
12
Mitchell, W. C., "Research in "ttie Social Sciences," The Backward 
Art of Spending Money, p. 79, reprinted by permission of the University 
of Chicago Press from The New Social Science, 1930.
177
1 *2
study of human nature.
The oommon problem, the central concern of all the social sciences is
to understand the social behavior of man and
The economist must himself contribute toward the under­
standing of human nature. Economic theory, thus con­
ceived, becomes part and parcel of the social psychology 
we are gradually developing through the cooperation of 
all the social scienoes.14
Thus, according to Mitchell's point of view, the economist can neither 
rest on the "moral sentiments" of the eighteenth century, nor can he 
ignore the importance of present-day developments in psychology, he must 
also contribute to a broader social psychology, to a broader understand­
ing of man and society.^®
The oommon aim of all the social sciences from the viewpoint of the 
institutionalists, is a better, a more realistic understanding of man's 
social behavior. Orthodox economics has failed on this score for it has 
centered exclusive attention on the behavior of prices and the allocation 
of scarce resources. According to the institutionalists, the reason for 
this emphasis has been a mistaken conception of human nature and of human 
behavior. A conception which has assumed that social activity is the man­
ifestation of individual activity. It is this view with which the insti­
tutionalists disagree.
Tugwell, for example, emphasized that the problems of economics must
15Ayres, C. E., "Fifty Years' Development in Ideas of Human Nature 
and Motivation," ABR, Papers and Proceedings, Maroh, 1936, p. 224.
14
Mitchell, "Economics 1904-1929," The Baokward Art of Spending 
Money, p. 408.
15Cf., for example, Ayres, "The Role of Technology in Economic 
Theory," AER, Papers and Proceedings, May, 1953, pp. 279ff.; also 
Mitchell, "Human Behavior and Economics," QJE, November, 1914, pp. 2ff.
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"be studied from the social point of view" because both the opportuni­
ties and the limits for any individual are defined "by the social group 
of which he is a member." "It is useful," therefore says Tugwell, "to 
consider the -ways and means by which a sooial group may improve its eco­
nomic conditions."^ And any improvement of the economic condition of 
society oannot be accomplished by approaching the problem from an indi­
vidualistic orientation, for in Tugwell*s view,
It seems not difficult to understand that the prosperity 
of society is something more than the total of individual 
prosperities: that social behavior is not to be predicted 
from a knowledge of individual psychology.^
And Mitchell, in one of his first published essays, "Human Behavior and
Economics," approvingly quotes Edward L. Thorndike to the effect that
among adults,
Much perhaps nine-tenths of what commonly passes for dis­
tinctively human nature is ... not in man originally, 
but is put there by institutions or grows there by inter­
action of the world of natural forces and the capacity to 
learn.
19"Human Nature," says Mitchell, "is in large measure a sooial produot," 
it is the product of man's sooial environment, the institutions whioh 
have shaped his behavior. And if we are to understand how the economic 
system functions in a particular society, we must abandon the individual­
istic orientation which assumes that man has certain natural propensi-
16
Tugwell, R. G., American Economic Life and the Means of itB Im­
provement (New York: Harcourt, Brace andCompany, 1§25), pp. 3-4. ""
17Tugwell, R. G., "The Directive," Journal of Sooial Philosophy 
and Jurisprudence, October, 1941, p. 22. quoted in Gruohy, Alan, Modem 
Economic Xhough£7 P* 418.
18"Human Behavior and Economics," QJE, November, 1914, p. 10. 
1 9Ibid., p. 2.
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ties and that society is but a product of these propensities— an assump­
tion which has continued down to the twentieth century to furnish a 
basis for orthodox economics. According to Mitchell, "it is mass be­
havior" that is of concern to the economist. "Hence, the institutions
that standardize the behavior of men create most of the openings for
20valid generalizations." Thus the proper study of mankind is not man, 
but the institutions and social forces which mold man's behavior; a 
valid understanding is not to be gained by generalizations made by the 
"treacherous method of reasoning on the basis of imputed economic motives," 
but by accepting "as ’scientific’ only those theorists who make the cumu-
p-l
lative change of institutions their chief concern."
This is basically the position which John R. Commons also developed
over a period of some thirty years. At the level of generalization of
concern to the social sciences, the individual is irrelevant, for, "instead
of individuals the participants are citizens of a going concern." These
"individuals" learn the customs of the society of which they are a part,
of "cooperation vrith other individuals," of "subordination to the working
rules of the many concerns of -which they are members."
They meet each other, not as phyeiologioal bodies moved 
by glands, nor as "globules of desire moved by pain and 
pleasure, similar to the forces of physical and animal 
nature, but as prepared more or less by habit, induoed 
by the pressure of custom, to engage in those highly 
artificial transactions created by the human will.22
Thus, no human activity or motive is eoonomio per se. Inherently^ hunger
or pain or gain are no more economic than is love or sex or pride of work-
20Mitohell, W. C., "The Prospects of Eoonomios," The Baokward Art of
Spending Money, p. 375, reprinted by permission of P. S. Crofts and Co., 
Hew York, from The Trend of Economics, ed. by R. G. Tugwell.
22Commons, Institutional Economics, pp. 73-74.
180
manship or the attempt to seoure a good reputation. People will labor 
(if sooiety so defines it) or play (if it is so defined) for a wide var­
iety of reasons— as numerous anthropological and sociological studies 
23have shown. Produotion and eoonomio activity in their entirety are a 
sooial, not an individual phenomenon. There is nothing "natural" about 
economic activity! there are no "natural" economic motives of individual 
men of which the rules and institutions of society are a manifestation.
To the contrary, men’s activities are a reflection of the particular 
society of which they are a "participant." And the focus of attention 
must therefore be shifted to the cultural, the sooial, level of generaliza­
tion.
This is the point, Ayres has insisted, which differentiates the 
orthodox eoonomist from the institutionalist. In his view, the "objective" 
of orthodox theory "is now as it has always been, the explanation of soo­
ial order ... as an expression of human nature," whereas for the institu­
tionalists, "the objective is the explanation of human nature (working, 
buying, consuming, investing, and so forth) as an expression of the social
pA
order...'. It is his contention that economics is a study of the total
sooial economy, but that
classical economics (in its entirety) is an attempt to 
explain eoonomio patterns as the consequence of the con­
catenation of the individual acts of a vast ooncourse of
individual human beings who are what they are "by nature."
But human beings are not what they are in any intelligible 
sense of the phrase "by nature."25
^®Cf», for example, Herskovits, M. J., The Economic Life of Primi­
tive Peoples, and Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, especially 
chaps, iai, iv, and xi.
24Ayres, "Fifty Years4 Development in Ideas of Human Nature and 
Motivation," p. 235.
25
Ayres, C. E., "The Co-ordinates of Institutionalism," ABR, Papers 
and Proceedings, May, 1951, p. 49.
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Quit© to the contrary, argues Ayres, "human beings are sooial phenomena." 
This being the case, "social patterns are not the logical consequents of 
individual acts; individuals, and all their actions, are the logical con­
sequents of sooial patterns." Institutionalists, says Ayres, simply pro­
pose to acoept the "full significance" of thi3 present-day conception of 
human nature in order to arrive at a "functional conception of human be- 
havior" and thereby lay the foundation for a more functional eoonomios.
Thus, the institutional economists, as Commons argues, "instead of 
investigating an individualistic human atom, ... investigate the work­
ing rules and administrative decisions of all collective a c t i o n . T h i 3 
collective action which Commons deems of vital signifioanoe for economic 
analysis did not, in his opinion, beoome important in America until the 
deoade of the 1850’s. Such action, therefore, "seemed revolutionary to 
the economists who followed Adam Smith. To them, only individuals felt 
pleasure and pain and did the bargaining on the markets." To Commons, 
however, an individualistioally oriented science cannot contribute towards 
an understanding of the economic system of today because it is not a man­
ifestation of individuals qua individuals. Individual behavior is molded 
and controlled by the working rules, the institutions, the collective 
action of sooiety. And, it is important to note that collective action 
means more to Commons than the "mere control" of individuals. "It means 
liberation and expansion of individual action; ... collective action is
pQ
literally the means to liberty." The fruitfulness for economics is that
Ayres, C. E., "The Co-Ordinates of Institutionalism," AER, Papers 
and Proceedings, May, 1951, pp. 48-49.
27Commons, "Twentieth century Economics," Journal of Sooial Philo­
sophy, 1939, p. 33.
po
Commons, The Eoonomios of Collective Action, pp. 34-35; we shall 
return to this point later”
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we can substitute for "a vague concept of human nature," the more mean­
ingful and usable "transactions and the working rules of going concerns
29wherein collective aotion controls individual transactions." It is
more meaningful and usable, for as we shift to the conception of our
science as but one of the sciences dealing with human behavior,
... we find our attention focusing upon the role played 
in behavior by institutional factors. ... It is these 
widely prevalent social habits, learnt afresh with mod­
ifications by each generation, that make our behavior so 
different from that of our ancestors, and that -will make 
the behavior of our descendants different from ours.®®
This emphasis upon the factors molding behavior is important, as Mitohell 
pointed out, for, in economics, as in all other scienoes, "we desire know­
ledge mainly as an instrument of control, ... the alluring possibility
of shaping the evolution of eoonomio life to fit the developing purposes 
31of our race." If economics is to take its place as a useful instrument 
of control, then it must adopt this evolutionary point of view with 
respect to human nature; it must abandon the conception of human nature 
as adopted by the eighteenth and nineteenth century economists, for the 
institutions, the social habits, the working rules which shape and mold 
this behavior, have changed since that time. The most important reoent 
development in this connection, which Mitohell thinks is helping the 
progress of eoonomios, is that the "records of human behavior, regularly 
collected and published, are becoming fuller and more accurate." This 
has enabled the economist, if he will use them, if he will adopt this 
social outlook, to "substitute knowledge of fact for uncertain opinion;
29Commons, Institutional Eoonomios, p. 655.
®®Mitohell, "The Prospects of Economies," The Backward Art of Spend­
ing Money, pp. 372-3.
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analysis of actual processes for speculation about what would happen
32under hypothetical conditions,”
The institutionalist argues that if economic theory and economic 
analysis are to be useful ”lnstruments of control,” then a more realis­
tic understanding of human nature, of psychology, is mandatory. As J. M. 
Clark pointed out, the orthodox utility theory rests upon only one phase 
or aspect of human nature, "the static or hedonistic phase of guidance by 
individual initiative." But as we have discussed above, these conomists 
hold that the importance of individual action, prevalent in the nineteenth 
century, has been replaced by the collective action of the twentieth. And 
it is for this reason that Clark continues, saying that "to the eoonomio 
problems of a century ago this ^/TndividualisticT" phase of guidanoe was
supremely relevant, but for the problems of today it is the other phases
33
of guidanoe that claim attention." Thus, the institutionalist, as
■typified by Clark, is not
...satisfied to start with conventional treatment of human 
nature, which separates out certain supposed economic 
motives for purposes of specialized study. We shall need 
instead a more rounded treatment which gives us some basis 
for judgment as to what the needs of human nature are and 
the relative importance to the community as a whole of 
meeting these needs in varying degrees.34
This, of course, is the main theme of the institutional economists— that
eoonomios should be a functional tool for control and direction, but if it
32Mitohell, W. C., "Engineering, Economics and the Problem of Sooial 
Well-Being," Meohanioal Engineering, February, 1931, p. 108; for a similar 
view of the importance of research in psychology, see, Commons, John R.,
"Wage Theories and Wage Policies," AER, Papers and Proceedings, March,
1923, pp. 112ff.
33
Clark, "Economics and Modem Psychology," Preface to Social Economics. 
p. 95j reprinted by permission from JPE, Vol. 26 (1918). ”
34Clark, J. M., "Eoonomio Principles of the New Civilization," Our 
Emergent Civilization, ed. by Ruth N. JJnshen (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
194?;, Vol. IV, p. 131; of. also, Tugwell, p. 201, below.
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is to assume this role, then the concept of human nature -which has 
plagued economic thinking since the eighteenth century must be revised.
If the economist accepts "the starting point of ’what ought to be done’ 
and the end of more orderly arrangements," then, according to Tugwell,
"the method of social science easily reveals itself as the study of indi-
tr c
vidua1 behavior in a social milieu." Although we have in the past re- 
versed this procedure and studied social behavior from an individualistic 
point of view, this must be abandoned— if we are attempting to direct the 
eoonomio system toward human welfare, if the search is for "what ought to 
be done."
UUhile individual initiative and individual activity (both also soc­
ially defined) may have been more prevalent in the eighteenth and nine­
teenth centuries, and therefore more meaningful for economic analysis 
at that time, beginning in the decade of the 1850’s, they have been in­
creasingly replaced by collective or group action. Psychological adjust­
ment today is largely a matter of adapting to the mores of the social
•Zg
group in some form of collective behavior. The opportunities for any 
one individual’s achievements and the limits to those achievements are 
defined and limited by collective action. And economic theory, if it is 
to be this useful tool, must take cognizance of this changed nature of 
human behavior. Man is not, in the view of the institutionalists, a 
rational, calculating, creature. He thinks only under stress, relyingon 
habits formed by his institutional environment for the direction of the 
greater portion of hia activities. And economics, as but one of the sci­
ences concerned with social activities, must therefore put more and more
Tugwell, R. G., "Human Nature and Social Economy," Journal of Phil­
osophy, August 14, 1930, p. 490.
56We will return to this point in the next chapter.
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emphasis, must increasingly concern itself -with these institutions which 
mold and shape economic behavior.
What these economists are saying is that what has been tradition­
ally subsumed under human nature is itself subject to change; that it is 
not a static, fixed, set of activities. Economic activity is not the 
manifestation of certain given motives. But the early economists, in the 
opinion of the institutional economists, took the then-existing institu­
tions as being a manifestation of an eternal human nature, of certain 
fixed human propensities or motives, and sought to show how the economic 
system functions as a result of these inherent qualities. Thus, orthodox 
theory conoerned itself with the workings of a market mechanism which 
could properly function only in the absence of any restraints upon man's 
basic nature. There was no need to examine human nature or the psycho­
logical assumptions underlying economic theory because the market mechan­
ism itSblf is but an expression of man's most basic traits, his innermost 
drives. Economics, therefore, needs merely to work out the logical conse­
quents of these motives under different assumed conditions.
The institutionalists, on the other hand, argue that human behavior 
is socially determined, that man is primarily a reflection of his social 
environment and if, therefore, we seek to understand the economic system, 
we cannot extrapolate an assumed inherent nature of man. Quite the oppo­
site, we must closely examine the psychological foundations upon which eco­
nomic theory is built.
The Importance of Psychological Assumptions in Eoonomios
It is the contention of the institutional economists that every eco­
nomist must and does use psychology— even if any particular economist 
opposes the use of it. In Clark's view, for example, for economics to
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rely on the "fact of choice," does not take economies out of a depend­
ence upon psychology, "save at the cost of becoming utterly meaning­
less." The economist may attempt, says Clark, to ignore psychology, 
but this is impossible for his is a science of human behavior. Any view 
or position that he may adopt (for example, that people attempt to maxi­
mize satisfactions) "involves psychological assumptions, whether these be 
explicit or not."*^ Whether the psychological premises be explicit or 
implicit, they are, in the opinion of the institutionalists, a necessary- 
base upon which any science of human activity is built. As John Ganibs 
put it, psychology is to the institutional economists "like the foundation
iJO
of a house." When the structure is completed, the foundation is unseen, 
seldom discussed, ofttimes forgot. It always, however, plays a limiting 
and determining rolej it forever limits the size, shape, and use of the 
structure above. In the same fashion, eoonomio theory is but the super­
structure, limited and determined by the psychological foundations upon 
which it is erected. This being the case, it is important to understand 
and appreciate the psychological foundations of economic theory, for the 
particular use, the function of, the superstructure is determined by that 
foundation.
The orthodox eoonomist, however, has seldom regarded a knowledge of
psychology, or of the psychological assumptions underlying his economic
39theory, as necessary or important. As Mitchell noted, when economic
37Clark, "Eoonomios and Modern Psychology," Preface to Social Eco- 
nomics, p. 96.
38Ganibs, John S., Beyond Supply and Demand (New Yorks Columbia Univer­
sity Press, 1946), p. 27.
39Cf. Robbins, Lionel, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Eco­
nomic Soienoe (London: Macmillan and Co., LtdV, i§49), pp. 8feff.
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theory was in its formulative stages, all psychological concepts were 
but tacit preconceptions from which economic theory proceeded uncriti­
cally. "Most of the older writers made no overt referenoe to psyohol- 
ogy, but tacitly imputed to the men whose behavior they were analyzing
certain traits concsistent with common sense and convenient as a basis 
40
for theorizing." These preconceptions continued to dominate economic
-theory; they were seldom critically analyzed or evaluated. They were as
completely out of sight as the foundations of a house. Even
When economists did become definitely consoious of what 
they had been assuming concerning human nature, it might 
have been expected that they would apply to psychologists 
to gain a knowledge of the mind and its modes of operation.
On the contrary, they adopted the practioe of formulating 
for themselves "a few principles of nature," proven by past 
experience to be serviceable for the ends of economic in­
quiry.41
Thus, in the view of the institutionalists, economic theory came
to be cast in a certain mold, its function or use was limited to that
which had been built into it from the tacit preconceptions of the economic
behavior of man in the eighteenth century. Economic theory thus came to
be prioe theory, for the price system was seen as the recorder of certain
basio traits, certain inherent economic motives, which were eternal and
universal, And while this type of economic theory may have been useful
42
in the past, it no longer serves the needs of today. What is needed, 
then, is a thorough and critical examination of this foundation, if the 
superstructure of economic theory is to become a useful tool for eoonomio
40Mitchell, "Human Behavior and Economics," QJE, November, 1914, p. 1.
41Mitchell, W. C., "The Rationality of Economic Activity," JPE, 
February, 1910, p. 97.
4 2Cf. Commons, "Political Economy and Business Economy," QJE, Novem­
ber, 1907, pp. 120-125.
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reform. The institutional economists argue that man does not have cer­
tain inherent economic motives and if economic theory is to have any 
functional meaning, it must divorce itself from this bias and establish 
itself upon a firmer and modem modem foundation, a foundation built 
with today's materials and in light of today's needs. The institutional 
economist agrees with William MoDougall "that some knowledge of the human 
mind and of its modes of operation is an essential part of their equipment,
and that the successful development of the social sciences must be depend-
43ent upon the fulness and accuracy of such knowledge."
It should of course be noted, that in psychology, as in eoonomios or 
any of the sooial (or physical) sciences, there are several dissident 
schools of thought— that psychology is subject to change as new insights 
and understanding are brought to light. Does this, then,mean, as Robbins 
asserts, that
If ... Economics rests upon particular psychological doc­
trines, there is no task more ready to hand than every
five years or so to write sharp polemics showing that,
since psychology has changed its fashion, Eoonomics needs 
"rewriting from the foundations upwards."44
If psychological theory does change, and if at any one time, there is dis­
agreement among psychologists, it mi ght seem relevant to ask whioh of sev­
eral interpretations is correct. In answer to this question, John (Jambs 
said that "the proper answer is that the question is unconstructive and 
deserves no directly reply." He points out that the professional psycholo­
gist is one who is reasonably well informed on the nature of human behav­
ior; in spite of differing views, he does have an understanding of the
43 „
Quoted by Mitohell, The Rationality of Eoonomio Aotivity," p. 100,
from William MoDougall, An Introduction to Sooial Psychology (Boston: John
W. Luce & Co.), p. 1.
^Robbins, op. cit., pp. 83-84.
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problem of human, behavior that is not possessed by others. And -while 
various psychologists may disagree, any particular member is certainly 
more competent than those who have never thoughtfully studied and con­
sidered the subjeot. Despite all intra-fraternal disagreements, the 
important point is that they have reached certain areas of agreement, and
it behooves the economist to take note of such advancements, to verify or
45reject them, to add to them if possible. Although Robbins may demur at
having to rewrite economics from the ground up every five years, in the 
view of the institutionalist, he is still using as the basis of his eco­
nomic theory, the naive and discredited psychological preconceptions of
46
the eighteenth century. And it is this bias which has rendered economic 
theory useless for the needs of the twentieth century. If the economist 
will base his conception of man and human behavior upon the findings of 
modern psychologists, then it will have a much better chance to succeed.
If he does not, according to Clark, "he vdll not thereby avoid psychology.
Rather he will force himself to make his own, and it will be bad psychol-
„47ogy."
The preconception with which the eighteenth and nineteenth oentury 
economists began was that of man's natural propensities, of his basic in­
stinct to "truck, barter and exchange," that man is naturally lazy and 
must be coerced into activity, that he is interested only in promoting 
his own self interest. From -tiiese assumptions, the whole theory of a natur­
al order in the economic and political system was deduced. If there were
45Gambs, op. clt., pp. 31-32; see also pp. 196-197, above.
46
Cf., for example, Hamilton, David, Newtonian Classicism and Darwin­
ian Institutionalism (Albuquerque: The University of Itfew !Mexioo Press,
1953), chap. iii.
47Clark, "Economics and Modem Psychology," Preface to Sooial Eoo­
nomios, p. 96.
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no artificial restraints upon these basic proclivities, then an economic
organization would emerge whieh would be in accord with the original
nature of man, an economic organization which would, then be "natural."
It was assumed by the economists, in the words of Commons, that
... economic power was limited by free competition be­
tween equal individual owners, and this was the reason 
why eoonomio agreements were deemed to be voluntary 
rather than ooereive. It followed that the only place 
of government in -the economic scheme was in the nega­
tive power (laissez faire) of preventing conspiracy or 
monopoly, either of which interfered with free competi-
Thus, if each individual was permitted to follow his own self-interest 
according to the dictates of human nature, then the best of all possible 
worlds would be realized, for it would be a product of the unrestricted 
functionings of an unrestricted human nature. In the view of these eco­
nomists, as expressed by Ayres,
The moral philosophers of the eighteenth century believed 
the institutions of their day to be an expression of ... 
human nature, and the orthodox economists of the twentieth 
century still confine their disoussion to the framework 
afforded by prevailing institutions because they conceive 
the institutions to be an expression of human nature. The 
institutionalists decline to do so because they hold pre­
cisely the opposite view of human nature, td wit, that it 
is an expression of institutions.
Holding that an economic system based upon Natural Law would emerge from 
the unrestricted activities of man's basic economic motives, it remained 
only for the economists to work out the explanation of that economic 
system. It was thus that economics turned to and remained a theory of 
prioe. This, in the view of the orthodox economist, is the whole sig­
nificance of the prioe system— the meaning of economics and of the eco-
48Commons, Economics of Collective Action, p. 215.
49Ayres, "Fifty Years’ Development in the Ideas of Human Nature and 
Motivation," p. 234.
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nomic system is to be found there. The institutionalists, however, 
disagree with this interpretation, for they insist that it stems from 
a misunderstanding of human nature. The institutions of society are 
not an expression of some original human nature, rather the institu­
tions and mores of sooiety mold and shape human nature. And if eoo­
nomio theory limits itself to the framework provided by the prevailing 
institutions— if, for example, it confines itself to the functioning 
of the prioe system— then it is to that extent limited in its useful­
ness. It is for this reason that economists must carefully examine 
the psychological assumptions which have been the foundation of eoo­
nomio theory for a century and a half. The science of eoonomios was 
founded upon the conception of a human nature which included higgling 
in the market, the tendency to "truck, barter, and exchange," the pur­
suit of self-interest, and the abhorence of work. It was founded, in 
short, upon
a conception of human nature of which the pecuniary 
system seemed to be a natural expression. Any criti­
cal disoussion of the classical principles of political 
economy must therefore take cognizanoe of the theory of 
human nature from which those principles emerged.®'-'
On the assumption that the "passions and instinct" of man had been so 
designed as to produce, in the absence of artificial restraints, a 
natural oonmunity of interests, economics undertook, and continued in 
the effort, to describe this "wonderful contrivance"— the prioe system.
Unlike modern orthodox economists who deny the importance of psy­
chology, or dismiss it with a cursory footnote, institutionalists 
attaoh importance and relevancy to it. Eoonomio theory, as is true of 
all social sciences, is a science of human behavior in a sooial milieu; 
it cannot avoid psychology or a conception of human nature simply by
50
Ibid., p. 224.
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concentrating on price theory. Prices and indeed the entire prioe system 
can have meaning only in terms of human behavior, but the meaning that is 
imputed to it, is in the view of the institutionalist, a false and mis­
leading one. It was because the eighteenth century conoept did offer an 
explanation of how men seem to act that it exerted so profound an influ­
ence upon economic thoughts and in the opinion of Mitohell,
It is because they are developing a sounder type of func­
tional psychology that we may hope both to profit by and 
to share in the work of contemporary psychologists. But 
in embraoing this opportunity economics will assume a new 
character. It will cease to be a system of peouniary 
logic, a mechanical study of static equilibria under non­
existent conditions, and become a science of human behav­
ior.^
The orthodox economist justifies his position by insisting that his only 
concern is with the machinations of the price mechanism; he insists that 
the subject matter of economics is delimited by the market mechanism.
This being the case, he argues that a knowledge of psychology is inessen­
tial. The only concern of the economist is with the faot that people do 
buy, that they do have scales of preferences, that they do lay their money 
on the line for this or that article. Robbins' position on this point may 
be taken as representative:
... all that is assumed in the idea of the scales of valu­
ation is that different goods have different uses and that 
these different uses have different significances for ac­
tion, such that in a given situation one use will be pre­
ferred before another and one good before another. ...
All that we need to assume as economists is the obvious 
faot that different possibilities offer different incen­
tives, and that these incentives can be arranged in order 
of their intensity. The various theorems which may be 
derived from this fundamental conception are unquestionably 
capable of explaining a manifold of sooial activity incap­
able of explanation by any other technique. ... Here, as 
so often, the founders of Economic Science constructed 
something more universal in its application that anything
, "Human Behavior and Eoonomios," p. 47.
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52that they themselves claimed.
The institutionalists take exception to this position on at least two 
counts. In the first place, in spite of Robbins' protestations, he does 
assume a certain view of human nature and the significance that can be 
derived from it: that people do act aocording to some scale of prefer­
ences, that incentives can be arranged in order of their intensity and 
that from these given truths, the economist is "unquestionably capable 
of explaining a manifold of sooial activity incapable of explanation by 
any other technique." .And this insight, it should be noted, is "more uni­
versal in its application" than even the founding fathers dared dream. In
other words, we have here a universal rule of behavior which gives us an 
understanding of any eoonomic system, at any time, in any place. The price 
system is therefore the key to unlock the mystery of any economic system. 
And it is precisely this position whioh the institutionalists oriticize.
The economic system is seen by the orthodox eoonomist to be an expression 
of man's basic nature (for example, his acting according to some scale of 
preferences), whereas for the institutionalist, man’s basic nature is an 
expression of the society of whioh he is a member. Eoonomio or social
phenomena are not the result of the acts of individual men who are what
they are by natum (lazy, selfish, calculating, acting according to some 
scale of preferences....), and any attempt to so proceed, any attempt to 
read the meaning of the eoonomio system in the horosoope of prioe, is to 
that extent limited in its application as a functional science.
The Nature of Rationality 
If, says Mitchell, we look behind the facade of eoonomio theory to
Ep
Robbins, op. oit., pp. 85-86.
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the psychological assumptions which are "really implied in and essential
to the conclusions," we will find that they are rather broad and simple.
The assumptions would be essentially limited to
... the irksomeness of labor, the satisfaction derived from 
the consumption of goods, the increasing intensity of the 
first and decreasing intensity of the second as labor and 
consumption proceed, the emergence of new wants as the old 
become partially satisfied, the preference for present 
over future satisfactions, and sufficient intelligence to 
recognize and to act in accordance with these simple condi­
tions so as to attain ends in the easiest known way.53
Mitohell, however, questions the validity and usefulness of both starting
and stopping with this list of assumptions. They are facts or hypotheses
to be explained, to be investigated, not premises from which to draw con-
54olusions about the nature of the economic system. Thus, rather than an 
unquestioned assumption about the nature of man, "the fact that labor is 
irksome is a fact to be explained; indeed a very puzzling problem rather 
than a simple fact." How can we, asks Mitchell, "reconcile man's aver­
sion to the activity necessary for his sustenance with his success in out­
stripping all other animal species in the struggle for survival and for 
domination?"Man is a doer, an actor, an active participant— not a 
vegetating, passive, bystander. And the same questions apply to these 
other premises of orthodox; economics, they are "traits whose fundamental 
importance makes their explanation fundamental problems." These, accord­
ing to Mitchell, are the central problems of economics, not a "solid found­
ation upon which elaborate theoretical constructions may be erected with- 
out more ado." The more important problem to Mitchell was to explain
^Mitchell, "The Rationality of Eoonomio Activity," p. 198.
54
See Chapter Five, above, for a more complete discussion of the dif­
ference between the institutionalists and the orthodox economists with 
respect to the use of assumptions and hypotheses.
55
See pp. 199 and 277, below.
^Mitchell, "The Rationality of Economic Activity," p. 201.
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economic theory and the economic theorists---why they came to attaok 
certain problems hut ignored others, why they took certain premises 
as given without exploring the meaning and significance of those pre­
mises. Instead of deducing from certain premises about human nature, 
one has to find out what they do and why they do it. And that is a 
matter of observation. Observation and investigation have been all too 
infrequently used by the economists} instead, they have deluded them­
selves "with strictly logioal accounts of the world ... they have always 
fabricated theories for their spiritual comfort and practical guidance
57
which ran far beyond the realm of fact...." Internal consistency, 
striotly logioal deductions, are not the test or truth; the test of truth 
is in the usefulness of conclusions. Whatis needed is an overhauling 
of the basic premises, the given view of human nature from which the 
economists had proceeded.
Mitchell was thus critical of the rationality which was imputed to 
man by the orthodox theorists. "It is a misoonoeption," says Mitohell, 
"to suppose that consumers guide their course by rationcination— they 
don't think except under stress. There is no way of deducing from cer­
tain principles what they will do, just because their behavior is not
eg
rational." Men of course do think, but for the greater part of their
activities they rely on socially formed habitB. Thus, says Mitchell,
The picture given by so many eoonomio treatises of 
buyers coming to the market with their minds already 
made up about what goods they wish, and what price 
they are willing to pay at need for successive units 
of each kind, is an undeserved compliment to the men­
tal energy of mankind.
57
Letter from Wesley C. Mitohell to J. M. Clark, dated August 9, 
1928, reprinted by pennission in Prefaoe to Social Eoonomios. p. 412.
CO
Ibid., p. 411.
59Mitohell, Business Cycles, the Problem and Its Setting, p. 165.
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A closer study of man's activity in actual economic behavior reveals 
almost no sign of the "human rationality conveyed by our theoretical 
treatises." Furthermore, a study of modern psychology reveals much more 
about "habits, conditional reflxes, action patterns," than about "fel- 
icific calculus, deolining utility, or curves of indifference." In many 
problems much more potency is assigned to "suspicions, fears, hatreds, 
and stupidities that do not yield to reason."60 In the same vein, Tug- 
well noted that "the present generation o f psychologists ... have al­
ready pretty well revolutionized the scientific definition of human 
nature." The role of reason, in particular, is considerably less than 
"the old oommon-sense view supposed." According to Tugwell's under­
standing of modern psychology, man does "not aot in response to reason, 
he, through reasoning, decides upon the "repression" of those socially
"undesirable modes of action," beoause he seeks primarily "the satis-
„Q1
factions of social approval."
*
The fatal error of the orthodox economist has been, in Mitohellfs
view, the study of human behavior "from inside the individual":
Introspection of their own feelings and common ob­
servation provide the data; common sense decides -what 
items in the array are typical; common logic weaves 
these items into a theory. This is the most intimately 
human and the most treacherous of all professedly sci­
entific methods.62
To understand economic behavior, we cannot "look inside the individual
and his oapacity to abstract from the totality of experience...rather
60 _
Mitohell, "Economics 1904-1929," The Backward Art of Spending
Money, pp. 406-407.
61Tugwell, "Human Nature in Economic Theory," JPE, June, 1922,
p . 317.
62
Mitohell, W. C., "Wieser's Theory of Social Economics," The 
Backward Art of Spending Money, p. 254, reprinted by permission from 
the poliii'cal Science Quarterly, vol. XXXII.
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we must look outside the individual to the habits of behavior slowly 
evolved by society and painfully learned by himself.’1®® According to 
Mitchell, the behavior that is of direct oonoem to the economist is 
not the rational calculation of orthodox theory, but that which is 
'directed by certain social institutions, that is, by certain widely 
shared habits of feeling, thinking, and acting in frequently recurring 
situations.” Economic behavior is not the sum total of disparate in­
dividuals each acting according to his own scale of preferences in 
order to maximize his total individual satisfactions; it is, rather, 
the socially and institutionally directed behavior, the ’’behavior of
fir
men in organized communities." The central concern of the economist 
is not human atoms, each acting aeoording to his given propensities; 
it is rather the social concepts, the social institutions, which organ­
ize and control that behavior. These social institutions which Mitchell 
defines as
... the prevalent habits of thought which have gained 
general acceptance as norms for guiding conduct. In 
this form the social concepts attain a prescriptive 
authority over the individual. Their daily use by all 
members of a social group unremittingly molds these 
individuals into common patterns without their know­
ledge, and occasionally interposes obstacles in the 
path of men who wish to act in original ways.®"
Thus, a sovereign self, aeting aeoording to an inherent set of motives
is a mistaken view of economic behavior; it results from the intro-
gB
Mitohell, W. C., "The Role of Money in Economic Theory," The 
Backward Art of Spending Money, reprinted by permission from AER,
Vol. VI, supplement, March, 1916.
64
Mitchell, "Wieser’s Theory of Social Economics," pp. 265-256.
66Ibid., p. 253.
66Mitchell, "The Rationality of Economic Activity," JPE, Febru­
ary, 1910, p. 203.
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spection of the earlier economists and which was later taken as one 
of the given premises for eoonomic theory. It m s  in this sense that 
Clark criticized the psychological assumptions of eoonomic theory, not­
ing that
We built economics on the idea of rational ohoosing, only 
to be told that rational choosing is but a small and very 
imperfectly developed part of our mental life. We 
•thought of the self as a sovereign will, in some sense 
independent of the universe. Men had their wants, and 
the universe granted or denied their gratification. Pro­
duction consisted in turning out goods and services to 
suit these pre-existing wants. Now, however, we find a 
self which is but a series of attitudes toward the uni­
verse; a set of tendencies to react and to seek, which
are ... developed and given their shape and direotion 
by the universe outside.6?
In the view of these economists, the scienoe of economics is not as 
simple and well-defined as some have assumed it to be. It is, in their
view, but a part of a larger attempt to understand man's behavior in
the social setting of the twentieth century. To do this, however, re­
quires that the foundations of economic theory be strengthened and per­
haps replaoed in light of today's knowledge and needs. Mitohell noted 
that the usual defense of the orthodox economist was that according to 
the acoepted (by the orthodox economist) definition of "the scope and 
method of economics, the science is protected by the statute of limita­
tions." Economic theory undertakes only to explain the "production, 
evaluation, and distribution of goods in sooiety as at present consti­
tuted." A H  other phases of the problem, including the psychological 
premises upon which their theory is based, they leave to other areas of 
the social sciences. "This division of labor," however, "betrays the 
economio theorist into tacitly misconceiving the mental processes in-
Clark, "Economics and Modem Psychology," p. 99.
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volved in eoonomic activity. The most serious of his misconceptions 
concerns the role played by concepts having a social origin."®®
Is Human Mature a Given
Much has been learned about the nature of human nature that was
not available to the earlier economists who of necessity had to rely
on introspection and common-sense notions about man's behavior. This 
advantage has been due, in large part, to the increasing study of man 
and his behavior in differing societies, to the fuller and more accur­
ate records of human behavior which are regularly collected and pub- 
69lished. The common-sense view of the earlier economists was of man 
as a passive agent, moved only by sensations (or expectations) of pain 
or pleasure (or of utility or disutility or ...). The more reoent stud­
ies in psychology and sociology, according to the institutionalists, de- 
emphasize the importance of motives or of stimuli. They view man as
being a creature of activity, of being, as Tugwell put it, "restless and 
70exploratory." They agree with John Dewey that "in truth man acts any­
way,, he can't help aoting. In every fundamental sense it is false that
71a man requires a motive to make him do something." The question to be 
probed, then, is what are the forces that direct this activity, that mold 
human behavior. In the view of the institutionalist, this activity—  
which is natural to man— is defined and directed by the social context
68Mitchell, v"The Rationality of Economic Aotivity," pp. 201-202.
69
See pp. 179 and 182, above.
70
"Experimental Eoonomics," The Trend of Economics, p. 372.
71Dewey, John, Human Mature and Conduct (New York: Modem Library, 
1930), p. 118.
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in which it takes place:
There is no movement ... of the human body which is not 
that of a physical organism and which therefore is not 
what it is because that organism is of the biological 
speoies homo sapiens; and similarly there is no organ­
ized activity or any human being which is not socially
organized. ^
Human behavior, then, is a developmental process, a process of adapta­
tion and adjustment. It is the function of economic theory to partici­
pate in that cumulative developmental process, but this means adopting 
an evolutionary, developmental, view of human nature.
It is in the changing institutional scenery, the "changes of col­
lective rules, including custom and going concerns," that Commons finds 
"the evolutionary theory of economics. According to Commons, "no better 
demonstration of the reason why the orthodox economist oould not develop
an evolutionary theory has been given than Veblen's characterization of
7*5the faulty conception of human nature of the Austrian economists."
This can only be avoided, says Commons, by shifting attention from the
individual to the collective action which controls and defines individual
behavior, by adopting what he terms as
objective psychology instead of the subjeotive psychol­
ogy of pleasure and pain. It is the psychology of lan­
guage, of duress, coeroion, persuasion, command, obed­
ience, propaganda. It is the psychology of physical, 
economio and moral "power," the truly "behavioristic" 
psychology of economics in preparing for the unknown 
future.1^*
Sinoe the middle of the last century, economic aotivity has become 
increasingly collective in nature, with -the growth of the trade union, 
the rise of the corporation, the increasing use of politioal action to
70
Ayres, Theory of Economic Progress, p. 93. Cf. ibid. chap. iv 
for a more thorough treatment cf this thesis.
73Commons, Institutional Economics, p. 656; see also pp. 95 ff.above.
74Commons, Economics of Collective Action, p. 109.
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solve what were previously defined as the economic problems of the 
individual, the competitive and individualistic aspects of the eco­
nomic system have been replaced by collective action. The earlier eco­
nomists were laissez faire as regards any form of collective action, 
and in particular of course, governmental action. They viewed govern­
ment as repressive to man’s basic nature; its function was to redress 
grievances rather than to guide development. The institutional economist, 
on the other hand, investigates to see how the government, or soma other 
form of collective action, leads people to better economic adjustment, to 
show that social harmony rests not upon some form of natural harmony, but 
upon a state of order worked out and continually modified by man.*^
Thus an important objection to the orthodox position is that it 
denies to economics its proper function. In the view of the institution­
alists, it is the function of eoonomics and of the economist to provide
a basis by which the economic system can be controlled and guided for the
76welfare of society. This being the case, any consideration of the wel­
fare of either the individual or of society which excludes consideration 
of human nature, or which assumes a mistaken view of it, is unthinkable. 
Thus Tugwell emphasized that
... it is certainly true that we cannot know what it is 
that we want for humanity from industry without knowing 
what the nature of humanity is that is to be affected.
To attempt to direct the economic system toward human 
welfare without understanding human nature would be 
quite as futile as the attempt to cure disease without 
a preliminary study of psychology.'”
The economist, in Tugwell’s view, eannot therefore confine his attention
75See pp. 233 ff. below.
76
See pp. 45 ff. above.
77"Human Nature in Economic Theory," JPE, June, 1922, p. 344.
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to the producer and consumer and "their transient appearances in the 
spotlight of the market place." It is not enough simply to explain the 
functionings of a price system under various assumed conditions. The 
price system has meaning only insofar as it is a manifestation of man’s 
basic traits (lazy, selfish, acting according to some scale of prefer­
ences), and if these are not the basic and inherent traits of man(as the
institutionalists insist they are not), then it is impossible to rely
78upon the price system as the directive force in our economy. Econo­
mists, in Tugwell's view,
...are imperatively required to be social scientists in 
reality; and this means that they are to say what it is 
the industrial system does to men and to define what it 
is men have a right to expect from industry. ...
He has at his disposal to define the ideal direction of
all the intricate and powerful forces of social pressure 
and the provision of alternatives.79
This directive force is the function of the science of economics, from 
their instrumentalist view, and this being the case, then a more thor­
ough and modern understanding of human nature is manifestly necessary.
Taking human nature as a given, as does the orthodox economist, 
also permits no light to be shed upon current economic behavior as an 
aspect of social culture; it permits no critical examination of the in­
stitutions which mold that behavior; it instead, becomes an apologia for
the existing institutional fabric of society. But in the view of the in­
stitutional economists, it is the proper function of economics to examine 
and to evaluate the institutions of society, to aid in the constant revi­
sion of those institutions which is mandatory if sooiety is to progress.
78We shall return to this problem of the price system in Chapter
VIII.
79 „Tugwell, "Human Nature in Economic Theory," pp. 342, 345.
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Taking human nature as a given, -thus, by definition, excludes large 
areas from critical analysis. It builds a bias into the subject-matter 
which is not easily overcome. Thus, the social organization of capital­
ism (capitalist, laborer, landlord) becomes fixed and therefore beyond 
inquiiy because they represent the eternal nature of society. When 
antipathy toward abominable conditions of work is explained as "indol­
ence," when trade and commeroe are said to be the natural result of man's 
rational behavior in light of his own scale of preferences, when the 
profit motive is identified as the prime mover of the economy, then all 
are placed beyond the purview of inquiry and examination; since they are 
but manifestations of original human nature, inquiry and appraisal are 
quite pointless.
The institutionalists argue that these subjects are not the "givens" 
of his scienoe; he does not regard man as having certain basic traits 
from which the functioning of a price mechanism is deduced. These traits 
are not to be disregarded, are not to be confined within the walls of an 
original human nature, "but they will be treated as problems requiring
81study, instead of being taken for granted as constituting explanations."
In the view of the institutionalists, man iB not a passive, inert, 
quiescent mass, requiring some prodding to move him into activity. He 
is rather an actor, a participant; inaction is in faot the greatest of 
woes. Thus the institutionalist is not satisfied to take the orthodox 
explanation of the profit motive as the prime mover of certain classes
80Clark, for example, does not confine himself to this given social 
framework; see, his "The Socializing of Theoretical Economics," The 
Trend of Economics, pp. 73ff, and in particular the section entitled 
Noh-Euclidean Boonomios, pp. 86-101.
01Mitchell, "Quantitative Analysis in Economic Theory," The Back­
ward Art of Spending Money, p. 27.
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of men. They do not see that the psychology of the entrepreneur is so 
different from that of the scholar, the inventor, or the scientist.
They do not see that the one is a burdensome and obnoxious activity in 
which men will engage only because of having been bribed by the hope of 
a pecuniary reward. They argue that this is a perversion of any meaning 
of the nature of man, that it is simply a rationalization of existing 
practices or of the existing olass structure. It becomes in a very real 
sense of the word, a system of apologetics for the existing institutional 
framework. Thus Tugwell insisted that it is a false simplioation to re­
duce the problem of human motivation to rent, interest, wages, and pro­
fits. These distributive categories become a justification for the
present system because "each furnishes an incentive to distinct individ­
uals to do a distinct thing." This being the case, it becomes socially 
mandatory that this incentive never be encroached upon. The real danger 
inherent in this orthodox treatment is that these distributive categories 
come to be
... taken as an expression of an ideal, a sort of classi­
cal absolute, they are seen at once to contribute enor­
mously to that symmetry of outline and perfection of unity 
we associate with fully developed classicism in economics.
They harmonize with all the other elements and become an 
indispensable part of the whole. If it can be assumed that 
these are the reasons why people conduot themselves as they 
do, then there is a sort of justice in the fact that these
are the shares that come to them in the distributive pro­
cess.
Thus the corrected and fully developed classical or 
orthodox economics of today, sometimes called marginism, 
becomes not only an analysis or a hypothesis but a program, 
something so true it is worth fighting for. Because if it 
is broken down, even in part— by the wage workers encroach­
ing on profits, to return to our former figure— then some­
thing disastrous impends from a lack of proper incentive 
for management, whioh will oease to function, or at lea3t 
show a progressive tendenoy toward slacking. So that all 
distributive shares must be kept within their proper limits 
or else it must be found that progress is slowed up and the 
future of society endangered. The end of all this is that 
distribution comes to be thought of as controlled by some-
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thing like natural law.
Tugwell holds that conduct is "infinitely more complex" than the ortho­
dox treatment would imply, that men in their economic activities have 
many complex, and socially defined reasons why they behave as they do.
One advantage, of course, in tnis view of human nature is, as Mitchell 
pointed out, that it "greatly simplifies the task of social scienee.
Whenever one can make out what it is to men's interest to do, one can
83deduce what they will do." It does, however, simplify the task to the 
point of meaningless. It is meaningless, because in the view of the in­
stitutional economists, it is a gross distortion of human behavior to 
reduce economic activity to a simple problem of motivation; more import­
ant, it removes this whole area of the economio system from Inquiry; it 
beoomes an apologia for existing institutional practices.
The "dependence" of our society, for example, upon the profit 
motive, upon acquisitivism, has been noted by many, since this is supposed 
to be the dynamic element in eoonomic development. Tugwell reoognized 
that there is indeed a "quite merciless play" upon -this sooial trait.
"But this does not," in his view,
excuse the economist for hiding acquisitivism under a 
mask of productive virtue, nor for justifying what be­
comes a ruthless and unintelligent directive force in 
industry, leading nowhere in particular exoept to the 
enlargement of this acquisitivism and the final justi­
fication of it in our common morality.84
And yet the dependence of economic theory upon a particular view of
hiimnn nature, and the conclusion that the price system, indeed the eco-
82Tugwell, "Human Nature in Eoonomic Theory," p. 536.
83Mitchell, "Bentham's Pelicifio Calculus," The Backward Art of 
Spending Money, p. 192.
84Tugwell, "Human Nature in Economio Theory," p. 341.
206
nomic system in general, is a manifestation of that basic human nature, 
leads inevitably to that justification. The result has been that eco­
nomists have been unable to divorce their analyses from the given insti­
tutional structure, they have been unable to inquire critically into and 
examine alternativemethods of procedure. To Mitchell and the other in­
stitutionalists, struggling with problems of economic and social reform,
... there is no problem of greater speculative interest 
or greater practical import than what is original in 
human nature. Logically, the issue between Godwin and 
Malthus, between the Philosophic Radioals and the Con­
servatives of Mill’s day, between the Socialists and 
the "Stand Patters" of our own time, involves a differ­
ence of opinion how far and how fast man’s nature can. 
be made over. ®
If human nature is unchangeable, if it is one of the "givens," if man 
does have certain traits and the economic system (wage payments, profit 
motive...) are but a manifestation of those traits, then nothing can be 
changed in the institutional scenery, except at great peril. We dare 
not, for example, encroach on the profit motive by taxes for this will 
endanger the -whole system. And if these be true, then the orthodox eco­
nomists are correct in confining their attention to an after-the-fact 
analysis of price. If eoonomic theory is a justification of existing 
practices and institutions, then it is simply a justification of the only 
possible set of institutions compatible with man's basic nature. The in­
stitutionalist, however, argues, that this view rests upon a false prem­
ise— the psychological assumptions of orthodox economics. The original 
nature of man is not one of the "givens"; it is, rather, one of the fac­
tors to be taken into account; it is one of the "variables." Only by 
taking human behavior, and the importance of psychological knowledge, 
into consideration, can eoonomio theory overcome the biases, the limita-
®®Mitohell, "Human Behavior and Economios," p. 6.
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tions, built into it by the assumption of human nature which is either 
explicitly or implicitly held by the orthodox economist.
If the economist is to shed light upon the darkened alleys of to­
day’s problems, if he is to assist materially in the problem of social 
and economic reform, in the problem of controlling and directing the 
economic system, then the science of economios needs to be re-examined 
from the foundation up. This involves, among other modifications, the
change from "a passive to an active participating mind, and second, a
86change from individual aotion to collective action*” It means that 
man is regarded as being "restless and exploratory," rather than passive 
and inert. It is a conception of man as an initiator of action, rather 
than a passive receptor, dependent upon motives and incentives— either 
monetary or otherwise. While man is primarily a creature of socially 
determined habits, a product of the institutional forces of his society, 
he can and does learn to adjust; and one funotion of the economist is to 
point out where present-day institutions and their derivative habits are
outmoded, -where they have become a hindrance to the smooth functioning
• 87of the economic system.
®®Commons, The Eoonomios of Collective Action, p. 180. 
87See pp. 241-245, and 279-296, below.
CHAPTER VII
THE INDIVIDUAL IN MODERN SOCIETY 
Human Nature Versus Social Nature
As has been indicated in the previous chapter, the institutional­
ists view the individual as being a product of the institutions of his 
society. They argue that in order to understand eoonomic, or any other 
form of social behavior, it is necessary to begin with a social point of 
view since individual activity is derivative from the customs, the mores, 
the institutions of society. They hold that the orthodox economists, who 
began with the opposite point of view, have simply taken the easier way 
out, that they have attempted to explain human conduct and hitman activ­
ity in terms of the inexorable lav/s which govern human nature rather than 
in terms of the social environment in which that activity takes place. 
They have, as Commons repeatedly pointed out, attempted to explain all 
economic conduct in terms of one principle— that of self-interest.^" All 
action must be induced; in the absence of some enticement, some advantage 
or satisfaction, the individual would remain at rest. It is only by dint 
of effort or pain or disutility that the organism engages in activity, 
that activity will not be forthcoming without the promise of pecun­
iary reward. And it is thus that orthodox economics emphasized the role 
of the entrepreneur and the profit motive. The tiller of the soil, the 
laborer, the artisan, must work in order to subsist; the problem is how 
to ensure effort over and above this bare minimum. The potential entre-
*Cf*, for example, Commons, Eoonomios of Collective Action (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1951), p. 124, and Institutional Eoonomios (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), p. 751.
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preneur may choose to provide society with the fruits of his endeavor, 
or he may choose not toj and given the passive nature of mankind, he 
will choose not to do so unless the pecuniary rewards are sufficiently 
great. Thus, as Professor Girvetz aptly remarked, the empty concept 
of egoism was equated with the doctrine of acquisitiveness or the quest 
for pecuniary profit. "As a result, the profit motive could be under­
stood without reference to its institutional origins and historical 
antecedents; it received it3 credentials from human nature and, like
human nature, it was thought inelectuable, given— and therefore ac- 
2
cepted." And thus it m s  that the problem to be explained— certain 
forms of economic behavior— became the premise for other explanations. 
It— self-interest— became the nexus, the basic premise, the unques­
tioned assumption, of economic theorizing. Prom the institutional­
ists’ view, the novel activities of one group of men at one time in 
history— the rising middle class at the time of the industrial revolu­
tion— became, in the hands of the orthodox economist, the accepted view 
3
of human nature. In the view of the institutionalists, however, this
^Girvetz, From Wealth to YJelfars, pp. 130-131.
®For a quite thorough and scholarly examination of the shift in 
the type of character dominant in western society from the time of in­
dustrialization to the present, see David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd—
A Study of Changing American Character (New York: Doubleday & Company, 
1953, originally published by ¥ale University Press in 1950).
Riesman traces the dominant oharacter type in various societies 
from the tradition-directed, past-oriented, character type of the mid­
dle ages, to the emergence of the adventurous, individualistic, "inner- 
directed" entrepreneurial middle class which came to be dominant in 
the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, through the decline of 
this type and the rise of the thoroughly socialized, "other-directed" 
type of the middle twentieth oentury. He is primarily concerned, how­
ever, with the latter transition.
It is his thesis that the rapidly expanding, hustling, bustling, 
society of the commercial and industrial revolution opened new fron­
tiers— both physical and economic— which called for and molded men who 
were ambitious, energetic, self-reliant; men who were engaged in trans­
forming the social and economio frontiers of their day. These individ-
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entrepreneurial middle olass was but a manifestation of the social
(Cont.) uals were "inner-directed" in the sense that the source of 
their direction, the goals, were implanted early in life by their 
elders, by society in general. Inner-direction was the principal 
mode of securing social conformity, though it was not a rigid be­
havioral conformity characteristic of the middle ages. Too many 
novel situations were presented for which a rigid, pre-defined 
code could not provide the answers. Thus, the problem of choice 
(solved in the earlier, static, tradition-oriented society by 
channelling behavior through a rigid social organization) is, in 
this period of rapid expansion and growth, solved by channelling 
behavior through a rigid though highly individualized character.
The social environment required and perpetuated a personality with 
a great degree of flexibility in adapting to a rapidly changing 
environment. Such a sooiety was "characterized by increased person­
al mobility, a rapid accumulation of capital (teamed with devasta­
ting technological shifts), and by an almost constant expansions 
intensive expansion in exploration, colonization, and imperialism.
The greater choices this sooiety gives— and the greater initiatives 
it demands in order to cope with its novel problems— are handled by 
character types who manage to live sooially without strict and self- 
evident tradition-direction (p. 29)." As people begin to pioneer on 
new and changing frontiers— the frontiers of production, of coloniza­
tion, of exploration, and of intellectual discovery, the social mores 
no longer unequivooally diotate what one must do in order to conform. 
The task of production, for example, is "no longer left to an exter­
nal group sanction ... but is installed as a drive in the individual, 
and tremendous energies are unleashed toward the alteration of the 
material, social and intellectual environment and toward the altera­
tion of the self (p. 61)." Personal, individual, initiative and am­
bition is the characteristic trait that emerges in this period of 
history— ambition -which may take the form of "striving for fame or 
for goodness: to get the job, to win the battle, to build the bridge. 
Competition in the era depending on inner-direction is frequently 
ruthless, but at the same time, people are in no doubt as to their 
place in the race— and that there is a race. If they feel guilt, it 
is when they fail, not when they succeed (p. 125)." This inner-di- 
reoted man comes to think of work or production in terms of non­
human objects, "people are seen as something more than the sum of 
their workmanlike skills and qualities. Thus for the inner-direeted 
mnn production is seen and experienced in terms of technological and 
intellectual processes rather than in terms of human cooperation.
Human relations in industry, as well as relations among industries 
and between industry and society as a whole, seem to the inner-di- 
reoted man to be managed by the anonymous cooperation brought about 
through the ‘invisible hand'— Adam Smith's wonderful phrase for eco­
nomic planning through the free market (p. 135)."
This, according to Riesman, is the dominant character type char­
acteristic of western society at the time eoonomic theorizing came to 
be formalized. And it is the type which the institutional economists 
insist has continued to dominate economio theory down to the present 
time. The novel, from any historical point of view, type of character 
extant at the time of Smith, Ricardo, and even down to about the time
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forces, ■the institutions and technological development of a particular 
time. And as these forces have changed, so have they changed human 
nature.
(Cont.) of Marshall, m s  taken as universal. The basic traits of hu­
man nature were read into this particular type of person, rather than 
recognizing that he m s  but a product of society at a particular stage 
in its development.
And according to Riesman, it was a type of character which has in 
time been replaced by another type— the "other directed personality.” 
This is a character type also produced by social forces— but within a 
different social matrix, a sooiety which neither needs nor fosters 
such independence, such zeal and aggressiveness. These characteris­
tics are no longer needed, they no longer assure success: "Increasing­
ly, other people are the problem, not the material environment (p.33)." 
The other-directed person relies not upon tradition, nor upon his per­
sonal ambition, for his goals or his source of direction, but increas­
ingly, he relies upon other people. "This mode of keeping in touch 
with others permits a close behavioral conformity, not through drill 
in behavior itself, as in the tradition-directed oharacter, but rather 
through an exceptional sensitivity to the actions and wishes of others 
(p. 38)." This other-directed person "seeks not fame, which represents 
limited transcendence of a particular peer-group or a particular cul­
ture, but the respect and, more than the respect, the affection, of an 
amorphous and shifting, though contemporary, jury of peers (p. 163)." 
The need of the other-directed person for approval and direction from 
others— for contemporaries rather than ancestors— differentiates him 
from the earlier character types. The frontiers for this other-di­
rected person are other people. He is the result of increasing pres­
sure toward social competence and social acceptance, characterized in 
Riesman1s words as the shift from the invisible hand to the glad hand. 
Thus, the expense accotint,Riesman points out, is as olosely tied in 
with today* s business practices as was the bank aeoount with the old; 
it is the expense aocount which "gives the glad hand its grip (p.161)." 
The young person of today wants social seourity, not great achievements, 
approval not fame (p. 271).
Riesman’s point is simply that the type of characteristic dominant 
in any sooiety is molded by that sooiety and that the type character­
istic of society a hundred years or so ago, is gradually being replaoed. 
And while he does not directly touch on economics, the point in bring­
ing this rather long reference in here is that this is the same point 
that the institutional economists have been arguing: that the histori­
cally temporary and novel type which was characteristic of society at 
the time economio theory was being formulated oame to be the accepted 
view of human nature and that this interpretation is still the basis of 
orthodox economics today. And thus, as noted above, the problem to be 
explained— certain forms of eoonomic behavior— came to be the basio, 
unquestioned, premise for all other explanation, for all further eco­
nomic theorizing.
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The institutionalists were considerably influenced in this way of 
thinking by such twentieth-century social-psychologists as Charles 
Horton Cooley who, in his Human Nature and the Social Order, first pub­
lished in 1902, noted that
Most people not only think of individuals and society 
as more or less separate and antithetical, but they 
look upon the former as antecedent to the latter. That 
persons make society would be generally admitted as a 
matter of course; but that society makes persons would 
strike many as a startling notion....^
Cooley, however, insists that the latter interpretation is necessary 
for a twentieth-century social science. He argues that the older indi­
vidualistic approach, which considered the individual as the independent 
source of events, has been discredited. His writings were an emphasis 
upon the social nature of human activity and the importance of collec­
tive action in control of individual action (thus anticipating much of 
Commons’ later work). He criticized those individualistically-oriented 
approaches to social problems, specifically the "wide-spread disposi­
tion among psychologists, psychoanalysts, biologists, economists, writ­
ers on education and others" who attempted to "avoid history or sociol­
ogy, to short-cirouit their ourrent of causation," who were unwilling 
to follow through "those intricate convolutions of social process" 
whioh molded and shaped human behavior. Such attempts, said Cooley, 
were"the postulate of an individualistic psychology in search of some 
special motive to explain collective behavior. If you regard human na-
^Cooley, C. H., Human Nature and the Social Order (Hew York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922 edition), p. 42. tfiark' in particular 
m s  especially influenced by Cooley; he dedicated his Alternative to 
Serfdom "to the memory of Charles Horton Cooley," and refers to him 
quite frequently in his writings— cf. Alternative to Serfdom, pp. 5,
10, and Prefaoe to Social Economics, pp. 3y-38, 122-123 and211; cf. 
also Ayres, the Industrial Economy," p. 422.
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g
ture as primarily social you need no such special motive.1'
The institutionalists, along v/ith Cooley, hold that human behav­
ior is primarily socially determined, that, in Commons' view, the eco­
nomist must therefore take the customs of the social group as primary, 
and individual behavior as derivative. Commons noted that formerly eco­
nomic science took social customs
as a presupposition whioh it did not necessarily in­
vestigate. But the methodology of recent economic 
science requires us to look further— indeed to set up 
an ideal type, or formula, of a social pressure which 
compels individuals to conform, in variable degrees 
of conformity, and which can itself be investigated 
in its own right, over and above the presupposition 
of habit. ... Here it becomes the function of meth­
odology to formulate a definition of custom, not on 
the psychological and individualistic basis of Habit, 
but upon the social pressure that compels uniformity 
of action by all individuals within the jurisdiction.®
Individuals, Commons added, "must adjust themselves to" these social
customs "simply because it has become habitual and not because it is
logical, rational, or intelligent." And this emphasis upon society as
a molder of individual behavior is, in Commons’ view, quite distinct
from the nineteenth century view that society wa3 but a "myth," that
it in fact had "no actual existence because only individuals lived and
existed."^
Since these earlier writers regarded individuals as primary and
sooiety as derivative— and artificial— , they, in Commons' view,
identified the sovereignly of the oitizen as one of 
the natural rights of men. ... The actual state, 
with its aotual officials, seemed to be unnatural,
^Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order, pp. 28, 29.
6
Commons, Institutional Eoonomios, p. 740.
7
Commons, The Economics of Collective Action, p. 110.
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a merely coercive power interfering with and over­
riding the natural liberty of man to use his facul­
ties as he pleased, rather than the collective 
power by which man's will is made effective.8
This last phrase is typical of Commons' point of view on one import­
ant function of sooiety, of collective action in general— it is only 
through collective action, whether it be the state, the trade union, 
the cooperative, or the corporation, that man’s will is made effec­
tive. A separate individual is an abstraction which has no meaning in 
a society for it is only through collective action that individual 
freedom and individual achievement is realized.
While individual behavior is defined and determined by social 
pressure, social mores or institutions, man can, through collective 
action, influence this molding process. Theirs is not a narrow deter­
ministic view of history or of human behavior. And it was in this con­
nection that Commons introduced his idea of the artificial versus the 
natural selection of social customs and institutions. The evolution 
of these economic phenomena are "like that of a steam engine or a breed 
of cattle, rather than that of a continent, monkey or tiger." It is 
his thesis that social institutions have evoled through artificial, or 
purposeful, selection— the selection of those whioh were desirable and 
the rejection of those which were not. This' view according to Commons 
differs significantly from -that held by the earlier economists who "en­
deavored to get rid of the human will and to explain economic phenomena 
in terns of physical or hedonic forces, ... as the working out of nat­
ural forces, either foreordained or blind. It was the concept of society
9
as the natural growth of a mechanistic equilibrium." In contrast to
0
Commons, John R., The Legal Foundations of Capitalism (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1§2T4), p. 373.
9
Commons, Legal Foundations, p. 376.
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this, Commons holds that sooiety is an evolutionary product of pur­
poseful, rather than purposeless, selection, because it involves 
"Purpose, Futurity, planning, injected into and greatly controlling 
the struggle for life."^ His is a "theory of social progress by
means of personality controlled, liberated, and expanded by collec- 
11tive action." It is not a blind, meohanistio, unfolding of man's 
inherent nature in whioh the emphasis is upon mankind as individuals 
and in which society is but a "myth" because it is merely a collection 
of those disparate individuals and their individually calculated ac­
tions. It was thus that Commons emphasized the importance of viewing 
society and the complex of social institutions and customs as a "going 
concern." It is a continuously evolving process rather than a set of 
rules laid down for the eternal guidance of man, or a permanent and 
fixed social order consciously brought into existence by man or his 
tribal ancestors. And thus Ayres argued that there is nothing more evi­
dent to the social scientist who investigates the subject than the fact 
that the institutions of society were not consciously enacted. The 
widely held supposition, especially in times past, that institutions 
were set up for the proper guidanoe of mankind is but a myth. Tfllhile 
some philosophers such as Hobbes and Rousseau have tried to explain 
their origin as the work of reasonable, calculating men who had come 
to see life in an unorganized state as unsatisfactory and therefore 
tried to "institute" something better, such explanations as to the ori­
gin of civilization's rules of behavior, are "just as mythical as the 
tribal legends their effort sought to replace."12 As Cooley noted in
■^Commons, Institutional Economics, p. 636.
^Ibid., p. 874.
12Ayres, The Industrial Economy, p. 44.
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his influential book, if we are to go back to that time in history 
when the state of our remote anoestors was such that we are not will­
ing to call it social, when we are not willing to use the term socie­
ty, "then it must have been equally undeserving to be desoribed as 
individual or personal; that is to say, theymust have been just as 
inferior to us when viewed separately as when viewed collectively.
The point is, of course, that society and mankind have emerged together; 
it is society, it is the collective action in control, liberation and 
expansion of individual action, which differentiates man from earlier 
Mammalian ancestors. It is the view of these economists that this soc­
ial process has evolved through what Commons calls purposeful selection 
and that today we must turn our social, our collective, intelligence to 
controlling that process through collective action.
If, then, human nature is a reflection of the eoonomic system and 
its multitudinous institutional patterns, then the focal point of eco­
nomic analysis has shifted. It is from this shift that Tugwell insists 
"there arose a notion of industry as one social mode of' functioning, to 
be devoted henceforth to new ideals." From this point of view, Tugwell 
argues that it is no longer of supreme importance whether some individ­
ual enterprises are "protected in their rights"; what is more important 
is "the efficiency with which the organization fulfilled its social func­
tion."^ That is to say, the institutions of capitalism— private enter­
prise, the profit motive, private property, etc.,— are not the necessary 
institutional arrangements compatible with human nature, and which are 
therefore to be oarefully defended. They are, rather to be strengthened
Cooley, op. oit», p. 45*
14Tugwell, R. G-., "Human Nature and Social Economy," Journal of 
Philosophy, August 14, 1930, p. 455.
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or abandoned depending upon their social effects. Human nature is 
compatible -with a -wide variety of institutional arrangements, many 
of -which have yet to be explored. And this exploration is one of the 
primary functions of the economist.
It is therefore the social or cultural level of analysis which 
the institutionalists deem important for a social science; and at that 
level of investigation, the individual is irrelevant. Soeia). patterns 
oannot be explained in terms of the behavior of individual men— though 
this of oourse does not deny the importance of individuals. It is merely 
an insistence that considered as such they are irrelevant for economio 
analysis. Ayres uses the analogy of the individual cell to a living 
organism to illustrate this point, noting that while every function of 
the organism is of course performed by a multitude of individual cells, 
without the action of which the organism could not survive, neverthe­
less, in the analysis of the functioning of the organism, the individual 
cell is irrelevant. The individual cell is simply another level of analy­
sis or understanding whioh does not shed light upon the behavior of the 
15living organism. It is of course true, agrees Ayres, that all human 
activities are carried out by individual men. And at this level of analy­
sis, the level on which ordinary daily affairs are conducted, such activ­
ities are important, and the question of "Who lias acted how, and why?” 
is significant and important for some purposes. But the functions and 
forces of society do not "act" as men act; these functions and forces 
are, however, the domain of the sooial sciences. In this analysis of 
social causes and effects, of social forces, the individual acts of in-
15Ayres, The Theory of Economic Progress (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1944), pp. 96-98.
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dividual men are not at issue. All this is obvious today, says Ayres,
and would have been recognized long ago but for the "persistent belief
in the metaphysical ultimacy of human individuality which has prevented
our viewing men as we view cells and molecules.
It was the traditional view of society a3 a population of atoms,
17to use Commons' apt expression, against which the institutionalists
are "revolting."
Instead of isolated individuals in a state of nature 
they are always participants in transactions, members 
of a going concern in which they come and go, oitizens 
of an institution that lived before them and will live 
after them. 18
Instead of centering upon "an individualistic human atom," the modem
social sciences must "investigate the working rules" by which collec-
19tive action is transmitted. It must not be assumed, however, that 
these working rules are something "external" to, something "existing 
apart from actual behavior."20 Rather they manifest themselves in actual 
behavior; they are the foroes which control and give direction to human 
behavior. It is these working rules, these institutions, which make 
eoonomios a sooial science; and it is this which makes human behavior, 
social behavior, or human nature, social nature.
An institutional economist, as Clark once pointed out, regards 
human nature itself as but another "social institution." Furthermore,
16 Ibid.. p. 97.
17Commons, Institutional Economics, p* 225.
18Ibid., pp. 73-74.
19Commons, "Twentieth Century Economics," Journal of Sooial Phil­
osophy, 1939, p. 33. 
onCommons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism, p. 140.
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all these social institutions "have their own continuity and life 
processes distinct from, though not independent of, those of the in-
n 1
dividual human beings" who participate in end are influenced by them.
Ihe human behavior which is of interest to the economist is thus seen 
to be a function of sooiety— not an antecedent to sooiety. It is a pro­
duct of the breeding, the eduoation, the training inculcated in the in­
dividual by society, by the proceeding generations. And according to 
Mitchell, any social scientist who ’’does not emphasize" that fact, thus
p p
"misses the most potent single factor in social psychology." He misses 
this most important single factor to the economist, for in the view of 
the institutionalists, economics is concerned with the total social eco­
nomy and its development— and the possibilities of improving it. And 
if human nature is a function of the sooial structure, then it is worse 
than useless to try to find an explanation, to try to find answers to 
those questions, by procedures which begin with a contrary assumption. 
This is why the institutionalists have ooncerned themselves with social 
institutions, with ceremonial patterns of behavior, with collective ac­
tion, with workmanship or technology. This concern lies in the convic­
tion that economic development, and the answer as to how to improve and 
facilitate that development, "can be explained only in terms of sooial 
forces and not in terms of 'human* wants or 'natural' scarcity— both of
which are of course defined by prevailing institutions and the state of
23the industrial arts."
PT_Clark, J. M. "institutional Economics— a Roundtable Discussion," 
AER, Papers and Proceedings, March, 1932, p. 105.
22Mitohell, "Human Behavior and Economics," QJE, November, 1914,
p. 15.
^3Ayres, "The Co-Ordinates of Institutionalism," AER, Papers and 
Proceedings, May, 1951, pp. 50ff.
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What is at issue here is simply a re-evaluation of the basic 
assumptions concerning what is meant by human nature. Orthodox eco­
nomics has been criticized from many sides for its "unrealistic" account 
of human nature— its narrow conception of the calculating, rational, 
economic man, for example. This led many, both orthodox economists and 
their critics, to suppose that what was needed was a more "realistic" 
account of these same traits, motives, propensities, instincts, etc., 
by which individuals are really moved. Veblen, for example, was parti­
ally inclined in this direction. While he vigorously demurred from the
24orthodox treatment of motives, he nevertheless sought to find the ex­
planation of human behavior in terms of the instincts of individual men. 
And while he did emphasize the importance of institutions (ceremonial 
behavior) and the importance of technology ("the cultural incidence of 
the machine process?!) in shaping the specific manifestations of those 
instincts, it has been only recently that the institutionalists have 
abandoned this individualistic orientation bequeathed by traditional 
views. They have come to emphasize that theirs is not a soienoe of in­
dividual behavior at all; that what is not needed is a better or more 
realistic account of how individual men behave. Instead of investigating 
the individual human atom, and thereby hoping to understand how a popu-
24Thus, for example, his famous characterization of the economic 
man: "... a lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscill­
ates like a homogeneous globule of desire of happiness under the im­
pulse of stimuli that shift him about the area, but leave him intact.
He has neither antecedent nor consequent. He is an isolated, defini­
tive human datum, in stable equilibrium except for the buffets of the 
impinging forces that displaoe him in one direction or another. Self- 
impose in elemental space, he spins symmetrically about his own spirit­
ual axis until the parallelogram of forces bears down upon him, where­
upon he follows the line of the resultant. When the force of the im­
pact is spent, he comes to rest, a self-contained globule of desire, 
as before." ("Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science," reprinted 
in The Portable veblen, pp. 232-233.)
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lation of molecules performs, they have shifted the focus of atten­
tion to the total society, to the cultural level of analysis. And at 
this level of understanding and investigation, the individual cell or 
atoia per se is irrelevant. They are interested in social patterns and
these patterns, they argue, do not st8m from the individual acts of men
25
who are what they are by nature.
John Dewey, who m s  responsible for much of this way of thinking, 
noted that the basic fallacy in the individualistic approach is its be­
lief that individuals alone are real, that classes, organizations, in­
stitutions, society in general, are secondary and derived. They are 
artificial} only individuals are natural or real. The fallacy in this 
way of thinking, according to Dewey, is that the individual is thus re­
garded as something "given,11 something to be catered to by society.
But, says Dewey, "social arrangements, laws, institutions, ... are not
means for obtaining something for individuals, not even happiness. They
26are means of creating individuals." And for an approach to economics 
which is primarily interested in planning, in improving the functioning 
of the total social economy, this recognition is vitally important in 
the opinion of the institutional economists. It is important to separ­
ate out the dynamic from the passive elements in the social organization;
25Keynes was of course partially influenced by this point of view 
in his general Theory. Thus in his analysis of the factors which deter­
mine the propensity to consume, he conoludes that at least in the short- 
run, total spending habits are primarily determined by the "institutions 
and organisation of the economic society" and are subject to ohange only 
slowly and over a long period of time (pp. 109-110). Sinoe the spending 
habits of individual men are to a great extent socially determined for 
any given level of income, he ignores them as one of the independent var­
iables in the determinants of social income and employment. At least in 
this portion of his theory, the activities of individual men are irrele­
vant to the total social picture.
26 ,
Dewey, John, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: The New Amer­
ican Library of World Literature, inc., I960: originally published by 
Henry Holt and Company, 1920), p. 152.
222
it is necessary to recognize and to take into account the role of in­
stitutions of society and the role played by the individual within that 
institutional matrix, if we are to have any standard of judgment, any 
starting point, for a comprehensive understanding of the economic system 
and the possibility of its improvement. Thus J. M. Clark argued that 
the body of doctrine enclosed in orthodox economics can furnish no mea­
sure of the social efficiency with which to judge the system, or to judge 
different industrial systems. The individual, says Clark,
... can make nothing out of the world that the world 
does not first make out of him; he cannot even desire 
of the world save as it has taught him to desire. He 
is limited by the range of stimuli that have come with­
in his experience. He is at the mercy of whatever system 
he happens to be bona into for creating, transmitting, 
and directing stimuli.^
Thu3 , what profits it to know, asks Clark, that an individual may man­
age his income perfectly, when it is only as perfectly as his environ­
ment permits, "lhat answer is this to one who is asking whether the 
present industrial environment tends to promote a more economic manage­
ment of men's incomes, in general, than any other possible environment 
would promote?"^ This is strangely lacking in conclusiveness, accord­
ing to Clark, for if we are trying to pass judgment on the existing 
system as a whole, or on any part of it, merely
to demonstrate that our productive powers are organ­
ized into a system of maximum efficiency, if price be 
taken as the measure of efficiency, and that prices 
are actually in proportion to the marginal Importance 
of the various products to the consumer, this marginal 
importance being in turn determined for good or ill by 
the environment which the competitive system itself 
plays so large a part in molding.&
0 1 7
Clark, "Economics and Modern Psychology," p. 104.
^Ibid., p. 105.
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This careful balancing of utilities, upon which the orthodox system 
depends so largely (even if it could actually be achieved), may be 
very efficient or very inefficient depending upon whether the condi­
tioning social environment is a favorable or an unfavorable one. Thus, 
we cannot assume that the individual acts of men, who are so strongly 
influenced by their institutional environment, will lead to the highest 
possible degree of economic efficiency.
Clark therefore concludes with the other institutionalists that 
we must abandon the individualistically oriented economic theory which 
has prevailed for so long. It was based on a false assumption, or as­
sumptions: that the institutions and social mores of the community were 
but a manifestation of some original, basic, human nature, and further, 
that the individual is a free agent, able to make those decisions which
will lead to the form of social and economic organization most compati-
30
ble with that basic nature.
When Marshall m s  at work on his Principles of Economics, "the age 
seemed an age of self-reliant foresight beyond other ages,” and in 
Clark's opinion, this is the central idea running through the whole of 
nineteenth century thinking. However, in Clark's view, "the twentieth 
oentury is an age which, beyond other ages, is aware how much man is 
molded by his environment, and is deliberately undertaking to control 
this molding process." This fact, moreover, "must be a dominant note"
30From this point of view, the only important function which col­
lective action could undertake was that of education— the one important 
agency of reform. Since man is a free agent, a rational being capable 
of carefully directing his own behavior, any deviation from society's 
best interests was due to the misconstruing one's proper interests or 
how to best achieve them. Education was thus the vine great salvation 
in which great faith was placed. (Cf. Mitchell, "Bentham's Pelioific 
Calculus," p. 194.)
224
31in any constructive contribution to economic theory today, for vre
are coming to realize that "to the individual many doors are closed
32which open to the collective power of society...." And thus, eco­
nomic theory must, in the view of these economists, recognize this 
shift. It must turn its attention to this collective power which is 
gradually taking over the role of the individual as society is more 
and moro undertaking to control the molding process of the institution­
al environment.
The Individual and Collective Action
Among the basic premises of the institutionalists is that men are 
mutually dependent upon one another, that they must cooperate in their 
social and economic endeavors, and that collective action is, therefore, 
the fundamental method not only of solving social-economic problems, but 
of achieving freedom for the individual. Collective action is increas­
ingly essential to modern economic life. With a more modern understand­
ing of human nature as being a derivative of social forces and institu­
tions, these economists have oome to argue, as Mitchell summarized Com­
mons' basic thesis, that "social cooperation rests not upon a divinely 
appointed or a 'natural' harmony of interests, but upon a state of order 
that men learn to establish among themselves." Industrial society is 
shifting from a system of status buttressed by immemorial tradition to
17 •»
Clark, "Economics and Modem Psychology," p. 98.
52Ibid., p. 141.
^Mitchell, W. C., "Commons on Institutional Economics," Backward 
Art of Spending Money, p. 340, reprinted by permission from AER, Decem- 
ber,' 1935.
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a socially organized endeavor for getting things done, for opening 
through collective action the many doors that are closed to the indi­
vidual. And this is why the institutionalists see collective action as 
more than mere control of individuals; it is also, and more importantly, 
the "liberation of individual action from coercion, duress, discrimina­
tion, or unfair competition ... it is the expansion of the will of the
34individual far beyond what he can do by his own puny acts."
Modem business and industry, social activity in general, are becom­
ing increasingly collective; we are in the midst of a social revolution 
involving a shift from the individual to the social point of view in 
which interdependence is becoming more intimate and more intricate. And 
under such conditions, the traditional reliance upon individualism and 
self-interest is no longer applicable, is, in fact, no longer meaningful. 
To meet the wider aims of society, we must adopt, both in theory and in 
practice, a socially-oriented point of view for it is only through this 
wider view, through collective action, that there is any "chance of sub-
«Z C
stitution of social for individual interest." Economics has for too
long, in Clark's view, made the mistake of assuming that social effi-
36oiency is merely the sum of all individual efficiencies, but in
Clark's opinion, the two are radically different concepts and economics
37must be on its giard not to reason from that supposition. Clark 
34Commons, Institutional Economics, p. 73.
®®Tugwell, R. Gr., The Industrial Discipline (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1933), p. 112.
•20
Clark, "Economic Theory in an Era of Social Adjustment," ABR, 
Papers and Proceedings, March, 1919.
37Clark, "Eoonomics and Modem Psychology," p. 122.
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pointed out that the concept of free competition and of the market 
meohanism as directed by the sovereign consumer are based upon ex­
actly that supposition; and that they further rely upon the idea that 
all individuals are equally competent to take oare of themselves, that 
they are the best judge of their own individual interests. This Clark 
denies and argues therefore that this means social problems can be
solved only by social or collective action, that society must intervene
38to assist and liberate the individual. It was from this point of
view that Clark said:
The growth of scientific knowledge of mental and phy­
sical health and disease is working a revolution in 
this matter, undermining the idea that each individual 
is the best judge of his own desires. ...the social
costs of industry in disease and accident may be re­
corded and studied quite objectively in a way far more 
useful as a guide to publio action than is the a priori
doctrine of equality between marginal disutility and
marginal reward.®®
In their basic physical needs, men are much alike ... 
and the conventional economic view that we know noth­
ing about the relative importance of things to differ­
ent people is clearly the least probable hypothesis 
one might adopt, and an unwarranted limitation of per­
spective. 40
In this, Clark is taking a quite different position from the orthodox 
economist who is willing to assume this limitation of perspective.
That is because in the traditional view, the foous of attention is 
upon individuals and their individual behavior. Society, collective 
government, are all interferences with the proper functioning of the 
market meohanism— with the few exceptions where they are directed to
38
Clark, Sooial Control of Business, pp. 48, 151ff, 199; ’'Econom­
ics and Modem Psychology," p. 141.
39
Clark, "Economics and Modem Psychology," pp. 98-99.
40Clark, Alternative to Serfdom, p. 61.
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assist the market (the coordinating nexus of the individual actions 
of individual men) to function more efficiently, more smoothly and 
more competitively* To Clark and the other institutionalists, how­
ever, it is mandatory that economic theory must divorce itself from 
its individualistic bias and adopt the social point of view if it is 
to contribute to social and economic welfare in the twentieth century 
because
... the quest for welfare evidently involves far more 
difficulties than can ever be surmounted by the mere 
calculating faculty of the individual. In proportion 
as scientific research progresses, minimum standards 
of welfare will become more and more matters of social 
knowledge and less and less matters of individual 
taste....^l
If we are to achieve the social welfare for which Clark and the other 
institutionalists seek, then increasing reliance will have to be placed 
upon social or collective action, and less upon the calculating facul­
ties of the individual who is pursuing his own self-interests. Ortho­
dox economic theory, as Commons argued, was based upon the premise that 
individual action in the pursuit of self-interest is the wellspring of 
all eoonomic activity. And as Commons elaborated, it could not be other­
wise if all collective action is eliminated in eoonomic affairs. For
if collective action is abolished, then the theorist 
must find in the individual breast a set of instincts 
that keep society agoing. These instincts must be 
placed there by some external power that intended the 
welfare of mankind. This external power was God. C~. iy 
three instincts were necessary ... sympathy, truck and 
barter, and the sense of propriety. These take the 
place of all collective action in eoonomio affairs
The institutionalists are arguing, however, that this is no longer mean-
^Clark, " Economics and Modem Psychology," Preface to Social Eoo- 
nomios, p. 103.
42Commons, Institutional Economics, p. 166.
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ingful; that In the day of increasing collective aotivity, it is 
only through that collective activity that welfare and freedom for 
the individual are achieved.
According to the institutionalists, man’s nature is a social pro­
duct; it is impossible for man to achieve his potential development ex­
cept as a part of a social organization. And in their view, economics 
is therefore concerned, not with the individual and his desires or dis­
utilities as an individual, but with how those desires can be realized 
and those disutilities and frustrations overcome as a part of a social 
or collective organization. It is thus that these economists look not 
to a social organization which is but the sum of many disparate indi­
viduals, but to that social organization itself, for they look to col­
lective aotion rather than to individual action to achieve liberty, 
freedom, and security for the whole of society. They assert that man 
is basically a cooperative and social, not a competitive animal.^
They argue that it was only for one brief moment in history that man's 
competitive tendencies were brought into dominance, and that by the 
close of the nineteenth century, the more mature industrial economy 
emphasized man's tendency to cooperate, to act in unison, to meet indi­
vidual and social needs through collective action. Increasingly, modem 
man is recognizing that in today's economy a premium is placed upon col­
lective aotion.
Commons, in particular, has not been content to confine his analy­
sis to the factors governing the maximum profit position of an individual 
firm or the maximum satisfaction position of an individual person; rather 
he has tried to show the general nature of the structure of opportuni-
43Cf., for example, Ayres, Industrial Economy, p. 322 and Sruchy, 
Modern Eoonomic Thought, pp. 563-564.
ties available— these opportunities being a function of the social
organization, and which are expanded and liberated by collective 
44
action. And it is multi-lateral collective aotion, to which Com­
mons i3 referring, not the mere exercise of power by one-sided collec­
tive action (monopoly); it is what he calls ’’collective democraoy" in 
order to distinguish it from the "individualistic democracy of Adam 
Smith," or the one-sided collective aotion of the "dictatorships of 
Europe and Asia." In Commons’ view, it is only through this process 
of collective organization and action that the whole is made greater 
than the sum of its parts, for through such a process, the "personal­
ity of each organized individual is higher and more capable than the
46
personality of the unorganized individuals." Collective or social
47action is "literally the means to liberty." And if economics is to 
contribute to an understanding of the problems and pressures of the 
twentieth century, it must adopt this orientation, for a recognition 
that it is indeed collective action which give3 the economist the "men­
tal tool of investigation" which will bring together the similarities
48
and differences in the complex of modem economic activities.
44
Cf. his Institutional Eoonomics, p. 311ff.
-^Commons, Economics of Collective Action, pp. 24-25. Cf. also 
chap. i, ibid., for his many illustrations of the importance of collec­
tive aotion as a means of aohieving opportunity, freedom and liberty 
for the individual in the complex sooial organization of the twentieth 
century; they range from the small local union negotiating for its mem­
bers, through the collective negotiation of 67 railways corporations 
and 5 railway brotherhoods, the activities of the F&deral Industrial 
Relations Commission, to lobbying in Washington, D. C., and the Ameri­
can Association of University Professors.
46Commons, Economics of Collective Aotion, p. 132. 
47_, .
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J. M. Clark, in the 3ame vein, emphasized the point that the
function of organization and association is to increase the liberty 
49
of the individual; that -without suoh cooperative endeavor, the indi­
vidual is helpless, in fact is hardly deserving of being thought of as 
a human being. As we noted earlier, Clark was particularly influenced 
on this point by Cooley and he refers to him specifically when he noted 
that, while in a simple economy, individualistic self-interest is one 
“possible'1 organizing principle, it is not possible in the highly organ­
ized industrial economy of today— except at the cost of chaos. Our soc­
ial salvation, says Clark, lies in the reworking of the relations be­
tween the various groups and associations of which every individual i3 
a member of many. In fact, we may be at a stage of social development 
to which some form of social contract "my for the first time, be applic­
able on the scale of a 1 great society.•” Mot for the task of organizing 
de novo a primordial society, as the earlier and more naive theories 
hypothesized, but for tying together these groups and organizations 
which are the necessary nexus of a harmonious end workable social group.
As we have in the past given lavishly of our energy to conquer the phy­
sical frontier, so we today must redirect that energy: “the frontier of
50today is in the field of neglected social adjustments.”
Cooley, to whom Clark dedicated one of his books, was, as we noted 
earlier, one of the earlier social philosophers to emphasize social organ­
ization and collective action as the necessary means to the growth and 
development of freedom for the individual. "Freedom,” said Cooley, "oan 
exist only in and through a social order,and must be increased by all
49See in particular his Alternative to Serfdom, pp. 4, 5, 6, 8,
15, and 125.
50
Clark, Alternative to Serfdom, pp. 4-8.
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51the healthy growth of the latter." Freedom is not merely a negative 
thing, the absence of constraint. It is a social goal to be achieved, 
the existence of socially defined opportunities always to be enlarged. 
Social institutions have no other function than to contribute to human 
freedom and development. And since this is true, it is neoessary to re­
evaluate our traditional, institutionalized, egocentric concepts of the 
individual and his relations to society. Collective o.r social action 
is deemed necessary to correct the workings of those social institutions 
which no longer contribute to the healthy growth of the society and its
individual members. And this is why freedom, in any meaningful sense
of the word, is an evolving social concept— to be extended and correoted 
by each generation. Thus, for example,
so far as children are ill-nurtured or ill-taught,
as family training is bad, the schools inefficient,
the local government ill-administered, publio librar­
ies lacking, or private associations for various sorts 
of culture deficient, in so far the people are unfree.®^
There is, then, no antagonism between the individual and society except 
insofar as society, or, specifically, the institutions of that society, 
prohibit the intellectual, physical, or economic development of the indi­
vidual members. Individuals who, it should be emphasized, are viewed, 
not as atoms, but as participants of a "going concern." J. M. Clark 
was conspicuously influenced by Cooley when he argued that "liberty ... 
is limited just as surely by ill-health or poverty as by actual servi­
tude." In fact, Clark argued, any meaningful concept of liberty would 
certainly include
... a certain mi nlmum of economic welfare on whioh 
everyone can fall back, in order to prevent him from
51
Cooley, op. cit., pp. 427-428. 
®^Cooley, op. cit», pp. 430-431.
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being under compulsion to accept whatever the market
offers at the moment.®®
This mimimum of economic welfare, this alleviation of ill-health and 
poverty, all of which are hindrances to the realization of liberty 
for the individual, cannot be realized by relying upon the eighteenth 
century concept of the individual as a free agent, following only his 
own self-interest, prodded only by the hope of pecuniary reward or the 
fear of the gaol. The twentieth century is the age of collective action 
and the crux of the problem, in the view of the institutional economists, 
is how we can both understand and then control these collective pressures 
and activities for economic and social improvement.
It is the basic belief of these economists, based upon the premises 
we have examined in this and the previous chapter, that man needs neither 
the pricking fears of insecurity, nor the expectation of monetary reward 
to induoe constructive endeavor. Quite to the contrary, the freedom 
from want and fear envisaged by these economists, would, in their view, 
provide an environment in which man's creative endeavor would find out­
let far surpassing anything that has stirred even the imagination of 
times past. This new social venture would accomplish wonders that would 
indeed dwarf even the "Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic 
cathedrals." As Ayres summarized it, the direct consequence of the in­
creasing social abundance of today's industrial economy is that "skill, 
initiative, and responsibility are more widely diffused than ever before." 
The dullness, the stolidity and lethargy characteristic of the underly­
ing population of a few generations back was not due to a natural indo­
lence, was not a manifestation of man's inherent passivity; it was a con­
sequence of a dietary deficiency and hookworm, of the almost perpetual
53Clark, Social Control of Business, pp. 162, 92.
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infestation with vermin. This is the importance of recognizing why 
social or collective action is today necessary, this is why Ayres holds 
that "abundance is indissociable from that 'maximum realization of in­
dividual potentialities' in terms of which many philosophers define
54
civilization itself."
The Role of Government
This minimum economic welfare, however, is a social problem which 
can be met and solved only through social or collective action. The 
individual today stands helpless before the myriad powers and forces of 
the complex industrial economy; helpless, but not completely so. Al­
though the great masses of mankind once resigned themselves to a life 
of tiresome toil, they have since made the exciting discovery that they 
are not the pawns of fate. They can in fact shape their own destiny.
They have come to recognize that social want, poverty, deprivation, are 
institutional, not technological; and institutions have no other func­
tion than to contribute to human freedom and development. This means, 
and twentieth century America has come increasingly to realize the impli­
cations of it, that the institutional fabric by which we have governed 
our society needs a close re-evaluation in light of the potentialities 
of today's industrial system. And increasingly, we have turned to col­
lective aotion to provide both the needed institutional re-evaluation, 
and to provide the minimum of economic welfare for which the institu­
tional economists have been arguing. This has meant, of course, that 
the role of government has changed quite markedly from the duties and 
responsibilities it assumed only yesterday. And though we have not yet
54Ayres, The Industrial Economy, pp. 405, 406.
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provided this minimum of economic wlefare necessary to the "life, lib­
erty and pursuit of happiness” for each individual, we have come to 
recognize that the government is one of the forms of collective aotion 
which we can use to solve many of our modem social and economic prob­
lems.
Commons once noted that the earlier economists assumed a laissez 
faire point of view in their outlook toward government. They thought 
it necessarily "repressive and obnoxious.” The institutional economists, 
on the other hand, "investigate how government acts to lead people into
nc
a supposedly better economic administration." It has taken a long
time, but the institutionalists are coming to recognize that the eight­
eenth century concept of government bequeathed to us by Tom Paine and 
Tom Jefferson, was in fact that of George III; was indeed, a short­
sighted, tyrannical, body from whose grasp one did try to escape; it
was repressive and obnoxious and they were quite correctly suspicious
56of it for it was one-sided collective action. They referred to gov­
ernment in the third person— as an "it"; they specified certain griev­
ances against "him" in the Declaration of Independence. With the growth 
of democratic society, however, governments have increasingly become the 
inevitable agency through which the people must and do act. It is our 
agency for collective or social action. And this is what Mitchell meant 
when he noted that with an expanding economy, as the "interdependence 
of individuals becomes more intimate and intricate," and the "wider geo­
graphic scope of economic organization exposes the modem man to more
Commons, Economics of Collective Action, p. 105.
56Cf., for example, Commons, The Economics of Collective Aotion. 
pp. 82-83, and Ayres, "The Principles of Eoonomic Strategy,Southern 
Economic Journal, April, 1939, p. 461.
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and more hazards that he cannot control, ... he calls stridently upon
his government for aid." Thus the government, the one great agency for
57collective action, inevitably finds its "functions multiplying." 
Likewise Commons, emphasizing the same idea, said that in our modem 
society,
Governments must have revenues in increasing amounts, 
not because they are corrupt and inefficient, which 
oan be remedied, but because the social needs of edu­
cation, ethics, morality, art, equality, liberty, 
protection of the weak, highways, health, recreation, 
grow faster in an improving civilization than do the 
private needs of food, luxury, ostentation.®®
An improving, expanding, civilization finds it both more efficient and
more economical to supply an increasing number of its needs, to satisfy
an increasing number of its desires, through collective action.
J. M. Clark, who has long been concerned with the role of govern­
ment in the modem economy, pointed out that whereas in times past it 
was "accustomed and adapted to restraining incidental abuses without 
fear of unduly weakening the main forces at work, now faces the
very different task of strengthening those main forces." Instead of 
operating from the premise that the main forces making for progress 
and development of the economy were external to government, and might 
indeed be weakened if the government were to interfere, rather than 
confine itself to the redress of grievances and not to the guidance of 
economic development— the government has now taken the task of ensuring 
that those main forces are continuously at work. Thus, for example, the 
government is "rapidly acquiring the task of umpiring the distribution
Mitohell, "Intelligence and the Guidance of Economic Evolution," 
The Backward Art of Spending Money, p. 119.
58Commons, Institutional Economics, p. 831.
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of the nation's product between farmers, laborers, and various busi­
ness groups." Here, "the government is grappling, not with incidental 
abuses, but with the central features of the economic system." Clark 
noted that the striving toward more equal distribution of incomes, which 
has long figured as a humanitarian aspiration, may indeed come to be 
viewed as an "immediate necessity for the continued full operation of 
industry."^® The evilsof unemployment, the social costs of industry in 
no way compensated by the price system, the ever-present problem of stag­
nation, all inevitably mean that we must turn to collective action to 
solve those problems with which the individual, or all individuals act­
ing singly, are helpless to cope. This means, and we should recognize 
in full the importance of the shift that has taken place in industry and 
the relation of government to industry, that "public functions will in­
evitably increase"; it means quite simply, says Clark, that we will in­
evitably have to turxi to "collective planning and direction" if our in-
go
dustrial economy is to achieve the potential of whioh it is capable.
The Individual Versus the Social Point of View in Economics
The institutional economists see individual human beings in the 
twentieth century as a part of a vast collectively organized economy; 
individual activity is no longer of the ruggedly-individualistic, self- 
centered, type that was envisaged by the eighteenth and nineteenth cen­
tury writers. Human nature has become thoroughly socialized. This, says
59Clark, "The Relation of Government to the Economy of the Future," 
JPE, December, 1941, pp. 798, 811.
^Clark, "Forms of Economic Liberty and What Makes Them Important," 
Freedom, Its Meaning, ed. by Ruth N. Anshen (New York: Haroourt Brace 
FCo., Inc., 1940), pp. 327-328.
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Commons, is the philosophical meaning of “holism" as applied to eco­
nomic thinking; it is looking at "economic society, not as did the 
early economists as a census of population, but as a hierarchy of organ­
ized managerial, bargaining, and rationing transactions from the family 
of a hundred sovereignties." The earlier economists viewed man as 
being naturally free, subject only to the coercion of the political 
state. The institutionalists, and Commons in particular, are arguing 
that this is an extremely limited and naive understanding of the rela­
tionship between the individual and the many forms of oollective pres­
sures to which the individual must adjust. Commons often refers to a 
hierarchy of governments, eoonomic and moral, as well as political, 
which enforce this socialized behavior through the use of sanctions or 
power, inducement or pressure, "ranging from mere friendly advice to 
the fear of loss of livelihood, fear of violenoe, or imprisonment, or 
even death," to enforce upon the individual some particular performance, 
forbearance, or avoidance. Viewed in this light, each kind of collective 
action, whether it be the power of the state, the trade union, the cor­
poration, or public opinion, is a form of government, differing only in 
the kind of sanction or pressure used to enforce this conformity to 
which the individual must adjust "regardless of logic, reason, or self- 
interest."62
Orthodox theory is, in all its myriad formulations, but an exten­
sion of a single underlying assumption— that of the pursuit of self- 
interest by the individual. It attempts to find the meaning and under­
standing of the modem economy in the actions of these separate indi­
viduals, each pursuing his own individual goals, subject only to the
Commons, Eoonomios of Collective Action, p. 135.
fiPCommons, Economics of Collective Aotion, pp. 40, 74-75, and 111.
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interference of the political state. The modem economy, however, is 
not characterized by such activity; it is rather, characterized by 
vast collective organizations to which the individualistic principles 
of the orthodox economists do not apply. Thus Clark pointed out that 
some interests of some individuals are indeed expressed through what 
may be called free oontract between individuals, but many other inter­
ests are expressed through various forms of collective action such as 
representative government, both industrial and politioal, and some are 
of course expressed by no recognized machinery at all which thus "leaves 
some interests without adequate means of expression and protection."
This evolution from what was previously considered to be the corner­
stone of our economy--free contract between free individuals— to the 
increasing use of collective action for meeting both social and indi­
vidual problems is, in Clark's opinion, one of the very vital ohanges 
that has taken place in the twentieth century. And orthodox economics, 
rooted in the eighteenth century concepts of the individual and sooiety,
simply has no means of understanding or coping with the collective nature
63
of the modern economy.
This eighteenth century conoept of the individual and society is
64
responsible for what Ayres calls the "mental atomism" of orthodox 
price theory, and it is this bias which destroys its usefulness as a 
tool of understanding and analysis in the twentieth century. Eoonomic 
theory inherited from the general philosophical environment of the 
eighteenth century the idea of a natural equilibrium of forces which
63
Clark, "The Relation Between Statics and Dynamics," Preface to 
Social Economics, p. 214.
64Ayres, "The Co-Ordinates of Institutionalism," AER, Papers and 
Proceedings, May, 1951, pp. 49ff.
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result in a stable social order among men. These forces are the inher­
ent qualities of human nature as revealed in the acts of the individual!
wants and satisfactions, perceptions of plain and pleasure, and man's 
65
passive nature. These natural forces, according to Ayres, are assumed 
by the orthodox economist to be registered in the price system; and the 
price system, therefore, is the vehicle through which a stable social 
order is realized.^ Orthodox economic theory is therefore limited in 
its usefulness because it attempts to explain the economic patterns and 
movements of society as the consequence of the individual acts of indi­
vidual men. But human beings and all of their activities which are of 
concern to the economist (who is perforce interested in understanding 
and explaining the total economy) are social phenomena. These social 
patterns, -which are of concern to the economist, are not the logical con­
sequents of the individual acts of individual human beings. Quite to the 
contrary, human beings and all of their activities which are of interest 
to the economist are the logical consequents of social pressures or 
forces, and any attempt to begin with contrary assumptions will throw 
little light upon today's socio-economic problems. This is the main 
criticism which Ayres directs at the orthodox approach via price theory, 
for price patterns can be conceived as revealing the character of the
economic system only if they are "regarded as the consequence of a human
67
nature whioh is antecedent to all social patterns." From the outset, 
orthodox economics has assumed a permanent social order composed of land­
lord, laborer and capitalist and has concentrated upon price movements
See Commons, p. 2£7, above.
66
Ayres, "Fifty Years' Developments in Ideas of Human Nature and 
Motivation," AER, Papers and Proceedings, March, 1936, p. 233.
67Ayres, "The Co-Ordinates of Institutionalism," p. 49.
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within that fixed social structure--price movements which were assumed 
to be a reflection of the inherent qualities of human nature as ex­
pressed in demand. And thus price theory is used to explain that which 
is already taken for granted! a market economy composed of permanent
social and economic classes in which individuals manifest, via price,
68the basic proclivities of human nature.
There are, according to the institutionalists, however, no inher­
ent qualities of human nature of which the social order is but a mani­
festation. And it is for this reason that Ayres rejects the use of 
price theory as an explanation of the social economy. This does not, 
however, mean abandoning the use of price data, any more than it means 
abandoning the use of census data:
We do not consider census data useless beoause nobody 
thinks of it as containing a theory of the economy; 
and there is nothing in the social conception of human 
nature that would invalidate the statistical treatment 
of price data.
But we must abandon price theory as the explanation of the forces shap­
ing the social economy of today because we must abandon the idea that 
society is merely the resultof a multitude of individuals each pursu­
ing his own self-interest. This means that we mu3t also abandon the 
importance previously assigned to motivation and particularly that of 
the entrepreneur and the profit motive as the main spring of economic 
progress. We must instead concentrate upon the sooial forces which 
shape ana determine the course of development of the total eoonomic 
system.
68Cf. David Hamilton, Newtonian Classicism and Darwinian Institu- 
tionalism, especially chap. iv for a more thorough elaboration of this 
point.
69Ayres, "The Co-ordinates of Institutionalism," AJEK, May, 1951,
p. 50.
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These social forces the institutional economists generally sum up 
under the headings of institutions (habits of thought, mores, collec­
tive action....) and technology (the state of the industrial arts, the 
scientific know-how of the community). They were defined by Veblen as
... of the nature of a common stook, held and carried 
forward collectively by the community, which is in 
this relation to be conceived as a going concern. The 
state of the industrial arts if a fact of group life, 
not of individual or private initiative or innovation.
It is an affair of collectivity, not a creative achieve­
ment of individuals working self-sufficiently in sever­
alty or in isolation.70
In neither of these social forces is importance assigned to the indi­
vidual nor to the problem of motivating him into activity.
Instead of taking the existing institutional setting as given and 
relying upon the entrepreneur, motivated by profits, to carry the system 
forward, the economist himself must adopt an experimental attitude toward 
these social forces, in particular, the use of collective action to solve 
socio-economic problems. According to Tugwell, "economic theory, strict­
ly defined, is the actual formulation of these suggestions for change,
71these solutions of problems." (This may be of little use in solving 
the economic problems o f the individual, such as how to stretch the 
monthly income to meet all expenses, but then this is not the concern 
of the economist.) As Tugwell sees it, an increasing part of economics 
"consists of this formulation and trying out of reconstructive programs"; 
this necessarily involves different attitudes and a different approach 
to the science on behalf of the economist for it involves "suggestions 
for new forms of institutional struoture and new forms of conduct" by
"^Veblen, The Instinot of Workmanship, p. 103.
71Tugwell. "Experimental Economies," The Trend of Economics,
p. 418.
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the economist rather than the passive acceptance of the given institu-
72tional fabric of society. This means that the economist must look
upon "institutions and arrangements in industrial life ... as instru- 
73
mental." As Clark also agreed, "we cannot be satisfied to take in-
74stitutions for granted as if they were supreme ends in themselves."
Instead, we must "regard even the more fundamental institutions as
means to social ends," and nothing can further this recognition more
than to emphasize the "gains and costs to society for which such insti-
75tutions are responsible," We are indeed more comfortable, Tugwell 
adds, if we simply attach ourselves to the existing institutional envir­
onment and identify ourselves with it.
In a primitive, static society there was a survival 
value in this. In our own rapidly changing society 
the survival value has shifted. Society itself can 
survive only if it submits its arrangements to con­
stant revision.
This is among the most important lessons that economists must learn—  
that the social or institutional arrangements are temporary, are exper­
imental; and that in the rapidly changing economy of the twentieth cen-
76tury a "hardening of institutions ... is positively dangerous."
Thus the institutional economist centers his thinking and investi­
gations around institutions, sooial arrangements, and collective aotion. 
Commons, it will be reoalled, defines an institution as "collective ao­
tion in control, liberation, and expansion of individual action," and
73Tugwell, American Economic Life, p. 594} of. also, Tugwell, Our 
Economic Life and its Problems, p. 542.
74
Clark, "A, Concept of Value— a Rejoinder," QJE, August, 1915, p.722.
75
Ibid., p. 723.
76
Tugwell, Amerioan Economic Life, p. 595.
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emphasizes that this is the ’’general and dominating fact of social 
77
life." Rather than confine their theories and analyses to the move­
ments of prices ivithin the given institutional setting, they look upon 
that institutional setting as a temporary social arrangement to meet 
certain 3ocial-economic problems. They look upon social-economic change 
and development, not as natural phenomena, nor as the product of indi­
vidual entrepreneurs seeking to maximize profits, but as an evolution­
ary social process subject to purposeful control. Thus, according to 
Commons, institutional economio3 belongs to this field of purposeful 
evolution because it is concerned with the "evolution of control of
individuals by collective action," because "it deals with human pur- 
7ftposes." Instead of taking for granted the existing "working rules" 
as did the earlier economists, the institutionalists propose to investi­
gate and thereby understand how these working rules evolve, how they 
affect individual behavior. For it is only through understanding these 
working rules, through understanding the impact of social institutions, 
or collective action, upon individual behavior, "that modem administra-
* 70
tive economics learns its mechanism of control by collective action.’ 
This problem of control, of guidance of the economy, it will be 
recalled, is the fundamental concern of the institutional economists. 
They have turned their attention to the question of how our modem in­
dustrial economy can be made to perform more effectively. They are in 
a real sense of the word, "reformers." And they insist that any effec-
77Commons, Economics of Collective Action, p. 21.
78
Ibid., pp. 192, 91.
79Commons, Economics of Collective Action, p. 129.
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tive eoonomic reform must begin with different premises than those 
provided by orthodox economic theory. Commons once noted that he had 
made "extensive historical studies" of various eoonomic and social re­
formers and had come to the conclusion that the main reason for their 
failure was the "creation in their own minds of an idealised society, 
an idealized workingman, an idealized capitalist, an idealized politi­
cian, remote from the actual because created in their own humanitarian 
image." Unable to reconcile their idealized conception of society and 
its problems they eventually became "disillusioned." And giving up 
hope for practical reform, they turn
...perhaps into able supporters of the most conserva­
tive and reactionary capitalism; or perhaps into des­
pondent pessimists holding that "nothing can be done"; 
or perhaps into a deistic or materialistic faith that 
an over-ruling Providence, or the great inherent foroes 
of natural law, can be trusted to work out those re­
forms ... to which they had formerly devoted their 
lives.80
Practical and effective reform must abandon this fictionalized picture 
of society; it must turn as a practical working measure to the instru­
mental view of what Commons oalls "sooiety in action":
...taxpayers’ leagues, organized employers, organized 
labor, corporations, going concerns, political parties, 
and so on, as they actually behave in their various 
harmonies and conflicts of interest. Society in action 
is custom, politics, corporations, in short any form of 
collective action in greater or less effective control, 
at the time, of individual action.
It is to the ubiquitous influence, the pervasive power of collective 
action— the cornerstone of the modern eoonomic system— to which prac­
tical reform must turn, for it is collective or social action, it is
80Commons, Institutional Economics, pp. 844-845.
8XCommons, Institutional Eeonomios, p. 845.
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the institutions of society, -which control individual behavior, and
■which in turn are 'the instrumental means of increasing the freedom of
that individual, of reforming and improving society. "Is it not better,
therefore," asks Commons,
to recognize in advance the foundations of capitalism, 
than to turn out ^ individuals who a.ref eventually dis­
illusioned, hopeless, reactionary, revolutionary, or 
contented with "natural law" instead of a better organ­
ized collective action.
If economic theory is to contribute to the development of sooiety, 
to the solution of its problems, it must abandon the eighteenth century 
idealized concept of the individual, of human nature, of the relation­
ship between the individual and society. It must recognize that human 
nature is a socially determined phenomenon; it must recognize that the 
one dominant characteristic of 'che twentieth century industrial economy 
is collective action in control, liberation, and expansion of individual 
action— that collective action is indeed the means of social progress.
It must abandon its exclusive attention to the price system. Instead, 
it must look upon existing institutional arrangements— including the 
price system— as temporary, as instrumental, as one of the variables, 
rather than as one of the givens.
82Ibid., p. 846.
CHAPTER VIII
THE INSTITUTIONALISTS' VIEW OF THE MARKET MECHANISM
Introduction
From the limited point of view of the individual, or of the firm, 
the economic system seems to be a vast market governed by implacable 
forces to which he, or it, must adapt and conform. And these foroes 
seem to be epitomized by prices— prices for the things that must be 
bought, prices for whatever the individual has to sell, whether it be 
land, labor, or capital. It is this compartmentalization of activities—  
those of buying and selling whioh result in prices in the market and 
which seem to be quite distinct from other activities--that formed the 
basis for the whole tradition of orthodox economics. And quite signifi­
cantly, the market does exhibit some sort of a system, some sort of an 
underlying order. It was the incipient realization of this system, or 
this order, which runs through the hustling and bustling of the market, 
that first focused attention on the phenomenon of price and subsequently 
led to the price system being prescinded from all other aspects of life, 
and thus compartmentalized, being treated as the main subject-matter of 
a new and distinot science, that of economics.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, this new science was 
committed to a course of development to which it has adhered for a cen­
tury and a half. The object was to understand and to explain the conger­
ies of activities which go to make up the economic system, and by that 
time, economists were convinced that the mystery was to be revealed in
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the behavior of prices.^-
It was thus that price theory was bom and thus that it has since
been nurtured by economists. Not by all economists, however, for the
institutionalists in particular have had grave misgivings about the
efficacy of the price system as an organizing mechanism and about price
theory as being the explanation of the forces which govern the economic
system. Thus, Ayres, one of the more trenchant critics of price theory
among the institutionalists noted that
We are approaching the middle of the century with a 
dawning realization that what has been wrong with 
economic thinking is its obsession with price. It 
has seemed to be axiomatic that ours is a price eco­
nomy. To explain price has been accepted by virtu­
ally all economists as their appointed task. That is 
why criticism of classical theory has failed. So 
long as economics has remained by common consent the 
science of price, any particular aspersion upon any 
particular principle could only be followed by elabor­
ation of other principles to substantially the same
effect.2
The institutional economists, however, have demurred from the tradi­
tionally accepted position. They have refused to accept the dictum 
that ours is a price economy, that price is the sole agency by which 
the economic activities of the community are related, and that there­
fore, price is the significant problem with which all economists must
Cf. Ayres, The Industrial Economy, chap. xiii, for a more thorough 
discussion of this background. Ayres notes that this discovery was nei­
ther late nor sudden, that ’’long before there was any systematic econom­
ics, learned men were called upon by princes and statesmen to unravel 
certain peculiar mysteries'1— those of money, taxes, and international 
trade. The exposition, for example, of the automatic equilibrium of goods 
and gold bullion by "the celebrated philosopher, David Hume, a fellow 
Scotsman, near neighbor, and good friend of Adam Smith, is now generally 
considered the most important forerunner of The Wealth of Nations. In 
short, economics did not begin as the science of price with the subsequent 
discovery that prices form an equilibrium. The phenomenon of equilibrium 
was discovered first, and it was this ■tiiat made economics the science of 
price" (pp. 326, 327).
2
Ayres, The Theory of Economics Progress, p. 14.
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be concerned. Clark, for example, insisted that he was not content to 
limit his study to "exchange values in a vacuum," that there are, in­
deed, "many matters truly economic which cannot be contained in the 
pigeon-hole of exchange value." Instead, he argued for treating the 
whole pricing system, the entire market mechanism, in terms of "human 
motives and desires," in terms of "social value," of the "value of 
things to society." These problems do "not stop with the fixing of a 
market price," Clark insists, and, furthermore, men "rightly demand 
that economics should contribute to the solution of these problems."
More important, these oonomists have rejected the traditionally held 
conception of the market mechanism or the price system as an inherently 
efficient governor by which the economy is regulated better than any 
other governor (or government) could do it. These are questions to be 
explored, in their view, not premises to be assumed as a starting point. 
And orthodox economics has yet to adopt that view and has yet to make 
that break with tradition, for it still assumes that the price system 
as it operates through a competitive market mechanism is a naturally 
beneficent mechanism which it is their duty to explain the functioning 
of, if not to justify.
It is the contention of the institutional economists that the eco­
nomic system is not controlled by the price system or the market mech­
anism, and that it is not to be understood by starting from that prem­
ise. It is their view that the economic system can be understood only 
in terms of the interplay and interaction of social forces; these forces,
g
Clark, "Towards a Concept of Social Value," Preface to Social Eoo- 
nomics, pp. 60, 61. This entire essay could be read with profit by any 
one interested in pursuing this question further from the point of view 
of one of the institutional economists.
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furthermore, are not to be equated with the so-called forces of supply 
and demand as registered in the functioning of the market mechanism.
As we noted in the previous two chapters, there are, in their view, no 
natural or innate tendencies of man to which the market gives expres­
sion. The economic system is, rather, to be understood as a congeries 
of a multitude of forces— institutional and technological, social and 
historical; they are what Commons would call the evolutionary result 
of a myriad of bargaining, rationing, and managerial transactions made 
and evolved in light of the present, past, and future habits of society; 
they are an important example of collective action in the control, lib­
eration, and expansion of individual action. And economics is a prag­
matic study of this whole process-in-action— not just those transactions 
resulting in price— with a view to controlling, regula.ting and guiding 
the development of that process in the interests of the whole social 
group. Thus it is that the institutional economists hold that for an 
understanding of our modern industrial economy, the economist must make 
a fresh start; the old way of thinking, centered in the belief that the 
price system is the economist’s Rosetta stone, must be abandoned. It 
will not suffice to continue laying stone upon stone in erecting an awe­
some edifice beoause the very foundations were ill-conceived.
The economist, heretofore, says Qlark, has "been content to let 
the market decide the uses to which economic goods should be put.”
It was only his duty and function to explain how those goods ended where 
they did through the price-performing mechanism of the market. Clark, 
however, suggests that the economist must "make a declaration of partial 
independence from the market," which though a useful tool, it is not 
complete.4 In the view of these economists, economic theory has found
4Clark, "Economic Principles of the New Civilization," Our Emergent
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itself stultified by the legacy of the market-organized economy which 
has bequeathed to us an over-simplified view of the economy and of the 
function of the economist. The search for an answer to the problems of 
our present day industrial economy is not merely a search for a solu­
tion to the problem of the market— to make it run more efficiently, to 
add oil to the round-bottomed bowl so that marbles will adjust more eas­
ily. The search is much deeper than that. But if successful, industrial 
society will, in the view of the institutionalists, continue to exist, 
will, in fact, grow and flourish, when the experiment of a self-adjust­
ing, raax'ket-organized, eoonomy is no more than a footnote in history 
books.
As a matter of fact, the institutional economists hold that in a 
very real sense of the word, the so-called "ideal" of a market-organized 
eoonomy was never more than a myth embellished by the economists. Tug- 
well, for example, argues that society long ago established a "vast pol­
itico-social machinery" to ensure that the forces of the market "do not 
work out in the way that is described by the economists as though it 
were inevitable and benevolent." Though exalted by the economists, "no 
enlightened society will tolerate the free working out of such forces."® 
Sooial values are simply too important to permit the machinations of
(Cont.) Civilization, ed. by Ruth N. Anshen (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1947) Volume IV, pp. 126-127.
C
Tugwell, "Experimental Economics," The Trend of Economics, p. 392. 
Karl Polanyi has given a fully developed account of this point of view 
in The Great Transformation (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1944); 
cf. also Polanyi, "Our Obsolete Market Mentality," Commentary, February, 
1947, pp. 109-117, reprinted in Sociological Analysis. ed. by Robert K. 
Merton (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1949), for asummary statement 
of this. Clark, Alternative to Serfdom, pp. 5-7, refers with approval 
to Polanyi’s thesis.
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the market to function as if they were inexorable natural law. This 
theology of a market-organized eoonomy had disastrous results; what 
emerged from it was not providential order, but chaos that came to en­
gulf larger and larger areas of the globe. The subjugation of labor, 
the depletion of natural resources, the ever-present problem of mass 
unemployment, all indicated that there was something less than an omni­
scient hand guiding the destiny of industrial society. While there were 
of course gains, the social cost m s  inordinate. And it m s  from this 
experience that society undertook to alter and guide the forces of the 
market. To recognize, if only subconsciously, that the market is but 
a means, an instrument, for the development of social values; to be 
employed on some occasions and to be ignored on others. This is the 
point Commons m s  emphasizing when he recognized that "interference with 
the law of supply and demand has always been the main objection raised 
against all collective action," but society has continued to resort to 
collective action to overrule the market, "these interferences have 
nevertheless been repeated and cumulated for a hundred years, because
the alternatives of noninterference under the circumstances were deemed
,6
worse than the interferences."
Clark, in the same vein, pointed out that the market mechanism can­
not be said to register social values so long as society does not acoept 
the results— not in the sense of merely being resigned to them as an 
inevitable evil, but unwilling to lessen them if it could. "So long as 
this does not represent the prevailing sentiment, so long it will be im­
possible to say that market value measures 'social value1 in the sense 
of 'value to society.'" There are many instances, says Clark, of "stan­
0
Commons, Economics of Collective Action, p. 137.
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dards of value contrary to those of the free market." And unless eco­
nomics can become cognizant of those social values, unless it can effec­
tively use them, it thereby misses its chance to perform one of its 
essential functions— "to contribute scientifically to economic reform." 
Economists, Clark insisted, do of course use standards of social value 
in their "practical thinking on matters of public policy," whether it 
be in supporting industrial insurance, a minimum wage law, regulation 
for the banking system, or for the subsidization of some industries. 
"Every measure of economic reform on which he expresses an opinion repre­
sents an estimate of social value of one sort or another, different from 
that of the market." In spite of all this practical recognition of the 
prior importance of social values to those of the market, in spite of 
the recognition that the market does not work toward social ends, 
"scarcely a breath penetrates to the rarified atmosphere of technical 
discussions of the theory of value and distribution." And thus Clark 
criticizes the economist, who by retreating to the security of this eco­
nomic theory, holds "aloof from the implications of his own thought and 
actions
The delegation to the self-adjusting market of all matters economic 
is no longer acceptable to society, the institutionalists argue, and it 
is therefore their contention that if economic theory is to contribute 
to the solution of social-economic problems, it must take full cogni­
zance of this. In the words of Hamilton, "the sovereignty of the mar­
ket is pastj the political controls are here and we must subdue them
8
to the public interest as best we can." The economist can no longer
''Clark, "Towards a Concept of Social Value," pp. 50-53 passim.
^Hamilton, Walton, Price and Price Policies (New York: McGraw- 
Hill, 1938), p. 556.
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hold aloof from the vast strides that have been taken in circumventing 
the market in the interest of furthering social values. He can no 
longer pretend that the market mechanism and the price system are the 
alpha and omega of all matters economic. Economists must recognize, 
in their thinking and their theorizing, that the locus of power has 
shifted from the amorphous market to the social group, from the indivi­
dual to various forms of collective action undertaken to further the 
interests of society. Hamilton warns, however, that the exercise of 
this power by the social group "must be based upon adequate knowledge";
it must lead to social measures useful for and suitable to the needs 
9
of the era. It is Hamilton's view, that the foundations of a more
productive and abundant economy— the technical and scientific know-how,
10
the resources, both human and material— are now available. V/hat is 
still missing, however, is the "art of control." And it is that vacuum 
which economics must fill— the knowledge and understanding necessary 
for collective or social action. To fill that vacuum, the economist 
must abandon his traditional view of the market and the price system 
as an "end," as something "given"; he must view it as but one of many 
institutions available, as but a means to be employed in economic re­
form. Thus Tugwell argued that there is a new attitude emerging "con­
cerning markets and prices which has a different end in view." This new 
attitude "stresses results desired rather than the mechanism by which 
they are attained"; it has to do with the social consequences of the 
market mechanism and the pricing process, rather than the mechanism it-
g
Hamilton, Price and Price Policies, p. 556. This recognition of 
the instrumental nature of knowledge and of its vise in meeting the de­
mands of social action is, as we noted in Chapter V, one of the import­
ant facets of the institutionalists' way of thinking.
^We shall return to this point later in this chapter.
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self. We are not so certain any more, adds Tugwell,
that so vital a concern for society ^ as "incomes and 
standards of living^ ought to be left to the vagar­
ies of the market. ... The idea grows that the 
national income and its apportionment is a matter 
which ought not to be left without some social super­
vision. 11
A1though it is true, as the economists have long pointed out, that
the forces of supply and demand do determine prices, in Tugwell's view,
"it simply does not follow that the public interest is best served by
allowing the supply of and the demand for commodities to remain com-
12pletely and solely determinative." Thus to these economists, as
Clark noted, it therefore seems "inevitable that there should be a
searching reconsideration of the question of what we want an economic
system to do for us in the light of this vast increase in potentially
available productive power and altered social and national objectives
or requirements." And, as Clark recognizes, although answers will not
be easily or quickly formulated, "economics will need to raise this
question and ... if it is answered by conventional formulas based
solely on satisfying commercial dollar demand, it will not be facing
13the realities of the time." Thus, according to Clark, "economists
must deal with quantities and qualities of which actual market prices
are not the only measure," indeed, they must take into consideration
14
many which "command no market price at all." They must consider
■^Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline, p. 178. Cf. p. 256, above, 
for Clark's similar comment.
12
Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline, p. 178.
13Clark, "Economic Principles of the New Civilization," p. 127.
^Clark, "The Concept of Value— a Rejoiner," QJE, August, 1915, 
pp. 709-710.
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in&ppropriables, and the social values which differ from those of free 
exchange, also the importance of institutional valuations and their 
influence upon social action, they must recognize the widespread preva­
lence of unpaid costs, of those overhead costs not allocated by the
15market, but which must be borne by society. These considerations,
these extra-market influences, must be considered, says Clark, "if we
are to have any standard of judgment on economic reforms which are con-
Ifitinually overruling the valuations of the market."
The economist, then, must widen the scope of both his inquiry and 
his theory; it is his function to do more than to show by means of 
algebra, geometry, or calculus what are the possible price alternatives 
of different kinds of markets; he is, rather, to show how the market 
mechanism and the price system, can be used as one of many instruments 
of control. He must stress social desires and social results, not merely 
explain one mechanism for achieving those results. He is to concentrate, 
not on the causes and determinants of price, but on the function of the 
price system and the market mechanism as one instrument of social organ­
ization.
The Significance of the Price System
The center of interest in orthodox economics has been and contin­
ues to be, price theory, or value and distribution theory. But in the 
view of. idle institutionalists, "if theory is to take its proper place, 
the center of interest must be shifted and price economics must become
15Clark, "Towards a Concept of Social Value," Preface to Social 
Economics, pp. 59ff.. cf. also, Clark, The Economics of Overhead Costs. 
p'.TTT.
16
Clark, "The Concept of Value— a Rejoinder," QJE, August, 1915, 
pp. 709-710.
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17a subordinate part of social economics." Elaborating on this point,
Clark draws a distinction between the two:
The central problem of social economics is the organ­
ization of the economic forces of society to get and 
to do the things that are wanted. Price is of inter­
est, not so much for its own sake as in view of the 
part it plays in this work of organization. Value 
economics is primarily interested in the determining 
causes of price; social economics is primarily 
ested in its function as an organizing agency.
The point is that the institutional economists do not fail to recog­
nize the importance of the price system, as some of its critics have 
19charged. The issue is not whether it is recognized as being import­
ant, but just what is that importance, just ivhat is the significance 
of the price system. In the opinion of Ayres, orthodox economics has 
found in the price system and the market mechanism the forces which 
have shaped the modern economy; it "attributes industrial development, 
past, present, and future, to the operation of the prioe system and the
institutions which define the market"; and it is this interpretation
20 m
with which the institutionalists disagree. To deny this significance 
to the price system does not mean, as Ayres recognized, that there is 
not an intricate and interrelated mutual adjustment of one price to 
others. "A causal nexus does indeed run through the whole universe of 
price linking all price phenomena together into an integrated causal
17Clark, "Economic Theory in an Era of Social Adjustment," AER, 
Papers and Proceedings, March, 1919, p. 282.
T O
Ibid., pp. 286-287. Gruohy, Modem Economic Thought, pp. 572ff 
also points out this as being typical of their point of view.
19Cf. Ayres, "The New Economics," Southwest Review. Summer, 1948,
p. 224.
20Ayres, Theory of Economic Progress, p. 35.
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system." But it is not within this network, intricate and inter­
related as it may be, that the understanding of the modem economy 
is to be found. It is not the price system nor the market mechanism 
that shaped our modem economy. The market mechanism is not the master 
plan by which the whole community is organized. This is what Clark 
meant when he said that the apparent ability of the market to organize 
our material interests has "deluded many of us, for some hundred and 
seventy years, into thinking that it could do all that was needed to 
organize an economic community on a basis of consent as embodied in 
the act of free exchange." It has been "growingly evident," however, 
that this m s  expecting too much, that this was imputing to the market 
capabilities "far beyond its powers." We have finally discovered, says
Clark, that the market can give expression to only some interests and
22forces, and that this is "not enough to constitute a society." Thus 
it is not price, as registered in the market mechanism as a response 
to the forces of supply and demand, which is the organizing instrumen­
tality of the economy. The price system simply reflects whatever degree 
of order may prevail in society as a whole:
When society as a whole (and the economy as a part 
of it) is tranquil, that tranquility will be re­
flected in the behavior of buyers and sellers and 
therefore in the patterns prices form. When society, 
including the eoonomy, is disturbed, that disturbance 
will be reflected in the market and the prioe 
system. ...
The truth is that our economy is not organized by 
the market mechanism. The market is organized by 
the economy. The order which the market exhibits 
is derived from the organizational patterns of the 
economy and is an expression of such order as actu-
pH
Ayres, Theory of Economic Progress,p. 35.
22Clark, Alternative to Serfdom., p. 5.
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23ally obtains in the eoonomy.
All that the price system can do is to give expression to the social 
forces, to the institutions and mores, the habits of thought, to the 
various forms of collective action extant or developing in the society
at any given time, to the state of the arts, which is itself a social
24force, "an active organizing process," in Clark's words. The market, 
as Walton Hamilton noted, is not a creator, but is rather a mediator? 
it is an umpire, not a governor. "All that is culture— the industrial 
arts, the organization of industries, the processes of marketing, the 
ways of life— converge there with their host of conflicting claims."
In all its operation, the price system is but a recorder of social cus­
toms . ^
It was in this sense that Commons emphasized the necessity of study­
ing, not the determinants of price, nor the distinction between nominal 
and actual prices, as the orthodox economist had done, but rather the 
importance of price movements as indicators of broader social and his­
torical movements. The eighteenth and nineteenth century economists 
were unable to recognize this importance, according to Commons, beoause 
they were unable to incorporate this point of view "in their more funda­
mental theories of nature and man...." The historical and social sig­
nificance of price movements came from later developments— "namely, sta­
tistics, and mathematics, which have nothing to do with labor, pain, or
u26pleasure."
2®Ayres, The Industrial Economy, pp. 344-5, 349.
2^ 01ark, "Economics and Modem Psychology," p. 129.
25Hamilton, Walton, Prioe and Price policies, pp* 549, 546.
26Commons, Institutional Economics, p. 124? cf. also the section 
"Economic Backbone of History,1' ibid., pp. 121-124, for a fuller elabor-
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In the view of orthodox economics, it is the market mechanism
which allocates the community’s resources to various and conflicting
demands upon them in the most efficient manner possible. Any sort of
disposition of the community’s resources would of course be some sort
of allocation. Stealing, for example, is one type of allocation of
consumer’s goods (or land, or cattle, or whatever the burglar chose
to allocate to himself). But in the opinion of the institutionalists,
it is not just any type of allocation which the orthodox economist
attributes to the market. Ayres, for example, criticizes the orthodox
tradition which sees
... in the machinery of the price system the most 
satisfactory possible organization of the economic 
resources of the community, one to which it therefore 
attributed the whole process of economic growth, pass­
ing over completely all that we now interpret as in­
dustrial revolution. ...
To those who define the problem of economics in -that 
way, the market mechanism is not merely "an" instru­
ment of allocation; it is "the" instrument; and the 
allocation it achieves is the most satisfactory one 
conceivable— human wants and nature’s scarcity being 
what they are— and the only alternative to the asperi­
ties of dictatorship.
This tradition still persists in orthodox price theory, according to 
Ayres, and is responsible for the unthinking condemnation of all eco­
nomic planning as unwarrantable and futile, at the very least, and in
27all probability "the work of reformers who aspire to dictatorship."
The institutional economists are unwilling to attach such sig­
nificance to the market mechanism as the instrument of allocation, 
or organization, or distribution. All the market can do is to give 
effect to underlying social forces. This would have been recognized,
(Cont.) ation of the importance of studying prices versus the import­
ance of studying price movements.
27
Ayres, The Industrial Eoonomy, p. 369.
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even in the eighteenth century, but for the fact that the market does 
seem to behave as the orthodox economist depicts it— on the individual 
level:
To individuals, trying to do the best they can with 
their limited talents and opportunities, the market 
seems to be the boss, just as to the individual motor­
ist the traffic policeman seems to have the power to 
determine in what direction and at what rate he shall 
proceed. The motorist of course knows that the police­
man is only a very minor executant of traffic regula­
tions.... This is also true of the market. 1'Vhat the 
market does, and all it does, is to give effect to the 
institutional patterns and arrangements which prevail 
in the structure of society itself. ...
It is the structure of society that allocates the com­
munity’s resources, just as it is the state of the com­
munity’s arts and crafts that defines those resources, 
determining their over-all relative abundance. Price 
patterns reveal those underlying conditions and give 
effect to them. In that sense the market does "allo- 
cate"--the same sense in which the policeman directs 
traffic— and in that sense only.^®
Thus, if at any given time, the results of the market mechanism are 
deemed unsatisfactory, it is to the structure of society that we must 
look for the explanation, "the allocations of the market will ... have 
whatever consequences are implicit in the social order to which they 
give effect."*^ Thus, any defect in the economy, such as the deep-lying 
tendency toward instability which it has exhibited in recent decades, 
cannot be corrected through the automatic functioning of the market 
mechanism; the market simply registers the instability inherent in the 
underlying social structure of the modem industrial economy. This means, 
and it is this meaning which is of primary importance to the institu­
tional economists, that the organized community may take whatever steps 
it desires to effect changes or modifications in the functioning of the
28Ibid., p. 370.
29Ayres,The Industrial Economy, p. 371.
market.
This does not imply of course, as Ayres emphasized, "that all
study of prices is fatuous." But it does mean that such study -will
proceed from the premise that the economy is ruled and organized by
the movements of the autonomous market. As Ayres noted, "prices do
SOserve as a tremendously important indicator of what is going on."
They are important to the businessman, to social and governmental agen­
cies of every sort. The investigations of economists, of research bur­
eaus, and governmental agencies have "given us a wealth of knowledge of 
price relationships the effect of which is to show us how various eco­
nomic activities affect each other." All this is important and of sig­
nificant value, but this is a quite different matter than assuming that 
these price formulas are the principles of economics "in the sense of 
providing the basic tools for understanding how the industrial economy 
came to be what it is and how it now operates." The point Ayres is 
making is the same we noted earlier that Commons had emphasized: that 
it is important to watch the movements of prices as an indicator of 
what is going on in the economy, just as it is important to watch freight 
car loadings, steel production, or census data. But the understanding 
of the economic system is not to be gained from the theory of price, 
any more than it is from a theory of freight car loadings, steel produc­
tion, or census data. It is from this point of view that the "institu­
tionalists have advocated and practioed systematic inquiry" into the 
movements of prices, the actualities of price policy and market move­
ments. "But this is a very different matter from treating the market
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as the prime determinant of the economic fate of the community, or 
attempting to read the horoscope of the economy in the crystal ball 
of price."^
Theirs is an attempt to put the price system and the market mech­
anism in a proper perspective, to recognize that it is the function of 
the economist to do more than explain by abstract reasoning the hypo­
thetical movements of prices under various assumed market conditions.
It is simply a recognition that the price system and the market mechan­
ism are instrumentalities, to be employed by the economist in his endeav­
or to bring about needed reforms and improvements in the economic system. 
Prom this point of view, the economist will, as Clark noted, "lay as 
much emphasis as ever on price as an instrument of productive organiza­
tion, but will tend to discredit it as the aim, end, and final measure
33of all things eoonomic." The price system and the market mechanism 
will simply be viewed as an instrument of organization, allocation, 
and distribution— not as the instrument.
The Efficacy of the Market Mechanism
Taking an instrumentalist view of the market mechanism as simply 
an instrument of organization, allocation, and distribution for affect­
ing the economic welfare of society, the institutional economists have 
found it deficient on several grounds. It has not been the automatic 
benefioient governor which earlier economists had assumed; it has re­
sulted in a distribution of the national income which, in their view, 
is not only unfair and unjust, but contains in it the seeds of its own
^Ayres, The Industrial Economy, p. 372.
■2 »Z
Clark, "Economics and Modern Psychology," p. 130; emphasis added.
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destruction. It has resulted in a concentration of wealth and econ­
omic power quite inconsistent not only with democratic and humanitar­
ian tenets, but also inconsistent with the welfare and stability of the 
whole social organism. And in the view of Walton Hamilton, the insti­
tution of the "price-system has denied to us a consciously formulated
34theory of social development." The delegation of all matters economic
to the price system and the market mechanism has resulted in a conserva­
tive attitude on the part of all members of society toward any proposal 
or suggestion for change or reform. The result has been to maintain old 
conventions and institutions, old notions about the efficacy of the mar­
ket mechanism as a naturally efficient regulator of the economy. It is 
Hamilton's view that among the various antecedents and institutions
affecting social policy, "the most pertinent" has been "the omnipresent
35and unescapable price-system." It is his thesis that any social pol­
icy which could be accepted within the framework of the ubiquitous 
price system, must meet two requirements: "The first is a demand for a 
preservation against collective action seeking to change conventional 
arrangements. ... The second is an approval of a program of exploita­
tion or expansion which gives promise of increases in pecuniary in­
comes . We have thus failed to establish an "economic democracy" 
when it was within our power to do so, and this failure is "inseps.r- 
able" from the "social policy which has sought as its first object the 
maintenance of the immediate and mutual pecuniary interests" of the var­
ious members of society. The only policies which were acceptable were
34Hamilton, Walton, "The Price System and Social Policy," JPE, Jan­
uary, 1918, p. 67.
35
Ibid., p. 39.
^Hamilton, Tfalton, "The Price System and Social Policy," p. 63.
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those which conformed to the beliefs bequeathed to us by our notions 
about the price system, and the result was simply "to enlarge old 
opportunities for money-making," and thus to bring about an increased 
concentration of wealth and economic power. Thus it was that a "con­
tinent possessed of boundless resources," coupled with a "marvelous 
machine technique which could turn them into a golden stream of in­
comes," has under the aegis of the price system and the social philo­
sophy which it nurtured, led to "reckless exploitation"; the price 
system has denied us a consciously formulated policy for economic
development and instead simply "opened opportunities for those who
37have wealth and power to have yet more abaundantly."
This resultant maldistribution in the income of the community, in 
its wealth and economic power, is, in the view, of the institutional 
economists, one of the basic xveaknesses of the market mechanism as it 
has functioned, unsupervised and unguided. But it has not been a nat­
ural nor an inevitable result. It is simply the result of the market 
functioning in a particular social milieu. As Ayres rather pointedly 
put it,
In its distributive aspect, our economy is what it is 
because the institutional structure of Western society 
is what it is. Who gets what is wholly determined by 
that organizational structure. This is the universe of 
discourse to which terms such as wealth and investment 
are truly pertinent, and also such terms as dividends, 
interest, rent, salary, wages, parity payments, poor re­
lief, and social security. All these terms designate 
the various groups and strata into which the community 
is divided by the prevailing institutional system. ... 
Moreover, there is nothing automatic or self-regulating 
about it, any more than there is about family life or 
government or any other aspect of the social structure.
37
Ibid., p. 64.
*2 0
Ayres, "The Role of Technology in Economic Theory," AER, Papers
and Proceedings, May, 1953, p. 283.
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The market mechanism simply implements the existing institutional and
technological forces, "it does not create that situs.tion on either the
39technological or the institutional side..,."
This reorientation of the role of the market as merely an instru­
ment of social forces does have important consequences in the area of 
social policy, for it does permit organized society to modify or alter 
the result of those forces if it so desires. And one important area in 
need of alternation in the opinion of these economists is in the dis­
tribution of income— which was not possible so long as the market m s  
viewed as a self-regulating, autonomous,mechanism; so long, as Walton 
Hamilton emphasized, as the price system continued to dominate social 
thinking. And Ayres levelled this same criticism, pointing out that "by 
far the most important practical consequence of the theory of the self­
regulating market was its apparent justification of a social structure 
characterized by a high degree of inequality of wealth and income."^ 
"Justified" in the view of Ayres, because what price equilibrium and 
the self-regulating market were supposed to achieve was
... to effect two sets of adjustments, one between the 
rich and the poor, and another between "alternative 
uses" of the instruments and materials of production; 
and these two adjustments must be adjusted to each 
other so as to maximize the national dividend. ^
And thus any resulting distribution of income was the best possible in
light of present demands for consumer goods versus the present demand
for capital goods. Saving was thus deemed a supreme virtue since it was
the factor responsible for industrial growth.
The original formulation of this theory did reflect, to a consider-
3S
Ibid., p. 284.
Ibid.
41Ayres, Theory of Economic Progress, p. 259.
266
able extent, the then-existing economic conditions. The early econo­
mists lived in a world characterized by extreme inequalities of wealth 
and income; but it was also a world in which the national dividend was 
obviously on the increase. These economists were impressed by the 
change which took place in the form of inequality— the shift from land 
ownership to money ownership as the basis of economic and social power—  
simultaneously with the growth of the national dividend.
It was the simultaneity of these changes which gave 
rise to the belief in a causal relationship between 
them. This conviction was nourished by the institu­
tional apparatus and ideology of capitalism and so 
eventuated in the theory that the growth of the 
national dividend is contingent upon a social struc­
ture in which inequality results in saving, saving 
in the growth of capital, and the growth of capital 
in the increase of the national dividend. *
It is this view— the idea that economic inequality is the cause of in­
dustrial progress by which all members of the community are eventually 
blessed— with which the institutionalists disagree. It is not merely 
a matter of feeling that what is produced is distributed in an unjust 
or unfair manner, but that due to this very inequality, the industrial 
eoonomy fails to achieve its industrial potential. The self-regulating
market has simply failed to provide the great bulk of consumers with
the power to purchase the goods whioh the economic system is capable 
of producing. And in particular, in the mass market of the twentieth 
century, this inequality of income, rather than leading to still further 
advances in output through the savings-investment channel, by restrict-
A
ing the market leads to a contraction of production. As Clark pointed 
out,
Our industrial efficiency is built on mass production,
and to keep it at work properly requires mass consump-
42
Ibid., p. 260.
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tion; in other vrords, fairly liberal incomes distrib­
uted among the mass of the people.43
This is, of course, the underconsumptionist view of the economy— the
view as also expressed by Ayres that
In order to produce we must consume. Economic stabil­
ity and the full utilization of our productive skill 
are contingent on the distribution of consumer pur­
chasing power. ^
It is underconsumptionism, but with a difference. For what the main 
objection is in this case, is the view which the idea of a self-regu­
lating autonomous market has implanted, both in the minds of economists 
and in its effect on social philosophy. The idea of price equilibrium 
in a self-regulating market, coupled with the doctrine that industrial 
growth is contingent upon the accumulation of vast sums of money, made 
that accumulation the "first anxious care of a sound economy." Thus, 
both in our thinking and in our acting, the accumulation of savings was 
placed "at the head of the council t a b l e . A n d  the process of indus­
trial growth, the realization of our productive potential, was rele­
gated to the automatic functioning of the market to allocate goods be­
tween present and future demand; extreme inequality and dire poverty 
were to be deplored on humanitarian grounds perhaps, but they were 
simply the price society had to pay for progress.
Viewing the market, however, as simply a register of social forces, 
and not as the governor of the economic system, the institutionalists 
take a rather dim view of inequality as a necessary condition of economic
43Clark, "The Riddle of Business Cycles," The American Federation- 
ist, October, 1932, p. 1112.
44Ayres, "The Principles of Economic Strategy," The Southern Eco­
nomic Review, April, 1939, p. 467.
^Ibid., p. 468.
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progress, of industrial development. It is their view that there is
no direct connection between savings or nonconsumption and industrial
development. The market does not automatically allocate goods between
present and future demand, it simply distributes income in accordance
with the prevailing social structure of society. Funds are accumulated,
not because of time preference, or because some people are more thrifty
than others; they are accumulated for the very simple reason that due
to the way the market operates as a register of social forces, some
46people are richer than others. It is not a matter of marginal pro­
ductivity, but of existing social structures. And
All attempts to idealize the accumulation of money 
are beside the point, and so are all attempts to dis­
credit capitalism on the ground of the cruel inequali­
ties on which it rests. Capitalism is neither sus­
tained nor discredited by the facts of inequality; it 
is inequality which in the last analysis is to be 
justified by capitalism.^?
The institutionalists argue that this inequality is not justified— ex­
cept on the supposition of a self-regulating autonomous market, in
which case, savings automatically find their way into spending and
48there is no problem. The market is not this self-equilibrating
46Cf. Clark,"The Riddle of Business Cycles," p. 1110, for example.
47Ayres, Theory of Economic Progress, pp. 52-53.
4-8Ayres noted in this connection that "it is ... highly signifi­
cant that the hottest theoretical controversy of this century centers 
in the doctrine of saving. The shift of emphasis from saving to in­
vestment reveals a trend within orthodox economic theory itself toward 
a unified theory of social organization ("The Role of Technology in Eco­
nomic Theory," p. 284). This of course, represents the influence of 
Keynes upon current economic thinking, but in the view of Ayres, ortho­
dox economic theory, including Keynesian economics— to which he refers 
as the "most formidable expression" of the underconsumptionists ("The 
Co-ordinates of Institutionalism," p. 48)— will be unable to achieve 
this unified theory of social organization so long as it looks upon the 
price system and the market mechanism as determinant rather than instru­
mental.
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mechanism, however. And as it has operated in the past it has given 
rise to a distribution of incomes such that the economy has chroni­
cally suffered from a deficiency of mass purchasing power accompanied 
by a surplus of funds for investment spending.
As it has actually operated— as the autonomous regulator of the 
economy— it has not functioned so as to bring the level of social well­
being of which it was potentially capable. It was this deficiency in 
the market mechanism, or what he calls our "economic organization," 
which Mitchell called attention to:
The factor which is thwarting our desires lies in our 
economic organization— that elaborate scheme which 
intervenes between men as producers and the same men 
as consumers....
But the inefficiency of our economic organization is 
not limited to these transitory periods of cyclical 
depression. The fact is that in good times as well 
as in bad our economic organization prevents society 
from producing as large a real income as natural re­
sources, man power, plant capacity, and engineering 
skill make possible. ^
Mitchell, also as a member of a subcommittee to investigate the possi­
bilities of increasing total production with existing technical facili­
ties, concluded that it m s  the judgment of engineers and engineering 
executives interviewed that "the productivity of industry could be 
greatly increased with existing facilities, were it not for limits to 
effective demand...." But, added Mitchell,
Experience promptly rejects the hypothesis that demand 
is restricted because all— or anywhere near all— con­
sumer wants are satisfied. Presumably, therefore, the 
restriction of demand is caused by ineffectiveness, due 
to the existenoe of interfering institutions or the 
aETsenoe of essential institution's, in the functioning 
of the processes whereby total income is distributed
49Mitchell, "Engineering, Economics and the Problem of Social Well- 
Being, Mechanical Engineering, February, 1931, p. 105.
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and transformed into purchasing power. Were income 
properly, promptly, and smoothly distributed and trans­
formed into purchasing power, productivity and the 
standard of living could be increased indefinitely 
through a continuous dynamic interaction and adjust­
ment. oO
And J. M. Clark, as a participant in the same project, devoted a paper 
addressed to the same question— "whether there exists a condition which 
can be correctly described as a chronic limitation of production owing 
to limitation of effective demand...."®'*' He notes, after a preliminary 
examination of the problem and reference to the report of the subcom­
mittee of which Mitchell was a member, that
The present report will assume that it has been rea­
sonably well established that there exists a very con­
siderable margin of unused productive capacity owing 
to the condition commonly thought of and spoken of as 
limited effective demand.52
Among the faults contributing to this condition of affairs, Clark lists
the "undue concentration of incomes and probably a resulting tendency
to over-saving." And he concludes in this connection, that
Any move in the direction of more equal distribu­
tion would mean an increased market for the things 
industry knows how to produce and for which it has 
spare capacity. If this were achieved mainly at the 
expense of reducing a volume of savings so swollen 
that a considerable part of it goes to waste, the 
change would be very nearly a clear gain.
Although this study was undertaken during the dark days of the depres­
sion, Clark raises the more important and "more permanent question of
Mitchell, et. al, "Report of Subcommittee on Produotion," Eco­
nomic Reoonstruotlon— Report of the Columbia University Commission, ed. 
by Robert M. Maclver- (.New York:~Columbia University Press, 1934), 
pp. 96-97, emphasis added.
51Clark, "Productive Capacity and Effective Demand," ibid.t p. 105. 
^Ibid., p. 106.
53Ibid., p. 125.
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our power to absorb increased productive power in the long run.”
And
Here it seems clear that there is no fixed limit to 
•this power, but that, under present conditions, our 
power to s.bsorb has not kept pace with our power to 
produce.
Thus, whether in the long run or in the short run, the market mechan­
ism lias not operated as depicted in the manuals of orthodox price 
theory. It has resulted in a distribution of income such that sooiety 
was never able to realize the full potential of its existing produc­
tive capacity. And this was not any natural or pre-ordained state of 
affairs, but due to what Mitchell called the "interfering institutions," 
or the "absence of essentis.l institutions" which could have corrected 
this problem.
Orthodox economics was never able to solve this problem, however, 
for it defined a priori the problem of economics as the explanation of 
the determinants of price under various assumed market conditions.
Since, however, it is the view of the institutionalists that the market 
is but an instrument for achieving social goals, this result can and 
must be corrected by social action. But as long as the market is ideal­
ized as the instrument of social organization, such social action was 
impossible. It is only by recognizing it as a means, as an instrument, 
that joint or collective action can be taken to assure the full and con­
tinuous utilization of our productive potential. The necessary strat­
egy— the social distribution of income— has not yet gained acceptance 
as laissez faire once did,
But the facts of which such a theory of economic pro­
gress would be a formulation are there and are already
^Clark, ibid., p. 121.
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dimly realized. Sooner or later we shall achieve a 
theoretical reformulation of the economic life process 
of which the strategy of income distribution will be 
the inexorable logical consequence and the prelude to 
a new age of economic progress. ^
It is this reformulation of the economic life process of the community
which the institutionalists are attempting to evolve. And the necessary
first step in its formulation is a recognition of the market mechanism
and the price system as but instruments for social usage. It is not
enough to recognize that the market does not function as effectively as
it should because of monopolistic elements and therefore to advocate the
elimination of this monopoly to make the market work better— i_. e_., more
competitively. It must be recognized as but a social instrument which
can be altered or modified by collective action to meet today’s social-
economic problems, to increase the well-being of the community.
This reformulation of the economic life process of the community, 
emphasizing the market as but a means to social ends, involves, in the 
view of the institutionalists, a redefinition of social-economic objec­
tives. It involves a de-emphasis upon money-making as the criterion of 
socially acceptable measures; it involves the social supervision of the 
economic system, including the distribution of money income; it involves 
a denial of the potency of accumulated funds as a necessary condition of 
industrial progress:
Gradually but inexorably a state of mind is growing 
in which the continuous efficient operation of indus­
trial machinery will have replaced the accumulation of 
funds as the object of general concern and the aim of 
public policy.
Thus, physical production, and not a competitive equilibrium of prices,
55Ayres, Theory of Economic Progress, p. 281; also cf. Clark, 
p. 255 and Tugwel'l, p. 2?2, above.
56Ayres, Theory of Economic Progress, p. 306.
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is in their view, the basis of a sound economy. The full realization
of our productive potential, the efficient utilization of our manpower,
machines and resources, and not the accumulation of financial capital,
is their view of sound social objectives for the economic system. As
Walton Hamilton stated it, "there is no surer index to the quality of
57a culture than the state of its industrial arts.” In almost identical 
words, Ayres held that ”it is the state of the industrial arts that 
determines why any people, taken as a whole, are as well off or as ill 
off as they are."®®
Pew economists would find occasion to disagree very strongly with 
either of these statements. It has probably been the accepted objective 
of all economists, orthodox or underworld, from Adam Smith to the present, 
that these were the main objectives of a sound economy, the raison d'etre 
of economic analysis. But the terms in which these objectives were form­
ulated by the mainstream of economists and by the institutionalists differ 
substantially. Essentially, the orthodox economist attributes indus­
trial growth to savings,to the prior accumulation of funds. And this 
is, of course, why this accumulation was made the first anxious care 
for a sound economy. It is this premise to which the institutionalists 
take strong exception. To argue that industrial development is contin­
gent upon the prior accumulation of funds is to be guilty of the fallacy 
of post hoc ergo propter hoc. The rise of Sirius above the horizon may 
have preceded each annual flooding of the Nile, but there was no causal
57Hamilton, Walton, Patents and Free Enterprise, Investigation of 
Concentration of Economic Power,' TNEC Monograpn N o . 31 (Washington:
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 4.
58
Ayres, The Industrial Eoonony, p. 84.
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connection. And likewise, the great revolution in scientific think­
ing culminating in the seventeenth century, the work of Copernicus, 
Galileo, and Newton, is not to be imputed to the prior accumulation 
of funds, to the rise of the free market as such, nor to the profit
motive. Neither is the ^^ o^rk of Faraday, Pasteur, Darwin, Maxwell, or
60Einstein to be attributed to the market, nor is the significance of
their scientific discoveries and contributions to be explained as hav­
ing been made possible by prior savings. Their discoveries and contri­
butions were significant, however, for the industrial development of 
the Western world.
It is of course true that whether or not an individual or firm is 
able to acquire the necessary goods does depend, in our society, upon 
having or being able to obtain the necessary financial capital. The 
possession of money capital does mean the power to assemble industrial 
capital; and it is from this reasoning that it is assumed that in the 
historical process of industrial evolution it is money that gives rise 
to society's industrial development. But this confuses what may be 
true of individuals with what is true of society. And it is this con­
fusion with which the institutionalists disagree. Thus, J. M. Clark 
noted that in the realm of "common sense," it would seem natural that 
if society spends more on one thing there would then be less to spend 
on other things, that "if more is to be spent on capital goods, more 
must be saved and less spent on consumption." Whatever common sense
59Cf., V. Gordon Childe, Man Makes Himself (London: Watts & Co., 
Thinker's Library edition, 1948), p. loS.
6GCf. for example, Paul H. Douglas, "The Reality of Non-Commercial 
Incentives in Economic Life," The Trend of Economics ed. by R. G. Tug- 
well, pp. 153-188; and Gjrvetz, op. oit., pp. 171ff.
may seem to indicate, Clark pointed out that "quantitative studies 
show us that we reach our largest consumption at the same time when 
we are also making the largest investments in tangible capital goods.... 
This strongly suggests to Clark that by "spending more for one thing, 
the economy as a whole may have more left to spend on other things," 
which is a rather different view than supposing that only by cutting 
down, by abstaining, can capital goods be brought into existence. And 
he noted in another paper that with the given distribution of incomes 
and the resulting tendency toward over-saving there can be "more spend­
ing by business" for capital goods expansion "without less spending by 
consumers." Clark also cited as an illustration the case of allied 
purchases of m r  materiel during 1915-1916, at which time we were able 
to send them billions of dollars worth of goods, at the same time to 
expand our industrial capacity, and "in addition have more real income 
left for domestic consumption than ever before."
The fact that our national economy received no real 
or ultimate payment for the goods sent abroad sharpens 
the paradox.... The goods were sold on credit, and 
immediate dollar payment was forthcoming by expansion­
ary methods. ... /^Thusy7, our real domestic spending 
power m s  increased, non in spite of sending more goods 
abroad, but because of it.°®
It m s  from such studies as these that Clark concluded that industrial
expansion does not depend upon the prior accumulation of funds; it does
not have to wait "for individuals to pile up original savings enough to
finance the projects in hand." When the potential of industrial ex-
61
Clark, "Aggregate Spending by Public Works," Preface to Social 
Economics, p. 380; reprinted by permission from the ABR, iMarclh, 1§35.
Clark, "The Riddle of Business Cycles," p. 1110.
63Clark, "Aggregate Spending by Public Works," p. 381.
^Clark, "Productive Capacity and Effective Demand," Economic Re­
construction, pp. 109, 114.
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pansion is extant, ’’the elasticity of the credit system furnishes
sufficient funds so that the amounts which expanding business can
65spend are not limited by the amount of prior savings available."
This is the same point Ayres made when he dismissed the "notion 
that current industrial growth is dependent upon the previous accumu­
lation and current outlay of an aggregate of funds." This is simply 
not the case; this is confusing what is true of individuals with what 
is true of social growth; it is confusing the role of Sirius in rela­
tion to the flooding of the Mile.
We know that industrial growth such as took place in 
the United States during the recent war was not pre­
ceded, or conditioned, by any such accumulation. For 
example, it is quite inconceivable today to suppose that 
the President of the United States might have replied to 
the scientists who laid before him the project of nuclear 
fission, "Gentlemen, this is a very promising idea. Such 
a weapon as you describe might indeed turn the tides of 
war. But gentlemen, we simply do not have the money."
As the sober and conservative London Economist remarked 
editorially, in commenting on the lessons of the war, 
we have learned that anything that is possible physically 
is possible financially.
The point that both Ayres and Clark are making is that economic growth
is self-financing. Actual industrial growth is dependent upon previous
industrial growth--not upon previous financial savings. And it is the
prospect of actual growth that justifies the "creation" of funds by the
banking system or the government. This does not mean of course that
either banks or the government can safely create new money by whim;
if the creation does not result in new industrial development, it can
have disastrous results. If, however, there is potential industrial
growth, then that is what will bring the new funds into existence. It
^Clark, "The Riddle of Business Cycles," p. 1110. 
Ayres, The Industrial Economy, pp. 116-117.
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is our "technological competence" to create new industrial plants 
that makes the "financing possible— the exact reverse of the tradi- 
tional supposition."
This technological competence, the process of technological devel­
opment, is the crucial factor to be nurtured and cared for. But it 
is not previous savings that feed this development, this growth. It 
is research and idle curiosity; it is knowledge added to the storehouse 
of knowledge that is the heritage of society. And that research, that 
new knowledge, is not made possible by pieces of paper accumulated dur­
ing some previous period. It is made possible, and in increasing amounts, 
by the increasing productivity which it itself is responsible for. The 
research physicist is supported, not by pieces of paper in a vault, nor 
by pen marks on a ledger, that were put aside yesterday. He is supported 
by the expanding productivity which he and his predecessors, back through 
Einstein, Maxwell, Pasteur, Faraday, Newton, Galileo, and on into anti­
quity, made possible. In Walton Hamilton's words:
The industrial arts are rooted in the long ago, passed 
on as a cultural legacy, and subject to improvement.
As a body of useful knowledge they are the possession 
of the entire people; from the store of techniques and 
skills every man may draw as his particular calling 
demands.
At the base of each invention, of each industrial or technological pro­
cess, there lies a "mite of knowledge." As that knowledge grew through
unknown millenia, as it increased in complexity and intricacy, man "con-
69verts more and more of the great unknown to his own account." "The 
creative urge runs deep," says Hamilton; "an ability to invent is indig-
^Ibid., p. 117.
^Hamilton, Walton, "Patents and Free Enterprise," TNEC Monograph,
No. 31, p. 1.
69_, . ,Ibid., p. 4.
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enous to humanity" not to particular races, nor to particular times. 
Though it of course takes place in the minds of individuals, invention 
and technological progress is a social or community affair. When this 
"mite of knowledge" was first discovered and how man first stumbled 
upon it, we can only guess, but "once a beginning was made, the carry- 
on would in time take care of itself." As life goes on, small varia­
tions in the daily round are inevitable.
Bach mutation presents some slight difference in re­
sult, and among the people there are some who will 
observe, repeat, and learn. As tribes are thrown to­
gether, in trade or in war, a process of borrowing is 
inevitable and in some fertile mind elements from two 
cultures unite to form a tool or a technique not known 
before.'
The "pioneer work" in today's society is carried on in the laborator­
ies and workshops of the government, the universities and the founda­
tions. "Here scientists, who are salaried employees, make an advance
72of the bounds of knowledge their regular occupation." The funds 
which they draw to account are those deposited by their predecessors 
in previous days. It is the fund which Commons describes as
... the accumulation of embodied ideas from the dawn
7QIbid., p. 29.
71Hamilton, Walton, "Patents and Free Enterprise," p. 4. It is 
beoause of the crucial importance of the industrial arts to the welfare 
of the community that Hamilton comes to the conclusion that the institu­
tion of the patent system no longer functions to facilitate the develop­
ment of the industrial arts, that it in fact is obsolete and should be 
markedly changed. As he pointed out, "no one would think of a scheme 
of usage, which seemed good enough a century and a half ago, as at present 
very useful for labor or land. Ho one would regard the obvious arrange­
ments, which seemed quite adequate just after the Civil War as at all 
suited to the current complexities of finance and labor. Yet the useful 
knowledge of the eighteenth has become the intricate and powerful tech­
nology of the twentieth century— and the primitive way of its control 
has endured (ibid., p. 164.)." .
72
Ibid., p. 154.
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of civilization to the present steam, gasoline, and wire­
less. The scientist, engineer, or mechanic of today is 
simply repeating the ideas of the lever or Archimedes,
•the gravitation of Galileo and Newton, the electricity 
of Franklin, and the thousands of ideas of scientists,^ 
engineers, and mechanics of centuries of civilization.
And from this broader historical point of view, "the concept of capi­
tal," as Mitchell pointed out,
merges into the broader concept of resources— soil and 
climate, mines and forest, industrial equipment, public 
health, intelligence and general education, the sciences 
that confer control over nature, the sciences that aid 
in developing body and mind, and the sciences that bear 
upon social organization.
This is the concept, the historical process of development, to 
which the institutionalists attach important significance; it is, indeed, 
the life-process of the community. And it is independent of the accumu­
lation of financial capital. It was not the rise of the market which 
brought the industrial economy into existence; it was just the reverse. 
And though it is true that the market may have facilitated this indus­
trial growth, it may also have impeded it. In any case, it did not 
cause it.
The Bias of the Market Mechanism
Adopting the view we have summarized above— that the market is not 
an autonomous, self-equilibrating, mechanism which it is the function 
of the economist to explain, but is rather merely an instrument for
^Commons, Institutional Economics, p. 656. This interpretation of 
the nature of invention and technological progress as summarized above 
in Hamilton's words, is quite similar to that held by other institution­
alists. See, for example, Veblen, Instinct of Workmanship, p. 103, cited 
on p. 241, above; also, Commons, Institutional Economics, pp. 656-672 and 
pp. 32bff; also Ayres, Theory of Economic Progress, chaps. vi and vii, 
and Ayres, The Problem o? Economic Order, pp. 6-20.
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achieving social goals, the institutional economists have found it 
deficient on several grounds. And consistent \vith their instrumental­
ist view, they have insisted that it is the function of the economist 
to divorce himself from this mechanism, to criticize and evaluate it 
as an instrument of social organization— to declare a partial inde­
pendence from the market, as Clark put it. Clark once pointed out that 
the economist, in his professional capaoity, is, by the traditional 
view, supposed to maintain a neutral position on the question of social 
goals, that he
... should ignore the ends of life, refusing to ask 
what people want or need, and considering only the 
economic mechanisms for promoting their attainment 
of whatever ends they do pursue.
This position of neutrality with respect to the goals and needs of
society is, in the view of the institutionalists, inconsistent with.
their interpretation of the market and the function of the economist,
for
This assumes that the instruments— the economic mech­
anisms— are themselves neutral; and the trouble is 
that they are not. The economist's chief mechanism—  
the market— cultivates certain kinds of needs and neg­
lects others. It is biased; and if the eoonomist 
limits himself as suggested, he is accepting the bias 
of the mechanism. The correction of the bias is then 
left to others, without the help economists can give 
in what is properly a joint undertaking.
Thus, in addition to criticizing the effects of the market with respect
to the distribution of income and the putative powers of industrial
development, these economists argue that the market itself is biased
and that it is the function of the economist to help correct that bias,
to show the effects which the market perpetrates on society, to show
75Clark, Alternative to Serfdom, pp. 9, 10.
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the social needs and goals which the market ignores or neglects.
It was in this connection that Mitchell pointed out that all the 
market can do is to give effect to short-run, private, wishes, and that 
this may be "exceedingly unwise on the basis of long-run public inter­
ests." The market, Mitchell insists, is not only wasteful of our natur-
76al resources, but is even more wasteful of our human resources. This
is the same criticism Clark levelled at the market as i t has functioned,
for individuals are so molded in their "body, mind, and character" by
their economic activities and relations, by the freedoms and servitudes
which are imposed upon them,
... that industry can truly be said to make men and 
women who work in it no less truly than commodities 
it turns out for the market. These human effects of 
industry are, in the long run, its most important pro­
ducts, and yet, as we have seen, the demand for this 
class of product is very inadequately expressed in the 
bargainings of the industrial market. These different 
aspects of industry are, moreover, not separate things 
but interdependent. Industry as a molder of character 
cannot be adequately studied apart from the question 
whether the quota of material goods it furnishes spells 
privation, comfort or luxury.'”
Clark also noted that while the market may equate the products of two
different factories, he contends that this is a social fallacy when one
of them is built "with an eye to such beauty as circumstances permit
and operated so as to give workers an opportunity for growth, while
the other furnishes an environment of unrelieved ugliness and a large
170
percentage of 'dead-end jobs.'"1 This is the same shortcoming of the 
traditional market-oriented analysis which Commons also noted— that
76Mitchell, "The Social Sciences and National Flanning," The Back­
ward Art of Spending Money, p. 89.
77Clark, Social Control of Business, pp. 46-47.
78
Clark, "Toward a Concept of Social Value," p. 48.
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■while the principle of "least-cost combination per unit of output" 
is significant for the private management of a firm, it "leads to 
social fallacies," and this discrepancy must, therefore, be recognized 
"in order to move from the private to the collective or social point 
of view."^
It is this collective or social point of view which these econo­
mists emphasize, and in particular, the welfare of the collective or 
social group. The market mechanism, as it has operated, has not, in 
their view, adequately promoted the welfare of society and it is the 
function of the economist to point this out, to show where collective 
or social action is necessary to modify or alter the market mechanism. 
There are three general areas in which they agree that the market has 
not achieved this social ’welfare, three areas in which collective action 
is required in order to achieve those social objectives of which the 
market is incapable. One is the instability inherent in the modem in­
dustrial economy; a second is the social costs of industry which the 
market ignores; the third is the inadequacy of the market as a measure 
of human needs, or of social welfare.
Clark wrote rather extensively on the problem of instability, or
what is more commonly called the business cycle, pointing out repeatedly
that this was one problem which arose due to the operation of the market
mechanism, and for -which there was no answer within the strict limits
of an automatic, price-equilibrating, market. Thus, most pointedly,
he noted that
This brings us face to face with one of the basic 
faults in the "price system" as it actually operates: 
namely, recourse to idleness if production will not 
cover "costs." When costs represent not what the pro­
ductive resources are worth under existing condition
79Commons, Institutional Economics, pp. 276, 277ff.
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but what they would be worth under more favorable 
conditions than actually exist.80
Clark points out that judged by the market, a three dollar wage for
making shoes ought to mean that there are other opportunities for
which this day's labor could be used to produce something worth three
dollars. But if the worker stands idle beoause he is not worth three
dollars per day for making shoes, it simply means that the alternative
is not available.
Under these conditions, to act on the assumption that 
shoes are not worth producing unless they will cover 
the three-dollar wage is false social accounting, fly­
ing in face of the elementary fact that anything pro­
duced is that much more than nothing. It stands in 
the way of our making the best available use of our
productive resources, whatever that use may be, by
insisting that they shall not be used at all unless 
their use will cover "costs" which changed conditions 
may have rendered, for this purpose, arbitrary and 
misleading....
Under these conditions, it is inevitable that pro­
ductive resources should go to waste, with the further 
result that they create no purchasing power to buy the 
products of other productive resources.8-*-
To argue, therefore, that shoes, or any other commodity, are not worth 
producing beoause the market has so decreed, is to fail to recognize 
that the market cannot accurately register all social forces, cannot 
at all times autonomously organize the community's resources. Finan­
cial bookkeeping for the individual firm, relying on the dictates of 
the market, says that goods at such times are not worth to society what 
it costs the firm to produce them.
Socially speaking, this is a fallaoy; a pecuniary fic­
tion. Goods are worth producing whenever there is a 
waste capacity which could be used to produce them; and 
the utilizing of this waste capacity costs the community 
substantially nothing, no matter what it may cost the
80Clark, "Productive Capacity and Effective Demand," pp. 123-124.
81
Ibid.
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private employer under the customary system of wages.
Thus, no matter what it may pay the individual employer to do under 
these circumstances, the community cannot follow the same line of rea­
soning. The individual employer of course can only organize his costs 
and income in accordance with the market; the community can alter the 
market in whatever way it chooses. Though it would cost the firm 
three dollars to produce the shoes, it would cost the community "sub- 
stantially nothing." A H  of which, Clark noted, is a rather "involved 
way of saying that idleness is waste" and that anything that idle labor 
is able to produce is "better than nothing." "Perhaps," added Clark,
the entire argument would be superfluous but for the 
fact that economics and business are both committed 
to judging whether goods are economically worth their 
cost according to the financial expense involved under 
existing forms of contract.
That is to say, they are judged as to their worth according to the price 
system and the market mechanism; this, however, is a social fallacy, a 
pecuniary fiction. It is a fallacy and a fiction, because it assumes 
that what is true for individual firms is therefore necessarily true 
for society— that social or collective action can do more than the indi­
vidual. In another and more elaborate treatment of the same subject, 
Clark argues that while the individual firm is faced with the problem 
of fixed and variable costs, from the social point of view, nearly all 
ult-imate costs are fixed. We shall return to this point shortly, but_ 
it is interesting to note in the present connection that
If ultimate costs are nearly all overhead it follows 
that it would pay for industry as a whole to keep go-
®^Clark, "Some Social Aspects of Overhead Costs— An Application of 
Overhead Cost to Social Accounting, With Special Reference to the Busi­
ness Cycle," AER, Papers and Proceedings, March, 1923, p. 57.
8^Ibid., p. 59.
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ing rather than stand idle, even if the product were 
worth next to nothing. And yet any serious drop in 
prices is the signal for widespread slackening of pro­
duction. Industry as a whole is unwilling to treat 
its expenses as overhead and act a c c o r d i n g l y . ^
As a result prices are frequently high enough to shut 
off the production and sale of goods which are econ­
omically worth producing, for the community.85
Industry, however, cannot act as a whole, because each firm must act 
individually as the market dictates. It is only through some form of 
collective action that the market could be circumvented in such circum­
stances.
Writing also on the problem of the business cycle and 'the efficacy
of the market in handling that problem, Mitchell noted that although
■the "immediate pecuniary hazards are borne by the shareholders," it is
only to the extent of the financial sums which they have invested and
they are thus able to "throw a large part of the business-cycle hazard
upon the employees."8® And Clark, elaborating on the same matter,
pointed out that we would not think of relying upon the market and the
traditional principles of individualism to provide for the victims of
such natural disasters as the San Francisco fire. In the same manner,
we should properly apply the same principles "to the victims of our
wholesale economic changes and upheavals," with the added emphasis that
the industries which cause economic upheavals have an "economic obliga-
S 7tion" which the market does not allocate. Ayres also noting the dis­
crepancy between the actions of the firm within the market and the inter-
Clark, Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs (Chicago: Uni­
versity of Chicago Press, 1^23), p. 2?;' of. also ibid., pp. 402 and 434ff.
85Ibid., p. 448.
88Mitchell, Business Cycles: The Problem and Its Setting, p. 157.
on
Clark, Social Control of Business, p. 154.
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ests of society, pointed out that the problem of depression and the
functioning of the market
... involves the question whether the cost of a depres­
sion is one of the irreducible costs that industry must 
bear. Is a contingency fund a legitimate cost; and if 
the contingency for which provision is so made is a 
depression, does this mean that the cost of weathering 
a depression is a legitimate cost?88
Prom the financial viewpoint of the individual firm, it would perhaps
be reckoned a legitimate cost, but it is not a legitimate social cost
in the sense of a necessary cost of production.
It is not, however, only during the time of depression that the 
market fails to register true social costs, for the market price does 
not include "robbing neighbors of their light and air, obstructing the 
streets, fouling streams, increasing or destroying the beauty of the 
landscape or the business character of the neighborhood, admitting 
tenants whose very presence destroys thw value of other real estate
OQ
in the adjoining blocks, etc., etc." It was from these deficiencies 
and shortcomings that Clark concluded that "if economics merely accepts 
and records the outcome / o f  the market^" as representing the effective 
social importance of that particular commodity, there is still some­
thing lacking."^*
Thus, not only does the market lead to social fallacies in decid­
ing what and when goods are worth producing, but the costs and the 
hazards of that production, the costs and hazards of the business cycle, 
are not fairly allocated. And even in prosperous times, not only do we
88Ayres, The Industrial Economy, p. 352.
89Clark, "Toward a Concept of Social Value," p. 45; cf. also Clark, 
Social Control of Business, pp. 41ff.
on
Clark, "Toward a Concept of Social Value," pp. 54-55.
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have unused capacity, but the market is unable to reflect the true
social costs of production. Society as a whole suffers from having
supposed that the price system and the market mechanism accurately
registers social needs as related to social abilities. It is, in
short, a total loss, but a loss which is unavoidable so long as the
market is regarded as the sovereign governor of the economic system.
These defects cannot, as Ayres said, "be removed by simply allowing
91the ’forces of supply and demand’ to do their work."
What is required, in the opinion of these economists, is a fresh 
approach, one which recognizes that such problems can be solved only 
by abandoning the traditional view of the market and the price system.
As Clark put it, what is required to meet this "common peril of depres­
sion" is some "common organization" which can exercise control as a "col­
lective organism" over the strategy of the individual business firms.
It cannot be achieved by the traditional view, simply allowing each indi­
vidual firm to operate within the matrix of an autonomous price system 
and market mechanism. And Clark added that if "prediction in social 
matters is ever justified," it is very likely that "some day such a 
vehicle of statesmanship will be a reality.... With such an organization
in existence, social cost-keeping would gain a definiteness which is
92
hardly possible today."
A valid concept of social cost-keeping would necessarily recognize 
the existence and importance of the fixed social costs which the market 
is unable to take into account. The most important of these is the 
fixed cost of maintaining the population irrespective of whether the
91Ayres, The Industrial Economy, p. 348.
®2Clark, Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs, p. 411.
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market finds it profitable to provide employment or not. From the
93
broader social point of vievr, there is a minimum maintenance which 
must be borne by the community whether people work or not, or the com­
munity as a whole vd.ll suffer irreparable damage. Thus Clark pointed 
out that when labor is not employed, "its cost does not disappearj it 
changes form... the overhead cost of labor is a collective burden upon
industry in general, but the market does not allocate to each employer
94the share for which his own enterprise is responsible.” As the indi­
vidual firm, operating within the confines of the market, sees it, labor 
is simply a variable cost, but from the social point of view, this is
incorrect for the social cost of labor is fixed, it does not vary with 
95output. Labor requires a maintenance that does not differ vastly 
whether the individual works or not and "thus, we may say that most of 
the ultimate costs of labor to the laborer and to the community are 
constant costs and that they are translated into variable costs to the 
employer by our customary system of wages....” As Clark pointed out, 
when the laborer is out of work, the community must still bear the cost 
of his maintenance or there will be a "still heavier loss." This is the 
penalty which orthodox economics and the price system have exacted from 
society; they have served the interests of the machines, have directed 
"attention to the bribe the offer and away from the conditions they 
exact"; they have neglected to "assume the burden of human overhead 
costs" by assuming that labor m s  a variable cost since it m s  seen as 
such by the individual firm. Clark, never the radical, did not advocate
Q*2
Cf. Mitchell, p. 279, above.
®^Clark, Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs, pp. 371-372. 
95
Ibid., p. 463.
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"revolting" against the machines, but he did insist that man should 
"aspire" to a "reasonable degree of racial equality" with them.®®
This racial equality would require a considerable change in our 
traditional views of the market and its function, however. But in 
Clark's opinion, the basic subject-matter is at hand in the realization 
•that economic welfare depends upon the state of the whole economy, upon 
the condition of the "sooial organism" which is "an active reality in 
its own right rather than the mere passive by-product of individual 
profit-seeking" within the domain of the market. "All in all," Clark 
insists, "the parts of our system are united, not by arithmetical addi­
tion nor by the mechanical composition of forces, but in that more 
thoroughgoing fashion characteristic of the parts of a true organism."®^ 
There is no question, for example, but that labor does constitute a fixed
social costj the important question is "as to the best distribution of
98the burden— the best form of social cost-accounting." This cannot 
be done simply by leaving it to the market and the customary form of 
business accounting. It must necessarily begin with a "revising of 
the market's reckoning of costs and values in the light of fuller social 
accountancy"; we must recognize and be ready to correct through collec­
tive action those problems which the market either causes or cannot it­
self correct— the problems of "uncompensated costs, of unpaid services,
99of unused capacities, and of conservation"; we must recognize that
96Clark, "The Socializing of Theoretical Economics," The Trend of 
Economics, pp. 99-100.
97Clark, Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs, pp. 403, 478.
98
Ibid., p. 384; cf. also ibid. pp. 15, 362, 376, 463, & 484.
99Clark, Sooial Control of Business, pp. 158-160; also ibid.. 
pp. 154-158.
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there are many social and. human needs which the market neglects, social 
and human needs which are, however, truly economic and which are within 
our collective ability to meet.
The institutional economists have examined the market— both the 
theory of a market organized economy and the actual results— and have 
found it deficient on both counts. In particular they find fault with 
the fact that there are many wants and needs, within our ability to 
meet, but that "left to itself, the market will neglect many of them 
disastrously* Through collective or social action, the market
must be made into a better social instrument to satisfy those social 
needs which the economic system is capable of achieving. But to date 
the economic system has not achieved even its potential because we 
have assinned that the market and the price system were the sine qua 
non of the economy. And it has therefore failed us. As Mitchell 
pointed out,
A vast number of American families ... are underfed, 
inadequately clothed, and poorly housed, even in a 
good business year like 1926.... The American popu­
lation has vast unsatisfied needs, judged by the 
criterion of physical efficiency— not to speak of 
desires. I’-’"'-
And yet this modern industrial economy is capable of meeting those 
pressing social needs. Referring to two separate studies of our pro­
ductive potential, Mitchell noted that "our economic organization fails
by a wide margin to secure the full use of our productive capacity
102even in years of business activity," and Mitchell is therefore un- 
"^^Clark, Alternative to Serfdom, pp. 21-22.
^^Mitchell, "Engineering, Economics and the Problem of Social 
Well-Being," Mechanical Engineering, February, 1931, p. 109.
^^^Mitchell, "The Social Sciences and National Planning," p. 94. 
The two studies referred to are the one mentioned earlier, Economic
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willing to accept the results of the price system as being an accurate
measure of the social significance of the goods which are produced—
or more importantly, of those which are not produced. Thus he finds
fault with the economic system, insisting that "it can hardly be argued
that the goods that pay the best are the goods the most needed" when
under the present institutional arrangement, "many cannot buy tilings
required to maintain their efficiency or to give proper training to
their children." This being the case, the economic system could hardly
be called efficient because Mitchell holds that the "ultimate test of
efficiency is that of satisfying the most important social needs in the
in*
most economic manner." And when the economic system is capable of 
providing the goods and services direly needed by millions of families 
but does not do so, then it is not satisfying those most important soc­
ial needs. It was on this ground that he appealed to engineers and 
social workers, as well as to economists, to find some way of "enabling 
the millions of families which need more goods to buy the surplus pro­
ducts which are the nightmare of the business men, plus the additional
104
goods which hover" in the day dreams of the engineers.
.Ayres also criticized the functioning of the market-controlled 
economy which operated at a capacity far below its potential even in 
prosperous years and which with "existing plant and manpower" could 
have produced enough to have provided a minimum income of $2500 per
(Cont.) Reconstruction, Report of the Columbia University Commission, 
pp. R7-1Q4-, nnd M'idwin O. Nourse and Associates, America's Capacity to 
Produce, pp. 415-425.
103Mitchell, "The Social Sciences and National Planning," p. 90, 
cf. also Mitchell, Business Cycles: The Problem and Its Setting, p. 172.
^^Mitchell, "Engineering, Economics and the Problem of Social 
'/Jell-Being," p. 109.
292
1 O K
family in 1929. Hamilton likewise argued that even allowing "in 
all things human concessions must be granted to inefficiency and 
waste/’ and that some "indulgence must be allowed to an imperfect 
foresight," it nevertheless seems inescapable "that the economic order 
yields far less of the wherewithal of living, leisure, and opportunity 
than even as a minimum we have the right to expect from it." The 
goal of industrial activity is "obviously an enlargement of the mater­
ial means to human welfare," but it lias not yet provided the minimum
107of which it is capable, and which we have toe right to expect. Tug-
well noted that this minimum which people do have toe right to expect
is not very much— they "do not ask much from this world in which they
find themselves— no more, at least, than ought to be guaranteed them
by our resources and achievements." Among the minimum which they do
have the right to expeot from our economic system are "security of
access to the goods of simple living, security of employment, security
in ill health and old age, security of maintenance end training for
their dependents...." Tugwell adds that "with an equipment adequate
to this purpose," toe reason why this "minimum security still remains
conspicuously lacking" is to be found in the "economic and political
108
organization" within which our industrial machine must operate. To
obtain these goals, however, requires a re-orientation in our thinking
109
in toe "substitution of social for individual interest." They cannot
105Ayres, The Industrial Economy, pp. 159, 270.
106Hamilton, Price and Price Policies, p. 2.
107
Ibid., p. 24.
108
Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline, pp. 198-199, emphasis added. 
109Ibid., p. 112.
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be achieved so long as many of the present institutions remain in 
operation.H0 We must recognize that "industry is a social instru­
ment" which if we are willing to experiment with it, if we are will­
ing to undertake the rather difficult task of directing this "social 
instrument" to the uses and needs of man, "holds definite promise for
the future." It can provide that minimum of security for all; it can
111indeed be the means of true freedom for all.
The Problem of Values
Orthodox economics has made exchange value the central feature of 
its theoretical analysis, rather than the conduoiveness of industry to 
increase the community's well-being. And quite rightly so, if it is 
assumed that the m y  to acnieve the highest level of well-being is by 
means of the market mechanism wherein a vast number of individuals each 
seeks his own self-interest— individuals who are by nature, lazy, self­
ish, and who make all their decisions after careful and cool delibera­
tion. But if these premises are dropped, then the only alternative is 
to attack the problem from a quite different angle. The institution­
alists have dropped these premises, as we have indicated in the above 
chapters, and it is on this basis that they have approached the problem 
from a different orientation. They have thus approached the whole ques­
tion of value from a different set of ideas than the orthodox economist 
has. They do not see the price system as registering value, for they 
are primarily interested in value to society, not in the relative value 
of bread versus oake to the individual. They are interested in value
110Cf. ibid., p. 178.
^^"Tugwell, "Experimental Eoonomios," The Trend of Economics, p.422.
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to society as a "social organism," as a "going concern." And the cen­
tral problem of this social-value economics, says Clark, "is the organ­
ization of the economic forces of society to get and to do the things 
112that are wanted." But Clark emphasizes that this theory of social 
value does not stop with the mere summing up of individual values; the 
more important question is the "value to society as a whole, independ­
ent of market v a l u a t i o n s . as Commons also argued, economic 
theory should provide both a foundation for social prosperity and at 
the same time a policy to achieve that social prosperity. He also 
emphasized,"the theory of value that fits such a theory of prosperity 
is a theory of a process and not an attribute"; value must therefore 
be conceived as a "verb instead of as a noun" since "a nation is a 
going concern, a process that has no beginning and no ending...."'*'^ 
Thus a "theory of value" which is "sufficient for the needs of modem 
action must be relevant to collective action" rather than to the "iso­
lated assumption of self-interest," to the endeavor of man to control
115
nature rather than to submit to it.
Values are relative to and derived from the total sooial organiza­
tion. Freedom, for instance, is not an unalienable right of man, it 
is a social achievement created and expanded by collective action. In
■'■'•2Clark, "Economic Theory in an Era of Social Adjustment," AER, 
Papers and Proceedings, March, 1919, p. 286.
113Clark, "Towards a Concept of Social Value," pp. 49, 54, 65, ad
passim.
•^Commons, "Wage Theories and Wage policies," AER, Papers and 
Proceedings, March, 1923, pp. 110-112.
115Commons, Economics of Collective Action, pp. 124, 150, 180,
195; and Institutional'Economics, p. 751.
295
the same instrumental sense, truth, as we noted in Chapter Five, is
not the result of a self-consistent deduction from given premises;
the truth or value of an idea can be known only by putting that idea
into practice. It is in this sense that Ayres holds that truth is a
synonym for continuity and that this is also the meaning of social
value— it means "continuity, literally; and that is its sole meaning."
And the continuity to which it refers in the social-economic sphere is
XX 6that of our industrial or technological continuity. "If economic 
value means anything at all,” says Ayres, that meaning from the social 
point of view can only be "the continuous realization of a more effeo-
117tive organization of the technological life-process" of the community.
"Ours must be a continually expanding economy," Ayres argues, because
"population is continually increasing, and technology is continually 
XX8progressing." This means making the best possible use of our in­
dustrial organization, our resources— both human and natural— , our 
know-how and understanding, in order to provide for the continued growth 
of the economic welfare of the total social group. This is the meaning 
of value to_ society, but the achievement of this is, as Ayres warns, 
a "difficult and complicated" process; it is "subject to continual 
error"; it achieves significance "only by virtue of continuing verifi­
cation and correction." But this is what we "must do and do contin­
ually better— technologically better— if we are to continue and exceed
1X9the achievements of the past." Our task, added Tugwell, is "to mold
.Ayres, Theory of Economic Progress, p. 221.
117Ibid., p. 228.
1X8
Ayres, The Industrial Economy, p. 199.
119Ayres, Theory of Economic Progress,pp. 228, 230.
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our social and economic environment so as to reap the largest possi­
ble rewards." To do this, however, "we cannot sit and wait. We must
120act and we cannot act without planning."
Thus it is the duty of 'the economist to show where the economic 
system is breaking down, to show where the institutional fabric of 
modern society is no longer adaptable to today's needs and today's 
abilities, to show where it is not performing as it could, where it 
can be improved. It is the function of the economist to show where 
certain institutions— such as the price system, the market mechanism, 
the resultant maldistribution of income and tendency toward over-saving, 
the neglected social needs,— are a positive hindrance to the welfare of 
the total social group. It is central thesis of the institutionalists 
that the economic system is but a part of a larger developmental, evo­
lutionary, process— the life process of the community. Since that pro­
cess is in fact going on, we are confronted with the alternatives of a 
planless or planned, a vegetative or intelligent, growth and develop­
ment. The institutionalist views himself as an active participant in 
this developmental procesa-a critic, a reformer, one who is trying to 
make use of his knowledge of the economic system to continue and to 
improve that process.
120Tugwell, Our Economic Life and Its Problems, p. 541.
CHAPTER IX
THE CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC PLANNING IN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
The Nature of Economic? Planning
It is the major thesis of this study that the unifying character­
istic of the institutional economists is their attempt to convert the 
science of economics into a tool for the improvement and reform of the 
modem industrial economy; and further, that this concern for economic 
planning is not fortuitous but is the logical result of their common 
views and assumptions on various aspects of economics and related soc­
ial sciences— the common views and assumptions which we have examined 
in the previous eight chapters. As these economists see it, economic 
planning is an inherent and necessary part of today's industrial eco­
nomy; it is also the logical counterpart of economic theorising. As 
we have shown in the pages above, they view the economic system as a 
social phenomenon, and they further view knowledge as a useful, func­
tional, tool. Economic theorizing is therefore useful only to the ex­
tent that it can be used— and if it is to be used, its primary purpose 
should be to make the economic system work better. This means, in 
their view, the active intervention through collective action to ensure 
the continued growth and development of the industrial economy.
In this respect, they are clearly the descendants of Thomas Robert 
Maithus rather than of David Ricardo, of whom the mainstream of economic 
theorizing is the progeny. Malthus, whom Commons often referred to as 
the founder of institutional economics, once argued that in the area 
of political economy,
There is scarcely any inquiry more curious, or, from
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its importance, more worthy of attention, than that 
which traces the causes which practically check the 
progress of wealth in different countries, and stop 
it, or make it proceed very slowly, while the power 
of production remains comparatively undiminished, or 
at least would furnish the means of great and abundant 
increase of produce and population.
Ricardo, friend and critic of Malthus, succinctly stated the differ­
ence between his view of the science of economics and that of Malthus:
Political Economy you think is an enquiry into the
nature and causes of wealth; I think it should rather
be called an enquiry into the laws which determine 
the division of the produce of industry amongst the 
classes who concur in its formation. Every day I am 
more satisfied that the former enquiry is vain and 
delusive, and the latter only the true object of the 
science.2
This surely states the development which orthodox economics has taken—
the search for the eternal and universal laws of distribution and of
value. The institutionalists, however, have followed Malthus, arguing 
that it is the function of economic theorizing to show how the economic 
system can grow and expand, how it can be made to function more effec­
tively for the community-at-large.
The institutionalists have, as Gruchy recognized, felt called upon 
to use their accumulated knowledge about the economic system as a tool
^Malthus, Thomas Robert, The Principles of Political Economy (2nd 
edition, London: William Pickering, 1(336 - -rep rihted by the International 
Economic Circle, Tokyo, in collaboration with the London School of Eco­
nomics and Political Science, London, 1936), p. 309.
2
Rioardo, David,Letters of David Ricardo to Thomas Robert Malthus 
1810-1825. ed. by James Bonar '["Oxford: 'i'be Clarendon Press, iBByJ, 
p. 175. It is interesting to note Keynes’ comment on Malthus: "If 
only Malthus, instead of Ricardo, had been the parent stem from which 
nineteenth-century economics proceeded, what a much wiser and richer 
place the world would be today! We have laboriously to rediscover and 
force through the obscuring envelopes of our misguided education what 
should never have ceased to be obvious." (Essays in Biography. London: 
Macmillan, 1933, p. 144.)
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for social and economic criticism, for economic planning and reform.'"’
They conceived economics to be a functional science and economists
should, therefore, translate their economic theory into some form of
action which vd.ll contribute to the solution of social-economic prob-
4
lems. As we noted earlier, in the view of the institutionalists, the 
basic issue is one of automatism versus human control and direction.
They reject the idea of an autonomous, self-equilibrating, market mech­
anism which will solve all economic problems. They argue that societies 
have always planned, have consciously intervened to promote the economic 
welfare of the social group. Thus, laissez faire was planned— it was 
not a natural nor an inevitable condition; it was, rather, a particular 
institutional arrangement which had to be implemented through collective 
action. The same was of course true of free competition. VJhereas the 
earlier economists looked upon laissez faire as the means by which free 
competition could be achieved, later economists came to recognize that 
a hands-off policy would not necessarily ensure such a state of affairs. 
And thus the means, the policy, was abandoned in favor of a different 
form of collective action designed to achieve a competitive economio 
order. Both of these, in the view of the institutional economists, 
were examples of eoonomic planning. They are not, however, sufficient 
for today's economy.
It is with today's industrial economy that the institutionalists
sGruchy, Allan G., "The Concept of National Planning in Institution­
al Economics," Southern Economic Journal, October, 1939, pp. I2lff.
^Cf. pp» 117-126, above.
g
Mitchell, W. C., "Intelligence and Economic Evolution," pp. 118- 
121, and "Social Sciences and National Planning," pp. 86-95, The Back­
ward Art of Spending Money and Other Essays (New York: Augustus M.
Kelley, Inc., 1950)7
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are concerned, and having a strong pragmatic bias, they have directed 
their attention to the ways in which this industrial economy might be 
improved. They are in this respect somewhat different from most of 
the orthodox economists, for they have insisted that it is their func­
tion to point out to the community what can be done, not merely wait 
until someone asks what to do. Thus .Ayres cited the problem of infla­
tion, pointing out that if economics must wait upon the will of the 
community,
then it is impossible to say that we "should" check 
inflation. The most the economist oan say is that 
if the community decides to check inflation, such-and- 
such are appropriate and effective measures for achiev­
ing that end.6
It is this position with which the institutionalists disagree; they in­
sist that it is the function of the economist to point out when infla­
tion, for example, is a serious social-economic problem, what the con­
sequences of it are, why it is undesirable, and that it should be 
stopped by certain specified measures. Thus also with the case of eco­
nomic planning. The argument that the economist should not concern him­
self with planning, if the business community and the public in general 
are opposed to any planning because they fear that such measures as a 
redistribution of income, or an increase in the national debt will 
lead to the degeneration of the economic system, simply says that the 
public has its misconceived prejudices and the economist can do noth­
ing but abide by them. The institutionalists maintain that quite to 
the contrary, it is his function to point out the error in their think­
ing, to point out better ways of carrying on economic activity. The
^Ayres, C. E., The Industrial Economy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1952), p. 295.
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economist should ho a critical appraiser of the present industrial
and institutional scheme and recommend changes where, in his view,
they are needed. As Tugwell noted in the 1920's:
The economists of the new generation are making 
tentative proposals which they believe to he hope­
ful, but which they desire above all to see tested 
and verified or disproved. If the suggestions prove
to he good they ought to be put into practice; and
not only put into practice but also become a part of 
our codes of conduct.7
Among these "economists of the new generation," was Commons, who 
devoted a major part of his work to analyzing and probing into indus­
trial strife, labor relations, workman's compensation, etc. And Mit­
chell emphasized the crucial importance of statistical research and 
attempted to shed some light on the riddle of the business cycle, while 
Hamilton turned to sick industries and the efficacy of the patent 
system, Tugwell himself to "the problems of planning in the overall 
sense, and to agricultural problems in particular, Clark to the problems 
of unpaid costs, of social costs of production, the business oycle, the 
inadequacy of the market meohanism, and Ayres to the problem of depres­
sion and war and to the factors connecting the two. They are committed 
to the thesis that the growth and development, the progress, of the 
economy, and the material well-being of the community-at-large, are 
their primary concern and that these can be realized only by a "con­
stant re-examination of ideals and constant redirection of social
Q
forces toward their attainment." Thus Clark, concerned with the problem 
of unused capacity during prosperity and the inordinate vuaste of man­
power, resources and machinery during depression recognized that "modem
^Tugwell, "Experimental Economics," The Trend of Eoonomios. pp. 
419-420.
8
Ibid., p. 421.
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society can no longer acquiesce in this misuse of the powers which 
nature and science have bestowed upon i t . S u c h  conditions, Clark 
argued elsewhere, are the "result of the unplanned character of our 
economic system" and to cure this social malady, 7/e must "introduce 
comprehensive planning into the scheme of controlled private enter­
prise.1'10 It will not suffice to put faith in the unregulated and 
uncontrolled market to achieve either a stable and prosperous eoon- 
omy, or to provide the impetus necessary for continued growth and 
development.
Society long ago abandoned such faith and it is the function of 
the economist, therefore, to concern himself with the problems of 
social control, of social direction, planning and reform, of collec­
tive action directed toward the guidance of the economic system. Thus 
Clark insisted that we are "living in the midst of a revolution"; a 
revolution which began with the industrial revolution of the mid­
eighteenth century and which has culminated in the efforts of society 
to control today's industrial economy. "This many-sided movement 
toward control cannot be disregarded," says Clark.
Even those who are honestly opposed to it realize 
that they cannot simply forbid this tide to rise.
It may be guided and directed, its movements made 
more informed and enlightened, but it cannot be 
stopped, and no one group oan dictate its course.
It is the inevitable result of many causes, canter­
ing, however, in three things. One is organized large- 
scale production, another is the growth of democracy, 
and the third is the growth of science and the changing 
attitude of the human mind itself toward the world at 
large and toward human organization in particular, 
especially the scientific attitude toward sooial
q
Clark, "Long-Range Planning for the Regularization of Industry," 
Preface to Social Economics, p. 230.
10Clark, Social Control of Business, p. 455.
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institutions which has been developing slowly 
throughout this past hundred and fifty years.
This attitude regards institutions as means 
to ends. ... their course is subjeot to some 
degree of direction, and man is continually call­
ing on them to justify themselves by their results, 
and trying to improve them where they do not meet 
this test.11
And Mitchell in the same vein recognized that
The course of wisdom is not to oppose national plan­
ning, but to make that planning more intelligent.
The more clearly any man grasps the enormous diffi­
culties of the task, the more sharply he realizes 
the harm done by poor planning, the keener he should
be to promote intelligent planning: for national
planning of some sort, or rather of sorts, we are
certain to have.12
The institutional economists, recognizing the necessity of such
intervention, have set about to show how it oan be done better, to
show the interrelatedness of the social and economic facets of our
highly complex life, to show that the choice is not one of unregulated
prive.te enterprise versus complete governmental ownership or control,
but a varying and changing mixture in between which is dependent upon
changing times and circumstances. Theirs has been, as Clark noted, a
recognition that
measures of control are neither attempts to discover 
and establish the ultimate right system, the goal to 
which all human progress hitherto has been tending, 
nor are they attempts to cure permanently the evils 
of industrialism or establish a fixed and stable bal­
ance of power between opposing principles. They are 
merely the next step in this unpredictable evolution.
^Ibid., pp. 4-5.
■^Mitchell, "The Social Sciences and National Planning," p. IOOj 
of. also Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts, 
pp. 499ff, for an elaboration of these points concerning the possibil- 
ity and the necessity for the social control of the modern economy.
13Clark, Social Control of Business, p. 33.
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The issue is between the functioning of an economy which is basically, 
if not exclusively, guided by automatic forces versus one which is 
guided by human direction; it is the alternative of a planless or 
planned, of a vegetative or intelligent, growth and development. The 
institutionalists have attempted to formulate an approach which will 
give more insight and understanding for the intelligent guidance of 
this process of economic growth and development than that which, in 
their view, has been provided by orthodox economics.
What Kind of Planning
The question as the institutionalist sees it is not if we shall 
plan, but how we shall plan— for planning, the organised use of intel­
ligence in the control of human affairs, is an inherent part of the 
whole continuum that sustains modem man. Thus it was that Tugwell 
approvingly quoted L. L. Lorwin who said that "the planning of the twen­
tieth century rests its case on a philosophical faith in the power of 
man to promote orderly economic change." The meaning of planning says 
Tugwell is
aligned to co-ordination ... and not to the guid­
ance of a hidden hand. ...
The difference between guessing and planning is 
the difference between laissez-faire and social 
control.
Planning to the institutionalist is not the attempt to find the solu­
tion to all of our industrial and economic ills in one fell swoop; 
it is, rather, the organized use of our collective intelligence in the 
endless series of solving problems of the modem economic system. Tug-
■^Tugwell, "Planning and Laissez-faire," AER, March, 1932, 
pp. 89, 85.
305
well’s basic thesis is that "gradual and experimental change may
15
come to dominate social drift." And that
...the solution of the problems of our economic 
life can be found only through maintaining an ex­
perimental attitude toward those problems.
And it is Commons' view that "human skill and judgment must take the
17place of automatism." Ayres argues that institutional change is
18
susceptible to intelligent control.; that we have begun to replace 
both "social drift" and "automatism" with organized human intelligence. 
The orthodox economist has of course recognized the necessity of some 
"interference" with the market mechanism; but it has always been just 
that— interference. The fundamental supposition being that the market 
mechanism is the most basio facet of the economy. And it is this dif­
ference which Ayres argues is the really important issue; 'the issue is 
not between planning and not planning, but in the meaning and the 
validity of the classical conception of a natural order, or an auto­
matic market mechanism, versus the organized use of human intelligence 
in the control and direction of the economic system— the organized 
human intelligence which regards the market as but one of several 
devices to be relied upon and to be used. As Ayres put it:
The issue is not between planning and dispensing 
with planning; it is between planning that is domin­
ated by the conception of an economic state of nature 
and planning that is not so dominated. ... Ho society 
ever has been or ever can be "planned." Sooieties 
grow and change and will always do so. But in that
15Tugwell, "The Superpolitical," Journal of Social Philosophy. 
January, 1940, p. 97.
Tugwell, -She Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts,
p. 542.
17
Commons, The Economics of Collective Action, p. 247.
18Ayres, "The Role of Technology in Economic Theory," AER, May,
1S53, pp. 285ff.
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process of growth and change creative intelligence 
has always played a part and vd.ll do so increas­
ingly as knowledge and understanding grow. Eco­
nomic planningis nothing more, and nothing less,
than the working of this universal law.
Economic planning, the institutionalists insist, is not an alter­
native to capitalism, it is not a question of free private enterprise
OQ
versus a Soviet-type controlled economy. Totalitarian societies
are, in the popular view, the chief exponents of economic control and
planning, but this is an unwarranted and limited view of the problem
vdth respect to our economy. As the institutional economists see it,
the question is one of institutional adjustment and adaptation to make
our present system work better, to work better for that which it is
traditionally supposed to achieve: expanding production and the in-
21creased well-being of the community-at-large. And the function of
the economist, according to the institutionalist, is to contribute to
that creative intelligence necessary for such institutional adjustment 
and adaptation. His function is not to lay out a detailed plan, a
"blueprint” of how society is to function, what it is to produce or in
what quantities. It is, rather, to use this creative intelligence; it
is to use and to add to that body of knowledge and understanding in
order to make -the most efficient use of our collective resources, to 
resolve the difficulties which arise in actual social living. As Tug­
well once emphasized, "adherence to any plan is not nearly so important
22
at present as the attitude implied in searching for alternatives."
19Ayres, The Industrial Economy, pp. 189-190.
20We shall return to a more thorough examination of this question 
in the next chapter.
21Cf., for example, Mitohell, "Intelligence and the Guidance of 
Eoonomic Evolution," p. 127, and pp. 131-132.
22Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts.p.227.
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The more pertinent course, the more pressing problem, as Clark saw 
it, is to
see what can be done to introduce collective plan­
ning into our existing system. This must be done 
experimentally, with the expectation that measures 
will change and develop with experience. It does not 
appear to us important either to safeguard private 
enterprise for its own sake, or to seek a collective 
economy for its own sake. What is important is to 
organize for the purpose of making the best possible 
use of our resources, and to take whatever measures 
such organization r e q u i r e s .
Emphasizing the same point, Mitchell argued that the important con­
cern is "not at finding a ’solution,’ but at finding methods by which 
communities can carry on intelligently the process of working out the 
endless series of detailed solutions with which they must keep exper­
imenting."24
Seen in this light, the economic system is a continually evolving 
congeries of social forces; economic planning, then, is simply the 
adaptation and adjustment of those social forces as the system moves 
forward; it is the implementation of those steps necessary to ensure 
that the system does move forward. The central problem is to make the 
best use of our collective knowledge so as to organize the productive 
facilities of our economy. It is, as Mitchell pointed out, not an 
attempt to find -the solution to all of our problems in one nice pack­
age, but to carry on the various solutions with which the modem society 
must keep experimenting. "We are bound to be trying experiments in 
the coming generation," Clark insisted, and
Those experiments may be planned or may be impro­
vised; they may be designed in the integral inter-
? 3" Clark, rtLong-Range Planning for the Regularization of Industry,11 
p» 230*
24Mitchell, "Intelligence and Economic Evolution," p. 127.
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eat of the whole or worked out by the pulling and 
hauling of special-interest groups. And planning is 
better than pressure-group politics.25
Experimenting we will do. The important question is how that ex­
perimenting will be carried out. Will it be carried out with the eco­
nomists contributing by showing what needs to be done, how it can be 
achieved, or will it be a continuation of the hit-or-miss, hodge-podge, 
piecemeal planning which has characterized our attempts in the past?^ 
Economic planning, Ayres noted, simply consists "in finding technical
devices adequate to the solution of the technical problems of the
27age." It is by definition "the process of adjustment to continuing 
change." And it thus contrasts with both stand-pat conservatism and 
revolutionary radicalism, both of which give expression to ideological 
dogmas. And whereas "dogmas have a way of becoming obsolete, ... plan- 
ning goes on forever.” Which simply means that the problems of to­
day's economy are going to have to be solved in light of today's know­
ledge, in light of today's needs and abilities of our economy to meet 
those needs. The institutionalists find neither the blueprints of Adam 
Smith nor those of Karl Marx very useful for today's problem-solving.
The physicist of today does not rely upon the theories of the nineteenth 
century physicist to convert the atom into electrical energy, and 
neither will the economist find the solutions to the social-economic 
problems raised by that conversion in the writings of nineteenth century 
economists. Planning, Ayres argued, is "a function of knowing, in eco-
25
Clark, Social Control of Business, p. 471.
26
Cf. pp. I20ff, above.
27Ayres, The Industrial Economy, p. 195.
28Ayres, The Industrial Economy, p. 202.
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nomics no less than in all other affairs."29 It is simply a projec­
tion of the situation in Yihich the problem occurs. Thus, our current 
efforts to stabilize and strengthen our economic system are based on 
our present knowledge of physical production, changing volumes of 
employment, the flow of money income through the economy, the current 
volume of saving as compared to the current volume of investment. In­
evitably, any proposals advanced are a function of that knowledge and 
of the social needs of the community. They are not once-and-for-all 
blueprints for social action, but tentative proposals advanced in an 
attempt to solve today's problems. Building a Maginot line against the 
depression of the 1930's vdll not in itself ensure the continued growth
and development of today's industrial economy. In an era of rapid
30
change, we must continually adjust and adapt to that change— and that 
process of adjustment and adaptation, if it is not to be merely haphaz­
ard, is what the institutionalists mean by planning, and that is what 
the economist must participate in. Change and adaptation are the veiy 
essence of the life-process of society, but that change and adaptation 
must be based upon adequate knowledge, upon adequate understanding, up-
29
Ibid., p. 186.
30Few would deny that we are in the midst of a rapid technological 
change— which the institutional economists view as the dynamic agent of 
social change. The rapidity of that change might well be illustrated 
by President Truman's remarks when he participated in the keel-laying 
ceremony for the first atom-powered submarine. He noted that it was 
1000 years from the first inoeption of the steam engine to its practi­
cal use, 100 years from the discovery of electricity to its practical 
use and only 10 years for atomic energy— a much shorter time in which 
sooiety has to adjust to this latest important technological development. 
And it is the firm conviction of the institutionalists that we must ad­
just and adapt our institutional environment to just such sweeping 
changes. Theirs, however, is not quite the adjustment of the U. S. Cham­
ber of Commerce when it reassured its members that since "this energy 
cannot at once be used for purposes other than destruction, immediate 
jeopardy to our economy is not in sight." (Quoted in Girvetz, op. cit..
p.  1 8 0 . )
310
on premises which look to knowledge as a useful tool for social action 
31
and control.
It is thus that the institutionalists have long advocated more 
thorough research, better statistics, better empirical data concerning 
physical production, flows of money, price levels, volume of employment, 
etc. If we are going to plan, then we need to know a great deal more 
about the economic system, its problems, shortcomings, areas of poten­
tial expansion, unused capacities. Mitchell, for example, insisted that 
in his view, "the real importance of economics derives from the contri­
butions it may make to welfare." If, however, it is to contribute to 
welfare, economics will necessarily be involved in action, rather than 
mere contemplation— and the real trouble is that the economist may 
"urge action" before he has "acquired sufficient knowledge" of the 
problems involved. It was because of the importance of welfare and the 
importance thereto of a knowledge of the problems involved, that Mit­
chell insisted that "careful deliberation and thorough realistic re­
search are certainly called for before we assume the responsibility of
•Z p
giving advice in the name of science." The institutionalists have
33
long emphasized the importance of statistics and research, they were
31Of. Chapter Five, above.
1 2 0
Mitchell, "Political Science, Political Economy and Values— Dis­
cussion," AER, Papers and Proceedings, March, 1944, p. 50.
33Mitchell is of course best known for his pioneer work in statis­
tical studies for the National Bureau of Economic Research, as was Com­
mons for his exhaustive investigations of labor and industry for vari­
ous industrial commissions; a brief perusal of the 31 page bibliography 
appended to The Economics of Collective Action will give some indicaton 
of this interest. The other institutionalists also contributed to this 
development, particularly by pointing to the need for better and more 
thorough investigations. Cf, for example, Tugwell, The Industrial Dis­
cipline and the Governmental Arts, pp. 211ff, and Clark, "Long-Sange 
Planning t o r the jRegularization of Industry," pp. 254ffj and Clark, 
Social Control of Business, pp. 466-471.
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long ago advocating extensive studies of the American economy, not
merely descriptive ones, but analytical investigations seeking to
identify causes and effects, seeking to ascertain what was the actual
condition of the economy and areas for improvement. The important
point is that such investigations are necessarily predicated on the
supposition that a better knowledge of -the actual conditions of the
economy will lead to better measures for the guidance of the economy--
a supposition that could hardly be entertained so long as the economy
was to be left to itself, left to function as the result of a multitude
of individuals each seeking his own self-interest. The institutionalist
thus argues that "the snore we know o f what is actually going on, the
better prepared we are to deal with our problems realistically and the
34more likely we are to try to do so." Commons, in particular, pointed 
to the necessity of investigation and research to discover which, among 
the thousands of cooperating factors, is the "limiting" or "strategic" 
factor that is obstructing the smooth and efficient operation of the 
economy. Economics, Commons argued, must inquire into "what extent that 
limiting factor can be, and requires to be, controlled in order to
17 C
facilitate the mechanism and accomplish its purpose." And Clark 
recognized that this method of controlling industrial activity, "via 
the strategic factors which govern its course, in itself is nothing
fZ £
new." We have long practiced this with respect to the monetary system, 
in banking and credit policies, public expenditures, antitrust policies, 
etc.
Ayres, "The Co-ordinates of Institutionalism," AER, Papers and 
Proceedings, Isay, 1951, p. 55.
35Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism, p. 377; see also Eco­
nomics of Collective Action, p. 180.
36
Clark, Social Control of Business, p. 468.
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Some of these policies, however, have been misconceived, in the 
opinion of the institutionalists. They have been misconceived because 
they have failed to recognize -what it is that is being limited. Trad­
itional economic policy, founded in orthodox economics, looked to com­
petition as the end of most economic policy. Large concentrations of 
industry therefore were viewed as an impediment to the realization of 
a competitive economy. They were, then, the limiting factor and thus 
the factor to be removed by various antitrust policies— policies which 
were designed in large part to break up any large industrial aggrega­
tion. It is this sort of policy which the institutionalists have crit-
37
icized. This reaction— "the attempt to smash all combinations and 
to return to what was then believed to be the most desirable basis" 
for economic organization and control, that of "free competition in 
industry" was, in the view of Tugwell, not the correct answer. The 
trend toward industrial concentration, Tugwell argued, was the result 
of porrorful industrial and technological impulses and he therefore in­
sisted that it m s  "a rather foolish public policy to go on with
attempts to smash business because it is big, instead of trying to
38take advantage of its bigness for the general welfare." So far, 
according to Tugwell, "our social policy has failed to recognize this 
movement and to formulate a means of turning it to the account of soc­
ial progress." We have not yet recognized the potentialities of it, 
we have as yet found no way of utilizing the gains to be made from it.
37For a more thorough treatment of the role and function of com­
petition as viewed by the institutional economists, see pp. 28-35,
above.
170
Tugwell, American Economic Life, p. 317.
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We "can only fear and strike blindly at what is feared. We still think
in terms of the badness of bigness, and in doing so we neglect to sec-
3 9ure the benefits of bigness." And Mitchell, emphasizing the same
point also noted that
We are afraid of that very process of integration 
among industries which is necessary to make them 
mechanically efficient, and rejoice when our govern­
ment dissolves the Standard Oil Company and forces 
the packers to give up their side lines, though by 
so doing it increases systematic waste. Economists 
must attack this whole problem of combining protec­
tion to the consumer with organization of production 
on a scale larger than is yet attempted.
Tugwell therefore argued that the reality of industrial and technologi­
cal development has been an "immense growth in the scale of operations," 
but in face of this, thd--dominant design of our public policy has been 
■the "attempted enforcement of .the universal petty conflict which was 
once characteristic of small-scale, one-man business," and it is thus 
that "the separation of theory and reality becomes a p p a r e n t . W e  
have failed to adjust and adapt to this new industrial condition be­
cause we were still thinking in terms of a dogma— that of the invisible 
hand of competition. Instead of investigation, in an attempt to ascer­
tain wherein social gains were to be realized from an expanded scale 
of operations, we simply tried to apply the answers learned (only too 
well) in a former era.
There are other possible answers, however. Ayres, for example, 
argues that the correct answer is "not one of breaking up those 
organizations but of extending their basic principles to the entire
^®Tugwell,The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts, 
p. 132.
^Mitchell, "The Prospects of Economics," pp. 379-380.
41Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts.
p. 217.
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42economy." By this, he means the extension of the same principles 
of efficient organization which have made possible -the size and effi­
ciency of the individual units to the relations be fare en these individual 
units. Thus, for example, with the practices of bookkeeping and inven­
tory:
It is such things as the cash register and the fil­
ing system that make large business organizations 
possible. What we need, obviously, is a system of 
cash registers for managing directors of the same 
sort as they impose on their subordinates. But this 
raises a larger question of the "inalienable right" 
to privacy. In spite of the fact that business men 
deny any such pretensions on the part of their sub­
ordinates, not to mention "public servants," they are 
ferociously indignant at any suggestion that their 
own much-touted consecration to the service of the 
public carries any obligation to submit their acts 
to public scrutiny.
But obviously they have no case. It is ridicu­
lous to suppose that opening the accounts of great 
corporations to public inspection is a violation^of 
the personal privacy for which free men fought.43
The important point, according to Ayres, is that
If full knowledge of everything that goes on in the 
economy is an indispensable condition to the effi­
cient organization of that company, it is no less 
true that full knowledge of everything that goes on 
in the economy is an indispensable^condition to effi­
cient organization of the economy.
Ayres is simply arguing that we can make a start toward attaining the
benefits of industrial integration, which Mitchell and Tugwell called
for, by insisting that the activities of the business concerns be made
public. As a step in this direction he advooated a system of grade-
labeling to ensure the honest representation of products. Another
42Ayres, The Industrial Economy, p. 396.
43Ayres, Theory of Economic Progress, pp. 254-255.
^Ayres, The Industrial Economy, p. 397.
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important measure would be the standardization of financial accounting 
and the opening of business accounts to public scrutiny. It has often 
been said, Ayres noted, that large corporations are obliged to keep 
three sets of books— one for their own information, one for local tax 
authorities, and one for purposes of income taxation. But, as Ayres 
sees it, it is this sort of secrecy that ails the modern industrial 
economy, and he argues that the whole problem would be vastly simplified 
if "all business men could be obliged to tell the simple truth about 
their investments and their equities and their intercompany charges 
for 'services'...
This would of course be a difficult and complicated undertaking, 
but, in his view, "it is certainly not impossible. On the contrary, 
many steps have already been taken in that direction, steps which any 
student of economics could enumerate." Thus he cites food and drug 
regulation, and the standardization of accounting practices in the rail­
way industry. The difficulty which has prevented us from going further 
in this direction has been our preoccupation with an outmoded dogma 
which
... has confined the whole discussion to the alterna­
tives of monopoly versus competition and bigness ver­
sus littleness. Since financial bigness is in large 
measure (though by no means altogether) a consequence 
of the steadily increasing technological scale of pro­
duction (including transporation and communication) 
we have been forced to make terms with it; but even so 
the terms we have made for the regulation of great fin­
ancial power have attempted only to simulate competi­
tive conditions.^
The problem of big business and of big industry will not be solved so
long as we confine the alternatives to monopoly versus competition or
bigness versus littleness. V/e must, the institutionalists argue, be-
a a
Ayres, Theory of Economic Progress, pp. 256-257.
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gin with a recognition that present-day large-scale industrial enter­
prises are a function of the industrial revolution which began some 
150 years ago. Their central concern, therefore, is to find some 
technique by which society can realize the fruits of this technologi­
cal development.
Admittedly, the adoption of a system of grade-labelling, the 
standardization of accounting, and the opening of business accounts, 
will not solve the problem. But they argue that such action is a step 
in the right direction, while traditional antitrust policies which have 
attempted to enforce competition, are not. As Ayres pointed Out, "per­
fection is beyond the power of social theory. The alterations which
any single generation can make in the existing social structure must be 
46very slight." But one important alteration is the extension of the 
business principles which have proved successful for the individual 
firm to the economic system as a whole and the operations of those busi­
ness units in the light of public scrutiny. Both of these, Ayres argues, 
are important and crucial steps. There m s  a time, for example, when 
kings resented the idea that the financial transactions of their pri­
vate exchequer be made public, but we have come to realize that "the 
efficient conduct of an organization as large as the modern nation
requires that full knowledge of revenues and expenditures be generally 
47accessible." And the same, Ayres insists, is true of the economic 
system and the individual business units within it. The problem is not 
one of "imposing conditions upon business that are foreign to it," 
quite the contrary, it is simply one of extending those same business
46Ayres, Theory of Economic Progress, p. 258.
47Ayres, The Industrial Economy, p. 397.
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principles as evolved by business to the relations between individual 
units.
Ayres argues that the whole problem of monopoly cannot be solved 
by merely breaking up the large business organizations since it is 
virtually impossible to turn the clock back to the small-scale atom­
istic kind of competition that prevailed at some time in the past.
The conditions that prevailed then were not because the small scale 
businesses were "natural,” but because the "machine technology of that 
day was rudimentary. With the growth in scale of industrial apparatus 
(inoluding the apparatus of organization), like growth in the scale of 
business units was inevitable." The real danger in this growth is not 
the deviation from the theoretical model of pure competition, the real 
danger is the degree of power that accompanies these industrial giants. 
And the public interest can be served "only by the continued evolution 
of democratic institutions" and not the attempted retreat to some pre­
vious scheme of affairs. "The only alternative to a universal totali­
tarian conquest of power is the extension of the principles of efficient 
organization, as they prevail within business units and make the effi­
cient oonduct of large organizations possible, to the entire economy, 
most particularly to the area between businesses."
This is essentially the same solution which Tugwell pointed to 
when he emphasized the tremendous size and scope of today's businesses, 
their wide-spread sooial ramifloations and their mutual interdependence. 
It is these characteristics, Tugwell argued, which "makes sooial con­
trol possible. It also makes control necessary, because business is so 
huge and interdependent that every action it takes is fraught with
^Ayres, The Industrial Economy, pp. 398-399.
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deep sooial implications.1* Thus the institutional adaptation and 
adjustment necessary to meet with and to cope with the problems posed 
by large-scale industry is of course dictated by the existence of 
large-scale industry. The growth of industry from the one-man, small- 
scale plant, to today's industrial giants, itself dictates the insti­
tutional arrangements under which they are to be operated. The prin­
ciples of business organization which have aided that movement must be 
adapted to the industrial system at large.
As Mitchell also pointed out,
Business planning can secure effeotive coordination 
of effort only within the limits of each independent 
business enterprise, that is, each group of business 
activities subject to single financial control. It 
cannot effectively coordinate the activities of inde­
pendent enterprises.50
Coordination within the single firm, Mitchell noted, is "the result 
of careful planning by experts, coordination among independent enter­
prises cannot be said to be planned at all"; whatever coordination 
does exist results simply from the struggle between businesses. And 
whereas "coordination within an enterprise is characterized by economy 
of effort, coordination among independent enterprises" is characterized 
"by waste." And, Mitchell argues, it is the uncertainty that exists 
in the hiatus between business units that has in large part led toward 
the business combinations whioh are the "businessman's remedy for un­
certainty— his effort to extend the number of factors that he can con­
trol." Tfhile these combinations do reduce the area of uncertainty for 
the firms so enclosed, they increase "the hazards for other enter­
49
Tugwell, Our Eoonomio Society and its Problems, p. 499.
^Mitchell, "The Sooial Sciences and National Planning," pp. 89-
90.
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prises." What is needed, then, is not the haphazard combination 
by individual businesses, nor the attempt to break up all industrial 
concentrations and return to some simple and obvious system, but a 
concerted social effort to meet these problems in light of what has 
caused the problem and what can be done to secure the social advan­
tages of large-scale industry.
This integration of various business units and their mutual 
dependence, is, in Clark’s view, a meaningful and important condition 
of today's industrial society— "it represents the underlying facts 
about the actual industrial organism, which is an integrated whole, 
whether its formal organization is cast in that mold or not." This 
being the case, Clark argues that "the integration of particular in­
dustries" would be a step in the right direction— in the direction of 
coordinated industrial system and of the "oorreot social accounting" 
which is necessary if we are to see beyond the profits or losses of
the individual firm to the potentialities of the entire industrial
52system. The potentialities which, however, oannot be realized so 
long as we approach the problem in light of eighteenth century con­
cepts of free competition, so long as our only solution to the problem 
of giant industry is to atomize them. Any useful social policy must 
first recognize the dependence of our modern society upon the effi­
ciencies of large-scale enterprise and then find the necessary insti­
tutional adaptation and adjustment for that kind of an industrial 
scheme. Institutional adjustment and adaptation are the essence of
51Ibid., pp. 90-91, cf. also Mitchell, Business Cycles, the 
Problem and its Setting, pp. 172-173, and Mitchell, wmking Goods 
and Making ifoney," p. 147, for a similar view.
52Clark, Eoonomics of Overhead Costs, p. 403.
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economic planning, and it is the function of the economist to partici­
pate in finding the correct adjustment and adaptation. "Planning,” 
as Clark recognized, "is no easy panacea; that much is clearly evi­
dent. It can easily make serious mistakes. But it contains possi­
bilities of real contributions to our present state of industrial
development." Ac economic system such as ours "cannot afford not to
53explore and develop these possibilities to the utmost.”
These economists in no sense argue that they have found the final 
answers to the problem of present-day large-scale industry, but they 
are convinced that efforts thus far attempted, and particularly those 
of antitrust, are not the correct answers. They insist that the well­
being of today’s society is dependent upon the results of industrial 
development and evolution which have culminated in the extermination 
of small-scale enterprises and the emergence of huge, interdependent 
ones. To make effective use of this industrial apparatus, different 
institutional arrangements must be evolved. The institutionalists 
have not worked out detailed solutions, but they have pointed to the 
necessity for experimentation. They have made tentative proposals, 
tentative suggestions, which can be tested only by being put into 
operation to be verified or disproved. They have attempted to evolve 
a different set of answers, but have recognized that the answer itself 
can begin only as a tentative suggestion— to be adjusted, imp rayed up­
on, or abandoned, as it is put into practice. It was from this point 
of view that Tugwell argued that the only "fruitful point of departure” 
for any economic thinking is that of eoonomic policy or economic plan­
ning. And though the scientific method in suoh fields as economics
53Clark, Social Control of Industxy, p. 171.
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is replete with "grave difficulties," they cannot be resolved by 
ooifihing economics to thinking end theorizing in a vaouum; such think­
ing and theorizing must lead to social practices. Though this is not 
easy, though it is full of pitfalls, they simply must be admitted and 
recognized. This, according to Tugwell, "means really only that the
tasks of a social science are more formidable than any of which we
54have yet had experience." More difficult, because we have not yet
adopted this instrumentalist orientation which looks upon thinking
and theorizing as but one step in the adjustment of sooial difficul­
ties. Tugwell once defined theory as the "sustained thought about 
some difficulty of practice." It arises due to the "inadequacies of 
the customary way of managing affairs." Theory, according to Tugwell, 
is simply the formulation and evolution in the thought processes "about 
ways in which our institutions can be made to work better." It is the
attempt of "trained intelligences" to come to "grips with problems
55that are the crucial ones of modem life."
This is the importance and the issue of planning, as the institu­
tional economists see the problem. It is the use of the "trained in­
telligence" of the economist to come to grips with modern social-eco­
nomic problems; it is the attempt to find ways in which our institu­
tions can be made to work more effectively. This is why Ayres insisted 
that it is an "egregious misconception" to put this kind of activity 
in the past tense— to refer to a "planned economy." It is a miscon­
ception beoause societies do grow and change and in that evolutionary
5 4
Tugwell, ^Human Nature and Social Economy, Journal of Philo- 
sophy, August 14, 1930, p. 486.
®®Tugwell, "Economio Theory and Praotioe," AER, Papers and Pro­
ceedings, March, 1923, pp. 107-109.
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process, ’’creative intelligence" has in the past played an important
role and will play an increasingly important role as our knowledge
56and understanding grow. And the exercise of that creative intelli­
gence is what the institutionalists mean by economic planning; it is 
the opposite of merely letting nature take its course; it is the 
opposite of relying on some series of natural laws or the guidance of 
the invisible hand, as Clark once argued, it is not among the various 
alternatives "to maintain the existing system literally unchanged...
systems change of themselves, if they are not changed by outside 
57forces." And the institutionalists are arguing for the use of our 
social or collective intelligence to assist in the evolution of our 
sooiety, in the step-by-step process of growth and development.
While they do not have final answers (indeed insisting that final 
answers are not possible), they argue that various institutional ad­
justments must be tried. They argue that there are many promising 
changes which should be introduced, that the possibilities of these
C O
changes "should not be abandoned without trial." And although "com­
plete revolutions" are indeed precarious, "first steps must be tried" 
if we are to adjust and adapt to the needs of our modern industrial 
society.59 The essential point, according to Clark, is to introduce 
tentative measure^ from an experimental point of view, always "with the 
expectation that ^ Ehese^ measures will ohange and develop with exper­
ience."60 And it is the function of the economist to indicate these
57Clark, Social Control of Business, p. 516.
CO
Clark, Social Control of Business, p. 517.
59
Ibid., p. 518.
60Clark, "Long-Range Planning for the Regularization of Industry,"
p« 230■
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necessary institutional changes, to suggest the measures which are
needed. As Commons argued:
What the economist does, if possible, is to uncover 
that limiting factor and to point out, if possible, 
the extent, degree and point of time at which it should 
be modified or counteracted, in order to control all 
the other factors for the further purpose deemed im­
portant.
As soon as the economist endeavors to find out 
the limiting factors in any particular juncture, he is 
both scientist and business man or politician. And it 
is difficult to decide at what point he passes from 
’’science" to "art." He is scientist, perhaps, in that 
he weighs without bias or purpose the relation of cause 
and effect. He is business man or politician in that 
•when, as scientist, he has discovered the limiting fac­
tor, he must decide, as business man or politician, up­
on the point of time, the degree of emphasis and the 
extent of operation by which he must control it by re­
codifying the working rules of the concern in order to 
modify all the other faotors in the direction ultimately 
desired.
And as Commons further pointed out, "the limiting factors are not 
merely nature’s resources, they are the rights of property in those 
resources, as determined by the accepted working rules of society."62 
It is, then, the function of the economist to uncover the "limiting 
factor," to point out "the extent, degree and point of time" at which 
this limiting factor should be modified or changed, where, in our 
modem society, the working rules or institutional arrangements are 
in need of adjustment. But one important question still remains un­
answered— the one raised in the quotation of Commons above: "for the 
purpose deemed important," or in "the direction ultimately desired."
It may be admitted that the institutionalists’ definition of planning, 
their view of the role of the eoonomist, the necessity for institutional
61Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism, p. 378.
62Ibid., p. 386.
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adjustment, is all well and good* This, however, leaves unresolved, 
for what purpose shall these adjustments be made, what is the direc­
tion toward which these changes should be introduced.
The Objectives of Economic Planning
As lias been clear in the discussion in the preceding pages, these 
economists do not have a detailed blueprint of Utopia. Their central 
concern is that the industrial society has reached a point in its evo­
lutionary development where certain things must be done if that evolu­
tionary development is to be continued. And the oentral objective 
toward which collective action should be directed is rather simply 
stated; it has, in Clark's view, one dominant purpose: "to eliminate
undesirable fluctuations of industrial activity and to make reasonably
full use of our powers of production to support an adequate standard
63of living, on a sound and enduring basis." The oentral objective
in Tugwell's view is similarly to provide "as great quantities of in-
64
struments of good living at as low a human cost as may be." As we 
noted in the last chapter, these economists have argued rather insis­
tently that the market mechanism, as it has performed in the past, has 
not achieved the level of production of which it was potentially cap­
able; it has had recourse to prolonged periods of stagnation; it has 
neglected many social needs for which it could have provided. The pur­
pose of collective action is simply to ensure that these deficiencies 
in the market will be corrected by whatever institutional adjustment is 
neoessary. Even if the necessary institutional adjustment should lead
63
Clark, Social Control of Business, p. 455.
64Tugwell, "Experimental Economics," p. 417.
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to collectivism, and if it were done gradually, step by step, then
as Clark emphasized, "there would be little or no reason to fear 
65
it*" The reason, of course, is that these economists are not com­
mitted to any particular institutional arrangement (such as the free 
market), but look instead upon all institutions as temporary means, 
as instruments, to be abandoned or strengthened dependent upon their 
efficacy. It is their conviction that the importance of the economic 
system, indeed sooial value itself, is to be found in the industrial 
or technological continuum, not the institutional environment within 
which this technological continuum must operate.
This is the point to which we referx’ed in the closing pages of 
the last chapter— that value to society, can only mean the "continuous 
realization of a more effeotive organization of the technological life- 
process of the community." k Vie also noted in the last chapter that 
the institutionalists were rather critical of the maldistribution of 
income which the market mechanism has caused. But the essential weak­
ness of our system is not just that some people have in the past been 
able to acquire more wealth, income, and power than others. The fatal 
weakness is that the institutions, the "rules of the game," under which 
they were able to acquire such wealth, income, and power, have imposed 
restrictions such that society was unable to realize its full produc­
tive potential. The institutionalists are, therefore, concerned with 
that almost primitive adherence to certain rituals, to certain "cere­
monial" procedures, which have prevented the realization of the full 
fruits of our industrial system. As Clark emphasized, it is both
CC
Clark, Social Control of Business, p. 517.
^Ayres, Theory of Economic Progress, p. 228; of. above, pp.
293-296.
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"irrelevant and intolerable, from the planning standpoint," that the
production of consumer goods
should reach its maximum only when we are unusually 
busy building railroads and skyscrapers; and should 
fall to levels that mean privation when these tasks 
subside, though consumers continue to have just as 
many needs and producers continue to have just as 
rauoh power (or more) to produce goods to satisfy
them. *7
It is both irrelevant and intolerable, not only because it is unneces­
sary, but more important, because it thereby prevents the continuous 
realization andthe continuous expansion of the technological life-pro­
cess of the community. And it is both irrelevant and intolerable "from 
the planning standpoint" because it is a negation of the modem concept 
of knowledge as an instrument of control; it is to remain instead under 
the taboo of the village shaman's incantation. Optimum production, the 
full realization of and the continued expansion of this technological 
life-process of the community, is not a mere humanitarian ideal; it is 
the necessary condition for sooial survival.
It is the continued development of this technological life-process 
of the community which is the central objective of eoonomic planning.
The central objective is to ensure the continued development and growth 
of the modern industrial economy; is based on a recognition that we 
have heretofore failed to utilize our full industrial capacity and that 
the objective of eoonomic planning is to ensure that it does just that. 
But as Ayres recognized, though all these be admitted, the questions may 
still be raised, "VShat is the 'end' for whioh industry is to be made to 
work?" "Just what is it we are planning 'for?'" It is Ayres' oonvic- 
tion that we shall be free to proceed with the task of ensuring the
^Clark, Social Control of Business, pp. 455-456.
continued development and growth of modern industry only when we rea-
68
lize that such questions are "nonsense.” They are nonsense and irre­
levant because they misconceive the fundamental nature of the problem 
involved. The basic misconception, according to Ayres, stems from the 
traditional supposition that consumption is the Mend" of all eoonomic 
activity. And if this is true,
...if consumption stands above production in some meta­
physical hierarchy in which it is the transcendent "end" 
to which production is but the "means"— then the classi­
cal economists are right and economic planning is the 
outrageous proposal of callow reformers to put their 
schemes above the conscience of the race.®®
In Ayres’ view, therefore, any consideration of the objectives of eoo­
nomic planning for the modem industrial society must necessarily begin 
with a reconsideration of the question of consumption as the "end" of 
all economic activity.
To begin with, modem science and philosophy, modem concepts of 
knowledge, know nothing of transcendent "ends.” The issue is, rather, 
one of a means-ends continuum; in particular, social development is 
seen as a "continuous process, and it is in terms of this continuity,"
Ayres argues, "that value and welfare can be objectively defined and 
70understood." Social value and welfare inhere, not in consumption as 
the end of all industrial activity, nor in individual feelings of reple­
tion, but in the furthering of this social process; and in this light, 
both production and consumption are conceived in terms of a continuous
68Ayres, "The Significance of Eoonomic Planning,” Development of 
Collective Enterprise ed. by Seba Eldridge (Lawrences University of
Kansas Press, 1943), p. 478.
69,.,,
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means-ends-means succession
in -which production, consumption, further production, 
and further consumption are similarly conceived as a 
continuum. In short both consumption and production 
are aspects of the total effort of carrying on the 
industrial process and making it continue to work.^
This is the central point with reference to economic planning as viewed
by the institutionalists. Consumption is but a part, and a necessary
part, of the social continuum, it is, in Commons' words, both "the be-
72ginning and ending of the social process." Theirs is a recognition,
as Clark put it, that
The true objective of planning is not stabilization 
at any static level, but regularized growth. It Is'
•the full utilization of our powers of production, 
which are continually growing, in order that our 
consumption may grow correspondingly. ... In­
creased production and a raised standard of living 
mush go hand in hand; neither end pan be gained with­
out tne other.
Neither end can be gained without the other because neither is the end
of all economic activity; each is a means and an end to the other, which
is why Tugwell also insisted that "planning for production means planning
74for consumption too.
Just what kind of production and just what kind of consumption, 
who is to consume what, and who is to decide who is to consume what, 
have always been unanswerable questions. The traditional attempt has 
been to appeal to some "ideal" of justice, and this has been singularly 
unsuccessful because
71Ayres, "The Significance of Economic planning," p. 479.
72Commons, Institutional Economics, p. 613.
73Clark, "Long-Range Planning for the Regularization of Industry," 
p. 245; italics are Clark's.
74Tugwell, "The Principle of Planning and the Institutional of 
Laissez Faire," AER, Papers and Proceedings, March, 1936, p. 83.
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So long as consumption is conceived as "the end," the 
problem of increased consumption is unsolvable. But 
the moment consumption is regarded as continuous with 
the uninterrupted industrial effort of the community 
it becomes perfectly clear that the consumption of the 
underfed must be increased not because it is their 
"right" to eat or because feeding them would be "just," 
but because their working capacity, and therefore their 
contribution to the effort of the community, is impaired 
by underfeeding.
The citizens of industrial society must consume more 
abundantly not because it is their right to do so and not 
because justice or equality or any similar shibboleth is 
a valid guide to economio welfare, but because if they do 
not industrial society will collapse.75
It will collapse, because, as Clark put it, production is "continually 
growing,"^® and to ensure that continued growth, consumption must grow 
correspondingly. But the free market, giving expression to the insti­
tutions of society, resulted in a distribution of incomes such that this 
continued growth has been periodically interrupted. The whole idea of 
an economic system is that production and consumption coincide, that 
they are but different aspects of the same thing— the life-prooess of 
the community. Both consumption and production are two sides of the 
"total effort" of carrying on the industrial process and ensuring that
it oontinues to work. And "economic planning," Ayres insisted, is but
77a "synonym for this concerted effort."
And it is the function of economics to show what institutional 
adjustments are necessary in order to promote this general welfare.
Thus Mitchell insisted that "a community is well off in proportion to 
its efficiency in producing a current supply of necessities, comforts,
75Ayres, "The Significance of Economic Planning," p. 480.
76Cf. also Ayres, The Industrial Economy, p. 199.
^Ayres,"The Significance of Eoonomio Planning," p. 479.
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and amenities of life"j the economist, according to Mitchell, works 
on the "assumption that an increase in commodities and services gen­
erally brings with it an increase of welfare. It is on that assump-
78tion that we seek to promote efficiency in producing goods." He 
went on to note that the "money economy" has indeed been a "marvel­
ously flexible institution" to achieve this social welfare, but the 
important task for the economist is to ensure that this will be car­
ried forward because its capacity for "further development and adapta­
tion to human needs has no visible limits except the limits of man's 
capacity for invention." With that thought in mind, Mitchell asked 
economists to consider ways in which this institution has served us
ill, in the hope that they "may invent practical devices for bettering 
79its operation." This is the same point Ayres made nvhen he argued 
that"the problem of general economic and social policy is that of mak­
ing the most of our tools, of their potentialities as well as their
present efficiency, by whatever institutional adjustments may prove 
80necessary." Ahd this is the reason why Mitchell sees the whole con­
cept of social welfare as being "inextricably involved" with the "grow­
ing prominence" of institutional adjustment. He thus emphasized the 
importance of the "close scrutiny" of the institutions of our modern 
society and of their efficiency in the production and distribution of 
goods. Investigations of this type will, in Mitchell's view, necessar­
ily "broaden out into a constructive criticism of that dominant complex 
of institutions known as the money economy— a constructive criticism
78
Mitchell, "Making Goods and Making Money," pp. 144, 142.
79
Ibid., p. 145.
80Ayres, "The Role of Technology in Economic Theory," AER, Papers
and Proceedings, May, 1953, p. 287.
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which may guide the efforts of our children to make that marvelously 
flexible form of organization better fitted to their needs."®'*'
It was also Mitchell’s conviction that economics should conscious­
ly "lay less stress upon wealth and more stress upon welfare." While 
he admitted that the concept of welfare is rather vague, he insisted 
that "it is oapable of being made objective and definite in reference 
to such matters as food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, education,
on
fatigue, leisure." This is the same point Clark made when he argued 
that in the modem day, the "quest for welfare" is far too difficult 
ever to be solved by the operations of an autonomous market based upon 
the "mere calculating faculty of the individual." Instead of relying 
on the self-equilibrating market, it is Clark's view, that "as scienti­
fic research progresses," the concept of welfare will increasingly rely 
upon and be based upon "social knowledge" rather than being merely a
Q«Z
matter of "individual taste." As he said elsewhere, we are "develop­
ing at least in the direction of objective standards" for deciding these 
questions of control and planning as they relate to social welfare. As 
scientific research progresses we are coming to know more and more about 
the importance of leisure and the necessary calorie content for a bal­
anced diet, we are beginning to see fatigue, not as a manifestation 
of man's natural indolence, but as a "physiological condition with 
determinable symptoms" the causes of which can be corrected to ensure 
the continued health of the individual and the continued growth of the 
social eoonomy. With the use of -this scientific researoh, Clark argues
81Mitchell, "Quantitative Analysis in Economic Theory," p. 30.
®^ Mitchell, "The Prospects of Economios," p. 381.
0*2
Clark, "Economios and Modern Psychology," p. 103.
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that we are now capable of supplying "the burden of proof" which is
QA
necessary if we are to "amend" the standards of the market.
Does this mean, then, that to achieve welfare as viewed by the 
institutionalists, someone is to say how much of something everyone 
is to consume? Does their eoonomic planning involve making the deci­
sions for the individual in order to promote his welfare? Such ques­
tions, in the view of the institutionalists, are based on a misconcep­
tion— that of equating all planning with "blueprint planning." It is 
not a matter of who is to consume what, but of providing the environ­
ment in which consumption and production can grow and expand as the 
necessary condition for the survival of our industrial society. They 
are simply arguing that social value, or value to society, lies not 
merely in the relative value of one article to another to the individual
and that it cannot be achieved by merely summing up these individual 
85
values. Social value lisa in the provision of ever-expanding amounts 
of goods, service^ and leisure to the populations as a whole; it lies 
in the continued realization of the production-consumption-production 
continuum by the total social group. Social welfare or social value 
lies not in forcing individuals to oonsume what some enlightened soul 
believes they ought to want; it does not involve making the decisions, 
the choices, for the individual. It involves, rather, the provision 
of a social-economic environment in which consumption and production 
can grow and expand indefinitely. There is, of course, a difference 
between judgment and decision. An expert may well be better able to 
judge -vdiat is good for the individual in many cases, but deciding that
R4.
Clark, Social Control of Business, pp. 199-200.
85Clark, "Economics and Modem Psychology," pp. 103, 146, 169.
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he must consume a certain item is a quite different matter. The 
goal, as the institutionalists see it, is to provide the best envir­
onment within which the individual makes his own choices, his own 
decisions. But to ensure that there is such an environment is a soo- 
ial problem, because social value inheres in the smooth functioning 
and expanding development of the production-consumption continuum for 
it is in this continuum that the life-process of the community is nur­
tured.
The point concerning wlefare being made definite and objective, as 
emphasized by Clark and Mitchell, is somewhat different, though closely 
related— that there are some, perhaps a very few, matters relating to 
welfare which are capable of precise and definite measurement. And as 
such they can be used to "amend” the standards of the market. We do 
not, for example, rely upon the automatic functionings of the market to 
solve the problem of sanitation. And similarly with the problem of in­
dustrial fatigue— we overrule the market’s calculation, vhich is based 
on the judgment of the individual laborer. Or the provision of social 
security, unemployment compensation, compulsory health insurance— the 
whole range of social services, of institutional adjustments, some of 
them already adopted, some not, but whioh these economists have insisted 
it is their function to take note of, to urge the adoption of, to crit­
icize. And thus it is that Ayres specifically criticizes the sooial 
security measures that have thus far been adopted. They were, says 
Ayres, simply a "great crusade ... for as much decency as is compatible 
with capitalism.” They will never really contribute to sooial value 
or social welfare so long as they are enacted in the spirit of apology. 
The importance of social security measures, says Ayres, is not in recti­
fying "a publio scandal but to restore the balance of the economy." We
334
may adopt enough such social security measures to "ease our con­
sciences," but so long as they are not reoognized as a part of the 
social strategy necessary to ensure the continued development of the 
industrial economy, they will not be enough to save that eoonomy— and 
we will have still more depressions, still more unused industrial cap­
acity.88
Their concept of planning thus stems from the concept of social 
value which sees the welfare of the community inextricably tied in with 
the advancement of production and the increased availability of that ad­
vancement to all those who participate in its advancement— with the lower 
income groups sharing relatively larger. "How much larger," can only be 
tentatively determined— it cannot be ascertained until we adopt this 
social strategy, and through statistical research, ascertain just how 
much is necessary to ensure that this process will be continued. It 
cannot be ascertained in advance for the simple reason that we have not 
yet undertaken the study of production and consumption (just as we have 
not adopted social security measures) from the point of view of expanding 
this pro duo ti on-c onsumption continuum. Economists have yet to make the 
"realistio analysis of present-day production" which Mitchell defined 
as the study of "the problem of distribution itself from the viewpoint 
of production, seeking to find out the bearings of inequality of income 
upon savings, personal efficiency of workers and employers, industrial 
depressions and the like."87 And as Clark clearly recognized, the "full
Ayres, Theory of Economic Progress, p. 280.
87 »
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utilization of our productive powers is admittedly hard to define, 
and one of the basic tasks of planning would be to define it."
And it should be remembered— it is not a matter of increasing the con­
sumption of the lower income groups because of some abstract concept
of justice, or because it is their right to it, but simply because
this is the necessary social measure if we are to realize the contin­
ued expansion of our industrial system. Theirs is, then, the attempt 
to evolve the theory of social value which Hamilton called for in 1918—  
a value theory which can be used as "a real basis for a judgment upon 
the social order.1" 89
The institutionalists have argued that economios is nothing if it
is not a science of value, that economic theory is rightly identified 
90
as value theory. Clark, for example, pointed out that
The concept of value is the core of economic think­
ing, and modern economics is older than American 
independence, yet the builders of the seienoe are
still disputing what value is, or how it shall be
conceived. This is altogether necessary and proper, 
for the concept is by no means in final shape. In­
deed, one may hazard the prediction that progress in 
economic philosophy in the next half century will 
hinge on the adoption of new and enlarged meanings 
for its fundamental terms. Only so oan we do for 
the twentieth century as much as our classical fore­
fathers did for their time. It is a question how 
long nineteenth century formulations will stand the 
strain of twentieth century development.91
The disagreement is with the traditional theory of value of orthodox
88
Clark, Sooial Control of Business, p. 456.
89Hamilton, Walton, "The Place of Value Theory in Economies,11 JPE, 
March 1918, p. 405.
90
See, for example, Ayres, Theory of Eoonomic Progress, pp. 84-85 
and 208-209, and also chap. x.j Ayres, '^The' Co-ordinates of Institu­
tionalism," p. 52; Clark, "Towards a Concept of Social Value"; Commons, 
Legal Foundations of Capitalism, chap.ix; Commons, Institutional Eco­
nomics, chap. x.
^Clark, "The Conoept of Value," QJE, August, 1915, p. 663.
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economics for they insist that it does not provide a basis for judg­
ment of the social order, that it does not meet the needs of present
day efforts of collective action to promot e the sooial economic wel-
99
fare of the community-at-large. Thus Commons argued that
If economic investigations are to implement the 
search of mankind for liberty, security, justice, 
equality or other great goals it would seem that
economists must analyze these political, eoonomic,
and social relations by which values are made avail­
able to, or secure for, the individual.®®
It is their conviction that orthodox eoonomics which has purported to 
find value measured in the price system, cannot contribute to the im­
plementation of these social "goals,” of these social values. It can­
not implement these social values because it oenters attention upon 
values of the individual as registered in demand and measured by price, 
rather than upon the collective action by which these values are rea­
lized.
The founders of the classical tradition, according to Ayres, did 
indeed attempt to make the science of economics into a science of value. 
It was their belief that "genuine and stable” values do exist, that 
these values are registered in demand and measured by price, and "hence 
the eoonomic affairs of commercial society are meaningful, since they 
are organized by price, which is the measure of value.Nineteenth 
century sooial studies, and in particular those of William Graham
9aVeblen was of course influential in this point of view; for an 
unusually dear statement of Veblen1s concept of value as related to 
sooial welfare, see, Daugert, Stanley M., The Philosophy of Thoratein 
Veblen (New Yorks King's crown Press, 1950), chap, iv and in particu­
lar, pp. 98-103.
93Commons, Eoonomics of Collective Action, p. 22.
94Ayres, Theory of Eoonomic Progress, p. 208.
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Sumner, invalidated this thesis, however. It was Sumner’s argument 
that the mores determine what is right and wrong; it is the mores which 
determine values. This mores principle, now of course accepted by all 
social scientists, destroys the validity of the classical theoi-y of 
value, according to the institutionalists. If the things that people 
value are merely the things they happen to value because of the mores 
of the community, then "demand means nothing more than the bare fact 
that that is what is demanded, and price means nothing more than the 
particular money-ratio at which something or other happened to be bought 
and sold"; and if this is the case, then the economic system of modern 
society "is no system at all and means nothing but •that such is the way 
things happen to be wherever they happen to be that my."®® This is pre­
cisely the same point Clark argued in "Economics and Modem Psychology" 
when he insisted (hat a person can make "nothing out of the world that
the world does not first make out of him; he cannot even desire of the
97world save as it has taught him to desire." And this is why Clark,
qnfl Ayres, arid the other institutionalists insist that eoonomics cannot
98rely simply on value as expressed in individual demand. It oaunot be­
cause that demand tells us nothing other than the mores have dictated 
certain community patterns with respect to consumption, production, and 
the distribution of income. This is the impasse to which the moires prin­
ciple has taken economios. It is the impasse to which economists have
QC
Sumner, William Graham, Folkways (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1906).
96
Ayres, Theory of Eoonomlo Progress, p. 208.
97
Clark, "Economics and Modern Psychology," p. 104; also ibid. 
pp. 95-106 for Clark's elaboration of this point and for its importance 
for economic theory and sooial value.
98See pp. 105ff, above, and Clark ibid., p. 96.
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reacted, according to Ayres,by either giving economic theory up as
a ’’bad job" and turning to empirical studies of various industries,
or "by reading the whole problem of value out of economics— referring
it back to philosophy, whence it came" and simply devoting themselves
with increasing ingenuity of mathematical technique to the elaboration
99of various price relations.
This has been particularly serious because it has thereby elimin­
ated the concept of value, which according to the institutionalists, 
should be the oentral feature of economic theory. But they further 
argue that there are other sources of value to the community, to the 
social group, than those which are dietated by the mores. In particu­
lar, they argue that the locus of value to the community is the tech­
nological life-process of the community, that the continuity of civil­
ization itself is the continuity of this technological life-process:
Throughout the ages every community has owed its exist­
ence to its heritage of tools and apparatus, the "know­
how" whioh is a function of the tools, and the materials 
which owe their significance to the tools with which they 
are manipulated. It is by carrying on this instru- 
mentally organized activity that every community— and 
each separate individual— "makes a living." 'Whatever 
contributes to carrying on this activity is economi­
cally valuable, and whatever arrests or even hinders, 
this aotivity is therefore economically deleterious.
This is the basis, then, of economic theorizing and of economic prac­
tices— to contribute to this technological or industrial continuum.
The oentral task, said Mitohell, "is to carry forward the industrial 
revolution through this generation— to carry it forward in such fashion
99Ayres, Theory of Economic Progress, pp. 208-209. 
100Ayres, Theory of Economic Progress, pp. 222-223.
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as to make it yield our race still greater benefits."^" The basic
criterion for all economic thought and practice, then, is simply to
further this process, to "keep the machines running." To do this
... is not to subordinate "human life" to "mere 
machines." What that phrase has reference to is 
the TJhole life-activity in -which mankind has always 
been engaged. It is literally oo-extensive with 
life itself, identical with the existence and con­
tinuance of the species, and it is the locus of value 
because of this integral continuity. To speak of 
value is to speak of the relation of any single act—  
choice, preference, decision, or judgment— to the 
whole life-process.102
The life-process of the whole community is, then, inextricably tied 
in with this technological continuum, with the whole means-ends con­
tinuum of production-consumption-production.... It is the function of 
the economist, then, to point out the institutional adjustment and 
adaptation which are necessary for the continuance of that process.
Some of course will demur, arguing that it is of no concern to 
the economist whether this so-called life-prooess of the community is 
enhanced and developed or not. They may point to many societies, to 
the Buddhists, for example, who contemplate extinction as the highest 
good and who thereby see this universe as meaningless, as valueless, 
who find meaning and value only in some other world. The mores of 
some societies do indeed emphasize the next world, or a return to this 
one in some other form. But the economist, as a social scientist, 
necessarily finds meaning in this world— and tie institutionalists 
are insisting that such meaning is to be found in the technological 
continuum to which our society owes its existence, and not in the 
mores or institutions within whioh that technological process, that
101
Mitchell, "Making Goods and Making Money," p. 139.
102.Syres, Theory of Eoonomic Progress, p. 225.
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production-consumption continuum, must operate. These economists are 
a product of western civilization, and their duty, as they see it, is 
to contribute to the development, to the healthy growth, of that civil­
ization.
J. M. Clark once said that economics "inevitably” is concerned 
with two inseparable problems: "a description of the m y  economic 
forces work, and a study of the economic efficiency— or inefficiency—  
which results,” And any analysis of these two facets, says Clark, can­
not stop short of "our ultimate ideals of what is good"; it inevitably 
must be concerned with "the whole problem of ideals of good conduct and 
welfare; in short, of morals and ethics." Some may attempt to separate
eoonomics from such values, but acoording to Clark, "it cannot be done
105without introducing a bias" in the results. And Commons likewise 
argued that the "essential attribute" of a theory of value suitable for 
economios is the "concept of an ultimate purpose or goal," and this in­
evitably involves the "intermediate and immediate instruments" by which 
that goal can be attained. The ultimate goal with which the economist 
is concerned is that of "welfare, sooial welfare, public good, common­
weal, commonwealth," and the intermediate goal by which these can be 
attained is the "progressive increase of the control over nature, the
'maximum of production'" which is the necessary means to the eventual 
104goal. Thus the immediate end-in-view for the eoonomic system is 
the mmr-Smnm possible production with the given facilities; the social 
value to which this is the immediate end-in-view, is the welfare of 
society. Ahd the important point, to return to Clark’s two inseparable
103
Clark, "The Socializing of Theoretical Economios," The Trend 
of Economics, edited by Rexford G. Tugwell (New York: Crofts, 1924), 
p. t3; italics Clark's.
104
Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism, p. 381.
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facets of eoonomics, is that any consideration of the question of how 
the eoonomic system works and the efficiency or inefficiency with 
which it does work, must necessarily have reference to what the eco­
nomic system is supposed to do. Economios, in the view of the insti­
tutionalists, is necessarily purposive and teleological— in the sense 
that -the economist cannot escape thinking in terms of ends as well as
means, and thus his analysis must necessarily be founded on fundamental 
105value-judgments. The fundamental value-judgment on which the eco­
nomic analysis of the institutionalists is avowedly based is that of 
the social welfare of the community-at-large. Theirs is in no way an
attempt to decide those "final valuations" such as which "human values
106are important," for as Clark pointed out, these evolve "endlessly."
But theirs is an attempt to show that the locus of value for the com­
munity as a whole i 3  in the continued growth and development of the 
technological life-process, in the production-consumption continuum, 
of the whole community. It is with reference to this continuum that 
Clark’s two inseparable questions must be related.
This is why the theory of value for the institutionalists must be 
in terms of a sooial process; it must, in Commons’ words, be related
to society as a "going conceit*, a process that has no beginning and no
107
ending"; value must be conceived of as a verb rather than as a noun. 
This is the sense in whioh Ayres argues that "the general welfare is
105Cf. A. B. Wolfe, "Thoughts on Perusal of Wesley Mitchell’s Col­
lected Essays," JPE, February, 1939, pp. 20-21, for an unusually clear 
and oonoise discussion of this aspect of the welfare economics of Mit­
chell.
^^Clark, "The Socializing of Theoretical Economics," p. 102.
107Commons, "Wage Theories and Wage Policies," AER, Papers and 
Proceedings, March, 1923, pp. 110-111.
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108not a condition; it is a process." And that is why 'they insist
that there are no fixed or final goals. Although Commons talks in
terns of "ultimate" and "intermediate" goals, these terms must be taken
in the contejct of his theory of value as a verb, as a process. The
ultimate "goal" of their economic analysis is the welfare of the sooial
group, but this social welfare is itself a continuing process, not a
condition or state.
They see the technological development of society as the locus of
social -value; and increased production and consumption are the neoessary
strategy for the implementation and realization of the social value.
Theirs is not an attempt to decide -what is to be produced or who is to
consume what, because they regard freedom of choice as of primary im- 
109portanoe. But to make that freedom of choice meaningful, the insti­
tutional framework which governs the distribution of income, must be 
altered. There is, in their view, nothing automatio, there is no in­
visible hand, which will assure the continued development of the means- 
ends continuum of production and consumption upon which the health and 
welfare of the -whole society depends. And it is the continuance of 
this means-ends process which defines the general welfare. They insist 
that the true significance to be learned from the development of the
industrial revolution from the eighteenth century down to today is the
110
possibility of the continued expansion of this means-ends process.
If, however, that expansion is to be continuous into the future, it
108Ayres, The Industrial Economy, p. 315.
109
See pp. 367-39H, below.
110Cf. Clark, Social Control of Business, pp. 3-5, 455; "Long- 
Range planning for the Regularization of business, p. 245; Mitchell, 
"Social Sciences and National Planning," pp. 36-95; and Ayres, The 
Industrial Economy, p. 317.
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will neoessarily call for the active participation of the economist 
to show what institutional adjustments and adaptations are necessary, 
to show what collective action is necessary in order to revise the 
working rules and the institutions of our society*111 The enhancement 
of economic welfare is to be realized through the continuous maximiza­
tion of goods and services, but 'this can be achieved only through the 
maximum use of the economic instrumentalities of technological know­
ledge, human and natural resources, labor power, etc.
The criterion of every economic judgment, of every economic theory 
which is to be tested by being put into practice, is as Ayres put it 
very simply, "to keep the machines running." And though this may have 
an ugly and base sound to some, that is what we must do continually
do better if our modem industrial society is to survive. And it is of
oourse no easy task. There have in times past, been those who supposed
112that the way to do this was to chain children to the maohines, but 
we have since changed our minds on this. Basically, however, this "keep­
ing the maohines running" has been the acoepted objective of eoonomic
113analysis from Adam Smith (if not earlier) to the present. For the 
last 150 years or so, economists have, in the main, assumed that the 
proper way to achieve this end was to allow the free forces of the mar­
ket to funotion unrestricted. The institutionalists, however, argue 
that the market oan only give effeot to the prevailing institutional 
struoture of sooiety, and that as it has operated in the past, it has
111Cf. Commons, Economios of Collective Action. pp. 129-130 and 
124, 150, 180, 195; also. Institutional £eonoml'e's,' p. 751.
112Cf. Paul Mantoux, The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth 
Century, (Hew York: Macmillan and Company, 1927), pp. 420-428.
113Cf. pp. 274ff, above.
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not resulted in the continued growth and development of industrial 
society. The tactics must therefore be altered, if this continued 
growth and development is in fact to be realized. There is, of course, 
no assurance that it can be realizedj but there is a definite possibil- 
ity, in the view of the institutionalists, if the economist will adopt 
the idea of collective action, if he will look upon the continued 
development of our industrial society as the locus of social value, if, 
as was disoussed in Chapter Five, the economist will adopt a more func­
tional and pragmatic conception of knowledge. These are some of the 
implications to which Ayres was referring when he said that
Yfithout being fully aware of it its implications 
(since, after all, most people are not social 
philosophers), the whole world has come to acoept 
physical production as the criterion of a sound eco­
nomy. Institutionalism is nothing more, and nothing 
less, than the intellectual implications of that 
axiom.
This is of course the criterion of a sound economy and therefore the
central objective of collective action which Clark also emphasized—
to eliminate undesirable fluctuations of industrial
aotivity and to make reasonably full use of our powers
of production to support an adequate standard of liv­
ing, on a sound and enduring basis.
Jind this is why the sooial supervision of income distribution is neces­
sary if we are to "keep the machines running." A "more equitable" dis­
tribution of income is, as Clark argued, "an immediate necessity for
116the continued full operation of industry." It is a necessity, be­
cause as he noted elsewhere, "our industrial efficiency is built on
^^Ayres, "The Co-Ordinates of Institutionalism," p. 55.
-1 i C
Clark, Social Control of Business, p. 455.
116Clark, "The Relation of Government to the Economy of the 
Future," JPE, December, 1941, p. 811.
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mass production, and to keep at work properly requires mass consump­
tion; in other words, fairly liberal incomes distributed among the
117mass of the people.”
The general strategy with which these economists are concerned
is that of the "continued full operation of industry”; it is that of
"keeping the machines running"; it is that of "economic stability."
These can be achieved, however, "only by achieving a sound system of
production, and we can have a sound system of production only by con-
118suming what we produce." Expanding production and its corollary,
expanding consumption, are contingent upon the distribution of consumer
purchasing, power aimed at that expansion. This, of course, is a problem
of tactics— which will have to be evolved in the light of trial and
error, in the light of continuous experimentation. Tactics, of course,
119should be governed by the strategy chosen, and these economists have 
tried to set up what they conceived to be a workable and usable strat­
egy— that of the continued full operation of industry. Among the tac­
tics by which this is to be achieved is the social control over the 
distribution of income in order to assure the continued expansion of 
the production-consumption continuum. Thus the "technical problem," 
as Ayres sees it, which Bociety faces is that "of devising some modi­
fication of the income mechanism calculated to correct the imbalance
120of production and consumption." The px*eoise tactios to be employed,
117Clark, "The Riddle of Business Cycles," The American Federation, 
October, 1932, p. 1112.
118
Ayres, "The Principles of Economic Strategy," Southern Eoonomic 
Journal, April, 1939, p. 469.
■^®Clark, "The Socializing of Theoretical Economics," pp. 74-76.
120Ayres, The Industrial Economy, p. 195.
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cannot be ascertained in advance, however. The precise amount of soc­
ial income which would have to be directed into lower income groups, 
or which would have to be spent socially, as we noted earlier, can be 
decided only when we investigate the problem of production, consump­
tion and distribution from the point of view of expanding that con­
tinuum. A tentative starting point might be to establish, by the use 
of the objective criteria whioh Clark and Mitchell think are becoming 
increasingly available,^ 1  -the minimum income neoessary for adequate 
"food, clothing, shelter," etc. This would be, in Commons' words, the 
"intermediate goal" toward whioh to aim as but one step toward the 
"ultimate goal" of social welfare.
This procedure might, as Clark noted, "start with a general notion 
of the size and distribution of possible social income" based upon estim­
ates of past performance and of unused capacities. As it is put into 
practice and as "limiting factors were revealed whioh would prevent full
utilization of other factors," modifications and alterations would be 
122■in order. Continuing studies would be neoessary to ascertain how 
income is being spent, and how much is being saved, and what bearing 
does the concentration of income, the tax system and the social secur­
ity programs, have on -these two uses of income. This would be the sort 
of investigation which Mitchell also called for— to "study the problem 
of distribution itself from the viewpoint of production, seeking to 
find out the bearings of inequality of income upon savings, personal 
efficiency of workers and employers, industrial depressions and the
*21Cf. above, pp. g,31-332.
■^Clark, Social Control of Business, p. 466; italics added.
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like."^® The "net outcome" of these surveys and studies, Clark 
noted,
would be, not a detailed budget such as a socialist 
state might draw up, but an estimate of unused capaci­
ties for production and consumption, ... would
also shed light on the adjustments neoessary if these 
potentialities are to be realized.^24
Thus, the precise institutional adjustments which are necessary, 
the precise ways in which collective aotion should be used to imple­
ment these goals cannot be spelled out in advance. But it is their 
conviction that a start in that direction must be made; we must endeavor 
to realize the full potential or our industrial capacity by seeing to 
it that all potential income is_ in fact created and that all that soc­
ial income finds its way back into spending channels. Whether that re­
channeling is done by means of subsidies, by farm price supports, by 
the use of a truly progressive income tax, by means of public housing, 
by an expanded social security program, by a guaranteed annual wage, 
or by some other measure, will have to be decided in the process of 
experimentation, of putting -these measures into practioe and testing 
their efficacy with respeot to the overall strategy of ensuring the 
"continued full operation of industry."
The institutionalists insist that the purpose of such measures 
is not simply to relieve suffering; it is not, as Ayres put it, to 
satisfy some abstract ideal of justice to the poor, it is not, as 
Clark put it, a mere "humanitarian aspiration." They are, rather, 
neoessary tactical moves to ensure the implementation of the overall 
strategy which they have adopted— the assurance of a stable and expand-
123
Mitchell, "The Prospects of Economios," p. 379. 
■^Clark, Spoial Control of Business, p. 467.
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ing industrial economy. We do not have it in our power, Ayres argued, 
to maintain a stable and expanding economy within the present insti­
tutional framework. Thus, we must either
find a way to distribute purchasing power in suoh 
volume as to permit the full utilization and contin­
ued expansion of our productive system and so attain 
the stability which ail economists have sought, or we 
must prepare to face the deluge only hoping that some 
other political regime will be wise enough to do what 
we have failed to do.125
And as Tugwell also summarized their view,
An experimental economics developed on the side of 
theory for the projection of reconstructive programs, 
on the side of research for testing and substantiation, 
on the side of teaohing to provide new workers and new 
attitudes and to insure the continuity of knowledge as 
well as to acquaint men in general with the nature of 
the problems and the general means of their solution—  
an experimental economics developing in a free univer­
sity where examination and criticism of industrial 
forces are encouraged and rewarded, would possess "that 
hope for the future that men are obliged to try to rea­
lize.
Lacking the adoption of this experimental attitude toward the economic 
system, our industrial civilization may "slip and regress, falling into 
the made desuetude of ruin that overtook Assyria and Egypt, Greece and 
Rome.” It is possible, Tugwell argued in 1924, that "our civilization 
may, with all our hopes and plans fall from the tree of time and rot 
like a withered leaf in the mold of common earth." Thus it is the 
funotion of free universities and of economists as free men within 
those universities to see that this does not happen. Most important 
of all, they should not "protect the two-hundred-year old institutions 
of industry," those "most transient institutions" from free thinking 
and experimentation,"for industry is a social instrument, which, if
125Ayres, "Principles of Economic Strategy," p. 470.
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freely experimented with," holds untold promises for the future; "it 
can deliver mankind for whatever life seems to men good. It remains 
only to be said that an experimental economics is the condition of
log
this freedom." It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that Tug- 
well’ s plea for this experimental attitude toward the institutional 
fabric of society m s  not adopted in the 1920’s and the economy did 
slip and regress; it did rot like a withered leaf for a long, long 
time. It did in fact require collective action to breathe life into 
the withered plant.
Perhaps what was required was a social revolution; a revolution, 
however, not of barricades, bufcsimply of ideas.
n gg
Tugwell, "Experimental Economics," The Trend of Eoonomios.
pp. 421-422.
CHAPTER X
ECONOMIC PLANNING: THE ROAD, OR THE ALTERNATIVE, TO SERFDOM?
The institutionalists have thus emphasized the need for social 
control, for collective action, as a means of implementing economic 
reform and planning. They have argued for the adoption of an "exper­
imental attitude” toward the institutional fabric of society. Theirs 
has not been an attempt to draw up a blueprint of Utopia, but to point 
to the necessity of making the eoonomic system work. And while much 
of this central thesis has been accepted by layman and economist alike, 
there do remain many who object strenuously. Professor Hayek, for ex­
ample, argues that the kind of eoonomio planning they advocate inevit­
ably brings the worst to the top, that it necessarily leads to cultural 
uniformity and political dictatorship. It is his central belief that 
"the democratic statesman who sets out to plan economic life will soon 
be confronted with the alternative of either assuming dictatorial pow- 
ers or abandoning his plans...." The issue, in Hayek's view, is 
always one of black or white; any deviation from the pure, lily-white, 
ideal of a competitive, market-controlled, economy inevitably starts 
society down that slippery road to a totalitarian nightmare. The only 
kind of planning which Hayek will tolerate, and indeed the one kind 
whioh he strongly advocates, is that "very neoessary planning whioh is 
required to make competition as effeotive and beneficial as possible.”
"Sfeyek. F. A», Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Pres3, 1944), p. 135; of. also, Hayek, F. A. and others, Collectivist 
Economic Planning (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1935).
2Hayek, Road to Serfdom, p. 42.
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So the issue is not one of planning versus no planning. It is one
kind of planning versus another. And in Hayek's view, any planning
other than planning for competition, means that "which is to be sub-
5
stituted for competition," and it is this kind of planning that will
inevitably lead to a dictatorship, no matter how well intentioned the
planners may be. It is simply the inexorable consequence of planning.
Thus Hayek argues that
planning leads to dictatorship because dictatorship 
is the most effective instrument of coercion and the 
enforcement of ideals and, as such, essential if 
central planning on a large scale is to be possible.
The clash between planning and democracy arises 
simply from the fact that the latter is an obstacle 
to the suppression of freedom which the direotion of 
economic activity requires.^
Ludwig von Mises likewise has long been a trenchant critic of any
form of eoonomic planning. In von Mises* view, the issue is even more
pointedly one of any planning versus a market-controlled economy.
There is no middle ground, there is no deviation from the ideal; it is
always and inevitably a case of "either-or." It is a question of
either a competitive, market-controlled economy, or of a socialist,
communist or planned economy— all of which mean complete abandonment
5
of the market mechanism. All economic systems must fall into one or
the other. Thus he argued that
Private ownership of the means of production (market 
economy or capitalism) and public ownership of the means 
of production (socialism or communism or "planning") 
can be neatly distinguished. Bach of these two systems 
of society’s eoonomic organization is open to a precise
3
Hayek, Road to Serfdom, p. 42.
4Ibid., p. 70.
®Cf. Mises, Ludwig von, Human Aotion, A Treatise on Economics 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), p. 702.
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and unambiguous description and definition. They can 
never be oonfounded -with one another; they cannot be 
mixed or combined; no gradual transition leads from 
one of them to the other; their obversion is contra­
dictory.
There is, then, no slippery road leading to the abyss of a planned
7
economy— once society deviates from the ideal, it is there. But the 
important point is that he, with Hayek, equates all planning and inter­
vention with totalitarianism and dictatorship. Thus he disdainfully 
refers to " social engineering’1:
Like planning, this term is a synonym for dictatorship 
and totalitarian tyranny The idea is to treat human 
beings in the same way in which the engineer treats the 
stuff out of which he builds bridges, roads, and 
machines. The social engineer’s will is to be substi­
tuted for the will of the various people he plans to 
use for the construction of his utopia. Mankind is 
to be divided into two classes: the almighty dictator, 
on the one hand, and the underlings who are to be re­
duced to the status of mere pawns in his plans and 
cogs in his machinery, on the other.®
Unlike Hayek, von Mises includes all forms of intervention or planning
in his wholesale condemnation; his is strictly a laissez faire, let
the chips fall where they may, market-oontrolled-economy, point of
view. He is equally bitter in his denunciation of trade unions, do-
gooders, the progressive income tax, public expenditures of money.
6Ibid., p. 712.
7
Although von Mises does not specifically say so, in fact seems 
to deny it most of the time, he presumably recognizes a difference 
in the degree of deviation from his ideal of a laissez faire, market- 
controlled, economy. Thus he is quite critical of the various inter­
ferences with competition, with the various forms of collective action, 
whioh have grown and developed during the last several decades. And 
while these interferences have resulted in "oatallaotic competition” 
having been "seriously restricted," von Mises holds that "the market 
economy is still in operation although sabotaged by government and 
labor union interference." (Human Action, p. 279).
®Ibid., p. 113.
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All are but the attempts of some small clique to impose its will on 
others; all therefore necessarily mean the loss of freedom and liberty 
for the great mass of humanity. All, if continued, inevitably mean 
the demise of the market economy. Thus he argues that 1 the interven­
tionist interlude must come to an end because interventionism cannot 
lead to a permanent system of social organization." He advances several
reasons for the "oollapse" of this interlude. Among the most important
is the fact that
all varieties of interference with the market pheno­
mena not only fail to aohieve the ends aimed at by 
their authors and supporters, but bring about a state 
of affairs which— from the point of view of their 
authors' and advocates' valuations— is less desirable 
than the previous state of affairs which they were 
designed to alter. If one wants to correct their 
manifest unsuitableness and preposterousness by sup­
plementing the first acts of intervention with more 
and more of such acts, one must go farther and farther
until the market economy has been entirely destroyed
and socialism has been substituted for it.
Any intervention with the market can only bring about a worse state of 
affairs whioh calls for still more intervention— until the market 
economy has collapsed. The only alternative then will be to return 
to a pure and perfect market economy because the basic aim of all 
interventionism is that of "confiscating the 'surplus' of one part 
of the population and ... giving it to the other part. Once this sur­
plus is exhausted by total confiscation, a further continuation of 
this policy is impossible."^0 The pressing issue today, the call to 
action whioh von Mises has sounded, is to "choose between the market 
economy and socialism." Society, aeoording to von Mises, "cannot 
evade deciding between these alternatives by adopting a 'middle-of-
9Human Action, p. 854.
*°Ibid., p. 855.
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the-road’ position, whatever name they may give it."
Von Mises has of course adopted a rather extreme view— that no 
kind or amount of intervention can be tolerated. If the market econ­
omy is to work, then we must have complete and absolute faith in it.
We cannot alter it in any respect, for once we do change it, vie are 
soon forced to change it again, and so on cumulatively until it is 
abolished. This is obviously the extreme of the view we examined in 
Chapter VIII— that the market mechanism is the alpha and omega of all 
matters economic. And it i s the extreme position of the view with 
■whioh the institutionalists have disagreed quite vigorously, for it 
is their view that the market is but one instrument for achieving 
social-economic welfare and that it can only give effect to the basic 
underlying institutional structure of society. It is not a prime 
mover, it is merely a recorder of that institutional fabric. It is not 
the sine qua non of the economic welfare of society but merely one 
means for implementing that welfare. As such it can be modified or 
altered to meet the demands of society. This is precisely what Commons 
referred to when he noted that “interference with the lawo f supply 
and demand" has always been the prime objection to all forms of collec­
tive action. As Commons pointed out, however, these interferences 
have been repeated time and time again because the "alternatives of
noninterference under the circumstances were deemed worse than the 
12interferences." Sooiety has simply been unwilling to accept the 
machinations of the market as final, as beyond human intelligence to 
control and direot. If society were to follow von Mises, we would have
i:iIbid., p. 857.
12Commons, Economics of Collective Action, p* 137.
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to abolish all social security, all banking legislation (perhaps 
eliminate banks except as a place to deposit "hard” money), trade 
unions, public health laws, and so on and on and on. This society 
has been unwilling to do, and in the view of the institutionalists 
(and in the view of most other economists), this refusal has been 
sound and correct. It has been sound and correct, for as Commons 
pointed out, interference or noninterference with the market cannot 
be judged in terms of the merely logioal consequences of isolated 
assumptions such as the lav/' of supply and demand. They must, instead, 
"be judged by the practical consequences of their operations; ... the 
full oonsequences can never be anticipated before programs are put into 
effect.""^
Worthy of more serious consideration, however, is the view of 
Hayek— that society can and should interfere with the market to make 
competition both effective and beneficial, but that any other kind of 
collective action, any other kind of interference, is the beginning 
of the end. It is the first step toward dictatorship and hence spells 
the demise of democracy and freedom. Here the issue is not one of 
planning versus dispensing with all planning, it is one of what kind 
of planning we shall use. It is the issue of whether capitalism or 
the market mechanism can be altered without losing our freedoms and
liberties, without adopting a totalitarian regime.
14
The institutionalists, as we noted earlier, have argued that 
freedom is not merely a negative concept; it is not merely the absence 
of physical restraint or coercion. It is in fact a social goal to be
Commons, Economics of Collective Aotion, p. 137.
14Cf. pp. 224-253, above.
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continuously sought and improved upon; and it is the total social 
structure which defines freedom and opportunity for the individual.
It is thus that these economists do not look to a social organization 
■which is merely the sum of the actions of innumerable disparate indi­
viduals, but to that social organization itself as an instrument for 
creating individuals. They have argued that it is only through col­
lective action that liberty, freedom, and security, are to be achieved. 
They have, therefore, argued that it is the function of the eoonomist 
to adopt an experimental attitude toward the institutions of society, 
that it is his function to point out needed institutional adjustments 
and adaptations, that it is the function of the economist to be a soc­
ial critic, a reformer. Many economists who would not adopt the ex­
treme position of either Hayek or von Mises have nevertheless taken a 
rather dim view of this "experimental attitude," insisting that when 
you scratch a reformer, you uncover a dictator. Professor Frank H. 
Knight, for example, once argued that "advocacy of extensive reform is 
practically the solicitation of the position of king on the part of
1C
the reformer." He goes on to argue that the reformer usually has 
little to offer in the way of a definite program and that "in an age 
of experimental science, he also rather typically advocates experi­
mental procedure— with himself as experimenter and society as experi­
mented upon."
Is this, then, the role in which the institutionalists are to 
be cast? They are avowedly reformers, they have avowedly advocated 
the adoption of this experimental attitude. Are they then merely
■^Knight, F. H., The Ethios of Competition and Other Essays 
(Hew York: Harpers, 1935), p. 35l.
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soliciting for the position of king, are they trying to impose their 
values on society at the expense of the values of other members of 
sooiety? If so, if they are but would-be dictators, if we have only 
the alternative of the market economy £r a totalitarian system, then 
perhaps von Mises is right. Perhaps we should logically abandon any 
interference with the market and simply relegate our lives and our 
fortunes to it. The institutionalists, however, have insisted that 
this disjunction is quite superficial that the choice is not simply 
one of an absolute reliance upon the market or of dictatorship. The 
real alternatives are not those of a market mechanism versus planning, 
or of a dictatorship versus democracy. Nor is it simply a case of 
planning for competition versus planning against competition, as Hayek 
would define it.
Eoonomic planning, the institutionalists assert, is inherent in
the functioning of -the modern economy. Thus Clark argued that among
"the more specific and tangible effects of the mechanical revolution"
was the fact that
It has enormously increased our interdependence and 
the resulting need of control, and of extending it over 
wider areas. It has created the problem of business 
cyoles and unemployment. It has given us nation-wide 
trusts end the modern forms of "imperfect competition" 
which somehow must be controlled.*®
.And Mitchell, emphasizing the same point, noted that while the earlier
attempts to reinstate economic planning were due to the "incidental
defects" in the operation of the economy under a system of laissez
faire, the more recent attempts at planning have resulted primarily be-
oause of the "major successes" of that system.17 By "major suocesses,"
^®Clark, Social Control of Business, p. 488.
17Mitchell, "Intelligence and Economic Evolution," p. 118.
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Mitchell is not overlooking the increasing number of defects, such 
as the business cycle. He is merely emphasizing that these defects 
are due to the major successes of the economic system. The increas­
ing complexity of economic relations, and the increasing number of 
social-economic problems, are due to the growing interdependence of 
individuals in modern society— and this interdependence is one of 
the major successes of the modern economy. Likewise, "the wider geo­
graphic scope of economic organization exposes the modem man to more 
and more hazards that he oannot control," and he has therefore turned
increasingly to "his government" and other forms of collective action
18
for aid and assistance.
Because of these social-economic problems which he thinks will 
grow and expand in the future, Mitchell concluded that we "are in for
19more rather than less governmental planning in the calculable future."
This being the case, Mitchell argues that "whether we fear or welcome
these prospeots of an evolutionary trend or a revolutionary shift
toward governmental regulation," it is manifestly necessary that this
20is "a problem that the social sciences should join in attacking."
This is of course the main development that institutional economics 
has taken— the attempt to contribute to the problem of social-economic 
reform, to contribute to the effioacy of social intervention in the 
functioning of the economic system.
To return to the fear that any economic planning necessarily leads 
to dictatorship, the institutionalists have argued that this misses the
18
Ibid., p. 119.
^9Mitohell, "Intelligence and Economic Evolution," pp. 124-126.
20Ibid., p. 126.
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important; issue. They are unwilling to compartmentalize all possible 
forms of economic organization into two nicely separated and disjointed 
categories. Thus Commons noted that in modern society one widely prev­
alent fear is of any form of collective action, whether it be by the 
government, trade unions, or corporations. "All collective action," 
Commons noted, "is looked upon with fear as leading straight to some 
form of dictatorship." Thiis, however, is hardly a scientific attitude; 
rather than condemn from the outset all forms of collective action, 
Commons insists that "in cases as they arise, all kinds of collective 
action can be investigated to see whether, at the time and place, they
are conducive to more real and equal freedom than the type of collec-
21tive action which they displace." Collective action, Commons argues, 
is the dominating facet of the modern economy and the adoption of any 
particular form of collective action does not involve adopting it de 
novo; it is a question of whether the collective action contemplated is 
more or less conducive to economic xvelfare, to "real and equal free­
dom," than are the forms of collective action already in existence.
The institutionalists do not oondemn all collective aotion per se, 
but argue that any particular instance of it must be examined in light 
of the extant problems and alternative ways of meeting those problems. 
Thus Commons insists that "collectivism and individualism are not in­
compatible except when reasoning from extremes at either end"; but 
problems are not to be solved by reasoning from extremes. They are to 
be solved only by finding a pragmatic solution somewhere "between these 
contradictory extremes." This, then, is "the field of institutional
21Commons, Economics of Collective Action, p. 237.
360
economics.*' And as Commons continued, it
...does not simplify the science of economicsj it 
makes the science more complex and difficult, even 
vital to national existence. But it makes eoonomic 
science less dogmatic and satirical by making it 
more investigational and more practicable, perhaps 
more conciliatory.^ 2
It makes economics less dogmatio, more functional and more investi­
gational, because the institutionalists are unwilling categorically 
to exclude everything that deviates from the one hypothetical extreme 
of a market-controlled economy. It is, in their view, impossible to 
abolish all forms of collective action; but this is precisely what 
would be necessary if we were to establish the system of laissez 
faire, of absolute and complete guidance of society by the actions 
of individuals, whioh von Mises advocates. (Although it is doubtful 
if von Mises would abolish the corporation— it is just the other forms
of collective action which he mistrusts.) But this course of action,
as Clark pointed out, "would in itself involve one of the most diffi­
cult tasks of coercive control of any course we might try to chart."
It would be more coercive than any other possible course of action 
because we would by force have to undo some 150 years of history.
Large business organizations would have to be broken 
up into small units, whioh might control one another 
by their unregulated competition. National labor 
organizations would have to be similarly broken up or
disarmed, with what expenditure of coercion and rous­
ing of group hostilities one hesitates to contem­
plate. 23
The chaos resulting from an attempt to go back to some small-scale 
economic system would be beyond imagination. It would involve a tre-
22Commons, Economics of Collective Action, pp. 237-238. 
^Clark, Social Control of Business, pp. 188-489.
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mendous lowering of our standard of living because it would neces-
24
sarily involve the elimination of all large-scale industry— unless 
we were to abolish all forms of collective action except for large 
business and industrial units, which would, then, be tantamount to 
fascism. And yet that is what von Mises would seem to advocate be­
cause of his unholy fear of any interference with the market meohan- 
ism. And this is why the institutionalists conclude that we have no 
real choice: we cannot go backj we have, as Clark said, "no choice 
but to go forward, into courses contrary to many of our cherished
n c
traditions.” Contrary to "cherished traditions," because in our 
traditions, in our institutions and mores, we have eulogized individual 
self-reliance and feared any form of collective action— even while our 
daily activities have increasingly contradicted these traditions.
Also, with Commons, Clark agrees that this going forward, this
attempt to make the economic system work by methods other than a return
to some previous era, is a difficult and complex problem. But in
Clark's opinion.
The only thing that can make the task hopeless is 
a conviction that it is hopeless and therefore not 
worth the endless effort it will cost. If men keep 
trying, after reasonable proposals have been wrecked 
by one obstacle after another, every now and then 
they surprise themselves by reaching a reasonable 
solution. And if they dislike strongly enough the 
alternative possibilities sketched in the preceding 
chapter ^ Sie return to laissez faire, or the adoption 
of various forms of dictatorial control/, they will 
conceive a workable democratic adjustment as their 
main task, worth almost any materiel concession, and
24This is essentially the plan temporarily advocated for Germany 
at the close of World War II— a plan which, because of the tremendous 
hardships which it would impose, even had it been possible to put in­
to operation, was therefore abandoned. Cf. Henry Morgenthau, Jr., 
Germany is Our Problem (Hew York: Harpers, 1945).
25Clark, Social Control of Business, p. 489.
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their will to keep on trying will become indomitable.
In that oase, it is not too late to avoid shipwreck 
by modernizing the constitution of industry.2°
The task, then, is not hopeless--if we try to make the economic system 
work, if we will adopt an es^erimental attitude and not dogmatically 
exclude possible alternative institutional arrangements, ind the 
important point is that by making it work, through collective action, 
we can thereby increase freedom and liberty— both in general nnH for 
the individual. The individual, in the view of the institutionalists, 
is but an abstraction; he is never an isolated datum. He is but a 
part of a going concern. And this is why Commons and the other insti­
tutionalists see collective or social action as the "liberation of 
individual aotion from coercion, duress, discrimination"; collective
action is the necessaiy instrumentality for the "expansion of the will
27of the individual far beyond what he can do by his own puny acts*" 
Differing from Hayek and von Mises, the institutionalists have taken 
cognizance of the tremendous growth of the modern industrial economy 
and have therefore concluded that '•collective action means more than 
mere 'control* of individual action. It means liberation and expan­
sion of individual action; thus, collective action is literally the
OO
means to liberty."
Both liberty and freedom are multi-faceted and multi-lateral soc­
ial goals. As Barbara Wooton once commented, any perusal of the im­
portance of freedom is always an important reminder that "freedom
2®Ciark, Social Control of Business, p. 525.
27
Commons, Institutional Economios, p. 73.
28Commons, Economics of Collective Aotion, pp. 34-35.
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has to be perpetually reinterpreted into freedoms.” This is because 
freedoms are of many kinds and of many dimensions; freedom includes, 
but is not confined to, nor defined solely by, the absence of physi­
cal restraint or coercion by the political government. That is but 
one kind of freedom: political or proprietary. Economic freedom, for 
example, means more than the legal right to open an enterprise and to 
make a profit; it means more than the legal right to work or to quit. 
Thus, in the case of the individual laborer, Commons argued that "labor­
ers cannot choose to work according to the amount of pain. They work 
or do not work according to the alternatives that custom and law permit 
proprietors to offer and w i t h h o l d . I t  is the customs and lavrs of 
society that determine the existenoe or absence of economic liberty.
And those customs and laws, if they are merely negative, meaning that 
they treat all individuals as equal agents, may ensure each individual 
equal political or proprietary liberty, but by so doing, deny them 
equal eoonomic liberty. Thus Commons drew a distinction between politi­
cal or proprietary liberty (the only kind of liberty recognized by 
Hayek and von Mises) and economic liberty:
The workingman and the job-giver have equal proprie- 
tary liberty in that each has equal liberty to work 
or not work, to hire or not hire— the officials of 
government are required both to keep their hands off 
and keep other people off. But each may not have 
equal economic liberty because the alternative for 
the workingman may be the onerous alternative of en­
larging his total labor-pain as the price he must pay, 
while the alternative for the job-giver may be only 
the inconsequential alternative of foregoing one out
29 tWooton, Barbara, Freedom under Planning (London: George Allen
and Unwin., Ltd., 1945), p.' 9. tChis little book, written in answer 
to Hayek*s Road to Serfdom, is well worth reading by one disturbed 
about the incompatibility of economic planning and freedom.
30Commons, Institutional Eoonomics, p. 199.
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of hundreds or even thousands of laborers in filling 
the jobs in his concern.31
And in the view of Commons, any meaningful concept of liberty must 
include economic, as well as, proprietary freedom because in order 
for there to be '"perfect liberty' there must be, not only absence 
of legal duties, there must also be abundance of economic opportun­
ity. "32 he sees it, that “which deprives people of eoonomic
33liberty is unemployment and poverty." J. M. Clark, elaborating on 
the same subject, pointed out that the “most fundamental limitation 
on control" is the fact that the “paramount human value is liberty."
This being the case, Clark emphasized the importance of a truly mean­
ingful concept of liberty, arguing that "we must deal with the sub­
stance, not merely the form." And the substanoe of liberty is of many
dimensions, for as Clark added, “liberty, as we have seen, is limited
34just as surely by ill-health or poverty as by actual servitude." So 
if there is to be “perfect liberty" much more is necessary than the 
mex’e absence of legal coercion or legal duties; and it is this “perfect 
liberty" toward which the institutional economists are striving— insist­
ing that it cannot be achieved by a mere laissez faire policy.
This perfect liberty can, perhaps, never be fully realized; it 
can, however, be approached— but only by a concerted effort through 
collective action, through social control, through intervention in the 
functioning of the market. It is the customs and laws of society that 
define the existence or absence of our various freedoms and liberties.
31Comons, Institutional Economics, pp. 199-200.
32Ibid., p. 200.
•Z«Z
Ibid., p. 902.
34:Clark, Social Control of Business, p. 162.
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And these customs and lav/s are translated into reality in many oases 
by the market mechanism. The market mechanism, unchecked and un­
supervised, can impose restraints, it can infringe upon liberties, 
just as surely as can the dictator -which von Mises and Hayek feel 
certain is the only alternative to the self-regulating market. Thus 
it is to collective aotion, to social intervention, that we must 
look in order to proteot or to increase the many social and individual 
freedoms which we deem important.
If we are to plan, if we are to interfere, if we are to guide and 
direot and alter the market, does this necessarily mean imposing some 
one person's will, some one person's values, on the rest of society?
It may be admitted that the market oan impose restraints and infringe 
upon liberties just as surely as oan a dictator, but it can also be 
argued that because the market at least disperses the power of various 
individuals, this is preferable to the imposition of the will and values 
of a single dictator. The institutionalists, however, take exception 
to this argument on several grounds. First it assumes that the market 
and a dictator are necessary alternatives— a view with which, as we 
have already seen, these economists disagree. This argument also assumes 
that all the market oan do is to give effeot to the actions of individ­
uals. The institutionalists, however, argue that the market also, per­
haps primarily, gives effeot to the social customs, the mores and in­
stitutions of society. But their most important objection is that the 
argument as framed is quite superficial— it assumes that the market is 
a non-partisan register of individual values and if the market is 
altered, it can only be to impose the values of some one else upon the 
values of the various individuals. This, as we have noted in this and 
the previous two chapters, is the view which the institutionalists
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have been trying to correct. It is their contention that individual 
values, -whether freedom, liberiy, health, happiness, or vice, can be 
realized and achieved only within a social milieu. And it is their 
central argument that economies as a social science is primarily inter­
ested in social values, in the value to society.
The locus of social-economic value is in the continuation of the 
technological life-process of -the community; it is in the continuation 
of the productian-oonsuraption-production continuum. And herein lies 
the basis of their insistence that eoonomic planning does not mean the 
assessments of a dictator as an alternative to the private values of 
the individual. Economic planning is 3imply the concerted social 
effort undertaken to ensure the continuation of that process. This is 
the oentral strategy in terms of which various tactics would be de­
signed. It does not mean and it does not entail blueprint planning
such as is practiced in the Soviet Union and was practiced to a lesser
35
extent in "tiio United States during World War II; but it does entail 
the abandonment of full faith and reliance on the market mechanism as
3SAnd the only type of planning possible, in the view of many* 
Although it is seldom noted that this type of planning during World 
War II did not entail the loss of any of our traditional freedoms or 
liberties. Thus Professor Girvetz aptly pointed out that our reoord 
of production, during the war was "one of whioh the American people 
are properly proud. It was a thrilling and unprecedented achievement. 
But it was also a disheartening measure of the magnitude of their ear­
lier failure. For this suooess in all its enormity was a startling 
and inescapable proof of what America could have done in time of peace 
but had not done." And as he went on to add, practical men had long 
warned us that it couldn't be done except at the cost of losing our 
traditional freedoms: "Once men, who professed a love of liberty told 
us that planning, organization, and regulation which made our wartime 
production possible would enslave us. But no one was enslaved: men 
still chose their church, aired their grievances, listened to their 
favorite oracle. Congress debated, pamphleteers protested, columnists 
denounced, reformers pleaded, and businessmen harvested lush profits.
To be sure, there were 'ceilings' and priorities and rationing and some 
limitation of profits, wage3, and the freedom of occupational choice; 
but where these were burdensome the difficulty stemmed mostly from the
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the self-equilibrating regulator of the economy; it does entail the
adoption of the view that the market is but one instrument for
achieving economic welfare, and for implementing some values. Most
importantly, it involves the recognition that economic value to_ society
inheres in the technological continuum, in the continuation of the means-
ends process of production and consumption and that the continuation of
that process is subject to intelligent control and guidance. This is
the central issue with respeot to economic planning in the view of the
institutionalists and it m s  from this view that Clark argued that
/^it iejT* clear we have the physical capacity and tech­
nical ability to produce more than we do, even allow­
ing for the faot that in many cases the limiting fac­
tor would be, not the capacity to manufacture, but the 
power of the earth to yield increased raw produce. One 
of the things that keeps us shoi't of our ultimate cap­
acity is a failure of sooial coordination— the failure 
to coordinate supply and demand or demand and need. In 
the main, no one is normally to blame for -this condi­
tion, but to cure it is to release enormous powers of 
production which are now imprisoned and make a greater 
contribution to human welfare than any conceivable 
technical invention could possibly do. At present, 
the greatest field open to invention for bettering the 
lot of mankind is the field of improvements in our 
system of social control.36
This is the central strategy with which the institutional economists
have been concerned— to contribute to human welfare, to better the
lot of mankind, to increase "real" freedom and liberty, by improving
our system of social control in order to facilitate the development
of the technological life process of the oommunity-at-large. Their
view of planning is not that it is a matter of deeiding what is to be
produced or who is to consume. It is not the attempt to impose their
(Conb.) soaroity of consumers1 goods in time of war." (Girvetz, Harry 
K., From Wealth to Welfare, pp. 175-176.)
36Clark, Social Control of Business, p. 18.
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will, their values, on othersj while they are indeed avowed reform­
ers, they are in no sense of the word soliciting the "position of 
king." They indeed argue -that such fears are based on misconcep­
tions, or in Ayres' view, upon a confusion of tactics with strategy.
It m s  with respect to this whole confusion over laissez faire 
versus planning that Ayres argued that "unless social control is to
•2 n
be mere tinkering it must be guided by some general policy." The 
pressing need, in his view, is the clarification of the general strat­
egy according to which social control and social policy measures are 
to be guided. "A principle of strategy," according to Ayres, simply
"undertakes to state in general terms what it is that we are trying to 
38do, and no more." And because we have lost sight of the central 
strategy of classical economics, we have been confused as to what is 
the purpose of general economic policy measures— the tactics which are 
designed to implement that strategy..
Although it has been forgotten, or at least lost sight of, clas­
sical economics "did provide some sort of perspective in whioh to view 
industrial society as a whole and some sort of guidance to eoonomic
policy as a whole"; it did provide a statement of what it is that society
39should attempt to do with respect to the economic system. The cen­
tral idea, idle key, to classical economic strategy, was the idea of 
equilibrium, which, however, found its way into economic thinking in 
the form of natural order or of natural harmony.
All sciences in the eighteenth century were of course fascinated
37
Ayres,"Principles of Economic Strategy," p. 460.
^Ibid., p. 464.
59Ibid., p. 463.
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■with the natural harmony that seemed to be revealed in the universe; 
and economics, according to lyres, found that natural harmony in the 
movements of prices— a harmony "as natural and perfect as that which 
appeared in the calculations of astronomers and p h y s i c i s t s . I t  
was from this idea of an equilibrium of prices— the natural harmony
of prices— that the central strategy of classical economics was derived,
for
Such a harmony would require to be let alone not as 
a matter of prudence— that would be the equivalent 
of the schoolboy notion that Newton invented three laws 
of motion which it would be well for all of us to fol­
low— but rather as a matter of necessity inasmuch as
a natural harmony will inevitably re-establish itself 
in spite of any conceivable disturbance.^ -*-
Thus the classical strategy, the key of which was the natural harmony
of prices, provided the basis for the policy, or tactics, of laissez
faire. The fathers of classical theory had a rather precise picture
42of what it is that m s  to be let alone, but Ayres argues that this 
is no longer true today, which is why the glib phrase of laissez faire 
is singularly shallow. Orthodox economics, adjusting to the changed 
climate of the science of the nineteenthand twentieth oenturie3 has 
abandoned the idea of a natural harmony as evidence of the genius of 
the Creator, but it retained its obsession with "normal1* price while 
rejecting the basic reason for that obsession. Since it is no longer 
possible to think of the price system as an expression of the natural 
harmony of the universe, classical economics has separated itself from 
concept, retaining, however, price theory itself and the vague feeling
40
Ayres, "Principles of Economic Strategy," p. 462.
4lIbid., p. 462-463.
42Cf• pp* 233-236, above*
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that something or other should be let alone. But as to just what 
is to be let alone, Ayres argues that "the appalling truth is that
A *2
orthodox theory has no answer to this question."
Thus the difficulty of implementing the tactics of a laissez
faire policy is that the general strategy which it m s  supposed to
implement has been abandoned. But it is not only the tactics of
laissez faire of which Ayres is critical— he also criticizes the
"singular shallowness" of most conceptions of economic planning. Thus
he notes that the word "plan"suggests to most people— critics and
planners alike— a precise set of blueprints which contain the design
for the whole proposed structure of economic organization. Thus
Orthodox critics denounce all economic planning as 
the work of would-be dictators, but the curious 
•thing is that even the real dictators have no plan 
in the strategic sense. They conceal the deficiency 
in a smoke-screen of political metaphysics. The key 
to their plan, it would seem, is the apotheosis of 
the Nation and the self-realization of the Race 
of the Proletariat^, which is to say there 1 s no 
key and no plan, only political opportunism and 
military bluster. Economic planning is dangerous 
not because it leads to dictatorship, but because 
it may lead nowhere even under the dictators. It.. 
is only an attractive phrase, like laissez faire.
It is the singular shallowness of both these phrases which leads
Ayres to insist that the need today is for a new/ economic strategy,
because before any system of tactics can be made to work-in fact
before any system of tactics can be evolved— we must have a sound
strategy, a general idea of what it is we are trying to do, what it
is we want from the economic system.
Ayres further argues that the foundation for this strategy must 
be a more modem, a sounder, ooncept of equilibrium. An equilibrium,
^Ayres, "Principles of Economic Strategy," p. 461.
371
however, conceived not in terms of prices, but in terms of physical 
stability. Although we have grown accustomed to think of economic 
stability in terms of prices, Ayres holds that the "first principle 
of all economic strategy" is that it is concerned with physical sta­
bility and physical continuity. It is concerned, for example, with 
the relation of population to food supply, with the continuity of the 
operation of our industrial society, with the full and efficient util­
isation of our industrial, human and natural resources. Economic plan­
ning is concerned with those industrial or physical continuities, as 
Clark recognized:
All our systems of control contemplate the main­
tenance of and even the further development of 
machines, system and standardization, in the inter­
ests of productive efficiency. And any ideals in­
consistent with this are doomed from the start.45
This, according to Ayres, is the pressing decision with which we are
faced today--"to seek economic stability oonceived not in terms of
price equilibrium but in physical terms as stability of men, maohines,
and operations." And Ayres further argues that
There is nothing esoteric about it, or even com­
plicated. For it must be understood at once that 
the adoption of the principle of physical stability 
does not by any means require a set of blueprints 
showing the place of every man and every tool at 
every hour of the day to an indefinite future, any 
more than our past reliance on the principle of price 
equilibrium presupposed a similarly detailed knowledge 
of the movements of all prices whatsoever and of all 
the things of which -they were the prices.46
It is from this point of view that Ayres insists that ourrent 
fears of any economic planning as leading to dictatorship are confused—  
they are confused because they misoonceive the necessary strategy with
^®Clark, Social Control of Business, p. 487.
46Ayres, "Principles of Economic Strategy," p. 464.
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whioh we should today be concerned. If the required strategy is 
that of price equilibrium, conceived as representing the! natural 
harmony of the universe, then the necessary tactic would be that of 
laissez faire— and any interference is obviously the work of reform­
ers trying to impose their will upon others, trying to impose their 
will, as it were, upon the natural harmonies of -the universe. But if 
the required strategy is that of attaining and extending the contin­
uity of the industrial or technological continuum, then the necessary 
tactics have changed. The implementation of the latter strategy by 
no means requires the adoption of precise tactics of a dictatorial 
nature. Or as Ayres specifically recognized,
If the adoption of an economic strategy based on 
production meant telling everybody exactly what he 
should have and precisely vfhat he should do and be at 
every hour and throughout his life, that would of 
course be a totalitarian nightmare. But does it?
Machine production has transformed western civiliza­
tion not because it has placed any particular object 
in our hands to sate any particular want but because 
it has multiplied the production of all goods and the 
satisfaction of all wants. fhe principle of economic 
strategy which emerges from the realization of thi3 
fact is that of the expansion of production as such 
and in general. The question, "Production of what?", 
is irrelevant to this principle. There is no point 
to saying before you can begin to produoe you must 
know what people want. Wo society begins to produce. 
Society is a going concern largely by virtue of the 
fact that we produce what we can. The effective mod­
ification of our habits of consumption does not come 
about as a result of spiritual revelation made mani­
fest in wants, or by the imposition of some people's 
ideals on other people. The actual changes come 
through the adjustment of consumption to the exigen­
cies of produotion.4?
Thus, -the economic planning which is designed to implement the strat­
egy of the continuation of the means-onds continuum of production- 
oonsumption-preduction, in no way requires the detailed concern with
47Ayres, "Principles of Economic strategy," p. 466.
573
what is to be produced, or vdio is to consume what. The public will 
consume what it is possible to produce, and production will be 
directed to those things the public wants to consume. It will be, 
as it always has been, a two-way affair.
And it is from this central strategy that we come back to the 
basic tactics of the economic planning as advocated by the institu­
tional economists: the social supervision of the distribution of 
national income. It is their contention, as vre have elaborated above, 
that the necessary tool to implement the assured continuation of the 
continuum of social production and consumption is the distribution of 
income, the distribution of the claims to production, in such a fash­
ion that all potential income is generated and all that income find3 
its way back into the spending stream. The incomes of the lower in­
come groups must be increased in order to increase their consumption 
in order to continue the growth of the industrial economy. It is not 
a mere matter of ’justice," as Ayres put it, or merely a "humanitarian 
aspiration," as Clark put it; it is the necessary tactic to ensure 
the full utilization of our productive capacity, of our human and 
natural resources. It is the necessary tactic for the realization 
of social value, for the implementation of value to_society. Thus 
Ayres argued that this "conception of value in terms of prooess has 
infinite constructive possibilities." It has these constructive 
possibilities because
the continued and maximal growth of technology pro­
vides an objective, factual oriterion of economic 
value that is not a matter of taste at all and so by­
passes the disjunction aooording to whioh the only 
alternative to the prevailing winds of popular taste 
as revealed (more or less adequately) by the "free
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market" is the bureau©rat i ca1ly imposed taste of 
the reformer-dictator.48
The institutionalists thus do not see economic planning necessarily
resulting in the imposition of a dictator as the only alternative
to the assessments of the market; economic planning is designed
simply to ensure the continued growth of the economy— not to impose
some one*s will on others.
Economists have long defined the central concern of their science 
as the allocation of existing resources. Prom the sooial-instrumenta- 
list theory of value as viewed by the institutional economists, this 
central problem has been revised. In a world where everyone wants 
more of everything, the perennial question posed to economic planners: 
"lfifho shall get what?", the institutionalist answers that "existing re­
sources should be so allocated that there will be continually more to 
49allocate." This is of course to be accomplished by the social dis­
tribution of income. These economists see the possibility of the con­
tinued growth and expansion of industrial output inherent in the modem 
industrial economy. It remains, however, only a possibility so long 
as the market is viewed as a naturally beneficent, self-equilibrating, 
regulator. Once this view is abandoned, once we adopt the view that 
organized social intelligence can keep the machines running, then that 
possibility becomes more probable. This does not mean of course that 
the institutionalists regard production as the "end" of all economic 
activity— any more than, as we noted earlier, they view consumption 
as the "end." They would, rather, dismiss the whole tradition of a
48Ayres, "Instrumental Economics," New Republic, October 17, 1949,
p. 19 .
49Ayres, "Instrumental Economics," New Republic. October 17, 1949,
p. 19.
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dualism of metaphysically distinct states in favor of the continuity 
of the whole industrial economy, in favor of the means-ends continuum 
of both production and consumption— eaoh of -which is both a means and 
an end to the other because each is a necessary stage in the contin­
uity of economic development and growth. Nor does this principle of
5
"keeping the machines running" subordinate human life to mere machines.
As Ayres insisted, what this whole m y  of thinking has reference to is
the "whole life-activity in which mankind has always engaged. It is
literally oo-extensive with life itself, identical with the existence
and continuance of the species, and it is the locus of value because
51
of this integral continuity."
The adoption of this instrumentalist view of the market mechanism 
and of social value as inhering in the further development of the in­
dustrial continuum, also involves a re-evaluation of the role of gov­
ernment from -that which has been traditionally conceived— and still is 
conceived by von Mises and Hayek. Thus Clark long ago regarded the
government as a productive economic agency of a vital 
sort, a partner of industry, provider of some of the 
most vital faotors of production, and not an extran­
eous burden whioh industry must pay for as a necessary 
evil but whose activities and services belong in another 
sphere, wholly separate from the economic: the political 
sphere, whioh at best touches the economic only to ham­
per business by regulation.®2
The government, as one form of collective action, then, is but a partner
to industry— not an outsider which at best can only hamper industry by
50
Although as Clark noted, thi3 is exactly what orthodox eco­
nomics has done; cf. Clark, Social Control of Business, pp. 487ff. 
and "The Socializing of Theoretical Economics,pp. 97-101.
FT
Ayres, Theory of Economic Progress, p. 225.
cn
Clark, Eoonomics of Overhead Costs, p. 454.
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needless and burdensome regulations. And as Clark elaborated, from 
this point of view, the "government can broaden its functions with­
out encountering the same sort of resistance on the part of public 
opinion with which a similar enlargement of ’political* functions 
would be met." For when we realize the interrelatedness of the 
whole soeial-economic-political scene, when we recognize the crucial 
importance of collective action as a means of liberating individual 
action, when we recognize that the individual, his government and 
business itself are each but a faoet of the social organism, a part 
of a larger, going-ooncem, then the activities of the government are 
not regarded as something external to and removed from the economic 
system.
This view of Clark's, advanced in 1923, has of course been accepted 
by many, without perhaps accepting the reasoning which we have been 
discussing in the pages above. It is a view which the institutional­
ists, however, still regard as of primary importance. Thus in 1952, 
nearly three decades after Clark advanoed the view above, Ayres argued 
for the same thesis:
It is likewise not the function of government to 
tyrannize over business, nor is it the function of 
business to subvert government. As we are coming 
to understand the functions of both government and 
business more and more clearly with the passage of 
time and the growth of knowledge and wisdom, it is 
the function of both to serve the community effi­
ciently and well.
That function, as we have seen, is a corollary 
of the whole technological process by which scienti­
fic knowledge and the industrial economy have been 
brought into existence. It is that prooess which has 
made large-scale organized teamwork possible, and not 
only in the realm of government.
53Ibid.
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The problem then is not one of maintaining a balance of power between 
the government and the business world. The trouble with a balance of 
power is that it cannot be counted on to remain balanced in a dynamic 
world. And if we come to look upon these two areas of our society as 
cheolonates in a struggle for power, that balance is likely to be up­
set in the struggle. Then it would make little difference which side 
won out— the result would be "equally totalitarian in either eventual-
• 4 ,  I t 5 4ity."
But that eventuality— dictatorship by either big business or by 
big government— is not inevitable. It is only one of the possible 
alternatives which could result from our traditional attitudes. And 
this is why the institutionalists have been arguing for a re-evalua­
tion of those traditional attitudes, centering their argument on the 
importance of economic planning and reform through collective action.
The alternative to a struggle for power by "rival gangs" is collective 
action as a means of implementing social value} it is collective action 
as a means of liberating individual action. The individual, these econ­
omists insist, cannot be abstracted from the society of which he is a 
part} nor can society be viewed apart from those individuals. The 
disparity which has been erected between the individual and society 
by Hayek and von Mises is a false and misleading one because it diverts 
attention away from the real problems of freedom, liberty, opportunity, 
and security, to fruitless controversies concerning hypothetical anti­
theses. The problem, according to the institutionalists, is not the 
abstract one of individualism versus collectivism, but the much more 
important and real problem of how best to use oolleotive or social
CA
Ayres, The Industrial Boonomy, pp. 393-394.
action to achieve and to expand freedom, liberty, opportunity, pnd 
security in the twentieth century. Their aim, as Clark defined it, 
is the
maximum development of the individual, and this 
cannot be brought about unless he is not only a 
healthy, intelligent, and effective individual, 
but also a unit in a system of healthy, intelli­
gent and effective social organs for the adjust­
ing of the many joint and conflicting interests 
in which he has a part.55
The institutionalists, therefore, are unwilling either to castigate
the government or to eulogize laissez faire. They indeed argue that
laissez faire was but one kind of liberty, it did "not mean complete
or absolute liberty,” for as Tugwell pointed out, laissez faire merely
stressed "the liberty of business at the expense of other kinds of
liberty.” Now, however, there are other liberties and freedoms which
are of greater social import, and these can "be secured only by social
control.
The institutionalists see economic freedom as being dependent 
upon our success in making such use of our productive potentialities 
that an adequate level of living is available to all. The possibility 
of social abundance is manifest in the modern industrial economy— in 
fact it is only by extending that social abundance that the industrial 
economy makes sense. The realization of that social abundance, how­
ever, requires a re-evaluation of our traditional attitudes and ideas. 
We have for so long emphasized individual wants and their satisfaction 
that we fail to see the real significance of abundance to society as 
a whole. As pleasant as it may be to the individual concerned, the
Clark, Social Control of Business, p. 525.
56Tugwell, Our Economic Sooiety and Its Problems, p. 505.
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significance of abundance is not to be found in his feelings of reple­
tion. It is rather in the fact that sickness, dullness, and stolidity—  
the "normal" characteristics of the indolent masses only a few genera­
tions ago— are being gradually eliminated. The social significance 
of industrial abundance is to be found in the tremendous efficiency 
and vitality of these masses, in the faot that initiative and enter­
prise are more widely diffused than ever before, in the fact that to­
day's children are able to grovr up in healthy environments, to go to 
school rather than to the mines and mills. Perhaps the most important 
significance is the realization that the masses are capable of such 
achievements; it has not been too long ago when it seemed quite clear 
that the common run were "by nature," lazy, indolent, and shiftless.
The task remaining today is to tap and to extend the sources of that 
social abundance, for as Tugwell emphasized,
Industry can lay the basis for any higher life; and 
no higher life can be built \vithout an industrial 
basis. In this sense the new industry will make the 
future. It can free mankind for whatever life seems 
to men good. It remains only to be said that an ex­
perimental economics is the condition of this free­
dom.®^
Their concept of planning thus demands not an authoritarian control
by either big business or by big government, but a society in which
free thought and experimental effort and social criticism play major
roles. And a3 Clark pointed out,
A society composed of such free individuals will be 
able to digest all the changes of technology and of 
social relationships, and will be able to transform 
into orderly evolution the dynamic forces that would 
otherwise create revolution.®8
57Tugwell, "Experimental Economics," p. 422.
CQ
Clark, Alternative to Serfdom, p. 152; this statement was quoted 
by Clark from an article by Bryn J. iHovde in the Mew School Bulletin. 
February, 1947.
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The achievement of such a society is not an easy task, for perfection 
is never attainable in short order. Clark recognized that "we shall 
not achieve the goal tomorrow," but added that "if we advance on all 
these fronts, we may move in that direction rather than toward 
chaos."®®
It is the basic thesis of -these institutional economists that , 
what is required today is the collective use of our social intelli­
gence to reap the social re\vards which are potentially available. 
Traditionally we have abhorred governmental or collective action. 
Laissez faire and free competition were all that were needed; no 
decisions which would affect the operation of the entire economy were 
to be made by anybody. But the economy has changed markedly from the 
time when those ideas were first formulated. The problems which socie­
ty faces today are not those of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. 
Changing and dynamic conditions have posed new problems; and these 
new problems, in the view of the institutional economists, require 
fresh examination and fresh answers. They require in particular the 
collective use of our social intelligence, for as Yfalton Hamilton
aptly reminded us, "the task of keeping industry the instrument of
m60
the commonwealth is as arduous as it is everlasting.
®®Clark, Alternative to Serfdom, p. 153.
Hamilton, The Pattern of Competition, p. 99.
APPENDIX A
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OP THE ECONOMISTS 
CONSIDERED IN THIS STUDY
Clarence E. Ayres m  bom in 1891 in Lowell, Massachusetts.
He was graduated from Brown University in 1912 and oontinued there 
receiving the A. M. degree in 1914. He studied one year at Harvard 
and then went to the University of Chicago where he received the 
Ph. D. in 1917. His aoademic positions weret instructor in philo­
sophy, University of Chicago, 1917-1920, associate professor,
Amherst, 1920-1923, professor, Reed College, 1923-1924, lecturer, 
University of Wisconsin, 1928-1929, and professor of economics at 
the University of Texas since 1930. He was also an associate editor 
of the New Republic, on the editorial board of the American Economic 
Review, was president of the Southwestern Social Science Association, 
and a director of the San Antonio Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Dallas.
John Maurice Clark, son of the noted economist, John Bates Clark, 
was bora in 1884 in Northampton, Massachusetts. He was graduated 
from Amherst in 1905 and took his graduate work at Columbia, receiv­
ing the A. M. degree in 1906 and the Ph. D. in 1910. His academic 
positions were: instructor in economics and sociology at Colorado 
College, 1908-1910, associate professor of eeonomios, Amherst, 1910- 
1915, associate professor of political eeonomy, University of Chicago, 
1915-1922, professor of political economy, Columbia, 1922-1926, and 
professor of economics at Columbia since 1926. Clark also led an 
active non-academic life, serving on the editorial board of the Amer­
ican Economic Review from 1924 to 1930, and as president of the Amer-
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loan Economic Association in 1935. He served as a consultant to 
the National Planning Board, as a special advisor to the National 
Recovery Administration, as a consultant to the Offioe of Price 
Administration during World War II and was a member of the United 
Nations Committee on Full Employment.
John R. Commons was bora in 1862 in Hollandsburg, Ohio, and 
died at Raleig^ x, North Carolina, in 1945. He was graduated from 
Oberlin College in 1888 and received his A. M. degree from Oberlin 
in 1890. His academie positions were: instructor in political eoo- 
nomy, Wesleyan, 1890-1892, professor of sociology, Oberlin, 1892- 
1893, Indiana University, 1893-1895, Syracuse, 1895-1899, and pro­
fessor of economics at the University of Wisconsin from 1904 until 
his retirement in 1932. He was a member of the Industrial Commis­
sion of Wisconsin, the Federal Commission on industrial Relations, 
the Wisconsin Mini mum Wage Board, end the National Civic Federation.
He was president of the American Economic Association, the National 
Consumers League, the National Monetary Association, and an asso­
ciate director of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Walton Hamilton was born in 1881 in Hiwassee College, Tennessee. 
He was graduated from the University of Texas in 1907 and received 
the Ph. D* degree from the University of Miohigan in 1913. His aca­
demic positions were: instructor in medieval history, University of 
Texas, 1909-1910, instructor in economics at Texas, 1910-1913, assis­
tant professor of political economy, University of Miohigan, 1915- 
1914, University of Chicago, 1914-1915, professor of eoonomios, 
Amherst, 1915-1923, The Brookings Institution, 1923-1928, and profes­
sor of law at Yale from 1928 until his retirement in 1948. Hamilton 
was a member of the National Recovery Administration Board, a director
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of the Bureau of Reaearoh and Statistics, Social Security Board, 
a special assistant to the U. S. Attorney General, and a delegate 
to the ILO conference in Geneva. He has been a member of the law 
firm of Arnold, Fortas and Porter, Washington, D. C., since 1945.
Wesley C. Mitohell was bora in 1874 in Rushville, Illinois 
and died in 1948. He was graduated from the University of Chicago 
in 1896 and reoeived his Ph. D. from Chicago in 1899. His aoademio 
positions were: instructor in economics, University of Chicago, 1900- 
1902, professor of politieal economy, University of California, 1902- 
1912, lecturer, Columbia University, 1913-1914, end professor 1914- 
1919, leoturer, New School for Social Research, 1919-1921, and once 
again professor of economics at Columbia University from 1922 until 
his retirement in 1944. Mitohell served as ohief of the Prioe Sec­
tion, War Industries Board during the first World War, director of 
research, National Bureau of Economic Beseareh, and as chairman of 
the Social Science Research Council. He was a member of the National 
Planning Board, the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works, 
and the National Resouroes Board. He was also director of the New 
Sohool for Social Research, an Honorary Fellow of the Royal Statisti­
cal aooiety, and president of the Amerioan Eoonomie Association, the 
American Statistical Sooiety, and the Eoonometric Society.
Rexford G. Tugwell was born in 1891 in Sinolairville, New York.
He was graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1915 and 
reoeived the A. M* degree in 1916 and his Ph. D. in 1922 from the 
same Institution. His aoademio positions were: instructor in econom­
ics at the University of Pennsylvania, 1915-1917, assistant professor, 
Washington University, 1917-1918, instructor, Columbia University, 
1920-1922, assistant professor, 1922-1926, associate professor, 1926-
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1931, professor from 1931 to 1937 and professor of eeonomies at 
the University of Chicago since 1946. Tugwell served as ohairaan 
and commissioner of the City Planning Gomission of the City of New 
York, Assistant and Under-Secretary of Agriculture? he was Chancel­
lor of Puerto Rico in 1941 and Governor of Puerto Rico from 1941 to 
1946.
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